Falklands Wars

Timeline History of the Falkland Islands

Vol.4
1982

Trial by Combat

Roger Lorton

"Not so much a timeline as a blow-by-blow account"



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Roger Lorton 2025

Long-time Falklands activist and researcher, Peter Pepper, once described this work as a “Research Resource”, and so it is. Please feel free to dip in and use whatever you please. If appropriate, a reference or citation would be most appreciated. If anything here leads to new information, sources or discoveries, it would be good to hear of them. Messages can be left at https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/

1982 – January 1st, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams sends a report to the Foreign Office, evaluating the previous year's events with regard to the Falkland Islands.

> *"... it has not been an easy year for the UK in its relations with the Argentine Republic, either politically or in export promotion. In the former, as regards the Falklands, we have had to walk like Agag all year to avoid offence to Argentine, Islander or Falkland lobby sensitivities ... We have come through without a bust-up, but certainly with the Argentines and the Islanders more on each others' nerves than a year ago."* [1]

January 2nd, in Argentina, the junta meet to debate plans for military solutions in the South Atlantic.

"... on 2 January 1982, the Junta considered the so-called "Alpha Project", first produced in May of the previous year at the request of the Admiral Lombardo and never executed. Seen against the success of 1976, when one of the first acts of the (military) had established a military presence in Thule, ... with the objective of founding a base with a view to the scientific research in the future. Despite English protests about this presence on "British territory", the program was not suspended, which made an attractive precedent. Supporters of the "Alpha Project" assumed that Britain would learn to tolerate an Argentine presence in South Georgia as they had in South Thule. However, at the request of the Naval Operations Command, it was again considered that the time to execute it was not appropriate, since any isolated action could be inconvenient in the circumstances in which the negotiations were held, and it was intended to avoid a potentially negative event for the development of future dialogue with the English. Despite this, the meeting was not unsuccessful as the Junta ... resolved "to explore the possibility of using military power to achieve the political objective"..." [2]

January 4th, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to make a formal protest to the Argentine Foreign Ministry with regard to events at South Georgia. [3]

January 5th, in Buenos Aires, the junta meet at the Libertador building to consider the Falklands question. [4]

"It resolved to 'reactivate to the fullest extent all negotiations for the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands' and at the same time 'prepare a contingency plan for the employment of military power should the first alternative fail.'..." [5]

"It was only a contingency plan. The mood was dictated by the absolute lack of progress in negotiations... at that time, at the end of five years of fruitless negotiations, we had become very frustrated." [6]

"The meeting took place at the Libertador Building, Army headquarters, starting at 9 in the morning. At that meeting the Malvinas issue was analyzed in the context of foreign policy and it was concluded that an "aggressive" policy should be adopted. At the same time it was determined that Operation Davidoff "would not be carried out before the round of negotiations scheduled for the purposes in February of that year in New York with the representatives of the United Kingdom, in order not to give them any reason to make it difficult"." [7]

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1 *FCO Diplomatic Report 14/82 ALA 014/2.* To *"walk like Agag"* apparently means – to walk on eggshells.
2 *Génesis de la Guerra de Malvinas (1976-1982)* Valeria Lourdes Carbone 2008
3 *Falkland Islands Review Committee* Report Franks Committee 1983
4 The Libertador building houses Argentina Ministry of Defence. The press had been told that the meeting was to consider the appointment of governors and ambassadors.
5 *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflicts* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990
6 Rear-Admiral Gaulter Alara quoted in *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* Martin Middlebrook 2003
7 *1982: Los documentos secretos de la guerra Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del pro* J. B. Yofre 2011. The reference to 'Operation Davidoff' is intriguing.

"Probably the most important link in the chain of events leading to the invasion of the islands was the consolidation of a military faction determined to bring Argentina back to its former international status and insulated from other actors within the government. In the Rattenbach interviews, all three members of the junta mention, at one point or another, that Argentina was in decline and under threat, and actions had to be taken to restore its status. ... The insularity and secrecy of the junta's decision making is hard to overstate. When the invasion decision was made in January, no more than ten individuals-all of them military officers-knew about these plans." [8]

"According to the report of the Military Junta, "At that meeting, the Malvinas case was dealt with outside the agenda of the Military Junta" and it was decided to commission an "abbreviated" General Staff study with the participation of one representative for each armed force. Also "it was discussed that not only had to obtain a restructuring of the negotiations with Great Britain with a view to the new round of negotiations, but also that studies should be started to analyze the feasibility and convenience of an occupation of the islands." ... As emerges from the exposed documentation, the determining date was January 5, 1982. On that day, it was considered to take a military step in the event that the diplomatic channel did not progress. The decision was made with the formal participation of the three commanders in chief. However, the matter had (already) been analyzed and planned by the Navy, first, and discussed between Anaya and Galtieri later." [9]

"On January 5th, 1982, after a meeting to designate governors, the Military Junta decided, by mutual agreement, to initiate planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands in utmost secrecy, since it was based on the scenario that the operation would only be feasible if the United Kingdom did not increase its military strength." [10]

"This decision was made considering the rigidity and emotionality that the issue had demonstrated in Great Britain during 1981." [11]

January 6th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams acts on London's instructions to formally protest Davidoff's violation of British sovereignty,

"When he approached the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... he was told that the Ministry had no knowledge of the incident and was investigating." [12]

January 7th, from London, the FCO inform Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires that the British Government can now offer a new round of negotiations on 22/23 February. [13]

January 8th, in Argentina, *La Nacion* reports that inflation during 1981 reached 331.6%.

Four US Senators arrive in Buenos Aires, including Howard Baker (Tennessee) and Paul Laxalt (Nevada).

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8 *Was the Malvinas/Falklands a Diversionary War? A prospect-theory reinterpretation of Argentina's decline* Luis S. Schenoni, Sean Braniff & Jorge Battaglino 2020. These authors believe that the final decision was made on January 5, 1982. See March 26, 1982, below. Reference to Rattenbach, is a reference to *Junta Militar: Comision de Analisis y Evaluacion de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlantico Syr – Inform Final* a.k.a. *The Rattenbach Report* (undated). Commissioned by the Argentine Junta after the 1982 war.

9 *El plan de la Armada que llevó a la guerra de Malvinas y los esfuerzos de un empresario por evitar el conflicto* in *Cadena 105* February 28, 2021

10 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. Digital book in English. As yet (2025) incomplete. See - https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/2023/10/faa-malvinas-0-10-en.pdf

11 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista 'Tata' Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

12 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

13 *FCO telegram 8 to UKE Buenos Aires January 7, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f116*

"... an attempt was made to demonstrate the importance given to the (Malvinas) issue in front of third parties. This is how Chancellor Costa Méndez informed Senator Baker of the United States during his visit in January 1982, that the situation between Great Britain and Argentina was conflictive and asked him to make this issue known to his government." [14]

From the Directorate of Antarctica and the Malvinas, career diplomat Carlos Lucas Blanco, forwards for the information of Enrique Ros, an outline of the failures of previous negotiations with the United Kingdom.

"After listing the topics that would be discussed at the New York meeting, and given the possibility of not receiving any satisfactory response from the United Kingdom, Banco said: "This would facilitate the acceptance by the international community of an eventual fait accompli, which would be presented as the only way open to obtain satisfaction of the Argentine claim, given the reluctant attitude of the United Kingdom"."[15]

January 11th, the governor of Tierra Del Fuego is reported as saying; *"I feel like governor of the Malvinas Islands and I hope that God gives me the opportunity to govern from the islands themselves before our mandate ends."* [16]

January 12th, Argentina's governing military junta establishes a planning group to refine potential invasion plans; comprising Admiral Lombardo, Army General Garcia, and the Air Force's Brigadier Sigfrido Plessl.

" The involvement of the Joint Staff and the Armed Forces Staffs was primarily ruled out. Instead, a Working Commission was set up with deeply trusted personnel: Vicealmirante Juan J. Lombardo, General de División Osvaldo J. García and Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl." [17]

The junta recognise that, in the case of invasion, casualties amongst the Islanders would be unacceptable.

"The first issue was logical since the population, although they were not sympathizers of Argentina as such were situated inside Argentine territory and therefore should be protected as much as possible. The idea of a bloodless operation also meant no unnecessary destruction should accompany the operation. On the issue of British troops this meant that the fewer the military casualties for Britain, the less the need for an emotive reaction on the part of the population or of the British Government." [18]

"The other armed services soon became involved. Their work was overseen by a Comisión de Trabajo – a Working party – which held its first meeting at Army Headquarters in the Liberatador Building in Buenos Aires in mid-January 1982. ... Admiral Anaya's initial plan to take the islands but not necessarily to stay or to defend them was abandoned at an early stage... A date of 15 September was given for the completion of the planning. No move was envisaged before that date..." [19]

"Its role would be to draw up a military plan that would be an alternative to the diplomatic strategy, envisaging the seizure of the Malvinas by the Argentine Armed Forces. ... From (Galtieri's) point of view, a "triumph" on the Falklands issue would have historically and definitively justified the Military Government and would support Galtieri's leadership electorally in a future civilian-military transitional government." [20]

14 Yofre 2011
15 *Ibid.* An anecdote to show that, despite the urging by the junta for secrecy, relatively minor officials at the Foreign Ministry were aware; and that therefore Nicanor Costa Méndez was fully involved with the junta's deliberations.
16 Quoted in Yofre 2011
17 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
18 *Operation Rosario* Admiral Carlos Busser 1984
19 Middlebrook 2003
20 Carbone 2008

"What was not revealed to the press was that on January 12, "military planning for the Malvinas was discussed as an alternative action in case the solution negotiated with Great Britain failed … By a resolution not included in the Minutes, Major-General Garcia, Major-Brigadier Plessl and Vice-Admiral Lombardo were appointed to analyze the potential of the use of military power (combined) with a political approach and to specify possible courses of action." [21]

At the Casa Rosada, in the presidential office, General Garcia meets with President Galtieri. [22]

"After the greetings, Galtieri told him that he had to give him an instruction under strict secrecy, which included his family, comrades and friends … (Galtieri) informed him that the mission was not 'certain' but 'tentative'. The mission was aimed at recovering the Malvinas Islands to negotiate later. "Occupy to negotiate", Galtieri reiterated. He also said it had to be "bloodless" … he would repeat several times: "There must be surprise in the execution of the missions." [23]

Instructions are prepared for Foreign Minister Méndez with regard to future Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

> *"The Argentine delegation will keep in mind permanently the fact that it is a national objective and permanent recognition of the Republic, the recognition by Great Britain of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and that therefore it is crucial for the successful development of the negotiating process that the negotiations deal essentially on this topic."* [24]

January 15th, in Argentina, the new Working Commission meet.

"When the joint Working Commission met on January 15th to plan the Malvinas recapture, planning only existed for the Chilean scenario. Each Force appointed their respective Commission assistants: the operation Commanders representing the Navy — Contraalmirante Walter Allara, Commander of the Naval Fleet; Contraalmirante Carlos García Boll, Commander of the Naval Aviation; and, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser, Commander of the Marine Infantry —, General de Brigada Julio Ruiz, representing the Army; and Comodoro Knud Erik Andreasen, representing the Air Force. … The COMIL briefing indicated that the operation should be unexpected and bloodless, since the sole purpose was to negotiate sovereignty from a more favorable position. The Working Commission met at Puerto Belgrano and would complete the Campaign Outline Plan, using the one already prepared by the Navy as a reference and adding the actions to be executed by the Army and the Air Force." [25]

January 16th, in the Falklands, Executive Council members pass a motion strongly protesting the planned withdrawal of HMS *Endurance*.

"Jim Callaghan made the same case repeatedly in the Commons, saying seven weeks before the invasion that this was "an error that could have serious consequences". More than 300 peers, including Shackleton, Buxton and Hill-Norton, urged the Government to think again." [26]

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21 Yofre 2011
22 Argentina's presidential palace is known as the Casa Rosada – the Pink House.
23 Yofre 2011
24 *Cadena 105* February 28, 2021
25 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
26 *Dirty Wars and Devious Politics: The Foreign Office, the Falklands, Argentina and the USA 1964-1999* Robert Elgood 2025

January 19th, from Port Stanley, the Governor forwards the 'Annual Review' for the information of the FCO; *"The Islanders' relations with Britain and Argentina deteriorated during the year. The community was split on the sovereignty issue. Attitudes hardened after the Argentines rejected the freeze proposal in February. Lease-back an insult to Islanders' loyalty, integrity and intelligence."* [27]

January 20th, in Buenos Aires, President Galtieri speaks to Argentina's Ambassador to the UK, Carlos Ortiz de Roza, seeking an opinion as to the reaction in London should Argentina seize the Falkland Islands.

"Ambassador Ortiz de Roza's evaluation of the British response to the possibility of occupying the Malvinas was the following: Ignore the fact; Protest or withdraw Ambassador; Break off relations and impose diplomatic sanction." [28]

January 22nd, Argentina renounces the 1972 *General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes*, that it had signed with Chile, before stationing troops on the border with Chile. [29]

> *"Argentina has renounced peace treaty with Chile on their Beagle Channel dispute over three islands and the surrounding sea potentially rich in oil … The dispute has soured relations for years and brought them to the brink of war in 1978...*
>
> *War was averted only at the last minute by the Pope's whose compromise peace plan has now been rejected by Argentina … Argentina says the Pope's compromise breaches a century-old bi-ocean principle that what's in the South Atlantic is Argentina's and in the Pacific is Chile's."* [30]

January 24th, Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa,* predicts that Argentina will present strict conditions for the continuance of negotiations with Britain.

In an article, journalist Iglesias Rouco also refers to probable US support and expresses a belief that; *"... Buenos Aires will recover the islands by force this year,.. an ambitious diplomatic and strategic plan which would assure the country of a relevant role in the South Atlantic."*

"I asked Forrester for his views on a recent article in (the) Buenos Aires daily La Prensa by gadfly Iglesias Rouco, who alleged that the Galtieri administration may be considering sending an "ultimatum" to Her Majesty's Government demanding recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and significant movement toward resolution of the drawn-out dispute. Forrester brushed aside the article as Rouco's fantasy. He acknowledged that there are officials in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry who would like to threaten or use force, but these people are not involved in the issue. He noted, for example, that in the Foreign Ministry the only officials involved are Under Secretary Ros, the Malvinas directorate, the legal division in a supporting role and, of course, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez. He said that he did not know the attitude of Costa Mendez or the President, but it appeared to him that the administration is fully engaged in other issues (e.g. the economy and, in foreign affairs, the Beagle dispute). The Malvinas problem is on the back burner." [31]

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27 *PREM19/613 f109*

28 Yofre 2011. Ortiz de Roza was visiting Buenos Aires in January, 1982.

29 See 1881, 1971, 1977, 1978 & 1981

30 BBC dispatch of January 22, 1982 in *Fight for Falklands Freedom: Reporting Live from Argentina and the Islands* H. Briley 2022

31 *Memorandum of Conversation January 27, 1982* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.* The conversation was held between Ricardo Forrester, Malvinas Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and John F. Keane, a political officer at the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.

"The references to military moves, however, are less likely to have been inspired by the Argentine MFA. 'La Prensa' has a history of supporting a military solution to the dispute, and it is to be expected that they would pursue the line in a major article like this." [32]

"... it became clear that Argentina was contemplating invasion four months before it happened. We tried to persuade the Foreign Office in London it had a serious problem, either to build Fortress Falklands to avert invasion or negotiate sovereignty. The Foreign Office took the comfortable course of pretending nothing had changed. The blame really does lie in London..." [33]

January 25th, in Ushuaia, commanding officer Captain Nick Barker takes HMS *Endurance* into the southern Argentine port. In contrast to previous occasions, he receives a frosty welcome.

> *"They declined to play football against the ship and even refused the use of their ground for a match against a local civilian side. All this was completely against the pattern of cordiality we had experienced on previous visits to Argentine ports, even as recently as our visit to Puerto Belgrano two months earlier. There was a partial belief that this may have had something to do with the fact that we were going on to Punta Arenas in Chile, but was this enough to explain such a complete snubbing? I did not think so and reported my misgivings in a signal.*
>
> *When I went to call on Captain Russo, in the absence of Admiral Zaratiegui, I was informed that I was in the Malvinas War Zone... I laughed and asked who the Argentines were fighting. 'You,' he said without a flicker of emotion... All this I reported to London."* [34]

"As Endurance was leaving, the Argentine harbor pilot had confided to Barker that something was 'very wrong' with the Argentine navy." [35]

"There were warnings aplenty from British official intelligence reports, from Argentina and from Falkland Islanders who came back from visits to Argentina convinced the junta intended to invade at the end of March."[36]

"A friendly Argentine Navy Captain told (Barker) that he was in "the Malvinas war zone". Barker asked, "Who is the enemy?" "You" he was told. Over a drink Captain Russo explained there was going to be a war. ... Barker reported this. ... Nott said that he never received Barker's raw reports" [37]

In Argentina, the Commander of Argentina's Air Force Air Operations unit hears of the junta's planning for a military operation in the Falkland Islands.

"On 25 January 1982, the Commander of Air Operations, upon learning of the planning imposed on the Working Commission, ordered his Planning Department to present the initial assessment on 2 February. After hearing it, the Commander concluded that none of the assumptions made by the Military Junta were right.

32 *Fearn to Ure February 8, 1982* in *ALW 040/325/9*

33 James Neilson, editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald* quoted in *Fight for Falklands Freedom: Reporting Live from Argentina and the Islands* Harold Briley 2022

34 *Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic* Nicholas Barker 1997. Barker's warnings to the Admiralty appear to have been dismissed as an attempt to save his ship, which was due to be taken out of service. Captain Barker had been energetic in the defence of *Endurance* before the decision and had been active in the campaign to have that decision reversed. These actions had not endeared him to the MOD's political masters, in particular Michael Power, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry. Nor, indeed, Secretary of State John Nott. The Frank's Commission that enquired into the causes of the 1982 Falklands War do not appear to have been fully informed of the warnings given by Barker.

35 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* R. C. Thornton 2004.

36 Briley 2022. Harold Briley was the BBC's Latin America Correspondent.

37 Elgood 2025 citing *Carrington: An Honourable Man* Christopher Lee 2018 p.419

Under his responsibility, he gave the order to accept as fact that the United Kingdom would launch a military response and anticipated it as an alternative for the occupation phase of the Plan Azul y Blanco. ... The Operations Plan 2/82 Mantenimiento de la Soberanía (Sovereignty Maintenance) — which would be completed in early April — assigned: tasks of exploration and reconnaissance in coordination with the commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations in the areas adjacent to the Malvinas Islands (500 nautical miles, or 925 km); strategic interdiction tasks against the United Kingdom fleet and tactical air operations on the islands through exploration and reconnaissance, close fire support, offensive reconnaissance, and direct air defense. It also established coordination measures with the Theater of Operations (TOM and subsequent TOAS58) and with the command that would exercise the leadership of the Air Force assets (FAS), specifying that the initial attack order would be given by the Theater Commander and confirmed by the Strategic Air Command. It further stated that the latter should assist the requests made by its subordinate command —the FAS— during the operations without interfering in their action." [38]

January 26th, in Buenos Aires, at the Libertad building, the military junta decide that the 'Malvinas Group' of Lombardo, Garcia and Plessl should; *"... prepare the presentation of the plans for the military alternative in mid-March 1982."* [39]

At the same meeting, *Directiva Estrategica Nacional* (National Strategic Directive) 1/82 is signed off. [40]

> *"Political Objective: to consolidate Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and contribute to affirming its full exercise in the South Atlantic.*
>
> *Strategic Resolution National: the Military Committee, in the face of the evident and repeated lack of progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to achieve full recognition of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour, the full exercise sovereignty in the South Atlantic and the exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources, has resolved to provide for the use of military power to achieve the political objective. This resolution must be kept in the strictest secrecy and should be circumscribed exclusively to the heads of the respective military departments."* [41]

"The junta charged Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser with planning "Operation Azul". "The order was not to update the plan but to draft a plan from scratch", Busser later recalled. "Argentina had made many plans in the past to recover the Malvinas, but the order we got was to make a out a new plan. We started doing so in January 1982. The basic idea was to negotiate throughout 1982, but at the same time have a military plan, just in case the negotiations failed. In that case we would take the military option. But that would only be towards the end of 1982, or the beginning of 1983." [42]

"DENAC 1/82 explains concepts referring to the National Power: "The Operation from a military point of view is suitable, feasible and acceptable" and "the Joint Force must be in a position to execute the operation from 15 May 1982". The instruction, however, had two conditions: "the current British state of defense of the islands had to be maintained and, in addition, if force had to be resorted to, it would be restricted to bloodless operations in order to minimize the British reaction and encourage the best negotiating position. Once the

38 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

39 Yofre 2011

40 This document is undated and seems to be made up of 14 pages of handwritten notes – badly written in Spanish. It appears among the appendices of the original Rattenbach Commission Report from pages 297-310. None of the online copies of the Rattenbach Commission Report, officially published March 30, 2012, include the appendices. A copy for those with good eyesight can be found here - http://www.radarmalvinas.com.ar/dar/ENE 82 DENAC 1.pdf

41 Quoted in Yofre 2011.

42 *Justice and the Genesis of War* David A. Welch 1993 p.167

islands were recovered, the occupation forces would be withdrawn and a small garrison would be maintained".” [43]

“The plan considered the only opposing forces would be the ones existing in the Malvinas, and anticipated the temporary creation of a theater of operations that would encompass the Malvinas archipelago and the South Georgia Islands. … it expressly specified that the operation would not be executed before May 15, 1982, as long as the element of surprise remained. The plan did not include any military response from the United Kingdom, nor did it consider a possible subsequent defense of the islands. … The latter discussed the readiness of assets and personnel training, which was particularly critical for the Army, as it was in the process of incorporating the 1963-Class conscripts. An initial deadline of July 9 was set, but it was objected by the Argentine Air Force, which advised a date later than September, given that most combat aircraft lacked night offensive capabilities. After recapturing the islands, an Argentine Army garrison of around 500 men would remain on the Malvinas. Their aim was not to provide defense against any reconquest attempt, but rather to maintain local control and collaborate with the government. The Navy and the Air Force would leave a minimum number of personnel for specific tasks.” [44]

January 27th, in Buenos Aires, the governing military junta delivers a *bout de papier* to the British Embassy.

> *“1. Argentine position: The Argentine position on the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands is well known by the British Government, but it would be useful to spell out once again to make any Argentine proposal easier to understand. The press communique put out by the Argentine Government on 27 July 1981 is a fundamental basis. Essential points in the negotiation were set out in it.*
>
> *A) Question of Sovereignty: In the first place, British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the above-mentioned archipelagos is the basic element of the Argentine position. It remains a sine-qua-non requirement for the solution of the dispute. So long as this question is unresolved the dispute will continue. Consequently neither must it nor can it be ignored, because the Argentine Republic, however much time may pass, will never abandon its claim nor relax its determination until this has been satisfied. From the beginning it has had recourse to negotiations as a means of seeking a peaceful solution to achieve its just claim. This negotiation has invariably been promoted by successive Argentine Governments on the basis of what was established by the United nations General Assembly in its resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49 (XXXI).*
>
> *B) Essential Characteristics of the Negotiations on Sovereignty: In this context, the Argentine Government appeals for the negotiations to be serious and in depth, based on the greatest good faith and the political determination necessary resolutely to push forward from now on a process culminating, within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination, in the recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands in dispute. So far, and despite the negotiating meetings held in the past, there has been no concrete progress. It is almost idle to point out that there has been for some time growing awareness by the Argentine people of the lack of progress in the Malvinas question, and that the matter has now reached a point which demands solutions, without further delays or dilatory arguments.*
>
> *C) Interests of the Islanders: The above-mentioned resolutions of the United nations give due attention to the "<u>Interests</u>" of the inhabitants of the Islands, in the context of the negotiation to which they invite both governments. At no point do the decisions of the world organisation refer to the "<u>wishes</u>" of the*

43 Yofre 2011
44 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

Islanders, because the dispute is confined to the Argentine and British Governments. The possibility exists of finding a meeting point between our respective positions in this aspect of the matter, in that the Argentine Government, always in the spirit of pushing the negotiation process resolutely forward, has repeatedly demonstrated its clear intention of respecting those interests, including the preservation of the way of life and cultural traditions of the Islanders. To this end, ot is ready to draw up a special statute of safeguards. No-one can cast doubt on the fact that successive Argentine Governments have made great efforts to satisfy Islander interests in a practical way, as demonstrated by, among other things. The communications system which has been in operation since 1971. In spite of Argentine good will, this policy has not produced the results expected of it. There is a virtual absence of information in the islands about the real thinking of the Argentine Government. Furthermore, deliberately tendentious versions are put about to detract from the Argentine position and delay the progress of a negotiated solution. The next meeting should additionally serve to clarify and put an end to such a state of affairs. The object of the statute of safeguards mentioned above will be to consider and respect the different aspects which comprise the "interests" of the inhabitants, for example, matters relating to military service, tax exemptions, protection of property rights, maintenance of the language and certain institutions, etc. As an additional guarantee the agreement which the parties might reach on this might be submitted to the United Nations. It must be repeated here that Argentina has no intention of disturbing the islanders' way of life, so long as there is an adequate balance between their interests and the recovery of Argentine sovereignty. To make progress in this matter, it would be necessary for the British Government to make known what are the safeguards it considers necessary and conducive to the preservation of the way of life and traditions of the Islanders.

D) Natural Resources: The isolation in which the Islands have found themselves for many years, the scant economic development, the diminishing population figures and other negative factors favour a tendency towards immobility. These problems will remain while the dispute is unresolved, since this constitutes a serious obstacle to the exploitation of natural resources. The lack of exploitation on the one hand and the depredation of resources on the other, in the context of a world short of food and avid for energy, is an obvious nonsense and anachronism which must cease. The Argentine Republic, which views the Malvinas question as a global subject which must also be solved globally, is ready to seek a practical formulae to give concrete form to the exploitation of these resources to the benefit of all concerned. It must remain very clear however that any idea of making progress in the search for pragmatic formulae for exploration and exploitation which might mean a delay or paralysis pf the solution to the sovereignty question is totally unacceptable to Argentina.

E) Security in the area of the South Atlantic: For the Argentine Republic, the security and defence of the area of the south-west Atlantic is a vital national interest. The Argentine Government has the responsibility of maintaining maximum vigilance for the protection of this area of the Atlantic, in which the islands of the South Atlantic have great importance. The maintenance of the dispute is incompatible with the appropriate defence of the area of the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of the Argentine mainland.

Proposal: It is therefore in the understanding that the question of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands must be resolved peacefully, definitively and rapidly in the interests of the parties to the dispute and of all those interested in resolving it, that the Argentine Government in order to develop the negotiating process, proposes the establishment of a permanent negotiating Commission, to meet in the first weeks of each month alternatively in each capital. This should be responsible for maintaining the continuity and impetus of the negotiations, without it having

to depend upon only sporadic meetings, devoid of clear objectives and concrete results. Its technical-political level should allow a deep but agile treatment of the subject matter, in conditions favourable to proposing solutions to the Governments.

The Commission would have the duration of one year. It would be open to denunciation by either side at any time with prior warning to the other side. The Argentine Government considers that the establishment of this Commission, preferably within the second two-month period of 1982, together with the sincerity and good faith taking account of the positions of both sides, would offer the best possibility of reaching success in its work. The Argentine Government will analyse the future of these negotiations in the light of the reply which the British Government gives to this proposal, hoping that this may be given before or during the next round of negotiations to be held in February, 1982." [45]

Argentina's Foreign Ministry suggests that the two sides meet in New York during February, 1982. [46]

"... I commented that the paper seemed to lump the Malvinas (sic), South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands together: I thought we might regard them as three questions rather than one, To this Ros and Ambassador Blanco responded with some surprise, arguing that in 1977 and 1978 agreed statements had specifically lumped South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands with the Falklands." [47]

"The document is a tough restatement of the Argentine view that the sole purpose of the negotiation is to cede sovereignty over the Falklands and the Dependencies to them and that all other matters are secondary. None of this is new." [48]

"On 27 January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a bout de papier to the British Ambassador which called for negotiations that would end 'within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination' in the recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Britain agreed to a series of talks in New York, but refused to accept preconditions to the outcome." [49]

"The bout de papier was delivered by Ambassador Enrique Ros to Ambassador Anthony Williams on January 27, 1982, when a revealing dialogue took place. After reading it, the British man commented on his objections "in a personal capacity". If his government accepted the proposal "it should include islanders (in his delegation) who would find it difficult to travel monthly to the meetings ...". He added that the document spoke of the question of sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands "when he understood that the negotiations were only about the Malvinas". With his characteristic coldness, Ros "pointed out his error in that Sandwich and Georgias were included in the negotiations..."." [50]

"Argentina produced a proposal on January 27, 1982 to constitute a permanent negotiating commission, with a mandate of one year, with the purpose of concluding the negotiations on sovereignty. This initiative had a considerable impact in London, due to the peremptory deadlines it contained." [51]

A very public discussion in newspapers such as *La Prensa, Convicción* and *The Buenos Aries Herald* consider the advantages and disadvantages of military action to seize the Falkland Islands.

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45 *FCO12/384 f74*. Original emphasis.
46 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 10*
47 *Williams to FCO January 27, 1982* in *FCO12/384 f74*
48 *Fearn to Luce February 1, 1982* in *FCO46/3202 f132.* See below
49 *Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War* David A. Welch 1997
50 Yofre 2011
51 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013

"All the conditions are in place: we have a determined President and an excellent Foreign Minister. If after winning the war on terrorism, we recover the Malvinas, history will forget the economic stupidities. Argentina will be alive, aware of its vigor and willing to take a place in the world." [52]

"Argentina will set a series of pre-conditions before continuing talks with Britain on the future of the Malvinas/Falklands islands ... If not met, other forms of action, including recovery of the islands by military means would be considered." [53]

"What was published by a Buenos Aires morning paper on January 27, 1982, linked to retired admiral Emilio Massera, is symptomatic: "Right now we are in optimal conditions: we are governed by the Armed Forces, we have a president (Galtieri) with drive and a great decision-making capacity, and we have a luxury chancellor (Nicanor Costa Méndez). If, in addition to having won the war against terrorism, the Falklands are recovered, the Process will be marked by these events (...). Regarding the internal front, the public would feel invigorated (...) ***The Malvinas are prior to the Beagle****"."* [54]

"On January 27, in the morning newspaper 'Convicción', with well-known links with the Navy, and especially with the political project of Emilio Eduardo Massera, an article appeared in which it was stated that the taking of the Malvinas would help solve the problem of Beagle, since it would strengthen the Argentine position." [55]

January 29th, from Santiago, Chile denounces Argentina's renunciation of the 1972 treaty.

February 1st, in Argentina, at a meeting at the 5th Corps HQ, Major-General García informs Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín, commanding the 25th Infantry Regiment; *"I have selected your regiment, the 25th Infantry, to recover our Malvinas Islands."* [56]

"Next, Garcia set out the conditions: "I must clarify that this operation will be characterized by a very important aspect, which must be taken into account without fail: there must be no casualties in the English forces or in the civilian population of the Islands. I repeat, even if they cause them to us, you will avoid causing casualties on the opposing side"." [57]

In London, Argentina's *bout de papier* is considered.

"... our Ambassador should be instructed to reiterate to the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister our own position on the dispute while confirming that, <u>provided</u> it is accepted that any discussions will be as hitherto without prejudice to the sovereignty position of either side, we are ready to discuss in New York their proposal for a future negotiating mechanism. I further recommend that we instruct the Governor to explain this exchange in general terms to Councillors. ... The paper is couched in hectoring terms. It accuses both the islanders and HMG of deliberate prevarication and assumes not only that the Argentines are in the right, but also that they have the support of the international community for their position. It asserts that Argentina knows best where the Islanders' interests lie." [58]

Lord Carrington telegrams the British Embassy in Buenos Aires with an instruction for Ambassador Williams to speak to Ros; to make Britain's position clear.

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52 *Convicción* quoted in Yofre 2011

53 *Latin American Weekly Report* February 12, 1982

54 *Lessons from the Malvinas* Martin Balza in *Perfil* July 29, 2023. My emphasis. Balza served as a Lieut-Colonel in 1982 in charge of Artillery Group 3 and became Chief of the Argentine Army from 1992-1999.

55 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024

56 Yofre 2011

57 *Ibid.*

58 *Fearn to Luce February 1, 1982* in *FCO46/3202 f132.* Original emphasis.

"Her Majesty's Government are grateful to the Argentine Government for the clear exposition of their attitude towards the inter-governmental talks on the Falkland Islands dispute, contained in the bout de papier … Her Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that they are in no doubt about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Falkland islands Dependencies, their maritime zones and continental shelves. They do not therefore accept the Argentine assumption that the purpose of the negotiation is the eventual recognition by HMG of Argentine sovereignty in the area. Our negotiations so far have been conducted on the basis that the sovereignty position of neither side is prejudiced. It is only on that basis that we can continue the negotiating process.

Provided it is agreed that negotiations may continue without prejudice to the sovereignty position of either the Argentine or Her Majesty's Government, the representatives of HMG attending the forthcoming talks in New York will be ready to discuss in detail the proposal to establish working groups to look at articular aspects of the dispute. Her Majesty's Government wish finally to reaffirm that it is their wish to find, by negotiation, an early and peaceful solution to this protracted dispute which can be accepted by all concerned, namely the British and Argentine Government and the people of the Falkland Islands." [59]

A telegram to Governor Hunt at Port Stanley requests that Islands' Councillors be informed; *"in general terms"*.

February 2nd, in Buenos Aires, at the Libertador building, the junta meet to consider their next move. With the prospect of further negotiations with the British, Davidoff is instructed not to visit South Georgia. [60]

"The military government ordered to postpone both departures (Grupo Alfa towards the Georgias Islands and Davidoff to South Georgia) until the round of negotiations was over..." [61]

In the UK, regarding a possible reinforcement of the Royal Marines in the Falklands (NP8901), the MOD write to the FCO.

"... I returned yesterday from a meeting of the UK Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Overseas). … at that meeting Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse (Commander-in-Chief (Fleet)) closely questioned Rear-Admiral David Brown (ACDS (Ops)) about possible reinforcement of the Royal Marine contingent on the Falkland Islands, in the light of the latest threatening noises from Buenos Aires.

Admiral Fieldhouse said he did not know what was expected of the Navy in this regard or whether perhaps the existing British contingent should be regarded as expendable in the event of hostile action against the Falklands by the Argentine Government.

Rear-Admiral Brown seemed unable to offer much guidance from the point of view of MOD operations, and smartly passed the buck to me for a Foreign Office view.

I said, for lack of a better line, that no doubt part of the tough talk from the Argentines was intended to stiffen their position when negotiations resumed and we should not necessarily draw dire conclusions. I nevertheless suspect that there is very real uncertainty as between the MOD and the Commanders-in-Chief about what they would be likely to find themselves called to do if deliberate harassment or worse by the Argentines were to take place. Do we need to think more about this and is there a case for giving, or seeking, political guidance?" [62]

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59 *Ibid.*

60 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.44

61 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

62 *Weston to Fearn February 2, 1982* in *FCO12/384 f102.* A note handwritten on the bottom of this letter by John Ure, and addressed to Fearn, states *"I don't in fact think this is a specific crisis just at present."*

In London, after considering an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan* Bombers, the Ministry of Defence decide against the proposal; *"... a sale of strategic bombers to Argentina would bound to be misunderstood or at least misinterpreted (by Chile)."* At the Foreign Office, Robin Fearn raises another problem; *"On the face of it, a strike aircraft would seem to be entirely suitable for an attack on the Falklands."* [63]

February 3rd, from London, Ambassador Williams is instructed to lodge a further protest regarding the visit by the *Almirante Irizar* to South Georgia without clearance. [64]

At Stanley, on the same day, Vice-Comodoro Roberto Manuel Gamen takes command of the LADE operation.

"In welcome gatherings and during the early days, a friendly and optimistic atmosphere as regards the islands sovereignty future was sensed. ... Before moving to Malvinas, Vicecomodoro Gamen was aware of the secret plan to recover sovereignty by employing the Armed Forces, though he did not know the exact execution date."[65]

February 4th, off Patagonia, members of an Argentine diving club discover the remains of the British navy vessel *Swift*, which foundered in March, 1770. [66]

February 7th, in Buenos Aires, a meeting takes place.

"... between Capitan de Fragata de Infanteria de Marina [Lieutenant-Colonel of Marines] Guillermo Botto, an intelligence officer, ... and two naval officers who knew the islands well. They were Vicecomodoro [Wing Commander] Héctor Gilobert, who had been the local manager of LADE in Stanley in 1980-81, and Capitan de Fragata [Commander] Adolfo Aurelio Gaffoglio, liaison officer for Argentine naval transport services. Botto asked them questions in order to identify targets for the invading forces, ..." [67]

Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa*, publishes a further article by journalist Jesús Iglesias Rouco.

> "*If London does not agree to stick to a timetable, Buenos Aires reserves the right to take other actions. We already announced fifteen days ago that among these actions, the recovery of the islands by military means is not ruled out, far from it."* [68]

"Jesús Iglesias Rouco anticipated what would happen several weeks later. It was clear that either he had a very good "deep throat" in the Palacio San Martín, or he was a "seer"." [69]

"Iglesias Rouca, writing in La Prensa, which had close contacts with the navy, warned ... Britain had no more than four months to acknowledge transfer of sovereignty..." [70]

Foreign Minister Costa Méndez speaks to Argentina's Ambassador to the Organisation of American States (OAS), Raúl Alberto Quijano, who is in Buenos Aires. [71]

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63 Quoted in *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015
64 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43
65 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
66 The loss of this vessel left the British garrison at Port Egmont on the Falklands with only one ship; facilitating the Spanish ejection of that garrison shortly thereafter. See 1770
67 *The Falklands Saga* Graham Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.644. Gilobert was not replaced at LADE in Stanley until February 3, 1982. Replaced by Vice-Comodoro Gamen, Gilobert would return to the Islands on March 30, 1982.
68 Quoted in *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: "En un mes tomamos las Malvinas"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022
69 Yofre 2011. 'Deep throat' was a name given to an informant during the 1970s Watergate scandal in the USA.
70 Briley 2022
71 Quijano had been Argentina's Foreign Minister for a few months in 1976; at the end of President Isabel Perón's term.

"The Chancellor asked him what he thought of an Argentine occupation of the Malvinas. Quijano (asked whether) it was ... an act of force to demonstrate the vulnerability of the islands to the English and then negotiate. Costa Méndez said that it was to stay. Raúl responded that the United States was going to condemn the operation because (it would) consider us (Argentina) the aggressors. And that Margaret Thatcher was going to send us a force to throw us out. Conoro (Méndez) said that everything was to stay." [72]

February 8th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Williams, delivers Carrington's message regarding the Foreign Ministry's *bout de papier* of January 27th.

"Blanco concluded: "In essence, the British document reiterates (that) government's position on the basis of the application of an 'umbrella of sovereignty', (and) accepts the continuity of the negotiating process, but does not respond to the Argentine initiative to establish a Permanent Negotiation Commission"." [73]

In London, on the same day, the FCO consider Weston's letter of February 2nd, regarding the Royal Marine detachment at Stanley.

> *"It is odd that there should be confusion within the MOD about the role of the Royal marines in the event of an attack on the Falkland Islands. The officer commanding the garrison has a clear directive about his responsibilities in such an event, according to priorities agreed by the FCO and the MOD. We see no reason to alter these. On the wider question of what the British armed services would be called on to do, there is no similarly agreed plan. We did however look at the various options with the MOD last summer and they prepared draft contingency plans. Although these reached a fairly advanced form, they were not fully cleared within the MOD … It would however be on the basis of a final version of these plans that we should proceed in the first instance if the need arose. ...I shall suggest to DS11 that, given the uncertainties within the MOD, it would be useful to complete their internal action on the draft contingency paper."* [74]

February 9th, in the UK, during Prime Minister's Question Time in the House of Commons, ex-PM James Callaghan asks a question:

> *"... is the Prime Minister aware that the Government's decisions to withdraw and pay off HMS "Endurance" when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have serious consequences? Is she further aware that this stale old proposition was put to me on more than one occasion when I was Prime Minister and after considering it I turned it down flat? Will she please do the same?"*

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responds:

> *"I recognise that this was a very difficult decision for my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for Defence. The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there are many competing claims on the defence budget, even though we are increasing it substantially. He will also know that the defence capability of that ship is extremely limited. My right hon. Friend (Nott) therefore felt that other claims on the defence budget should have greater priority."* [75]

"The Government were warned by my right hon. Friend the member for Cardiff South-East (Mr. Callaghan), as early as 9 February, that General Galtieri would interpret the Secretary of State for Defence's decision to

72 Unidentified source quoted in Yofre 2011.
73 Yofre 2011
74 *Fearn to Ure February 8, 1982* in *ALW 040/325/9*
75 Repetition, repetition, repetition. See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-02-09/debates/a4590c34-fdda-4ff2-b631-9564a126ecba/Engagements

scrap HMS "Endurance" when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have consequences. ... The point is that the announcement to scrap her was taken in Buenos Aires as a sign that, as far as Britain's Secretary of State for defence was concerned, the Argentines could do as they wished." [76]

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams protests Constantino Davidoff's unauthorised landing on South Georgia.

"... some fifty days after the offence had been committed, he (protested). Ambassador Williams warned that this had been a violation of British sovereignty, and that if a further attempt were made to land without proper authority the British Government reserved the right to take whatever action necessary." [77]

"... Ambassador Williams ... loudly protested Davidoff's three-hour (sic) December stay on South Georgia." [78]

Reported in *The Buenos Aires Herald*:

> *"New Argentine Governments, no matter what their provenance or their ideology, have at least two things in common: they all aspire to reduce the inflation rate and they all strive to establish, once and for all, unquestioned Argentine sovereignty over the islands known in English as the Falklands ... This Government is no exception but ... its Falklands approach will be far tougher than anything we have seen so far. Besides the attendant historical rights and the infinite patience so far shown by Argentina, the truth of the matter is that the Malvinas situation is seriously interfering with our security in the South Atlantic, is limiting our economic and geopolitical plans, including ones relating to Antarctica, and bears moreover in a most negative fashion on our dispute with Chile over the Beagle.*
>
> *Looking at the subject from an international, or western, viewpoint, the British presence there deprives Argentina of its proper participation in the defence of the region against constant Soviet penetration ... this makes any strategic planning for the area virtually impossible or of doubtful value. So if it is borne in mind that it is not only this country which finds itself daily more prejudiced by Britain's inexplicable obstinacy, it seems easy to predict that an initiative involving force could count not only on the understanding of the international community, particularly of the third world, but also on the support, or at least the interested tolerance, of NATO."*

Grupo Alpha board the ARA *Bahia Paraiso*, bound for the South Orkney Islands. [79]

February 11th, Argentina's Naval Transports department authorises the *Bahia Buen Suceso* to take Davidoff's workforce to South Georgia. [80]

February 13th, on South Georgia, two members of the Joint Services Expedition arrive at Leith harbour to find three yachts moored there. *Isatis* and *Kim* are French registered and have complied with entry procedures, although *Kim* has overstayed. The third, *Caiman,* is of unknown origin although she is flying the flags of the UK, Belgium and Panama. Her crew are suspected to be in radio contact with Buenos Aires. [81]

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76 John Silkin MP in *UK Parliament- Hansard- Commons Chamber- Falklands Campaign* December 21, 1982. There is no evidence that the junta in Buenos Aires was swayed one way or the other by the announcement that HMS *Endurance* was to be withdrawn. See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-12-21/debates/90afde7b-521a-4032-ab34-92b3d6b3377c/FalklandsCampaign

77 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

78 Thornton 2004

79 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. Where they boarded the vessel, is not stated.

80 *Ibid.*

81 *Caiman's* owner was an Italian, Giovanni Raggio. It has been suggested that this vessel, and possibly the French yachts too, were on a spying mission for Argentina. See *Large Animals and Wide Horizons: Adventures of a Biologist* Richard M. Laws *Scott Polar Research Institute* undated.

"(Caiman) Although flying the Panamanian flag, on board were an Italian crew of three and an Argentinean bank official, Adrion Marchessi. Marchessi claimed that his bank was financing Davidoff's enterprise and he was simply inspecting the whaling stations. Suspicions were raised when three "very sophisticated" radios were found aboard the yacht, and more so when Davidoff, contacted by the British embassy to verify Marchessi's story, denied it." [82]

In the Falkland Islands, aircraft overfly Stanley.

"By February the Argentines had become quite brazen in their sabre-rattling and intelligence gathering. There were unexplained nocturnal flights over Stanley. Those who heard the aircraft or saw the lights in the small hours believed that they were military Hercules planes. Twice they dropped flares as they flew over Stanley Airport. The flares may have been signals to LADE staff who would have confirmed the accuracy of their navigation." [83]

"By the end of February, he (Vice-Comodoro Gamen) participated in the coordination of a secret mission devised by the Argentine Air Force Jefatura III: a Malvinas VOR verification task would be simulated but, instead of being executed by the INAC radio aid verification Learjet 35 A, the flight would be performed by a photo reconnaissance Learjet 35 A of the II Brigada Aérea (2nd Air Brigade), with the purpose of carrying out a photographic survey of Puerto Stanley and its adjacent areas. The material would be used to plan the islands' recapture operation. Gamen (arranged) that an INAC's NCO would do the reception on the island for that operation's ground support so that the British would not be suspicious of the aircraft change. Due to unfavorable weather conditions and because the verification process could not last more than three days, the Learjet returned to Paraná without having completed the required survey." [84]

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri is the guest of honour at a barbecue to celebrate 100 years since the end of the Conquest of the Desert. [85]

February 15th, in London, Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister regarding Argentina's demands.

> *"The Argentine Government have given us, as a prior notification of their position and objectives at New York, a substantial and toughly worded document which asserts that the sole purpose of the negotiations is to cede sovereignty to Argentina, denies the relevance of the Islanders' wishes (as opposed to interests) and, without explicit threats, refers to the Islanders' dependence on services provided by the Argentines."* [86]

Thatcher responds that it should be made clear that the wishes of the Islanders remain paramount. [87]

"... the British were pursuing two contradictory policies: (1) negotiate a settlement with Argentina over the Falklands; and (2) protect the rights of the Falkland Islanders as British citizens. Both were undermined by the inherent difficulties of doing things "in twos." Britain was unable to make the kind of offer to the Argentine government that would have settled the issue peacefully, because the islanders and their supporters in Britain would have seen this as betrayal." [88]

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82 Thornton 2004

83 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders' Story* Graham Bound 2007

84 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

85 Argentina's conquest of Patagonia after 1860. Without doubt, a colonization. Now viewed by some as genocide. See - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/13/argentinian-founding-father-genocide-row

86 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100.* Also *PREM19/657 f113*

87 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 - 100*

88 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* Patrick Bratton & Wallace Thies 2011 in *Comparative Strategy* 30:1 1-27

In Buenos Aires, the British Embassy hosts a reception for a joint Anglo-Argentine military climbing expedition recently returned from the Andes.

"Amid the celebrations and clinking of glasses, the ambassador (Williams) turned to me and said: "See the camaraderie. Relations have never been better between our two countries". At that moment, preparations were well advanced for the invasion. The ambassador's remark was surprising as he was involved in the attempts to diffuse the threatening crisis. It was later revealed that his sympathies lay with Argentina, to the extent that there were allegations that he betrayed the United Kingdom by withholding vital information from Lord Carrington." [89]

February 16th, in London, the Governor's annual review of the Falkland Islands is considered; *"It is inevitable that the view it gives is a partial one. But, as a description of the Islanders' position, it is admirable and worth reading carefully for that reason."* [90]

February 17th, in Buenos Aires, morning newspapers announce that negotiations with Great Britain regarding the Falkland Islands will resume in New York on February 26.

"In February 1982 the Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, recommended that project Alpha be postponed so as not to complicate the forthcoming negotiations in New York. On 17 February the Junta agreed. Nevertheless, there is some indication that the navy – without the knowledge of either the Junta as a whole or its own commander-in-chief – decided to proceed." [91]

February 18th, Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* reports:

> *"The least that can be asked of military governments is that they do not dither in the face of any military eventuality when questions of sovereignty are involved. After decades of fruitless negotiations, Argentina has good cause to know that Great Britain will not give up the Malvinas either voluntarily or via any agreement that would mean losing its administrative power in the islands... the time is approaching for Buenos Aires to think in terms of force."* [92]

"Mike Hickson has been sending you translations of a series of articles written by Jesus Iglesias Rouco, and calling for an invasion of the Falklands Islands by Argentina. The latest of these appeared on 18 February. David Joy and I had a chance to talk to Iglesias Rouco about these articles ... Iglesias Rouco was adamant that he had not been put up to write any of the articles, but that they represented his own opinion. He genuinely believed that the time was right for Argentina to take unilateral action to recover the Islands, that after many years of patient negotiation, Argentina could no longer expect results from negotiating, and that since the British government was not in a position to force the issue vis-à-vis the Islanders, or to defend them, it fell to the Argentine Government to take the necessary action to solve the dispute once and for all. Our own view, following this discussion with him is that, having been given a lead on the story by one of his editors, as reported by secret sources, Iglesias Rouco has got a bit of a bee in his bonnet about the subject of the Falklands. The question is, as Igelsias Rouco himself said, whether anyone in the Argentine Government will listen to him." [93]

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89 Briley 2022. It was later alleged that Ambassador Williams had purchased land in Argentina for the construction of a retirement home. That said, Williams sent many warnings to the FCO regarding Argentina's aggressive intentions.

90 *PREM19/613 f101*

91 Welch 1997, citing circumstantial evidence that the Navy afterwards authorised another voyage without notifying the Foreign Ministry. See Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.46

92 Iglesias Rouco quoted in *ALW 040/325/3*

93 *MacKenzie (British Embassy Buenos Aires) to Bright February 19, 1982*

"Speaking of "the measure of Argentine need", the "Galician" Iglesias Rouco, at that time with the help of influential sources in the San Martín Palace, made a scan of the reasons that (lay behind) the military decision of April 2: "1) The isolation that the country suffers with regard to the political and strategic schemes of the West, caused by its erratic foreign policy of the last thirty years, its progressive internal weakening and more recently, the methods used in the so-called anti-subversive war, which have placed Argentina in a kind of international ghetto; 2) the unfavorable results of the arbitration on the Beagle, and now of the Papal mediation, which poses an imminent threat to our position in the South Atlantic; 3) the Soviet penetration in the zone, with the consequent North American concern [...]. In short: if Argentina does not immediately obtain a new foothold in the South Atlantic, it runs the risk of being excluded from everything that is cooked there"...".[94]

February 22nd, in Buenos Aires, Lord Buxton, en-route to the Falkland Islands, has a brief conversation with Foreign Minister Costa Méndez.

"Lord Buxton found Costa Méndez an eminently urbane and cultured person and more pertinently, quite reasonable and clearly anglophile. Buxton came away convinced that no wild actions are likely to be taken by the Argentines whilst the present government was in charge. Costa Méndez said it was essential to find some alternative to the discredited leaseback proposal which he considered had been badly handled. For the Argentines sovereignty was crucial but the rest was negotiable. ... He discounted the possibility of invasion with disparaging references to the airliner hijacking of some years ago. ... Lord Buxton ... seemed generally optimistic that some civilised solution to the problem could be found..." [95]

"Lord Buxton stated that Costa Méndez repeatedly said that he was under pressure from public opinion, but Lord Buxton judged the pressure was coming from the junta. Nevertheless, Buxton gained the impression that an invasion of the Falklands was unlikely." [96]

February 23rd, in Buenos Aires, scrap dealer Constantino Davidoff turns up at the British Embassy.

He apologises for his earlier failures to comply with South Georgia's regulations and informs Embassy staff that he wishes to return to Leith on March 10th, with 30 workers; expecting to stay some six months. Davidoff is warned that the appropriate formalities must be complied with on his arrival at South Georgia.

"Davidoff was never, of course, given any permission by this Embassy but, on the contrary, warned personally in February ..." [97]

"Admiral Otero's office, in charge transportation and logistics, gave the go-ahead to the trip without further consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." [98]

94 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: "En un mes tomamos las Malvinas"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022.

95 *UKE Buenos Aires to FCO* in *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 – 100.*

96 Elgood 2025

97 Ambassador Williams in a telegram to London dated March 20, 1982 quoted in *PREM 19/613.* The *'warning'* was actually given by Richard Gozney, a junior member of the Embassy staff, and later described by *Endurance's* Capt. Barker as; *"so weakly worded it was no more discouraging than a few dandelions in the lawn of opportunity."*

98 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.46

"... the time to conduct salvage operations on South Georgia was between November and March, not March and October. Yet, Davidoff's declared plan of operations called for his men to work for the next four months through the worst of South Georgia's winter when there would be nineteen hours of darkness out of every twenty-four, heavy winds and several feet of snow. This was a poor choice of timing for what purported to be a purely commercial enterprise." [99]

"Whitehall's complacency was shared by the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, who, belonging to the Neville Henderson school of diplomacy, believed that even a horrible dictatorship like General Galtieri's would not stoop to actual aggression, especially if Britain kept on good terms with it. Williams, a 'brilliant' public-school and Oxford diplomat, carried weight in the Foreign Office; Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Isles, a plain commonsensical man who shared Barker's fears, did not." [100]

From Buenos Aires, Harold Briley, the BBC's Latin American Correspondent, reports:

> *"Speculation that Argentina's Generals may resort to force in an attempt to invade the Falkland Islands to get their way is emphatically discounted by the Foreign Ministry. ... A Foreign Ministry spokesman told me Argentina's patience is running out and the new Galtieri government wants 'quick results' (on surrender of sovereignty). ... The Argentines have promised to respect the interests of the Islanders and guarantee their lifestyle, traditions and democracy. The Islanders are understandably sceptical, pointing out that successive Argentine regimes have been unable to guarantee democracy in their own country."* [101]

February 24th, in London, Edward J, Streator, Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy, speaks to Richard Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; *"Luce noted that he would be in New York over the weekend for further discussions with Argentine officials on the future of the Falkland Islands. The Argentines, he said, were if anything more prickly than ever. The new regime in Buenos Aires was sounding more hawkish. It came through in a more aggressive attitude toward Chile over the Beagle Channel, and the Falklands negotiations could easily go the same route, to the disadvantage of all concerned. Luce wondered if we might quietly pass the word to the Argentines to 'cool it' a bit."* [102]

Informed, the US Embassy in Buenos Aires telegrams the US State Department.

> *"In response to Luce's February 24 request for the United States to "quietly urge restraint on the Argentines", the Embassy advised that the United States should "avoid involvement" in the dispute. "As Department recalls, the Argentine Navy has tried to draw us into the dispute on Argentina's side. In any case, the cost to us here of being perceived as leaning toward the British in this dispute, which arouses Argentine passions, could be high and the Argentines would find ways of indicating their displeasure".*
>
> *In a final comment, the Embassy noted: "Some of our contacts in the GOA have sought to convey a sense of urgency about the current round of negotiations" and "we have also heard references to an*

99 Thornton 2014. Thornton calls the Embassy reaction - "*nothing less than extraordinary*" after Davidoff's previous failure to follow regulations. Sadly, Thornton's interpretation of events is tainted by his belief that Thatcher's government was complicit in the fomenting of a conflict for its own political ends; which he was trying to prove.

100 *The High Cost of Cuts* Correlli Barnett in *The Spectator* May 16, 1997 p.42. Henderson was Britain's Ambassador to the USA.

101 Briley 2022

102 *Telegram 4235 from the US Embassy, London, to the Department of State* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 10*

Argentine desire to accelerate the pace of the negotiations but it is hard for us to tell what precisely the Argentines hope to accomplish".” [103]

February 25th, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez issues instructions to the Argentine negotiators in New York.

“The Argentine delegation will constantly keep in mind the fact that the recognition by Great Britain of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is a national and permanent objective of the Republic and that therefore it is crucial for the successful development of the negotiating process that the negotiations deal essentially with (that) said issue.”[104]

“The Argentine delegation that attended New York was made up of ambassadors Enrique Juan Ros, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas and Carlos Lucan Blanco; Minister Atilo Molteni; Secretary Domingo Cullen and the advisor of the Antarctic and Malvinas Directorate of the Foreign Ministry, Colonel (R) Luis González Balcarce. The British (delegation) was chaired by Minister of State Richard Napier Luce; the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams; the head of the South American Department, Robert Fearn, and Foreign Office officials Colin Bright, John Anthony Penny and Jeremy Creeswell. Kelpers Lionel G. Blake and John Edward Check (sic) were also integrated into the United Kingdom delegation.” [105]

“A bilateral meeting was scheduled in February to continue talks. It fell to Richard Luce, then Minister of State at the FCO who replaced Ridley, to represent London, with instructions to resist the deadlines set in the Argentine memorandum and maintain that any agreement on the Commission should be ad referendum.” [106]

In Britain's House of Commons, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher takes questions.

“Mr. Farr: Has my right hon. Friend seen the reports in today's press about the possibility of the Argentine taking military action against the Falkland Islands? Can she assure the House and the country that the Falkland Islands will receive full support and military protection from Her Majesty's Government? Furthermore, can she assure the House that she will again consider withdrawing HMS “Endurance” from station and leaving her in the area until a suitable substitute can be provided?

The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend knows, we have put the position to the people of the Falkland Islands and we have said that their future is wholly a matter for their decision. In the meantime, we shall do our level best to meet the decisions of the Falkland Islanders.” [107]

February 26th, in New York, Anglo-Argentine negotiations commence. Argentina's delegation is led by Deputy-Foreign Minister Enrique Ros. Britain's team by Minister Richard Luce. Representing the Falkland Islands people are Tim Blake and John Cheek.

“Mr. Luce explained that he wished to make the British position clear from the outset. We had no doubts about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. The wishes of the Islanders themselves were paramount …

Sr. Ros recalled that Argentina had been trying to reach a solution to this dispute for over 16 years … He stressed that the principal question for Argentines' was sovereignty. The key to their position was the need for Britain to recognise Argentine sovereignty in the area. … Argentina had no intention of disturbing the Islanders' style of life; what they wanted was a balance between Islanders' interests

103 *Telegram 1112 from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, to the Department of State; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820105–0567*
104 Quoted in Yofre 2011
105 Yofre 2011
106 *La política británica hacia las Malvinas* Vicente Berasategui 2013
107 *Hansard HC [18/980-84]*

and Argentine sovereignty rights. … For the Argentines it would not be possible to accept any agreement that excluded the Argentine claim to sovereignty. …" [108]

"We knew before the talks took place in February 1982 what the Argentines were going to propose. Lord Carrington agreed that I should accept their concept of a 'negotiating commission' which would look at every facet of the Falkland Islands problem, including sovereignty. However, I was to make it absolutely clear to them that, as far as sovereignty was concerned, there would be no change without the consent of the Islanders and of Parliament. Against that background I was given the broad brief to go into negotiations, to keep dialogue going and, to be quite blunt about it, if things were getting difficult, we would just have to buy time. … I say, quite bluntly, that we were blocked in. Leaseback had not made any progress, and we saw no easy way out. We hoped, I hoped, that perhaps the Argentines would come forward with something positive out of the negotiating commission, which might lead us to a new way forward … all we could do was buy time. We had run out of any innovating ideas. Of those, leaseback had been the most important." [109]

"At one point (February 26 at 10 a.m.), Luce said that "the wishes of the islanders take absolute priority". An unacceptable condition for the Argentines, since only "the interests" of the islanders should be taken into account. … The terms of the dialogues hinted at the difficult possibility of an understanding. LUCE: The wishes of the islanders are of absolute priority to us. There must be no change without their consent … (We) have no doubts about British sovereignty. ROS: Argentina has no doubts about its sovereign rights. In the future we must reach a "common understanding". [...] The element of recognition of our sovereignty is essential. We must bear in mind that this problem will persist until a solution is reached. In Argentina there is increasing pressure in this regard [...] And nothing should be interpreted in Buenos Aires that could lead to the inference that the dispute over sovereignty is set aside. LUCE: I don't think we're misunderstanding each other. I understand the special sensitivity but it also exists in our Parliament. Our common goal is to work towards the solution. ORTIZ DE ROZAS: I do not underestimate the sensitivity of your Parliament, but it is more acute in Argentina." [110]

"The official position is that Luce had been instructed to play for time, offering no more that continuing talks rather than the monthly meetings the Argentines expected. Mrs Thatcher had ordered "it must be made clear to the Argentines that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount". Luce could not talk about the merits of leaseback, as the Islanders had rejected it. Cheek told the author (Elgood) that he found Luce's negotiating manner very odd, scarcely surprising as apart from suggesting freezing the dispute for a period of years, a gesture to the Islanders present which was swiftly rejected, it seemed that Luce was in the awkward position of having nothing of substance to offer the Argentines except a good lunch." [111]

February 27th, in Argentina, the morning newspaper *Convicción* notes; *"All the conditions are given: we have a determined president and an excellent foreign minister. If after winning the war on terrorism, we take back the Falklands, history will forget the economic stupidities. Argentina will be alive, aware of its vigor and ready to take a place in the world."* The article concludes that a positive outcome for Argentina in the negotiations would reinforce Argentina's position regarding the Beagle Channel Islands.

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108 *PREM19/613 f68*

109 Richard Luce interviewed in *Little Platoon* M. Charlton 1989 p.182

110 *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: "En un mes tomamos las Malvinas"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022

111 Elgood 2025

In New York, a second day of talks take place at the United Nations. [112]

"At the end of day one we were going to continue discussing ways of cooperation, and ways forward. All we had to do after that was draft a communiqué. But they had obviously conveyed to BA what they thought had been agreed, and were told to go back and start again. So we covered exactly the same ground on day two."[113]

"Ros' brief was to obtain firm agreement for a negotiating commission with scheduled meetings ending with a conclusion favourable to Argentina by the end of the year. Luce spent much time explaining to Ros why the FCO was prevented by the strength of support for the Islanders in Britain from taking the action requested by Argentina, despite being eager to do so." [114]

At the end of the meeting, the two delegations confer on a joint-statement to be released to the press.

"*Then we drafted a communiqué, saying that we would aim to progress the relationship, and that we respected each others' position on the sovereignty dispute. It was another long grass' situation. We had no inkling that they were losing patience. It was odd. To this day I don't believe that the people in New York were aware of the level of planning in BA. The idea that we were [made] aware that they were going to invade is something that people have invented."* [115]

From New York, Ambassador Ros informs his Foreign Ministry as to what he believes has been achieved.

> *"It should be stated that the (Argentine) delegation has achieved the objectives set in the instructions in that the Argentine proposal have been accepted in the following aspect: Constitution of a permanent negotiating Commission whose meeting will have sufficient frequency to negotiate the dispute."* [116]

"Ros's superiors in Buenos Aires were furious. Here the assessment was that Britain was procrastinating once again. The aim of demonstrating British intransigence before the international community was not going to be helped by cryptic reports of cordial meetings. The key fact was that Britain had not formally accepted the Argentine proposal and had given no indication of when it intended to do so." [117]

"From the report it is clear that Juan Enrique Ros felt satisfied with the progress made in the meetings in New York, but that was not the feeling of Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez." [118]

In Argentina, conscripts inducted into the armed forces from the 'Class of (19)63', commence basic training. [119]

February 28th, from New York, for the FCO, the UK's Mission sums up its understanding of the agreement regarding a 'Permanent Negotiating Commission.

> *"The purpose of a UK/Argentine Permanent Negotiating Commission would be to accelerate progress towards a peaceful and comprehensive solution of the dispute between Britain and Argentina on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. … The work of the Commission should be conducted without prejudice to the sovereignty position of either Government."* [120]

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112 These were the 3rd round of talks under the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher and, as it would turn out, the last ever face-to face Anglo-Argentine negotiation regarding sovereignty..
113 Tim Blake quoted in Bound 2007
114 Elgood 2025
115 *Ibid.*
116 Quoted in Yofre 2011. All proposals were *ad referendum* to London.
117 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.28
118 Yofre 2011
119 1963 being their year of birth.
120 *PREM19/613 f67*

"By the end of February, the DENAC 1/82 and a handwritten fourteen-page document called "Outline Plan for Recapturing the Malvinas Islands" were ready." [121]

"Foreign Secretary Costa Méndez messaged the Argentine Ambassadors at London and the UN: "What would the British do if we invaded?" The answers he received by the end of February 1982 (read by the British, courtesy of America's NSA) were "break off diplomatic relations and impose economic sanctions"." [122]

March 1st, in New York, the negotiating delegations release a joint statement to the press.

> *"The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense."*

In Washington DC, on the same day, Britain's Minister Richard Luce has a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas O. Enders.

"When Luce saw Enders at the State Department on 1 March, , he briefed him on the present situation on the Falklands issue following the New York talks. The issue was becoming increasingly polarised. The Argentines were impatient at what they saw as a lack of progress after sixteen years of negotiations: at the same time Islanders opposition to any transfer of sovereignty or greater involvement with Argentina had hardened. ... It would therefore be helpful if Enders during his forthcoming visit to Buenos Aires could encourage the Argentines to keep things cool on the Falklands dispute. Enders undertook to do this ... His only specific comment was that the Argentines had recently given the impression of greater optimism that the UK was now more ready to consider the interests rather than simply the wishes of the Islanders..." [123]

From Buenos Aires, in the evening, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a statement.

> *"At the meeting held in New York on 26 and 27 February, the representatives of Argentina and Great Britain considered an Argentine proposal to establish a system of monthly meetings with a pre-established agenda, pre-arranged meeting place, and led by top-level officials. The aim of such meetings will be genuinely to speed up to the maximum the negotiations in train to achieve recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and by this means to achieve substantial results within a time which at this advanced stage of the discussions will necessarily have to be short.*
>
> *Argentina has negotiated with Great Britain over the solution of the sovereignty dispute over the islands with patience, loyalty and good faith for over 15 years, within the framework indicated by the relevant United Nations resolutions.*
>
> *The new system constitutes an effective step for the early solution of the dispute. However, should this not occur, Argentina reserves the right to terminate the working of this mechanism and to chose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests."* [124]

121 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
122 Elgood 2025 citing *Through the Looking Glass: British Foreign Policy* Anthony Verrier 1983 p.341
123 *PREM19/657 f108*
124 *Williams to FCO March 2, 1982* in *ALW 040/325/1 B 51-100.* Also *PREM19/657 f107.*

"The unilateral Argentine communique was released before the GOA negotiator returned to Buenos Aires, indicating that the GOA planned to issue it regardless of the outcome of the talks, which the British entered with instructions to listen only. In any event, the Foreign Ministry has limited influence on GOA decisions regarding the Malvinas, which, like the Beagle, is managed at the Junta level. The unexpected, threatening GOA communique suggests a hardening attitude, ..." [125]

"I would not say that that report was the beginning of an offensive, but an accentuation in the face of a failure bigger than we expected, from the meeting on the 26th and 27th. (It had) the purpose of putting pressure on the British government so that they would not give in to the pressure of the (Falklands) Committee or a group of the Islanders. ... Both General Galtieri and Admiral Anaya called me in the morning of March 1st, both rightly disappointed about the meeting of the 26th and 27th and they pointed out to me the convenience of doing something more concrete. That is why I planned that memorandum... At no time did I have in mind, when I talked about other procedures, the possibility of resorting to force." [126]

"... Costa Méndez, after consulting the Military Junta, issues a unilateral statement maintaining that a negotiation system had been considered in New York and revealed the points analyzed, despite the confidentiality of the treaty (sic) having been agreed to ... The final paragraph of the statement was more of a threat than a warning." [127]

"The talks appeared to go well and resulted in an agreement to set up a commission that would consider both parties' demands. The Argentines, however, decided to turn up the pressure on London rather than wait to see what the commission might accomplish." [128]

March 2nd, Argentine newspapers report on the Foreign Ministry's statement.

> *"The press release stated that Argentina had negotiated for more than fifteen years with the UK, with patience, loyalty and good faith and within the framework of the UN and had proposed a new mechanism for negotiations which is to include South Georgia as well as the Sandwich Islands. If there was no agreement, Argentina retains the right to ... resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina. This last paragraph obviously does not exclude the possibility of military occupation of the islands."* [129]

"The Falklands talks are given front-page treatment in most of today's newspapers. The text of the Joint Communique is widely reproduced, but is overshadowed by the text of a separate Argentine statement which was issued by the MFA ... an unnamed Government source, quoted by La Nacion, recalled Camilion's assertion that the present status of the Falkland Islands was "unsustainable" ... He said that various plans were already being prepared for forthcoming meeting. ... He stated that there were also parallel plans already formulated in case the envisaged meetings did not produce sufficient progress." [130]

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125 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

126 *Judgment provided by Decree 2971/83 of the alleged infractions provided for in the Code of Justice Military indicated in the actions and report produced by the Commission for Analysis and Evaluation of the Military Political and Strategic Responsibilities of the War Conflict in the South Atlantic.* Interview with Costa Mendez after the 1982 Falklands War for, apparently, the Argentine Commission of Inquiry (Rattenbach). Undated, the document can be found here - https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/ar_ea_cem_csf_05_17.pdf

127 Yofre 2011

128 Bratton & Thies 2011 p.4

129 *Clarin* March 2, 1982

130 *Williams to FCO March 2, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f107*

Argentina's *Buenos Aires Herald* sees the Foreign Ministry announcement as containing a *"veiled threat"*, and warns the UK that this time Argentina, *"means business."* [131]

"Even the Buenos Aires Herald (never a lapdog of the military government) soberly reported a source in the government, believed to be the Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, saying that Argentina was preparing to break off diplomatic relations with Britain unless there was a successful outcome very soon." [132]

From Buenos Aires, Britain's Defence Attaché, Colonel Stephen Love, writes to Defence Intelligence at the MOD, Robin Fearn at the FCO and Governor Hunt regarding the Argentine's possible use of force to seize the Islands; suggesting a clandestine assault would be the most probable. [133]

"On 2 March, the military attaché in Buenos Aires, Colonel Love, envisaged the Argentine navy landing marines on the Falklands, and if the Argentines believed a negotiated settlement was no longer possible, there might be 'a straight seizure of the Islands.' ..." [134]

"... he referred to Galtieri's impatience, the belligerent press articles, (and) the possibility of the Argentine navy taking direct action against the Islands in the form of a blockade or temporary landing... The FCO copy of Colonel Love's report is annotated: "I suspect that the Ambassador asked for this to be sent. It says nothing we don't already know". In MOD Colonel Love's memorandum was not circulated above branch level." [135]

In New York, Britain's delegation respond that the Buenos Aires statement; *"... creates a more difficult and unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiating process."* [136]

"Alarm bells should have been ringing loudly in London. Instead, it was judged that negotiations would continue. The government's Joint Intelligence Committee concluded no major military action was likely before the start of the southern summer in October. There was little sense of urgency." [137]

In Argentina, Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez is informed that he will head the military government in the Falklands, once they have been seized. [138]

"On 2 March, when Galtieri offered the governorship of the Malvinas to General Mario B. Menéndez, he told Menéndez that the invading force would only remain on the islands until November-December 1982..." [139]

"On 2 March, ... Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was informed about the existing plans to militarily recover the islands and his intended role: Military Governor of the Malvinas." [140]

"At the meeting, Galtieri informed him that the Military Junta was preparing (for) the occupation of the Malvinas and that the operation depended on how diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain evolved." [141]

"The Military Junta had appointed General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez, Chief of the 3rd Operations of the Army General Staff, to be in charge as Military Governor. General Galtieri assured him that his commission would not extend beyond November or December as they did not expect any complications. Menéndez quickly

131 *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 – 100*
132 Bound 2007
133 Not in the file, but the Governor responded to Love on March 11, 1982. See *FCO12/384 f216.*
134 Briley 2022
135 Elgood 2025
136 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign* L. Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.137
137 Briley 2022
138 *Falklands: The Secret Plot* O. Cardoso, R. Kirschboom & E. Kooy 1983 p.52
139 *The Origins of the South Atlantic War* John Arquilla & Maria M. Rasmussen 2001
140 Carbone 2008
141 Yofre 2011

requested to be assigned assistants, as there were around 1,900 people living in the archipelago: 1,420 natives, 450 British citizens, and approximately 30 foreigners (including Argentinians, Canadians, Uruguayans, Israelis, and Americans).” [142]

From New York, Island delegates Tim Blake and John Cheek return to the Islands but are unable to comment due to the level of confidentiality insisted upon by the Foreign Office.

> *“The meetings have been shrouded in secrecy to a degree that would not exist in most other democratic countries … we, whose way of life is up against the wall are left uninformed and wondering.”* [143]

“The councillors returned to Stanley on 2 March, exactly one month before the invasion, and reported confidentially to their colleagues on Executive and Legislative Councils (Exco and Legco). Even before their LADE plane touched down in Stanley the Argentine popular press was shrieking outrage at the 'failure' of the talks and quoting bellicose words from the military government.” [144]

March 3rd, in Argentina, *La Prensa* reports that Britain has only a limited time period in which to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

“… columnist Iglesias Rouco claims to detect Argentine dissatisfaction with the New York talks and serious thought of breaking off relations with Britain in the near future. He quotes his sources as saying that Britain will have no more than three or four months to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty and agree on an early date for the "return" of the Islands to Argentina. … There would be no flexibility in Argentina's minimum demand for restitution of sovereignty before the 150th anniversary of the colony … Argentina would resort to other means if there were no progress. He goes on to speculate about the advantages of a direct seizure of the Islands, which he believes would be "understood" by the Americans, to whom joint naval facilities in the Islands could be offered. He suggests that such direct action might be taken between the middle and end of this year.” [145]

“We have now received a Secret report confirming that this press speculation was inspired by the Argentinian Naval High Command in an attempt to achieve and early settlement of the dispute. The report states that is there is no tangible progress towards a settlement by the end of June 1982 the Navy will push for a diplomatic offensive in international organisations, a break in relations with the UK and military action against the Islands.” [146]

“No diplomat can talk about the use of force. A decision of this nature is taken without any prior notice. We are willing, very firmly, to go as far as need be if the archipelago is not returned as soon as possible.” [147]

British newspapers report on the Falklands dispute and the reaction in Argentina following the New York talks.

> *“The Argentine Government has warned that it will "put an end" to negotiations with Britain over the disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and feel free to take other action unless a quick solution is found.”* [148]

142 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
143 *Penguin News*
144 Bound 2007
145 *UKE Buenos Aires to FCO Mar 3, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f103*
146 *Lt.-Colonel Lowles to DGI Falkland Islands* in *FCO12/384 f170*
147 Foreign Minister Méndez quoted in Bound 2007
148 *The Guardian* March 3, 1982

"A British Embassy official who handles Falkland affairs told EmbOf on March 3 that Argentine FonMin statement took HMG by surprise and is likely to annoy HMG because of the breach of confidentiality." [149]

"On 3 March Mr Luce sent a personal message to Enrico Ros referring to the agreement that the discussions should remain confidential until Governments had been consulted. He said the communique and residual press comment had created more difficulty and an unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiation process. He added, "I am deeply disturbed by what may be interpreted as threats..."..." [150]

".., Margaret Thatcher would say that the Argentine government "violated the procedures agreed during the meeting" through Costa Méndez's (public) statement. ... However, she said years later, "despite my trepidation, I did not expect anything resembling an invasion, thinking consistent with the most recent assessment of our intelligence."..." [151]

In London, in the House of Commons, Minister of State Luce makes a statement before taking questions. [152]

> *"I met the Argentine Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for discussions on the Falkland Islands question on 26 and 27 February in New York. While we both agreed on the need to resolve the dispute, and discussed future procedures, I made it clear that we had no doubts about British sovereignty, and that no solution could be agreed that was not acceptable to the islanders and to the House. The text of the communiqué was published in the Official Report of 2 March and has been placed in the Library."*

Asked about reports in the Argentine press, Luce responds:

> *"The statement reported to have been issued by the Argentine Government yesterday is not helpful to the process that we all wish to see that will resolve this dispute."*
>
> *"The statement to which my right hon. Friend referred causes me and my right hon. and noble Friend deep concern, especially as the discussions last week were held in a friendly and cordial atmosphere. Yet, they have been followed by a statement that is most unhelpful. It causes deep anxiety and is not helpful to the process of finding a solution to the problem."*

"That evening in the lobby of the House, Luce told Mrs Thatcher they should restore HMS Endurance to the Falklands. She said: "That's no good; it only goes pop, pop, pop. We should send aircraft carriers instead". [153]

PM Thatcher *minutes*; *"we must make contingency plans."*

March 4th, from London, a message is sent to the British Embassy in Washington DC.

> *"In the light of Luce's discussion with Enders on 1 March, Mr Luce hopes that you can brief Enders before he leaves for Argentina, on the statement issued by the Argentines on 1 March and on the terms of our reaction. You should make clear that while we have every wish to find a solution to the dispute, it is politically impossible for us to negotiate against a background of threats. The Argentine action not only contravenes the spirit of the New York talks: it makes the whole task of finding a solution much more difficult. We appreciate that Enders will not necessarily wish to appear to be in support of the British view of the dispute in his talks in Buenos Aires.*

149 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 4, 1982* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

150 Barker 1997

151 Yofre 2011

152 *Hansard: Oral Answers to Questions: Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Falkland Islands March 3 1982*

153 Elgood 2025 citing *Ringing the Changes: A memoir* Richard Luce 2007 p.139. *Endurance* was still in the South Atlantic at this time, not having reached the end of its deployment.

But it would be helpful if he could reinforce with the Argentines the clear risks of pushing this issue into a confrontation. He should be aware that the Argentine press continues to assert that the Americans would turn a blind eye to a use of force by Argentina." [154]

Informed of the PM's conversation with Richard Luce the day before, Lord Carrington advises Mrs Thatcher against sending aircraft carriers into the South Atlantic; believing that the Cabinet would not see the need. [155]

From Stanley, the Falkland Islands' Governor telegrams London.

"Partly as a result of the Argentine MFA statement, feeling of Councillors today was against acceptance of informal working paper. ... More time for consideration was needed. They asked for another meeting in a fortnight. ... In view of the Argentine breach of confidentiality, Councillors have asked they could release text of informal working paper immediately.... I assume that you would prefer not to authorise this..." [156]

March 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the FCO in London.

"My interview with Enrique Ros yesterday evening turned into an exchange of commiserations. He was at pains to make it clear ... that he accepted that the false impression of menace on the MFA's statement's last paragraph was "unhappy" (sic) and that the Ministry accepted no (repeat no) responsibility for the remarks ascribed to it unattributably..." [157]

From Port Stanley, Governor Hunt updates Capt. Barker on HMS *Endurance*.

"New York talks did not end in deadlock but a bland communique. Councillors returned with an agreed working paper for consideration by Legislative Council here and Ministers in UK for further talks in near future. Irresponsible statements from Argentine MFA and press about what was agreed at New York have now made progress more difficult and Councillors have asked for a fortnight's grace to consider Argentine proposals. My guess is that they will reject them, in which case we shall have reached deadlock: but that time is not yet." [158]

In London, Lord Carrington speaks to Ure and Fearn.

"After the meeting, Ure met the Under-Secretary of State (who had not been present), who asked him to pass Lord Carrington an afterthought, that "a small naval task force" was sent to the Islands in 1977 by David Owen to deter an invasion threat. Carrington asked if the Argentines had known, was told no, and took no further action. It was the last moment when a task force could have reached the Islands." [159]

Britain's Cabinet members request that the next Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee paper include; "*Annexes on both civil and military contingency plans for counter-action against Argentina."*

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154 *Carrington to UKE Washington March 4, 1982* in *FCO12/384 f180*

155 Elgood 2025. Had the British made a show of force at this time, the war would almost certainly have been averted.

156 *Hunt to FCO March 4, 1982* in *ALW 040/325/1 B 51 - 100*

157 *Williams to FCO March 5, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f99*

158 *FCO46/3202 f122*

159 Elgood 2025. The Under-Secretary of State was Richard Luce. Information regarding the 1977 deployment had not been made available to Thatcher under some arcane convention whereby one government is not made privy to the actions of its predecessor, particularly when they involve national security operations. The deployment in 1977 would come out dramatically on March 30, 1982, during a Commons debate (see below). Made aware, it would seem that Carrington did not pass this information on to Thatcher, or his colleagues in Cabinet. To the Franks Committee in 1982/3, Lord Carrington maintained that, at this time, he still did not believe that the Argentines posed a threat.

Guy Huntrods, a director of Lloyds Bank International, complains about the implications of rising tensions for trade with Argentina, and Britain's financial interests in that country. [160]

In Buenos Aires, Costa Méndez tells Ambassador Williams that he is dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations. David Joy, a member of the Embassy staff in Buenos Aires, reports a conversation with Raul Schmidt of the Chilean Embassy.

> *"The Schmidt thesis is based essentially on the Argentine Navy's need of a strategic port further south than its current and most secure port, Puerto Belgrano. The obvious option Ushuaia was not satisfactory from a security point of view because it is under constant Chilean surveillance. Therefore the Argentines are, according to Schmidt, desperate to have some other secure port further south, a goal that could be satisfied by having access to the islands south of Beagle or the Falklands. In this context, he believes the sovereignty disputes are linked."* [161]

Argentine *La Prensa* journalist Jesús Iglesias Rouco reports that; *"practically all (Army) commanders express their belief that the firm position adopted by the government against great Britain is correct, and some add that the recovery of the islands, whether by diplomatic or military means, will strengthen the process."* [162]

Unidentified military aircraft are reported to have flown over Port Stanley.

March 6th, at Stanley airport, an Argentine *LADE Hercules* transport aircraft lands unannounced; citing an in-flight emergency (fuel leak).

"Overflights by Argentine military aircraft were a frequent topic of conversation. The emergency landing of an Argentine C-130 at Stanley Airport ... had given the people the jitters. (As Port Stanley reported by telegram, the plane arrived without formal warning and it was only thanks to a local ham radio operator that anyone knew it was coming in. The control tower was not manned since it was a Sunday, and the plane could presumably have landed before anyone could have got out to the airport. As it was there was still time for the Airport Manager, Mr. Gerald Cheek, and a contingent of armed marines, to drive out to the airport before the plane landed). The incident certainly demonstrated the relative ease with which unannounced military aircraft could land at Stanley ..." [163]

"Ricupero cited the recent surprise landing of an Argentine air force Hercules at Stanley and surmised that despite what Costa Mendez had told his own Ministers, this might indicate the sort of additional pressure which the Argentines might feel tempted to use." [164]

"With hindsight, Dick Baker saw the flight and the landing as either a spying mission or a rehearsal for an Entebbe-style raid. It was a quiet Sunday afternoon and the pilot had radioed Stanley claiming his Hercules, supposedly on a routine mail dropping flight to an Antarctic base, was leaking fuel. He needed to land immediately. When Vice Comodoro Hector Gilobert (?) disturbed the Baker household asking for permission, Dick did not refuse it, but decided he would drive to Stanley Airport to have a look at the aircraft. Dick watched with growing concern as a few dozen obviously senior officers disembarked. They were not the sort of men to

160 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements (Security, Conflict & Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* Grace Livingstone 2018

161 Quoted in *Daily Telegraph* 21.2.2013

162 Quoted in Yofre 2011

163 *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101.* Hickson *minute* following duty call to the Island dated 19th March 1982

164 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No.42 of 11 March 1982.* This telegram details a conversation in Brasilia between Ambassador George Harding and the Head of the Brazilian America's Department.

go on supply flights, but they were the kind of invasion planners who would love to have a good look around Stanley. The Chief Secretary smelt a rat and the stench became stronger when one of the airport's technical staff told him that there was no firm evidence of a fuel leak." [165]

"The Deputy Governor and Dick Chief Secretary, Dick Baker, said to me that efforts to sound alarm bells in London were wasted. "A lot of us did foresee it. The tragedy was no one in London seemed to want to know or to react to the signals... Why nothing happened in response is a great mystery to me". He suspected there was a deliberate policy to ignore the signals and weather an invasion in the hope that Britain would be rid of a troublesome colony. "We used to joke we were expendable", said Dick Baker." [166]

In Mendoza, Argentina, Alejandro Orfila, current President of the Organization of American States (OAS), makes a statement to the press regarding the Falklands; *"It will not be long before that corner of national territory flies the flag of the Fatherland."* [167]

March 8th, in London, PM Margaret Thatcher speaks to Defence Secretary John Nott regarding preparations for an Argentine blockade, or invasion.

"The Prime Minister indicated to Mr Nott on Monday evening that she would like to know how quickly RN ships could be deployed to the Falkland Islands." [168]

"As talks with Argentina broke down, leading to the 1982 war, the settlers' cunning assertion of themselves as both indigenized kelper subjects with the right of self-determination and neglected white British citizens ultimately earned the UK's steadfast defence." [169]

From London, HMS *Endurance* is instructed to remain *'on station'* at the Falklands. [170]

On the same day, Lord Carrington telegrams Governor Rex Hunt asking him to discern the views of local Councillors to a resumption of negotiations with Argentina. [171]

Aware that Assistant US Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, is due to arrive in Argentina, Lord Carrington telegrams US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig.

"In the message, which mentioned the "very helpful" meeting between Enders and Richard Luce on March 1, Carrington stated the United Kingdom's increasing concern about "the Argentine Government's attitude, in particular about the threats which recur in the Argentine press (apparently with some measure of government inspiration) to use force if the negotiations do not soon reach a conclusion on Argentine terms". "You will realize", Carrington continued, in a passage that Haig highlighted in the margin of his copy, "that it is politically impossible for us to negotiate against such a background, so anything that Tom Enders can do while in Buenos Aires to bring the Argentines to a more reasonable and pacific frame of mind will be much appreciated by us". At the top of his copy of Carrington's message, Haig wrote: "Was Tom apprised"?" [172]

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165 Bound 2007. Gilobert had been replaced as head of LADE on February 3, 1982 by Vice-Comodoro Gamen.

166 Briley 2022

167 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 p.51. Orfila would later deny any pre-knowledge of the *Junta's* plans.

168 *Ministry of Defence memo March 12, 1982.* The seemingly reluctant answer, four days later, was, "20 days"; albeit with reservations regarding support and maintenance.

169 *Salvaging Empire: Sovereignty, Natural Resources, and Environmental Science in the South Atlantic* J.J.A. Blair 2023

170 HMS *Endurance*, albeit under threat, had not been withdrawn from the South Atlantic although this was supposed to be her last tour. There are often suggestions that the Argentine junta was swayed in its final decisions by the withdrawal of *Endurance*. I can find no evidence for this. They knew exactly where she was. In the South Atlantic.

171 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No.30 of 8 March 1982*

172 F*oreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 12* citing *Department of State, Central Policy File, P820044-1953)*. There is no evidence that Enders was informed.

In Buenos Aires, on his arrival, Assistant US Secretary of State Thomas Enders, meets with Foreign Affairs Minister Costa Méndez and Under-Secretary Ros. Enders raises the question of the Falklands negotiations.

> *"Ros presented a picture of British intransigence. The GOA has long been willing to accord the Islanders every kind of special status to safeguard their way of life, he said. However, the GOA insists that the British recognize Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas and their dependencies.*
>
> *When Enders observed that HMG's position does not seem to be based on economic or strategic concerns but on its belief that the wishes of the Islanders must be respected, Ros said that UN decision on the Island clearly set aside the concept of self-determination for the Islanders. Ros said with emphasis that "the United Nations did not give the Islanders the right of veto".*
>
> *Ros stated that at the recent bilateral talks with the British, the GOA had proposed the establishment of a permanent high-level commission in London and Buenos Aires to seek out a solution. The GOA is now waiting for the British answer. Ros stated that his government is under increasing pressure from various sources to solve the Malvinas problem. Now the government is trying to see if the British are really interested in resolving the issue or instead are just looking for ways to procrastinate. Argentina is willing to do its upmost to find a negotiated solution but a solution cannot be delayed indefinitely, Ros stated."* [173]

"During his visit to Buenos Aires, Tom Enders raised the Falkland Islands both in private and in public. He said that there are human and strategic aspects to the dispute and that both must be satisfied. Tom urged the Argentines to continue negotiations. They were non-committal but not negative." [174]

"We were contacted by the British government prior to my trip. They raised their fears about the unproductive character of these talks, and that they might be broken off. I raised that fear with the foreign minister of Argentina, saying that the United States did not intend to change its historic view – which was not to take a position, one way or the other, on the territorial dispute. We wanted countries with which we had friendly relations to solve that problem, but we were concerned that the talks appeared to be headed nowhere. Costa Mendez did not commit himself, although he was not negative.... He said they were 'working on it' and they 'hoped to have something.'..." [175]

"... during the visit to Buenos Aires of the United States Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Enders, the foreign minister and Enrique Ros discussed the Malvinas issue: Mr. Enders, who, as we have seen, had been informed by Luce in Washington, stated that the United States was not worried about the Malvinas issue and that his country's position on the issue was hands off (expression he used). Although it was known that Great Britain had apparently asked Enders to discuss this issue with Argentina, he did not make any statement in Buenos Aires in relation to the British position or [the] requests." [176]

In Buenos Aires, at a dinner hosted by US Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, Thomas Enders addresses the possibility of war with Costa Méndez, who assures both Shlaudeman and Enders that there will be no war.

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173 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820137–0228*

174 *Haig to Carrington March 13, 1982* in *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820135–0667*

175 Thomas O. Enders interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.165. This 'historic' view had only become policy after 1945. Contrary to what was said in this interview, there is some evidence that Enders was unaware of Carrington's March 8 request until his return to Washington DC. See F*oreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 12*

176 Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022 o*p. cit*.

"Nicanor Costa Méndez was not telling the whole truth. Years later, former ambassador and former foreign minister Bonifacio del Carril recounted that between March 9 and 10, 1982 — that is, hours after the foreign minister's meetings with Enders — he had an interview with Costa Méndez in his office. He was surprised to see so many maps of the south(ern) Seas spread out. After discussing the issue that had brought him there and when he was saying goodbye, the chancellor told him: — With all the trouble I'm in, now the junk dealers are coming. "What junkyards?" asked Del Carril. "Some who go to Georgia," answered his friend the chancellor. And after a few seconds, in a low voice, he added: "in a month we will take the Malvinas."..." [177]

March 9th, in Argentina, the junta meet again as the final invasion plan nears completion.

"The basic landing plan was ready by the third week in February and was presented to the junta on 9 March. The junta accepted it and forwarded it to Admiral Suárez del Cerro..." [178]

"... a plan was drawn up which envisaged: the landing in the Falklands ... the establishment of an Argentine government, and the immediate withdrawal of the troops involved, with the exception of the troops indispensable for maintaining security and control over Malvinese territory. In addition, it was determined that, in order for the plan to succeed, it was necessary to meet two requirements: to act with "tactical surprise", that is to say, to disembark without prior warning and, if possible, without bloodshed; and to act under the greatest "strategic secrecy" to prevent England from having the opportunity to strengthen its reduced strength – of 40 Marines – on the islands. Once the military operation – which in the end only contemplated the landing of military forces in the Falklands – had been carried out, the stage of diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain would come. They would seek to convince the British government of the 'fait accompli,' offering concessions ranging from compensation to the Islanders and commercial companies, to offers of economic cooperation with British companies that would like to exploit with Argentina the oil from the Southern Basin or the Krill fishery. In addition, it was intended to involve the United States in the negotiation, to convince Britain that there was no 'reverse' and that they should accept the new situation in the South Atlantic as it was." [179]

"The occupation plan established a D+5. This meant that, once the mission was completed, the ships and troops returned to their destinations on the continent, leaving only around 400 troops carrying out police duties, while the diplomatic scene opened. ... It was very simple for those who imagined Operation Rosario, Margaret Thatcher would not give the order to attack an "unprofitable" target. That was what history taught." [180]

"On March 9th, the COMIL gave intervention to the Joint Staff and ordered them to prepare the DENAC 2/82, extending the previous one without considering any UK military reaction, except for the local one. Additionally, they were tasked with preparing the corresponding documents: the Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL) and the Campaign Outline Plan. The preparation of a new Campaign Outline Plan started on the basis of the previous one, creating the Malvinas Theater of Operations (TOM, for its acronym in Spanish) under the command of General de División Osvaldo García. General de Brigada Américo Daher was appointed as Chief of the Ground Forces, Brigadier Luis Castellano as Chief of the Air Component, Contraalmirante Walter Allara as Chief of the Amphibious Force, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser as Chief of the Landing Force, and General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez as the military governor. In short, this would be the leadership for Operation Rosario." [181]

177 *Ibid.* See also Yofre 2011
178 Middlebrook 2003
179 Carbone 2008
180 Yofre 2011
181 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

In London, Minister Luce meets with the UK Falkland Islands Committee. [182]

March 10th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receives a message from Davidoff's lawyers to say that he is sending a party of 41 workers to South Georgia to dismantle the derelict whaling station at Leith. Also that an Argentine naval support vessel, *Bahia Buen Suceso* has been chartered for the operation. Embassy staff try to contact Davidoff in order to remind him of his obligations, but are unable to locate him. [183]

"A well-placed official interviewed for this study who asked specifically not to be identified on this point expressed his conviction that Davidoff's team included marines with orders to carry out the principle elements of Project Alpha." [184]

"..., Operation Davidoff began. "The Georgia operation was prepared well in advance. I know this because the ship that transported the scrap metal dealers also carried people from the Antarctic Command, ..." [185]

March 11th, Constantino Davidoff's lawyers are warned, by the British Embassy, that there will be consequences should he not comply with South Georgia's landing restrictions.

"Davidoff knows full well that he must report at Grytviken for clearance before proceeding to Leith He will receive full instructions there. Legally, he should also be fined or imprisoned for his last illegal entry but, in view of FCO (instructions) of 31 December, Acting-Base Commander will be advised merely to admonish him not to repeat the offence." [186]

From the UK, the owners of the whaling station at Leith, South Georgia, 'Christian Salvesen Ltd.', confirm that they are aware of Davidoff's plans, and that his contract has been extended to March 31st, 1984.

From the Rio de la Plata, *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails for South Georgia.

"The ship carried Davidoff's equipment and the forty-one civilian workers of his party; it also carried some general cargo for delivery to the Argentine port of Ushuaia... Sr Davidoff was not on board the Bahia Buen Suceso when it sailed from Buenos Aires; one of his engineers would be in charge of the dismantling crew." [187]

"The captain of the ship, when he set sail, received two sealed envelopes: One with the order to cut off radio contact (on a certain day); another in which instructions were given to direct the ship first to the Georgia Islands. The entire operation was carried out on the basis that the English would not respond. There was great improvisation, in all areas". Colonel Luís Carlos Sullivan, director of the Antarctic Command, confided (this) to the author on August 16, 1982. The "Alfa" naval personnel commanded by officer Alfredo Astiz, also went to participate..." [188]

Observed from Grytviken, Argentine military aircraft overfly South Georgia.

"The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, ... These include initiatives in the UN, a break of diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, an invasion of the islands." [189]

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182 *FCO12/384 f19*
183 *FCO12/384 f246*
184 Welch 1997 fn.8
185 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024
186 *Hunt to UKE Buenos Aires March 12, 1982* in *FCO12/384 f249*
187 Welch 1997
188 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024
189 *Latin American Weekly Report* March 12, 1982

In London, intelligence reports indicate that Admiral Anaya is behind the more belligerent press articles.

"The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hands, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the navy..." [190]

March 12th, in the UK, John Nott responds to PM Thatcher's request for information of the 8th.

"... if a frigate were to be deployed to the Falklands, RFA support would also be necessary. Passage time whether from the Caribbean or the UK would be in the order of 20 days. Maintenance of one frigate on station on a semi-permanent, deterrent basis would, in practice, require the deployment of two, in order to allow for maintenance and serviceability." [191]

A Ministry of Defence *memo* notes that HMS *Endurance* is off Adelaide Island, and within three days sailing time of Port Stanley.

From Washington DC, Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders, sends a message for Minister Luce; *"He had raised the Falklands both privately with the Argentine Foreign Minister and publicly during his recent visit to Buenos Aires, ... although the Argentines had been somewhat non-committal, they did not give Enders the impression that they were about to do anything drastic."* [192]

March 15th, at South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* arrives.

March 16th, at Leith, South Georgia's Magistrate leaves a prominent notice at the old whaling station. [193]

'British Antarctic Survey… Leith Field Station… Unauthorised Entry Prohibited.'

At Port Stanley, Islands Councillors agree to allow a further round of talks with Argentina provided that there is no negotiation on any question of sovereignty. [194]

March 17th, from the UK, ships of the Royal Navy sail to Gibraltar for a NATO maritime exercise in the eastern Atlantic - *Exercise Spring Train*. [195]

March 18th, from London, the US Embassy reports to Washington DC.

> *"FCO South America Department Head Robin Fearn has told us that the negotiations over the Falkland Islands are in real danger of breaking down. At the recent meeting in New York, he said, the Argentine delegation was "clearly uninterested" in discussing anything other than the early transfer of sovereignty. ... HMG is anxious to keep the negotiations going, fearing that Argentina might otherwise feel impelled to attempt a military solution. The British remain convinced of the legality of their position and the issue is an emotional one in Parliament, particularly in the House of Lords. Fearn fears that talks may be broken off if the Argentines refuse to take a more flexible approach. Should negotiations break down, HMG is considering the feasibility of bringing the question before the United Nations. The British believe they would stand a good chance of winning there, given the Argentine record on human rights, the UK's recent successes in decolonization (Zimbabwe and Belize), and the contrast between British democracy and the Argentine Junta. HMG would prefer, however, to avoid such a course if at all possible."* [196]

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190 *Memorias Políticas* Oscar Camilion 1999
191 *DEFE24/2264/1 f127*. Also *Ministry of Defence memo March 12, 1982.*
192 *Henderson to FCO March 12, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f105*
193 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.149
194 *Hunt to FCO March 17, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f88*
195 An annual event, some 18 British destroyers and frigates were scheduled to take part, accompanied by support vessels.
196 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820146–0021*

March 19th, in the Falkland Islands, HMS *Endurance* anchors in Stanley harbour.

An Argentine *Learjet* overflies Stanley.

"On a second secret mission with the purpose of completing the previous one, Gamen participated directly. On 12 March, he adduced his wife was sick and, with the excuse of treating her, he traveled to Buenos Aires on a LADE scheduled flight. The mission consisted in returning him to Malvinas. On 19 March, Vicecomodoro Gamen went aboard a photo reconnaissance Learjet 35 A. It took off from Río Gallegos and, when overflying Malvinas, the aircraft commander pretended he had a landing gear failure; he performed several verification passages over the airport control tower and, therefore, completed the photographic task they had started in February. The photographers and the material used were left back in Rio Gallegos. Then, it departed again towards Malvinas carrying Vicecomodoro Gamen, who got off on Stanley Port platform with the engines on. The Learjet returned to Rio Gallegos immediately." [197]

At South Georgia, *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails directly into Leith Harbour, bypassing Grytviken in defiance of British instructions. [198]

"While Davidoff may have been anxious to keep the British happy, the Argentine navy was less concerned to do so. Once again the boat travelled in radio silence..." [199]

"The UK Ambassador at Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, had advised Davidoff that the ship should first arrive at Grytviken, an entrance and control port designated by the British Government. Nevertheless, following the order of the Chief of Transportes Navales, the Captain of the Bahía Buen Suceso went directly to Puerto Leith where technicians and workers disembarked to dismantle one of the whaling stations. It was not a capricious decision. Should British supervision be accepted, sovereignty would be implicitly acknowledged."[200]

A British Antarctic Survey observation point is established overlooking Stromness Bay, from where a large party of both civilian and uniformed personnel are seen to land from the Argentine ship. An Argentine flag is raised. Shots are fired in salute. [201]

"The workers at Leith raised an Argentine flag, in a ceremony without much pomp. According to military sources, this act had previously been agreed by Davidoff with the Navy." [202]

197 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

198 Middlebrook (2003) gives the date of arrival as March 16, 1982. Carbone (2008) as March 20. Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 suggest March 18, 1981.

199 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.47

200 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

201 Meneghini (*Malvinas: las causas inmediates de la Guerra* 2015) suggests that the shots were fired by a party from a French yacht hunting deer but, in support, erroneously quotes a message of March 17. There are a few references to a 40' French yacht, *Cinq Gars Pour*, having arrived at Grytviken on, or around, March 14. Damaged in a storm, the crew of three (Serge Briez, Olivier Gouon and Michel Roger) sought assistance from the BAS and hunted deer for their food supplies. On March 22, 1982, the Base Commander indicated that the French sailors appeared to be in contact with the Argentines. See *Franks Committee (UK) Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983 para.175

202 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 p.67.

"... I was deeply concerned at the way this happened. Nevertheless, I was informed that, quite clearly, he had this contractual arrangement, it seemed to me that the problem really lay in the fact that he was there without clearance from our Embassy in Buenos Aires. The important thing therefore was for him to get his papers in order. My concern was to smooth this one over.... The advice from our Ambassador was "Look, I think we can see a way through this one, because all we need to do is to try and legitimize his papers..." Clearly Governor Hunt was concerned about the position, and saw it from a slightly different viewpoint..." [203]

"On 19 March a party from the British Antarctic Survey arrived at Leith Harbour, where they found the Bahia Buen Suceso unloading and the Argentine flag flying ashore. ... There seemed to be around 100 people ashore. They were making themselves comfortable, having occupied the BAS refuge and shot some reindeer (although this was a protected species). ... The four observers then reported all this back to King Edward Point from where, with some difficulty, the information was transmitted to Rex Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Islands." [204]

"... this was the second move in "Project Alpha", the Argentine navy's plan to use Constantino Davidoff's scrap-metal venture to establish an Argentine presence on the island. Some of the men were genuine civilian scrap-metal works, but others were military personnel;... that evening the BAS reported their activities to Stanley."[205]

"Hoisting the flag was an insignificant action carried out by civil workers, who refused to abide by the formalities because they were following orders." [206]

"As with Southern Thule, the FCO did not publicly admit that British territory had been invaded." [207]

In London, Argentina's Ambassador is summoned and informed that the incident on South Georgia is regarded as serious. He is also told that if the *Bahia Buen Suceso* does not leave forthwith, the UK will take whatever action it deems necessary.

March 20th, on South Georgia, Trefor Edwards of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) delivers a message from Governor Hunt to Captain Briatore of the *Bahia Buen Suceso*.

> *"You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahia Buen Suceso immediately and report to the base commander Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore."*

Argentina's flag is lowered 15 minutes later.

"The British Antarctic Survey claim was submitted to the captain of the Bahía Buen Suceso vessel, assuming the workers depended on him. The latter answered his vessel was only complying with a charter agreement..."[208]

203 Richard Luce interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.184
204 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.48
205 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.652
206 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
207 Elgood 2025
208 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

From London, Governor Hunt is instructed to send HMS *Endurance* back to South Georgia; *"You have discretion, in consultation with Captain Barker, to embark whatever detachment of Marine Garrison seems necessary in the circumstances."* [209]

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams London. [210]

> *"I suggest that great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is a deliberate challenge authorised at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness."*

"Davidoff blames the war on the British. "Why should they have sent a warship, the Endurance, to take our men away?" he asks. "That was ridiculous. What if I went to North America and raised an Argentine flag? They would just take it down and say I was nuts"." [211]

"The prompt dispatch of Endurance did not accord with the Argentine strategy. Buenos Aires was at this stage unprepared both militarily and diplomatically for a sudden escalation in the Falklands dispute. Yet Argentine citizens were ashore on territory which Argentina claimed as her own. The British were demanding the formal acknowledgement of sovereignty through the obtaining of permits, on pain of removal by force. This would constitute a conspicuous loss of face for Buenos Aires. ... The South Georgia incident had come at least six months too soon ... Endurance ... should have been safely back in Britain before any invasion." [212]

"Because of delays in receiving routine messages about the Falklands, it (GCHQ) misconstrued the first signal received on the (crisis), on 20 March, from the only Royal Navy vessel in the South Atlantic. HMS Endurance, with a small but unique Sigint (Signals Intelligence) capability,..." [213]

"In the case of Malvinas, the crisis began on March 20. ... On March 20, 1982, a crisis originated from a strong British reaction – in my opinion disproportionate – as a result of the scrapping of an old factory located on the island of San Pedro de las Georgias del Sur, located 1,500 kilometers southeast of the Falklands. In charge of this was a private Argentine commercial company, belonging to the citizen Constantino Davidoff, who had carried out the corresponding legal procedures before the British authorities in Buenos Aires. As events have unfolded, I have always appreciated that the intention of the United Kingdom (UK) was clearly to escalate the crisis, which did not surprise the Argentine government." [214]

In Argentina, at Puerto Belgrano, the invasion plans are reviewed in the light of events at South Georgia.

"On March 20, after Davidoff-related events at the Georgia Islands, the Military Committee ordered the reconvening of the Working Commission to outline an alternative plan since the Navy ships initially planned were assigned to Antarctic tasks." [215]

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209 *PREM19/657 f86.* This would result in 22 marines on the ship. *Endurance*'s own Royal Marines plus part of Naval Party (NP) 8901 (Falklands garrison).

210 *PREM 19/613.*

211 *Bizarre Salvaging Incident was Fuse in Falklands War* Margot Hornblower in *The Washington Post* May 14, 1982

212 *The Battle for the Falklands* M. Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997 p.70

213 *Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* John Ferris 2020 citing *Memorandum, 'Falkland Islands: The Nicholl Report' May 13, 1982 D/2304/14 pt.IV*

214 *Lessons from the Malvinas* Martin Balza in *Perfil* July 29, 2023.

215 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

March 21st, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry informs Ambassador Williams that the *Bahia Buen Suceso* is not in South Georgia officially; that it has no military personnel on board and that the ship will leave.

> *"Blanco telephoned at midnight with official Argentine response which, without pronouncing actual apology, expressed hope that significance of the affair will not be exaggerated. The party and ship would be leaving South Georgia today, they were in no way official, had no serving service personnel or military arms.*
>
> *I asked if they would call at Grytviken and what about the Argentine flag, defaced notices etc? Blanco was not sure about the first and said he had No repeat No knowledge of the other matters. The BAS observers must have been mistaken about the shooting, perhaps they were not accurate over the flag etc either."* [216]

Ambassador Williams makes it clear; *"... that if the party left without regularising their conduct at Gryviken they would have made an illegal landing and be liable to arrest.."* [217]

From Stanley, Captain Adolfo Gaffoglio, a *LADE* representative, informs Buenos Aires of the departure of HMS *Endurance*. He also reports that his office has been broken into and the Argentine flag covered over with a Union Jack. *"Tit for tat you buggers,"* is written on the desk in toothpaste.

"On March 22 (sic), learning of the Argentine activity, the Falkland "Kelpers" reportedly attacked the offices of Argentina's state airline in Port Stanley. They lowered the Argentine flag over the building and hoisted the Union Jack, vowing "an eye for an eye", according to local press reports. ... Asked about the Falklanders' attack on the LADE office, the FonMin spokesman said the situation could become "grave". LADE is Lineas Aereas del Estado, a small Argentine Air Force feeder airline which is the Falklands' main connection to the mainland. Its offices in Port Stanley reportedly had its locks forced by irate British Islanders, who then took down the Argentine flag on the building and hung a British flag on a tree in front of it. There were no other reports of damages." [218]

"Asked about the Falklanders' attack on the LADE office, the FonMin spokesman said the situation could become "grave". LADE is Lineas Aereas del Estado, a small Argentine Air Force feeder airline which is the Falklands' main connection to the mainland. Its offices in Port Stanley reportedly had its locks forced by irate British Islanders, who then took down the Argentine flag on the building and hung a British flag on a tree in front of it. There were no other reports of damage." [219]

"The Governor reported that on the night of 20/21 March the LADE office had been entered, apparently by someone using a key. A Union Flag had been placed over the Argentine flag there and "tit for tat, you buggers" written in toothpaste on a desk. In a later incident, during the night of 22/23 March, "UK OK" was written on two external windows of the LADE office." [220]

"There was frustration in Stanley and relations with the few Argentines living there became fraught. The LADE air service was continuing, but on the night of Saturday 20th a few local youths, fuelled with bravado and beer from the dance, broke into Vice Comodoro Gilobert's office ... It was relatively harmless stuff, but Vice

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216 *Williams to FCO March 21, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f86*
217 *Ibid.*
218 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 23, 1982* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984 Document 15*
219 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p31*
220 Franks Committee 1983

Comodoro Gamen, who had just replaced Hector Gilobert, was worried. The LADE Fokkers never scheduled overnight stops at Stanley, but on this occasion one of the aircraft had developed a fault and needed to remain on the tarmac." [221]

"... at Stanley, activists broke into LADE's offices and damaged the premises. Answering Governor Hunt's call, foreign reporters arrived to cover the events." [222]

Speaking to Governor Hunt, Comodoro Gamen insists that the airport must be guarded by the local Marines.

> *"We had been on a shorter state of alert for a couple of weeks. For a few days before the invasion we had a section [about seven men] in the airport terminal building every night. A few guys kept watch while the rest of us slept and were ready to move at very short notice."* [223]

"(Comodoro Gamen)... insisted that Gary Noott's Marines guard it around the clock. This was not too much bother to Noott, as, unknown to Gamin, the Marines had been staking out the airport." [224]

"..., because of the protests sparked off by Davidoff's disembarkation on Georgia Islands, LADE offices were attacked. The life of the Gamen family, as well as that of the Argentine residents, got complicated. From that moment on, they would be watched." [225]

Governor Hunt forwards a message from Lord Buxton, for the attention of Lord Carrington. [226]

"... Davidoff should not be regarded as a casual scrap-dealer; and that his contract should be terminated because of his breaches of the terms. Buxton believed that if the British reaction was placatory, further landings would occur, the next time probably on the Falklands themselves." [227]

At Leith, the *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails away early evening; but some personnel are seen to remain. [228]

"The foreign ministries of both countries sought to smooth over the incident and agreed that Bahia Buen Suceso would quietly leave South Georgia as indeed it did on 22 March. The British, however, assumed that Davidoff's party would be aboard and reported publicly that evening that Argentina had agreed to withdraw the workers." [229]

"Contrary to some accounts, she did not take any of the scrap-metal workers with her; they were all left at Leith. The ship set course for Ushuaia, ..." [230]

March 22nd, from Grytviken, BAS staff report to Stanley, for the information of London.

> *"Base Commander has confirmed presence of at least six Argentines still ashore at Leith... In addition to launch ... they had also seen a landing craft ... they also observed a vehicle with a mechanical arm on the jetty..."* [231]

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221 Bound 2007
222 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
223 Acting-Sergeant Geordie Gill quoted in Bound 2007
224 Bound 2007
225 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
226 Aubrey Buxton, Lord Buxton of Alsa, was a prominent figure in the world of television and wildlife conservation. The reasons for Lord Buxton's visit to the Falklands are not clear, but most probably connected to the presence of his daughter in the South Atlantic. Cindy Buxton, was filming on South Georgia at this time.
227 Elgood 2025
228 Franks Committee 1983 para.178
229 Welch 1997
230 Middlebrook 2003
231 *ALW 040/325/12 Part A 1 – 100 Telegram No. 45 of 22 March Rex Hunt to FCO.* In fact there were 39 still onshore.

From Stanley, Lord Buxton telegrams the FCO in London.

> *"It has been naïve to regard Davidoff as a casual scrap dealer and it is abundantly clear that every move has been carefully researched, planned and timed throughout… If our reaction is placatory and is not firm and final this time I predict that more unopposed illegal landings will follow ... British reactions are being tested."* [232]

En-route to South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* receives orders from London to remove any trespassers. However, Captain Barker's instructions clearly state that he is not to use force and, if resisted, should withdraw and seek further instructions.

> *"Ministers have agreed that HMS Endurance should continue to South Georgia in order to remove the remaining Argentines. The continued Argentine presence at Leith, … leaves us no option but to take this action. … It is hoped that the political consequences, with careful handling on both sides, can continue to be minimised. But it should be quite clear that this situation has not been of our seeking. It has been Davidoff's irresponsible action and the apparent inability of the Argentine Government to take the necessary remedial action which has brought it about."* [233]

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the FCO, urging; *"... no forceful action be taken which would irritate public opinion in Argentina."* [234]

> *"The Argentines ... appreciate the gravity of the hoisting of the Argentine flag, but say that they have just received reports that there has been a parallel insult to the Argentine flag at the LADE office in Stanley."* [235]

From *Endurance*, Capt. Barker reports that overheard radio traffic indicates collusion between Davidoff and the Argentine Navy; *"The naval headquarters in Buenos Aires had congratulated the Bahia Buen Suceso on a successful operation and directed her to return to Buenos Aires as soon as possible."* [236]

March 23rd, in the UK, morning newspapers report the Argentine landings at South Georgia. *The Financial Times* focusses on the raising of the Argentine flag, while *The Guardian* refers to the event as "*comic opera*". John Biggs-Davidson MP is reported as calling the landing an "*act of aggression*" and demanding an explanation.

"When it became clear that Argentine personnel had remained behind, the British press played the event as an 'invasion' of South Georgia." [237]

In Argentina, the news of the flag-raising at South Georgia makes the headlines; as reported by US Ambassador Shlaudeman to Washington DC.

"All Buenos Aires morning dailies March 23 bannered the weekend flag-raising incident involving Argentine seamen in the South Georgia Islands on March 19, denounced yesterday in London. British Ambassador Anthony Williams was summoned this morning to the Foreign Ministry for a discussion of the issue, which now appears complicated by the retaliation by British Falkland Islanders. On March 22, learning of the

232 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.154
233 Quoted in Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 p.71. No source provided.
234 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990
235 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 82 of 22 March 1982*. See March 21, 1982, above.
236 *Franks Committee (UK) Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983 para.175
237 Welch 1997

Argentine activity, the Falkland "Kelpers" reportedly attacked the offices of Argentina's state airline in Port Stanley. They lowered the Argentine flag over the building and hoisted the Union Jack, vowing "an eye for an eye", according to local press reports." [238]

In Britain's House of Commons, Minister Luce makes a statement:

> *"We were informed on 20 March by the commander of the British Antarctic survey base at Grytviken on South Georgia that a party of Argentines had landed at Leith harbour nearby. The base commander informed the Argentine party that its presence was illegal as it had not obtained his prior authority for the landing. We immediately took the matter up with the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires and the Argentine embassy in London and, following our approach, the ship and most of the personnel left on 21 March. However, the base commander has reported that a small number of men and some equipment remain. We are therefore making arrangements to ensure their early departure. ... for a short period the Argentine flag was planted. It has now been removed. We are making arrangements to ensure that those who remain at Leith harbour will not do so for very much longer."* [239]

Ex-Prime Minister James Callaghan MP, asks the Minister:

> *"Does the hon. Gentleman recall that he was warned that as soon as the news of the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance" became known to the Argentinians this type of escapade would be likely? Is it not a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the Government to persist in this course? Will they please give an undertaking forthwith that they will ensure that HMS "Endurance" is not withdrawn?" ...*
>
> *"Luce: HMS "Endurance" is in the area. It is not for me to answer questions specifically for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on the deployment of forces. I must say as strongly as I conceivably can that it is our duty as a British Government to support and defend the islanders to the best of our ability."* [240]

"Mr. Luce's brief statement led to some tough questioning from both sides of the House. Denis Healey wanted confirmed that an Argentine flag had been raised, and sought more information about the state of discussions with the Argentine Government. He wanted to know whether the landing had occurred with the support or knowledge of that Government. Mr. Luce reported that the Argentines had denied this, but he pointed out that the vessel was a naval transport, albeit on hire for civilian purposes." [241]

In Buenos Aires, the junta meet at the Libertad building.

"The military leaders and the chancellor had been planning the war for at least three months before and that day, in the heat of the news, the planning for the Malvinas military alternative continued. They discussed what was happening with the workers hired by Davidoff in Port Leith (South Georgia) and it was decided to "protect the Argentine personnel; intercept the Endurance and detach the ARA Bahia Paraiso ... to Port Leith". Then it was resolved by Minute No.2 'M'/82 that "the name of the military alternative would be Azul" (... although it would later become Operation Rosario)." [242]

"On March 23, General García, in charge of the Working Commission, submitted the rough draft of the alternative plan to the Military Committee, which was immediately approved. It would be a joint operation

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238 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p31*
239 *HC Deb 23 March 1982 vol 20 cc798-801*
240 See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/mar/23/south-georgia-incident
241 *Patterson to Thatcher March 23, 1982* in *Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 1/20/3/2 f21*
242 Yofre 2011

consisting of an amphibious landing launched from a single transportation vessel, the ARA Cabo San Antonio. The closest date set for the landing force departure was 28 March. In just five days, the alternative plan was completed, maintaining the high-ranking leaders from the Joint Staff plan. The ground, naval, and air forces were assembled, and the necessary co-ordinations were carried out. The operation was initially called Azul and later designated Operation Rosario. There were no plans for or precautions against any enemy reaction other than a local one." [243]

From London, Foreign Secretary Carrington telegrams the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires with a message for the Argentine Foreign Minister.

> *"We recognise the risk that this problem could escalate dangerously ...Please now speak to Costa Mendez making clear that you are doing so on my personal instructions. You should say ... it is essential that the remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia should be removed without delay. If the Argentine Government are able to arrange for the Bahia Buen Suceso to return immediately to Leith and to collect the remaining men and their equipment for return to Argentina, I would be prepared to authorise this and would see no need for HMS Endurance to be involved. If this cannot be not done, we have no choice but to remove them ourselves."* [244]

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to '*hold*' off Grytviken.

> *"In view of continued diplomatic activity at ministerial level aimed at allowing Argentine authorities an opportunity to remove party and equipment by Argentine vessel, HMS Endurance should proceed to Grytviken and await further instructions. Pending these instructions, HMS Endurance should not, repeat not, enter nor conduct any Naval operations in the vicinity of Leith harbour."* [245]

In Buenos Aires, on hearing from Ambassador Williams, Costa Méndez expresses surprise that the British are proceeding so rapidly to such very grave action, without exhausting the diplomatic options. He gives a warning that, if the action to remove the party on South Georgia is not postponed, those like himself, who are trying to deal with the dispute in a moderate way, will lose control of events. Costa Méndez threatens that harsh action will precipitate a harsh response, and that perhaps the men should be removed by an Argentine vessel in order to take some heat out of the situation. [246]

"The English ambassador requested on behalf of his government the immediate withdrawal of the Argentines in the Georgias (who had raised the Argentine flag) and was told that "he should not forget that this is a disputed area that Argentina considers as hers"." [247]

Williams, after conveying Méndez's reaction to the FCO, adds that he considers the events at South Georgia as *"trivial and low-level misbehaviour."*

"Lord Carrington (later) told me he was misled by Ambassador Anthony Williams." [248]

At Stanley, the scheduled LADE flight arrives with, among others, 16 employees of the Gas de Estado (State Gas) company. All fit young men of military age, local suspicions are aroused. Also disembarking is an Argentine photographer, Rafael Wollman, employed by an Argentine weekly magazine, *Gente*. [249]

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243 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
244 *FCO Telegram 68 to UKE Buenos Aires* in *PREM19/657 f81*
245 Quoted in Barker 1997
246 *Franks Committee (UK) Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983 para. 182
247 Yofre 2011
248 Briley 2022
249 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.658

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's Navy Command orders the ice-breaker *Bahia Paraiso* to take its marines as quickly as possible to Leith to protect the Argentine workers there.

"The Junta, determined to avoid humiliation, ordered a second ship in the vicinity, the ice patrol vessel Bahia Paraiso, to land a party of marines at Leith to protect Davidoff's men." [250]

"In view of this, the Superior Command of the Armed Forces decided that another vessel – the ARA Bahía Paraíso – which at that time "coincidentally" was on the Orkney Islands completing a phase of Antarctic planning, would immediately be highlighted to the Georgias to disembark the "Alpha Group", a curious name given that the operation of the same name had been abandoned. This group of "elite troops" of the Navy, with Lt. Alfredo Astiz at the head, had the objective of taking positions in the whaling facilities and protecting the Argentine workers from any future action by British forces. Apparently, given the seriousness of the situation, the Junta considered activating the plan that had been prepared at the beginning of the year..." [251]

"... the National government considered the use of British Marines as a clear provocation and that the United Kingdom would probably send naval units to dissuade a military escalation. The transport ARA Bahía Paraíso, which was at the Orcadas Islands, was released from the Antarctic Campaign and sent to protect Davidoff's workers, together with the Grupo Alfa, before the Endurance arrived. Argentina found herself at a crossroads. On the one hand, if Argentina let the workers be removed by force without opposition, she would be accepting British sovereignty over the islands, according to the doctrine of Estoppel. On the other hand, if she accepted Governor Rex Hunt's proposal arbitrarily requiring that passports be stamped at Grytviken, it implied waiving the rights ipso iure." [252]


THE STANDARD
CITY PRICES
Wednesday, March 24, 1982. 15p. Incorporating the Evening News
Forty Marines head for the Falklands to repel ten rebel scrap merchants
BRITAIN SENDS A GUNBOAT
HMS ENDURANCE—heading for South Georgia.
A BRITISH gunboat was on its way to the Falkland Islands today to repel an Argentinian "invasion."
by Steve Doughty
'Provocation'
Secrecy
SEE INDIA IN A DAY
A unique exhibition on our 4th Floor.
Selfridges
INSIDE
DOUBTS ON DEFENCE
GLC ARTS CASH THREAT
Women in London
THE IRA INFORMERS
THROWING LIGHT ON DEPRESSION

Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo is; *"... directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification."* [253]

"I immediately ordered an increase in my staff, and we worked all through that night and very hard in the next two days. We gave an answer to the junta on the 25th; I think that Admiral Lombardo went to Buenos Aires and told them that the decision was that it would be possible to land on the Malvinas on the 1st April."[254]

March 24th, at South Georgia, *Endurance* arrives off Grytviken. Capt. Barker liaises with the BAS commander at King Edward Point.

In London, intelligence reports suggest that the forced removal of the workforce at South Georgia will be used by the junta as a pretext for military action. Either at South Georgia, or against the Falkland Islands. Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister; *"... the situation on the dispute has developed to a point where we now face the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina."* [255]

250 Welch 1997
251 Carbone 2008
252 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
253 *The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study* Douglas N. Hime 2010
254 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003
255 *Carrington to Thatcher March 24, 1982* in *ALW 040/325/1 Part C 101*

Lord Carrington further *minutes* the Prime Minister; *"we might be coming to a point at which negotiations would become increasingly difficult to be continued, or indeed might not be able to be continued."*[256]

Lord Carrington also *minutes* the Secretary for Defence, John Nott; *"There is one action we could take which would be an immediate demonstration of our support for the Islands: that is to maintain HMS Endurance on station in Falklands waters for the time being."* [257]

A House of Commons *motion* signed by 91 Members of Parliament calls for a tough line to be adopted with Argentina.

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy transmits a telegram to Washington DC.

> *"... we doubt that an attempt at a "military solution" will be made any time soon. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez and others in the GOA are looking for ways to enlist U.S. support for the Argentine cause. This issue is likely to complicate Argentine-U.S. relations…"*[258]

From the UK's Embassy, Britain's Defence attaché, Colonel Stephen Love, telegrams the MOD.

> *"If the Argentines fail to remove the work party from Leith Harbour and HMS Endurance were tasked to do the job, there would be the sternest of reactions (Argentine nationals taken on board British warships in Argentine waters, etc). One upshot might well be an encounter with an ARA warship. … There is a hawk faction in the FFAA whom we can see pressing the leadership thus to take advantage of the heightened blood pressure of recent days when a military measure might attract less censure and be more easily justified abroad. We must therefore be aware that if HMS Endurance is committed we would be facing not only the obvious risk of the operation meeting resistance but also an increase in the threat to Port Stanley..."* [259]

In London, the Cabinet meet to discuss South Georgia. [260]

"Carrington said feelings in Argentina were high and that intervention by HMS Endurance would run the risk of a military confrontation which Britain would not win. … Lord Carrington agreed that the British Ambassador should be instructed to urge Costa Mendez to persuade his colleagues to find a way out of the impasse, and to say that the British Government did not wish to escalate the situation, but that the Argentine Government should be in no doubt that we are committed to the defence of British sovereignty in South Georgia as elsewhere." [261]

At South Georgia, just before midnight, *Bahia Paraiso* arrives in Leith Harbour, some 25 kilometres north-west of Grytviken. [262]

March 25th, at Leith, around dawn, *Teniente de navio* Alfredo Astiz[263] and ten Marines disembark from *Bahia Paraiso*, accompanied by a few sailors who start to unload supplies and military hardware; including three landing craft and a helicopter. Watched by the BAS observation team; shortly after joined by Capt. Barker.

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256 Elgood 2025.
257 *Carrington to Nott March 24, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f78*. Already done.
258 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820157–0409.* Signed off by Ambassador Shlauderman.
259 *ALW 040/325/9*
260 Elgood 2025. This is the only source I can find for this.
261 *Ibid* citing Franks Committee 1983 p.56 para.195 (which does not mention a Cabinet meeting).
262 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.660
263 Astiz had a reputation for violence; implicated in the 1977 kidnapping of 12 human rights activists, including two French nuns; none were ever seen again. *cf.* 1982

"Tony Ellerbeck flew me to the top of one of the mountains and we landed at 3000 feet on a narrow section of flat ground with excellent binocular vision over Leith Bay... all we could do was to sit and watch. We noted the continuing disembarkation of stores from the Bahia Paraiso and it was clear to us that the operation had been long pre-planned." [264]

"The ARA Bahía Paraíso left Grupo Alfa at Leith, a crew of ten Marine officers, in order to protect the workers, together with enough elements and supplies for a long stay." [265]

Argentina's naval planning committee informs the junta that their forces can be ready to sail on the 28th. [266]

In Buenos Aires, Costa Méndez speaks to Britain's Ambassador to suggest that the impasse can be broken if it is agreed that the workers at Leith now comply with the landing formalities – by going to Grytviken and having their *'white cards'* stamped. Then returning to work on the whaling stations.

From London, informed of this proposal, Lord Carrington's responds that; *"only passports will do."*

"A series of progressive demands culminated in the imposition that the Argentine workers of the Davidoff company – who were on land that we consider under a sovereignty dispute – should seal their passports at Grytviken, as if they were entering a foreign territory..." [267]

"... this was the last straw. Permitting Endurance to evict Davidoff's party or acquiescing in the British demand that they present their passports would be tantamount to acknowledging British sovereignty over South Georgia and, by extension (so they believed) over all of the disputed territories, including the Malvinas proper. In Anaya's view: "This was aggression on the part of Britain against the territory of Argentina."..." [268]

"Britain's escalation of the dispute – especially its demand about passports – came as a complete surprise ... There was unanimous agreement that we could not permit it." [269]

"Now the British assert that the 1971 treaty does not extend to South Georgia, although it had always been understood that the dependencies of the Falklands were included. (I can confirm that this was also Ambassador Williams's understanding until yesterday). ... it would appear from here that the Endurance is the key to the problem of the moment. If the ship moves in to take off the workmen, there will surely be trouble. If it stays where it is, the impasse and the tensions accompanying it will continue." [270]

From London, the US Embassy also telegrams the State Department; *"Deputy Under-Secretary John Giffard called in Charge March 25 to inform him that Carrington is sending a message to the Secretary requesting that the U.S. use its influence with Argentina in the current impasse over the Argentines encamped on South Georgia Island. Argentina has conveyed its displeasure over the dispatching of the British ice patrol vessel Endurance to South Georgia. HMG also has had reports that the Argentine Navy may be planning to intercept the Endurance if it removes Argentine party and provoke a naval confrontation, possibly with a view to bringing the entire Falklands dispute to a head. Should that happen, the British would have to respond, and a situation will have arisen that neither Foreign Ministry wants. HMG consequently plans to hold off taking any*

264 Barker 1997
265 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
266 From an interview with Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser in Charlton 1989 p.115
267 President Galtieri in *La Nueva Provincia* November 28, 1985
268 Welch 1997
269 Interview with Lami Dozo quoted in Welch 2005
270 *Shlaudeman to State Department March 26, 1982* in *Dept. of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820162–0574.* The 1971 Communications Agreement made no mention of any of the Dependencies. See - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf

action, but considers it essential that the intruders be removed. The Endurance is presently waiting about ten miles away from the Argentine party." [271]

At South Georgia, during the evening, *Bahia Paraiso* departs Leith, taking up a position just off the island.

March 26th, from South Georgia, a situation report is radioed to Port Stanley for the Governor.

> *"Argentine party are still ashore at Leith. Although only two people were actually sighted this morning, smoke was emerging from several buildings and 2 boats were still alongside jetty. 65 blue drums had been stacked at inshore end of jetty. A large quantity of stores and equipment was visible, even dead reindeer. Consider shore party were working late into evening yesterday disembarking stores from Bahia Paraiso and are now established for a long stay at Leith. It is clear that this operation had been preplanned for some time as Bahia Paraiso came from Antarctic..."* [272]

In London, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) sends a note on the defence implications of Argentine action against the Falkland Islands, to the Prime Minister. They note; *"our scope for effective military action in response to whatever the Argentinaians may do is extremely limited, and that almost anything we could do would be too late and/or extremely expensive."* [273]

" ... Argentine military options were identified as: a. Harassment or arrest of British shipping. b. Military occupation on one or more of the uninhabited islands. c. Arrest of the British Antarctic Survey Team on South Georgia. d. Small scale military operation against the Islands. e. Full scale military invasion of the Islands. ... Argentina, with the most efficient armed forces in South America, has the military capability any of the options listed..." [274]

The presence of HMS *Endurance* in the South Atlantic is also a consideration at the MOD. [275]

> *"You asked whether as a temporary solution HMS Endurance could remain on station in the Falklands area beyond her planned departure date. It would be possible to defer HMS Endurance's departure from the area by up to two months."* [276]

At Montevideo, 43 Royal Marines under the command of Major John Norman, fly in to meet the RRS *John Biscoe* for the journey to Falkland Islands; where they are to relieve the garrison (NP-8901). [277]

From Stanley, Governor Hunt telegrams London regarding the scrap metal workers' white cards.

> *"... I am more than ever convinced that this whole exercise was carefully planned ...*
>
> *Proper documentation does not (repeat not) mean stamping of white cards.*
>
> *I am instructing the base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them in the normal way with an entry permit..."* [278]

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271 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820159–0368*
272 Barker 1997
273 *PREM19/657 f46*
274 *Ibid.*
275 *DEFE13/1606 f114*
276 *Wiggin to Carrington March 26, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f42*
277 *John Biscoe* was a civilian vessel owned by the British Antarctic Survey. With *Endurance* busy elsewhere, the BAS had given permission for the ship to transport the marines to Stanley. This was a standard military rotation and not connected to the rising tensions on South Georgia; although the MOD was already considered maintaining the two squads at Stanley while the crisis persisted. Bad timing from Argentina's perspective.
278 *PREM 19/613*

"The issue of the South Georgias precipitated the events. When the 40 or 41 Argentines landed there, and, departing from (the) agreement of coexistence of 1971, the British demanded the signing of the cards at Grytviken... or else they were going to remove them with the 'Endurance' or other ships. That affected the dignity and honor of the Nation. And that forced us to make the decision that was taken on March 26." [279]

In Buenos Aires, at 7.15pm at the Liberator building, Junta members meet to consider the evolving situation at South Georgia. The meeting is informed that a British submarine has been observed leaving Gibraltar.

"... that is what (Admiral) Anaya describes as a "war-starter". That announcement turned out to be false. But based on that announcement he decided to execute a contingency plan... He decided to advance it because, if he did not, he would never be able to do it." [280]

"We interpreted the sailing of an SSN from Gibraltar on 26th March as coming south and that the Brits would keep one on station indefinitely thereafter, so ... we had about twelve days in which to fix it." [281]

"Costa Mendez's view was that, from 1956, Britain's behaviour was always to deal, but not on the basis of force. Rhodesia was the most recent example. There Britain had abandoned 600,000 British subjects. The sum of perceptions led to the conclusion that Britain would not respond with force. ... How could we doubt his judgement?" [282]

At 11pm, Argentina's Military Junta decides to occupy the Falkland Islands. [283]

> *"March 26, the Military Committee met at 7.15pm in the Libertador building ... t**he decision to occupy the islands was made** ... with the objective of affirming and defending the Argentine position in (South) Georgia, preventing Great Britain from militarising the islands and establishing a naval and air defence system for them, preventing the British position in the area since this would have a negative impact on the rights, strategy, positions and objectives of Argentina in the South Atlantic and Antarctica. It will also activate the negotiation and improve the Argentine negotiating position. The occupation of the islands is not intended to initiate a military escalation or end the negotiations or replace them ... on the contrary, an attempt will be made to achieve the beginning of a serious and substantive negotiation ... it is emphasized that the operation should be bloodless and that it should provide for the maintenance of a small garrison in the Malvinas once the recovery is achieved... "*[284]

"On the evening of 26 March, the Junta decided to occupy the Malvinas as soon as the necessary military preparations could be completed ... The Junta believed that with Endurance in the vicinity of South Georgia, Argentina had a narrow window of opportunity in which to act without interference from the Royal Navy. The 500 men assigned to Operation Rosario were to capture and disarm the forty-two-man garrison of Royal Marines at Port Stanley and evict the British Governor. They had strict orders not to shed British blood. Once

279 Galtieri quoted in General Benjamin Rattenbach 1983. Translation by Fabian Turcato.

280 US Admiral Harry Train in Charlton 1989 p.116. Train interviewed Admiral Anaya immediately after the 1982 conflict. Contrary to some contemporary views in the UK, the proposed withdrawal of *Endurance* had not weighed on Argentine planning. She was lightly armed and no match for the Argentine navy. A submarine, however, would be an entirely different matter.

281 Admiral Jorge Anaya in an interview with Hugh Scully quoted in *The Falklands War* Andrew Dorman, Michael Kandiah & Gillian Staerck (eds) 2005 p.20. In Charlton (1989 p.187) it is suggested that news of the submarine's departure was published in the *Daily Express*. This particular submarine, however, was actually headed north. No decision to despatch a submarine to the Falklands was made before March 29, 1982.

282 Interview with Admiral Jorge Anaya, quoted in Welch 2005 p.87

283 *Cadena 105* February 28, 2021. Quite when the Argentine Military Junta made their final decision to invade the Falkland Islands is much debated, even today. This, was it.

284 *Minute No.4 'M'/82* quoted in Yofre 2011. My emphasis.

they had secured Port Stanley, they were to withdraw, and Argentina would place the islands under temporary international administration while Britain and Argentina finalized an agreement recognising formal Argentine sovereignty over the islands and safeguarding the 'interests' of the Islanders. … The Junta seems clearly to have underestimated the danger and misgauged world reaction." [285]

"I was told on 26 March the invasion would take place… We thought that occupying the Islands would press Britain to negotiate or press the international organisations to intervene and try to obtain a peaceful end of the conflict." [286]

"According to the Rattenbach Report, the Military Junta's decision was made hastily due to events on South Georgia that spiraled out of control. It would have been advisable to postpone the recovery date for the Falkland Islands by at least six months (until spring) or, ideally, a year, due to: a. The implementation of the United Kingdom's defense spending cuts policy and the plans for allocating personnel, budgets, and materiel to the Royal Navy, which contemplated the decommissioning of a significant number of surface vessels, especially amphibious ships, as well as Royal Marines." [287]

"On 26 March, the Military Committee decided to take the Malvinas Islands, which took the Joint Staff by surprise, who had not yet finished the DEMIL or the Campaign Plan. Therefore, the islands recapture would be carried out using the alternative plan proposed by the Working Commission." [288]

Argentina's Foreign Ministry issue a statement announcing the arrival at Leith of *Bahia Paraiso*.

"The arrival at Leith of "Bahia Paraiso" was announced last night by FonMin Costa Mendez, who called the situation in the disputed archipelago "serious" and "grave". He spoke to the press after an emergency meeting of the three service commanders of the ruling Junta, making clear that the GOA is not presently disposed to back off. "The Republic is ready to provide the workers (at Leith) all diplomatic and security protection that may be necessary", he said. The GOA, he added, has adopted a posture to insure that "measures are not taken against them (una medida que no corresponde) and that they are permitted to continue their work". Costa Mendez added that a British proposal for overcoming the crisis is under study." [289]

From the UK, a message is relayed to the Falkland Islands Governor instructing that the roulement of NP8901 should not take place. Both squads to be retained until further notice. [290]

March 27th, Argentina's morning newspapers announce a statement from the Foreign Ministry: *"… a firm decision has been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary diplomatic protection… nor is this protection diplomatic only, since there is a navy ship called Bahia Paraiso in the area to provide any necessary protection."*

Newspapers note that the *Bahia Buen Suceso*, *Granville* and *Drummond*, will be sent to South Georgia to protect the scrap-metal workers there. [291]

Relaying this information to the Ministry of Defence in London, Britain's Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires, Stephen Love, adds; *"Detailed press comment conflicts with some known facts but confirmation secret sources*

285 Welch 1997
286 Costa Méndez quoted in Briley 2022. Méndez had been present at the meeting.
287 *Hacia una mirada diferente sobre la Guerra de Malvinas* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022
288 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
289 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820163–0916*
290 *FCO46/3202 f32*
291 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667

of others obtainable." He also reports that Argentine destroyer ARA *Bouchard* and a corvette, *Granville*, have sailed from the Mar de Plata. [292]

"After Major-General Garcia and Marine Rear-Admiral Carlos Busser had approved of the landing plan ..., the invasion force weighed anchor and Task Force 40 assembled in the Bahia Blanca de la Plata estuary..." [293]

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy reports;

> *"The crisis atmosphere heightened sharply overnight Mar 26–27 as the armed Argentine Navy transport "Bahia Paraiso" carrying a unit of marines, reportedly turned up at Leith Harbor. Its mission there, where it is said to be in sight of the British icebreaker "Endurance", is to protect the Argentine work party landed on San Pedro Island Mar 18 that triggered the present UK-GOA face-off. Unconfirmed press accounts attributed to Argentine naval sources also reported the dispatch of two missile corvettes, "Drummond" and "Granville", to the South Georgias in support of the ArgNav transport."* [294]

Britain's Ambassador Williams, after being denied a direct interview with Costa Méndez, reports his fears that the Foreign Minister has been less than honest with him and that Argentina had been "*playing us along"*.

> *"I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disrupt the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines."* [295]

"... an R. W. Apple despatch to the New York Times in early April stated that the (UK) embassy, on 26, 27, or 28 March, had warned the Foreign Office of an Argentine invasion plan. Embassy officers later complained, "They chose to ignore it entirely. It was a complete error of judgment on London's part." ... If Apple's information is accurate, this episode would stand as another familiar example of unwillingness of a government preoccupied with higher priority problems to hear and accept warning." [296]

"Anthony Williams and Whitehall making 'Tut! Tut!' noises is not impressing the Argentines. Rex Hunt and a few others taking a good firm stand. C-in-C (Fleet) is sailing some ships in support. In my view some Buccaneers are required." [297]

"Williams was met by deputy foreign minister Enrique Ros, who simply stated that the junta had given the foreign ministry new instructions. Later that day Costa Méndez called his five top officials to his office, told them to look at the crucifix on the wall, demanded an oath of silence, and revealed that Argentina was about to enter a war." [298]

In London, PM Thatcher considers taking the question of South Georgia to the ICJ. [299]

> "*... if we win or if we lose, at least we know where we are."*

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292 He also reported information provided by the Chilean Consul that none of Argentina's four submarines were now in the Mar de Plata. Colonel Love believed that his warnings were not being taken seriously by the MOD; while the MOD believed that Love's sources were solely local newspapers and that the information was either old, or inaccurate.

293 *Argentine Perspectives on the Falklands War: The Recovery and Loss of Las Malvinas* Nick Van der Bijl 2023. Task Force 40 was the amphibious group landing force.

294 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820163–0916*

295 Williams quoted in Franks Committee 1983 para.207. *PREM 19/613 Telegram Nos.110 & 113 of 27 March 1982*

296 CIA Doc *RDP85T00153R000200020037-8.* Approved for release July 12, 2007. Raymond Walter Apple was a prominent journalist working for the *New York Times*.

297 From Capt. Barker's *Endurance* diary in Barker 1997

298 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667 citing Cardoso *et al.* 1987 pp76-77

299 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.164

"To the Prime Minister a much more attractive option was to go to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. She had raised the idea that morning and Carrington had investigated it during the day. A submission could be made but would not be accepted if Argentina withheld consent. He was therefore edging towards going to the Court on the legality of Argentine behaviour on South Georgia rather than on sovereignty. To Thatcher that was where the challenge lay. The message from Costa Mendez was an open assertion of sovereignty and while she accepted that there was nothing new here, there seemed obvious advantages in daring Argentina to go to Court. The Foreign Secretary then warned that "We might get the wrong answer". This came as something of a revelation to the Prime Minister, the first time she became aware of any doubt at all surrounding the British case. She professed herself alarmed, "Because there is no earthly point in sweating blood over it if it's not ours". Carrington explained that the problem lay with the vagaries of courts rather than the quality of the case. They decided to explore the options again." [300]

"In March 1982, in the light of the growing Argentine pressure, the Buenos Aires Embassy suggested that it might be worth offering to submit the ***Falklands*** *to the (ICJ) "as a last resort if things really turn nasty". If the offer was refused, which was quite likely given the Argentine attitude, then Britain would have gained moral support; if accepted then the whole matter would be put on ice for a considerable period... In March the FCO saw insufficient merit in adopting this strategy, ..."* [301]

En-route from Curaçao to Britain, RFA *Appleleaf* is ordered to make for Gibraltar; take on general stores and then sail south in support of HMS *Endurance*. [302]

March 28th, in Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez sends a message to President Galtieri, requesting a delay to the occupation of the Falkland Islands.

"1) if it is deemed necessary to stop the military operation, this decision can still be made; 2) the US position is unclear. There is no guarantee that it will support Argentina; 3) with the block of Non-Aligned countries, although we start from an unfavorable situation, we can rebuild it in a short time and achieve their solidarity by virtue of our anti-imperialist struggle." [303]

*"The Malvinas Special Group had not completed the necessary measures to accompany military action in the diplomatic field ... to such an extent that on Sunday, the 28th March (Costa Méndez) asked for a postponement. After thirty years of silence, a diplomat related: "He sent me to Campo de Mayo with a personal letter to Galtieri in which (Costa Méndez) requested a few days postponement of the invasion. They made me go to (Galtieri's) office, I handed in the letter and he read it in front of me. After finishing reading, the president (said): "****Tell the chancellor absolutely not****", and as if this were not enough, he returned the letter to me after writing "absolutely not"."* [304]

In Argentina, all leave for military personnel and diplomatic staff is cancelled. Argentina's Embassies around the world are told to await new instructions; *"There were no major setbacks, and the troops started loading in the ships at Puerto Belgrano at 8.00am on Sunday 28 March. Secrecy had been well maintained. ... The Argentine newspapers announced that a joint anti-submarine exercise was to be carried out with the Uruguayan Navy."*[305]

Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve flies into Buenos Aires from Germany.

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300 *Ibid.*
301 Freedman 2005 vol.2. My emphasis.
302 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.667
303 Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024
304 Yofre 2011 citing a conversation of August 5, 1982 with Ambassador Gustavo Figueroa. My emphasis.
305 Middlebrook 2003

"Comodoro Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve had been the Argentine representative before the Special Advisory Commission and head of LADE on the Malvinas Islands between 1974 and 1976. Additionally, in his capacity of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff, he had participated in formal and informal rounds of talks between 1979 and March 1981. In 1982, he was performing functions as Air Attaché to the Argentine Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany. He was possibly the cabinet member who best understood the Malvinas Islands' reality. In the morning of 27 March, in Bonn, Bloomer Reeve received the order to immediately travel to Buenos Aires so as to witness the execution of the contract with Dornier Company for the design of the IA-63 Pampa aircraft. At 0900 in the morning of the 28th, he arrived at Ezeiza Airport, where the Airport Chief was waiting for him to tell him to contact Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo. The latter then referred him to Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl." [306]

At the UK Embassy, Ambassador Williams receives a statement from the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

> "*The activities of the group of workers disembarked at Leith are of a private and peaceful character based on the undisputed fact that they were known in advance by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and in any case on the fact that they are being carried out on territory subject to the special regime agreed in 1971 between the Argentine and Great Britain.*
>
> *It is moreover within Your Excellency's knowledge that these territories are considered by the Argentine Republic as her own and that the sovereignty dispute about them had been recognised by the United Nations in its relevant Resolutions. Your Excellency's Government has accepted the existence of the sovereignty dispute. However the British Government has reacted in terms which constitute a virtual ultimatum backed by the threat of military action in the form of the despatch of the naval warship Endurance and a requirement for the peremptorily immediate evacuation of the Argentine workers from the Island. …*
>
> *In light of this attitude my Government can only adopt those measures which prudence and its rights demand, in this context the Argentine workers in South Georgia must remain there since they have been given the necessary documentation to do so. … the present situation is the direct result of the persistent lack of recognition by the United Kingdom of the titles to sovereignty which my country has over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. …."* [307]

Williams reports to London and Port Stanley that Costa Méndez insists that South Georgia was included in the *white card* scheme arrangements.[308] On receiving a copy of the Argentine message, Governor Hunt telegrams London; *"The 1971 Communications Agreement does not apply to the Dependencies … (and) … does not absolve the holder of the requirement to present himself to an immigration officer at a recognised port of entry … I am appalled at the arrogance of the message which confirms my previous fears that the Argentine Government are using Davidoff as a front to assert with a physical presence their sovereignty claim over South Georgia."*

From Puerto Belgrano, aircraft carrier, *Veinticinco de Mayo*, four destroyers, *Comodoro Py*, *Hipólito*, *Bouchard*, *Piedra Buena* and *Segui*, accompanied by a tanker, *Punta* Medanos, depart.

> *"In the islands we are going to meet a population that we must treat deferentially… They are inhabitants of Argentine territory and, therefore, they have to be treated the same as those who live in Argentina. You will have to strictly respect personal property and integrity; you are not going to intrude into any private residence unless it is necessary for combat reasons. You are going to respect*

306 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

307 *PREM 19/657 f37 Telegram No.116 of 28 March 1982*

308 See June 6, 1972, (ratification) above. Link to agreement, here - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf

women, children, elders and men. Be tough to the enemy but courteous, respectful and kind to the population of our territory which we have to protect. If anyone engages in rape, robbery, or looting, I will immediately apply the maximum penalty." [309]

"Those of us who knew where we were going were very proud. We felt very lucky that we had been chosen and extraordinarily fortunate to have the opportunity to regain the Malvinas... April was a lovely month that year." [310]

An 'invasion' squadron, led by a destroyer, *Santisima Trinidad*, includes a tank landing ship, *Cabo San Antonio*, the icebreaker *Almirante Irizar* and a submarine, *Sante Fe*. The submarine is carrying members of Argentina's elite frogmen, the Buzos Tactico, whose orders are to reconnoitre the beaches for the invasion forces. [311]

Further east, near South Georgia, is the corvette *Guérrico,* and the naval auxiliary, *Bahia Paraiso*. Argentine frigates *Drummond* and *Granville* position themselves between South Georgia and the Falklands.

"... there was no need for such a vast force; the Argentinians were using a sledgehammer to crack a nut... it is hard to escape the conclusion that the main purpose was "prestige and display";..." [312]

In the USA, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issues a report:

"On or shortly before 28 March 1982, the Argentine Army and Navy prepared a joint assessment for President Leopoldo ((Galtieri)) on the current dispute with the United Kingdom over the South Georgia Islands in the South Atlantic. The assessment included the following points:

A. Argentine public opinion strongly approves of the Argentine Government taking a strong stand against UK "threats" to Argentina.

B. The UK Embassy in Buenos Aires was aware of plans to place Argentine workers on the Island and has therefore urged London to keep this in mind and be moderate in its response.

C. The UK appears unwilling to take any action to remove the workers.

D. Successful handling of this incident could help to fortify the Galtieri government and give it an image of being strong, decisive, and highly nationalistic. This will deflect leftist charges against the government. The "crisis" is already serving to deflect public attention from economic problems and from the planned labor demonstration in Buenos Aires on 30 March.

E. If Argentina gives the appearance of having "lost" in this confrontation with the UK, it will serve to strengthen enormously Chile's position in the dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel.

(Source comment: On 28 March, working-level officers within the Argentine Naval Intelligence Service, who are not necessarily privy to actual operational planning, discounted the possibility of Argentine intervention should the British choose to forcibly remove the Argentine workers from the

309 Rear-Admiral Büsser's address to his officers, quoted in *74 days under the Argentine flag: The experiences of occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War* A. L. Corbacho 2018

310 Rear-Admiral Büsser quoted in Middlebrook 2003

311 A set of coded, detailed, instructions, dated 1530hrs March 28, 1982, were intercepted (by who is not clear) and sent to be decoded by GCHQ in England. The message referred to a '*reconnaissance of the beach*' and a reference to the '*San Felipe lighthouse*'. San Felipe being Argentina's name for Cape Pembroke; good indicators of the submarine's intentions. However, GCHQ did not start work on the message until the following day and the final decoded message was not available until the 30th /31st. See below.

312 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.670

Island; these naval intelligence officers believed that the Argentine Navy is not ready or able to support any type of armed conflict in the South Georgias area because of existing limitations on equipment. These naval intelligence officers expected that, if the British should remove the workers, the Argentine Government would certainly speak strongly but would try to cast itself as a peacemaker by avoiding a direct conflict with the UK.)" [313]

In London, a *note* titled *The Defence Implications of Argentine Action Against the Falkland Islands* is prepared by Britain's Ministry of Defence.

"The recent JIC assessment argued that the Argentine Government … if they concluded there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, military action could not be ruled out. Argentine military options were identified as: a. Harassment or arrest of British shipping. b. military occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands. c. Arrest of the British Antarctic Survey Team on South Georgia. d. Small scale military operation against the Islands. e. Full scale military invasion of the Islands.

This note considers the defence implications of seeking to deter or counter these options by military means. … Possible responses to Argentine action …

c. Full scale military invasion of the Islands. In order to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising for example, Invincible or Hermes with an LPD and LSLs, 4 destroyers/frigates, plus an SSN, supply ships in attendance and additional manpower, up to brigade strength, to reinforce the garrison. Such a deployment would be very expensive and would engage a significant portion of our naval resources. Moreover, its despatch could well precipitate the very action it was intended to deter. If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake the Dependency. Argentine national pride would demand a maximal response. Their geographical advantage and the relative sophistication of their armed forces would put our own task group to a serious disadvantage, relying as it would on extended lines of communication.

Conclusions. Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistic difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would present significantly greater problems requiring naval and and forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale; the logistic problems of such an operation would also be formidable."

Lord Carrington sends a telegram to Washington DC, for the attention of US Secretary Alexander Haig. [314]

"Your Charge d'Affaires in London will have reported to you the serious situation which has developed between ourselves and the Argentine Government following the illegal landing at Leith Harbour on the British island of South Georgia last week of a party of Argentines. The Argentines have a long-standing claim to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies and, despite all our efforts to resolve the dispute by peaceful negotiation, the Argentines have recently been making it clear that they are prepared to use other means to achieve their aim of a full transfer of sovereignty. The whole

313 *Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, POL–15(h) Country Political 82—Latin America.* Most likely that "*working-level officers within the Argentine Naval Intelligence Service*" were pulling the wool over someone's eyes.

314 Delivered personally by the UK Ambassador, Henderson.

question of the Falklands is a very sensitive one for us, our public opinion and our Parliament. As soon as we discovered the presence of the party, we sought to persuade the Argentine Government through diplomatic channels to remove them. But they have refused to do this. Instead they appear to have consolidated the party's position by landing further equipment and have issued a statement that the men on South Georgia will be given all necessary protection. I have moreover, just received an uncompromising and negative message from the Argentine Foreign Minister about the problem. It offers no constructive suggestions and seems likely only to aggravate the problem. The Royal Navy Ice Patrol Ship, HMS Endurance, is anchored nearby in Grytveken Harbour. A number of Argentine Navy vessels are heading for the area and we cannot exclude the possibility that, if we attempt to remove the men ourselves, they may retaliate.

It is our firm wish to resolve this problem peacefully. To that end, we have done everything we can to persuade the Argentines to find a way out: we are prepared to examine every avenue with them. But the continued presence of these men is an infringement of British sovereignty and you will understand that we cannot acquiesce in that. I appreciate that this dispute will seem to others a bilateral matter from the British and Argentine Governments. But despite all my Government's efforts to find an acceptable solution, we have now reached a stage where the situation will soon become very difficult. I do not, however, believe that it is in anyone's interests to allow this incident to be the cause of what may become armed conflict in the South Atlantic, and I wish to explore every possible avenue which might help us to avoid this.

I should accordingly be grateful if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines, stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. If the Argentines maintain that they will not remove the men themselves and that they will resist any attempt by us to do so, the use of a third country ship might be a compromise they could accept. The problem could also be resolved by the Argentines agreeing that their men should seek the necessary permission from the British authorities at Grytveken in order to regularise their presence. I should be very grateful for any help you can give us on this. If we do not find a solution soon, I fear the gravest consequences."[315]

"To his astonishment, he received a message from Haig's deputy, Walter Stoessel, pointing out that both Britain and Argentina were 'good friends' of the USA and counselling caution. America's Ambassador … would nevertheless see what he could do. … Carrington hit the roof." [316]

"… first attempts to get the Americans to play a constructive role were not encouraging." [317]

"The Foreign Office had lost control of events; Carrington sent an urgent message to US Secretary of State Haig, informing him that Argentine warships were heading for South Georgia with the strong possibility that war might ensue, …" [318]

Furious with the equivocal response, Lord Carrington summons the US *charge d'affairs*, Edward Streater.

> *"(The UK had) supported American policy in Sinai, had supported it in El Salvador; that this support had not been particularly willing, not wholly consistent with our own better judgement, but we had given it; and now we expected a better response than this not very friendly message, equating our case and position with that of Argentina."* [319]

315 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820054–0571*
316 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.82
317 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.164
318 Elgood 2025
319 Quoted in Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

"Carrington suffered a sense of humour failure and told the US Embassy in London bluntly that an aggressor was loose in the South Atlantic and the US had better make up its mind which side it was on. It was not an auspicious beginning." [320]

March 29th, from London, Margaret Thatcher and Lord Carrington fly to Europe for a meeting.

"By the time their plane landed at Brussels, they had agreed that three nuclear submarines should be sent south immediately. John Nott at the MoD was telephoned from the airport and instructed accordingly. Considering the abuse heaped on British ministers and their cabinet staffs in the prelude to the Falklands invasion, it is worth pointing out that a submarine force was ordered to sea within two and a half days of the junta's probable decision to proceed with an early invasion." [321]

"Following a decade-old reflex regarding the Falklands, and fashionable ideas about rationality and 'escalation ladders' during crises, Britain reacted cautiously in order to avoid provocation and to buy time. Whitehall thought that crisis loomed, but it was months away – likely after a slow and rational process of escalation ... Whitehall disassociated the flashpoint of South Georgia Island from the Falkland Islands. It over-estimated the rationality of the Argentine junta and the pace of the unfolding crisis. Thatcher later said "It seemed utterly ridiculous to contemplate an invasion of the Falklands then"." [322]

HMS *Spartan*, a nuclear powered submarine, is directed to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar.

Support vessel, RFA *Fort Austin,* is ordered to sail from Gibraltar to resupply HMS *Endurance.* First Sea Lord Sir Henry Leach and his senior staff meet at the Ministry of Defence; after which Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a *"viable"* naval force, then three more weeks to get them to the Islands; although a group of seven destroyers and frigates, on *Exercise Spring Train* in the eastern-Atlantic, could be off the Falklands within two weeks.

In Buenos Aires, newspapers refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and report that five Argentine warships are heading towards South Georgia. Ambassador Williams writes to the Foreign Office in London.

> *"I am receiving gestures of sympathy ... but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures."*

At Stanley, RRS *John Biscoe* anchors with 43 Royal Marines from Montevideo, reinforcing those marines of NP 8901 that have not sailed with HMS *Endurance*. [323]

In Argentina, Comodoro Carlos Bloomer Reeve speaks to Brigadier Plessl.

"(Bloomer Reeve) was of British descent, bilingual in Spanish and English, and had been serving as Argentine air attaché in Germany.... With another bilingual officer, Capitan Barry Hussey, he was given two days to plan a civilian administration for the islands." [324]

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320 *The View from BDLS Washington* Ron Dick in *Royal Air Force Historical Society* 2003 (Journal 30) p.26

321 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.76

322 Ferris 2020 citing *Falkland Islands Review Committee, Note of an oral evidence session October 25, 1982 CAB 292/47*

323 Originally intended as replacements, Norman's team merged with that of Gary Noot; some of which had deployed to South Georgia with HMS *Endurance*. The result was a force of 69 Royal Marines in Stanley, together with a few officers and men left behind by *Endurance*. Rather more than Argentina had been expecting, although this news appears to have reached Argentina before April 1, 1982. Argentina had eyes in Stanley.

324 Middlebrook 2003

"Bloomer attended the briefing called by Menéndez. The General explained to the appointees that the islands would be considered a province, that he would be assuming the position of governor, and they would form the cabinet with direct responsibility over the civilian population. … In subsequent meetings and on the basis of these data, it was decided to organize the government on the existing structure, which the islanders were familiar with. The existing communication networks could be used, and public officials, without many alternatives for employment, would appreciate the opportunity to keep their jobs. Patriotism and the fear of being labelled as collaborators could be overcome with the excuse that they were serving their fellow citizens. … Law and order would initially be maintained by military police personnel. The governor would lead the administration, assisted by a chief secretary who would oversee the superintendencies of the basic government agencies. The treasury would report directly to the governor, except for certain duties of the chief secretary. In addition, there would be two elective councils: one with legislative functions and the other with executive functions. Both would be chaired by the governor and assisted by the chief secretary and the treasurer. " [325]

Out in the North Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Sir John Fieldhouse, observing Exercise Spring Train from HMS *Glamorgan*, is notified of events. Fieldhouse summons the flag officer in charge of the exercise, Rear Admiral Woodward, to a conference before flying by helicopter to Gibraltar, and then on to London. All British vessels involved in *Exercise Spring Train* are ordered to report their readiness for war.

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman reports to the State Department in Washington DC; *"British Ambassador Williams called on me this morning… Williams is now persuaded that the Argentine military have stage-managed this entire incident as a means of pressing the British for accelerated negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas without revealing their full intentions to the Foreign Ministry. One particular piece of evidence in this regard is the fact that the Bahia Paraiso has been unloading equipment at Leith Harbor. Costa Méndez told Williams initially that the ship had been sent there suddenly to watch over the working party and perhaps to evacuate them."* [326]

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's invasion squadron encounters bad weather.

"The intention was to sail down the coast of Argentina until well past the Falklands and then approach the islands from the south, but a fierce storm which blew up on… Monday the 29th – lasted for forty-eight hours and spoiled that plan." [327]

"29 March was a day of rough seas and poor weather. The galleys, particularly on the transports, struggled to provide enough food. Garcia was unable to meet with his commanders and in spite of the risk of interception, he issued orders by radio. The Almirante Irizar reported that the 601 Combat Aviation Company Puma helicopter on board, tasked to land a 25th Regiment platoon… had been damaged beyond repair in the rough seas." [328]

In Washington DC, Argentine Ambassador Takacs is summoned to the State Department.

"The Deputy Secretary called in separately March 29 the Ambassadors of Argentina and the UK and made the following points regarding the situation at South Georgia Island: —We are concerned about the situation in the South Georgia Island and the possibility of confrontation. —We appreciate the public concern over this issue in Argentina and in the UK. —We would hope for an amicable resolution; both parties are good friends of ours. —We urge restraint on both sides. —We realize that the underlying issues need to be solved between the two parties and do not see a useful role we could play with respect to them. —However, we are concerned

325 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
326 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820165–0179*
327 Middlebrook 2003
328 Van der Bijl 2023

about the immediate situation in South Georgia Island and if both sides felt we could play a useful role, we are ready to listen and offer our good offices. —The situation is of personal interest to the Secretary. Ambassador Takacs said that he had no instructions on the issue but would convey the Deputy Secretary's comments to Buenos Aires immediately. Takacs asked if he could tell his Foreign Minister that the same message was being conveyed to the British. The Deputy Secretary replied that he would be telling the exact same thing to Ambassador Henderson and reiterated that we would like to be helpful if both sides believe we can be." [329]

Britain's Ambassador Takacs is also summoned to the State Department.

Ambassador Henderson said that the workmen were on the Island illegally, having gone there ostensibly under the scrap removal contract. They had no immigration permission for the Island, not even a white card which is valid for entry into the Falkland Islands proper. The line the Argentines are taking does not suggest they are prepared to do anything. The British do not want them to stay there but they are prepared to make an important concession: if the Argentine ship, the Bahia Paraiso, would take the work party around to Grytviken Harbour, they could give them permission to stay. " [330]

In England, the coded message to *Sante Fe*, intercepted on the 28th, arrives at GCHQ. [331]

"Few people handled intelligence on the Falkland Islands, which slowed its processing and impact … DIS, charged with basis analysis, had no specialist on the Falklands and only two officers tasked to handle Latin America, meaning one person at a time. … Thatcher probably saw only the most important of reports – as did the two ministers most involved with intelligence (Nott and Carrington)." [332]

March 30th, in Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlauderman speaks to the Argentine Foreign Minister; making an offer to mediate between the UK and Argentina regarding the situation on South Georgia.

Meanwhile, the junta commence the first of two meetings at the Libertad building; *"The first meeting … resolved that General Garcia would be the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations until approximately D+5, after this the South Atlantic Theater would be created … appointing Vice-Admiral Lombardo as commander."*[333] Possible reactions by the British Government, are considered.

"Finally, on 30 March 1982, the Military Committee approved the DEMIL 1/82 drafted by the Joint Staff to plan the use of the force and urge the United Kingdom to negotiate the Malvinas Islands sovereignty. The Directive maintained the Chilean case precautions and established that, in the event of an armed reaction after recapturing the islands, a defensive strategic military stance should be adopted, and that, depending on the circumstances, British maritime traffic should be interdicted to deter the dispatch of troops and/or the theater of operations established on the Malvinas Islands should be supported. The estimation that the United Kingdom would not respond with a military operation was of particular influence on the development of the conflict. "[334]

A decision is made to suspend the discharge of the '62 class of conscripts. [335]

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329 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820166–0400 March 30, 1982*

330 *Ibid.*

331 Intercepting and decoding Argentine signals was not a quick process, taking up to a day during the early stages of the intelligence operation. Even when GCHQ managed to improve on that, it could still take 14 hours.

332 Ferris 2020

333 Yofre 2011 citing *Act. No.5 'M'/82*

334 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 citing *DEMIL 1/82", Annex 6. DEH-FAA Archives.*

335 Yofre 2011 citing an interview he held with Leopoldo Galtieri on July 29, 1982. Many of those conscripts had already been discharged and were on their way to their homes.

"The assessment carried out by the Joint Staff, and approved by the Military Committee, indicates that Britain was not expected to commit to a significant military effort, estimating that the British would deem it a minor and distant conflict." [336]

Unaware of what is happening, a large demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires demands a return to democracy. Similar protests take place in other Argentine cities.

"On the 30th, a protest was held that concentrated thousands of demonstrators in all the major cities of the country. And the government prepared to receive them: Plaza de Mayo was surrounded by patrol boats, fire trucks, police on horseback, assault cars and even helicopters. The restriction on access to the square provoked clashes between demonstrators and security forces, as happened in Pueyrredón Bridge – where a large column of workers was intercepted and repressed – courts and the port of Buenos Aires. Similar situations occurred in cities of the interior where there were acts: Mendoza, Rosario, Tucumán, Córdoba and Mar del Plata. The day of protest left more than a thousand detainees (including many union representatives), wounded and one dead in Mendoza." [337]

"In 1982 inflation was running at 150%; 400,000 children in northern Argentina were suffering chronic malnutrition, and the peso had been devalued by 500% in less than a year – a new 100-million-peso banknote was introduced which was worth only just over £50. ... Three days later, the same square was filled with crowds cheering the same dictatorship." [338]

In the UK; *"GCHQ confirmed that Argentine naval units were heading for Falklands waters, noting that there were unusual military movement and air force activity in Argentina itself. Puerto Belgrano was closed to civilians. There could be little doubt that an invasion was underway. Despite this, the JIC's Latin American Current Intelligence Group, meeting on the morning of 30 March under Foreign Office chairmanship, concluded that there was no invasion threat! The FCO was confident of its interpretation of developments, possibly believing the Argentine communique issued on 2 March gave Britain until the end of 1982 to complete negotiations."* [339]

In Britain's House of Commons, Richard Luce makes a statement regarding the situation in South Georgia.

> *"The situation which has thus arisen, while not of our seeking, is potentially dangerous. We have no doubts about British sovereignty over this Falkland Islands dependency as over the Falklands themselves. We remain of the view that the unathorised presence of Argentine citizens in British territory is not acceptable. We have no wish to stand in the way of a normal commercial salvage contract, but the position of those carrying it out must be properly authorised. Further escalation of this dispute is in no one's interest. In those circumstances, it is clearly right to pursue a diplomatic solution of the problem. This we are doing. I hope that the Argentine Government will take the same view.*
>
> *Meanwhile, the question of security in the Falklands area is being reviewed, although the House will understand that I prefer to say nothing in public about our precautionary measures. I can, however, inform the House that HMS "Endurance" will remain on station as long as is necessary."* [340]

336 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 citing *DEMIL 1/82", Annex 6. DEH-FAA Archives.*
337 Carbone 2008
338 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.674
339 Elgood 2025
340 *HC Deb 30 March 1982 vol.21 cc163-70.* See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/mar/30/south-georgia-falkland-islands

From the opposition benches, ex-PM James Callaghan reveals his 1977 deployment to the South Atlantic – Operation Journeyman.

> *"... is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood then about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS "Endurance", and that* ***when this fact became known****, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? ..."* [341]

"Concluding, Denis Healey said that the Government clearly took the Argentinian moves as deliberate provocation. Taking a cue from Mr. Callaghan, he argued that the Government, unlike its predecessor, had failed to assemble a suitable naval force to assist in sorting matters out. It was simply one more in a terrible series of errors on defence policy." [342]

"Nobody believes the Argentines had any knowledge of the submarine's presence (its frigates kept 400 miles away). [343]

After an *in-camera* meeting of the Conservative back-bench committee, at which Luce refuses to confirm anything, a leak suggests that a submarine force has been ordered south. This is immediately broadcast by the *International Television News (ITN)* service; *"The information was flashed to Buenos Aires where it confirmed rumours already current ... Britain's Parliament, ... had turned a covert deterrent to invasion into a public invitation to one."* [344]

Britain's Defence Operations Executive (DOE) receives intelligence of an Argentine task force lying 800 miles north of the Falklands; consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft. Also more information regarding the situation at South Georgia.

> *"Intelligence Briefing: The Argentinian party at Leith Harbour, South Georgia, was now estimated at 16 men. The British Antarctic Survey (BAS) Team at Grytviken numbered 22, and HMS Edurance, with 21 Royal marines on board was currently lying off Grytviken. The Argentine ship Bahia Paraiso was patrolling off the coast with two helicopters. 2 landing craft and an unknown number of marines embarked. ... Two type A69 Argentinian Corvettes were in the Falklands/South Georgia area, and believed to be tasked with intercepting Endurance should she attempt to remove the Argentinian shore party...."* [345]

A joint MOD/FCO *note* considering options for reinforcing the Falklands is sent to PM Thatcher. [346]

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341 My emphasis. There is no evidence that Argentina had been made aware of this deployment. When pressed, in the days that followed, Callaghan refused to say how Argentina's government knew of his sending a squadron to the South Atlantic. Eventually, Callaghan refused to take any further questions on the matter. See March 5, 1982, above. *cf.* 1977

342 *Pattison minute to Thatcher March 30, 1982* in *PREM19/657 f26*

343 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982. Archive material regarding the 1977 deployment was released in 2005. The wording implied that Argentina had been quietly informed, but without any detail as to who by, or when. There is no source in Argentina that suggests that they knew. See 1977, above, and 1983.

344 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

345 ALW 040/325/9. The DOE acted as the executive agency for the Chiefs of Staff. Franks 1983 para.224. For the minutes of the DOE meeting on March 30, 1982,

346 *PREM19/657 f27*

From London, Britain's Foreign Office telegrams Argentina's Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires; *"The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. … A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests."* [347]

From Argentina, Britain's defence *attaché* contacts GCHQ to warn that a small invasion of East Falkland Island was possible, and requests any indicators that GCHQ may have been aware of. [348]

From Faslane naval base in Scotland, a nuclear powered submarine, HMS *Splendid,* deploys south. Another, HMS *Conqueror,* is readied.

In Stanley, the scheduled LADE flight lands and Vice-Comodoro Héctor Gilobert steps off the aircraft.

*"On Thursday, 30 March 1982, Vicecomodoro Héctor Gilobert arrived in Stanley aboard a Fokker F-28, in what would be the last scheduled service of Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) to the Islands. The aircraft was guarded by armed Marines under the pretext of preventing hostile attitudes. However, it was clear that they wanted to prevent the possible descent of Argentine commandos hidden inside. The F-28's arrival, after the riots at the airline commercial offices following Davidoff's incident in South Georgia, immediately aroused the authorities' suspicions as they already knew that a Task Force had set sail for the South Atlantic. Gilobert explained he had come to assess the situation after the attack against LADE's premises and wished to clear the air. As he entered the town, everything looked as usual. Local residents did not seem to suspect the reasons for his visit and exchanged polite greetings. … **Sophisticated communications equipment**, which had been transported on that same flight, was installed at Vicecomodoro Gamen's house (LADE House) to send coded messages. The installation was done in front of local residents, as it had been impossible to conceal the bulky packages being transported and the technicians working with the antennas, although some of the work was carried out overnight. … news and the events in Stanley were coded and rebroadcast to the landing forces command via LADE's stations in Buenos Aires and Comodoro Rivadavia."* [349]

Also arriving on the flight are four British journalists attempting to reach South Georgia. [350]

In Cheltenham, England, GCHQ finally decode the message to Argentina's submarine, *Santa Fé*. The submarine is being ordered to take reconnaissance forces to Mullet Creek, near Stanley. [351]

"At some time on 30 March, GCHQ distributed an Argentine order that the Type 209 diesel-electric submarine Sante Fe sail with remarkable caution, launch a "reconnaissance of the beach and/or disembarkation (word garbled)" and then move twenty miles east of the San Felipe (or Pembroke) Lighthouse, just off Port Stanley. … This remarkable message might not have arrived until late evening on 30 March, but it would have been on a DIS desk at 0900, 31 March, alongside another one: the Argentine aircraft carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo, would receive special meteorological reports". On this basis, an alert DIS (Defence Intelligence Staff) officer might have called the alarm several hours faster than actually occurred,.." [352]

At the Libertad building in Buenos Aires, despite the late hour, the second meeting of the day commences.

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347 *PREM 19/657 f24. Telegram No.77 of 30 March*

348 Ferris 2020 citing *GCHQ incoming telegram no.36 March 30, 1982. cf. The Threads that Link the Falklands to Iraq* Simon Jenkins *London Spectator* March 30, 2007

349 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. My emphasis. Gilobert had been tasked by the junta with organising a civilian administration to follow the invasion. See above. The LADE flight left the next day.

350 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.675. Simon Winchester (*Sunday Times*), Ken Clarke (*Daily Telegraph*), David Graves (*The Sun*) and William Langley (*Daily Mail*).

351 See March 28, 1982 above.

352 Ferris 2020 citing *3/AA/73089-82 March 30, 1982 D/2304/14 pt.1*

"... The Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Leopoldo Alfredo Suárez del Cerro "reported on the weather forecast for the landing, reporting that the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations (had) decided to begin operations on April 2 at 0000 hours" (as) a storm prevented the operation being carried out on April 1. It was also resolved that "for reasons of international policy, it was appropriate for the Military Governor (General Mario Benjamin Menéndez) to have jurisdiction over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands." [353]

March 31st, in the UK, following the ITN news report of the 30th, Britain's morning newspapers carry stories of Royal Navy submarines sailing for the South Atlantic; *"The Argentine chargé d'affairs in London, Alfredo Molteni, had a call from the local manager of Aerolineas Argentinas, who told him that flights between Argentina and London had been "suspended". Molteni ... phoned the London manager of the Argentine national bank to warn him there might be financial restrictions if there were an "incident" in the Falklands."*[354]

Published in *The Daily Telegraph* newspaper, a Gallup poll of voter intentions places the Conservative Party on 35%, the SDP on 33% and the Labour Party on 30% - with the Conservatives having an overall lead of 2%. [355]

From Buenos Aires, Britain's defence *attaché* reports to the MOD that the whole Argentine fleet has sailed.

"On March 31 At 12:57, the fleet cut communications with the continent, modified the navigation course, headed to Port Stanley and changed the code name: from Operation Azul it became Operation Rosario." [356]

In the UK, during the afternoon, the information from GCHQ finally gets a reaction; *"... GCHQ began a drum-roll of alarming messages, collectively showing that Argentine warships would concentrate around Port Stanley on 2 April. ... At 1436, GCHQ distributed a message showing that an Argentine auxiliary vessel was to take "a position south of the Falkland Islands" and, at 1738, that 2 Marine Infantry Brigade would soon land somewhere."* [357]

At around 6pm in London, the GCHQ intercepts are handed to Defence Secretary John Nott, who seeks an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister at the House of Commons. They meet in the Prime Minister's office, together with Humphrey Atkins and Richard Luce of the Foreign Office.

"John gave the MOD's view that the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized. This was terrible, and totally unacceptable. I could not believe it: these were our people, our islands. I said instantly: "if they are invaded, we have got to get them back."..." [358]

"As Thatcher recalled: "That night no one could tell me whether we could retake the Falklands – no one. We did not know – we did not know". Nott and the DIS believed that Argentina had achieved a fait accompli to which Britain could not even respond." [359]

At the Palace of Westminster, uninvited, and unannounced, Admiral Sir Henry Leach arrives with copies of the latest intelligence reports. Asking to speak to John Nott, the Admiral is allowed into the meeting where he, in opposition to much of the advice already given, tells Margaret Thatcher that Britain could, and should, send a task force if any of the Islands are invaded.

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353 Yofre 2011 citing *Act No.6 'M'/82*
354 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.676 citing Cardoso *et al* 1987 p.88
355 *UK Polling Report.* See June 9, 1983. Urban myth has it that Thatcher started a war because the Tories were behind in the polls.
356 Yofre 2011
357 Ferris 2020
358 *The Downing Street Years* Margaret Thatcher 1993
359 Ferris 2020

> *"Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little."*[360]

"Leach's advice was that whatever was done must not be half-hearted, for that was likely to result in a shambles. ... He argued for sending every element of the fleet of any possible value. ... Leach's conviction that a fleet able to look after itself if subjected to air and sea attack by Argentine forces would be ready to sail early the next week made a deep impression on the politicians present." [361]

Prime Minister Thatcher authorises Admiral Leach to proceed.

> *"... the main thrust of this was that I left ... with full authority to assemble, but not yet sail, a task force."* [362]

"... the hour produced the man. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, joined us in my room in the Commons, where colleagues and advisers gloomily combined to tell me why every option was unthinkably risky. I asked the Admiral: "If this invasion happens, precisely what can we do?" I won't forget his answer. Quite calmly and confidently, he replied: "I can put together a task force of destroyers, frigates, landing craft and support vessels, to be led by the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible. It can be ready in 48 hours. All I need is your authorisation. I gave it." [363]

"... once the crisis came she was second to none in her single-minded devotion to the righting of a wrong and the defence of democracy and British interests. It is hard to believe that the Falklands would be British now if any other politician of that day had been in No. 10 Downing Street..." [364]

In Stanley, Governor Hunt, informed of the probability of an invasion, reviews his options. At his immediate disposal are the remaining marines of NP 8901 and their newly-arrived replacements; a total of 69. Also eleven Royal Navy personnel remaining onshore from HMS *Endurance*; and one ex-Royal Marine, who had promptly re-enlisted on hearing rumours of an attack. Of the civilian Defence Force, 21 men report for duty. [365]

"Major Gary R H Noot, the outgoing commanding officer, and his replacement, Major Mike J Norman, were halfway through the administrative handover when the first hints of the impending invasion were received. The handover meant that the defending force was about twice what might otherwise have been expected..." [366]

"On Wednesday afternoon, 31 March, the mood changed. The Marines' secure link with Britain was through their Commander in Chief, Rex Hunt, at Government House. He had received a message which was as confusing as it was disturbing. American intelligence had picked up a radio signal indicating that some action around the Falklands was imminent and they had passed it to London." [367]

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360 *Admiral Sir Henry Leach: First Sea Lord who convinced Thatcher that Britain must recapture the Falklands* in the *Independent* May 2, 2011

361 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.181

362 Sir Henry Leach in *The Falklands War* A. Dorman, M. Kandiah & G. Staerck (eds) 2005 p.28

363 The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher in *The Falklands War: Then and Now* Gordon Ramsey (ed) 2008

364 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.678

365 Defence Force members were: Ally Biggs, Les Biggs, Fraser Wallace, Marvin Clark, Teddie Summers, Len McGill, Gavin Short, Brian Summers, Rag McAskill, Neil Ford, Robert King, Martyn Smith, Owen Summers, Phil Summers, Keith Summers, Les Harris, Derek & Tony Pettersson, Pat Peck, 'Tubby' Smith, Vernon Steen, Gerald Cheek, Kenneth McKay, Dougie Hansen, Stewart Wallace, Jeremy Smith, Duane Andrade, Charles Coutts, Robert Rozee, Irwan Summers, Robert Stewart and Anthony 'Taff' Davies. Information provided by Taff Davies.

366 Freedman 2005 vol.2

367 Bound 2007

From London, Lord Carrington sends a message to Minister Costa Mendez in Buenos Aires offering to despatch a high-level British official to discuss the situation of Argentina's scrap-metal workers on South Georgia. [368]

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson calls on Secretary Alexander Haig.

> *"British Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the Falkland Islands. The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing site. The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the Falklands March 30. More serious, according to the British, is other intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of assurances they are giving us. Henderson reported that the UK is still trying to diffuse the situation and that Lord Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith Harbor. The British believe however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over the status of the workers, but only on the question of sovereignty over the Islands. HMG is convinced that the Argentines will only hold off if the US immediately immediately raises the issue with the Argentine President. …"* [369]

Disturbed to discover that US agencies, including the CIA, have no information, Haig immediately alerts the White House before sending a telegram to Ambassador Shlauderman in Buenos Aires.

"In telegram 85684 to Buenos Aires, March 31, the Department instructed Shlauderman to deliver a message from Haig to Costa Mendez expressing the former's "hope that both governments will be able to move forward towards a satisfactory resolution" of the "longstanding issues" between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Haig continued: "Because the issues are not new, it would appear that arrangements and understandings have been agreed upon in the past for how to deal with problems such as that now posed at Leith Harbur. I urge your government do everything possible to adhere to such arrangements, and to avoid any actions that would make solution even more difficult. I have made the same requests to the British. I am convinced that it is in the interest of both governments to resolve the current impasse as quickly as possible. If our good offices can be of assistance, please let me know"." [370]

In New York, Argentina's new Permanent Representative to the UN, Eduardo Roca, tells the President of the Security Council (SC) that his country is considering putting the issue of South Georgia before the Security Council. [371]

> *"It is appropriate for me to emphasise in the clearest possible terms that the means employed by the British Government and their unilateral acts have created a situation of serious tension whose continuation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security."* [372]

368 Referred to in *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*. See below.

369 *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom April 1, 1982, 0429z* in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984

370 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 31, 1982 2208z* in *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).*

371 *The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982* Anthony Parsons in *International Affairs* vol.59 Issue 2 (Spring) 1983 p.169

372 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

In Moscow, Argentina's Embassy requests that the Russian Government uses its veto should a Security Council vote go against Argentina. [373] China receives a similar request in the event of an unsupportive Security Council resolution.

From South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* is ordered back to Port Stanley.[374] Before sailing, Capt. Barker transfers a platoon of Royal Marines onto South Georgia to maintain a presence, and protect the unarmed BAS civilians. At 7pm local time, HMS *Endurance* slips away from South Georgia. [375]

At Stanley, what little news there is, is circulated to the population by radio.

"Around 1900, on March 31st, Stanley's radio broadcast spread the news on the Islands that the Argentine fleet had been set back twenty-four hours due to a sea storm. This cleared things up. Not only were the British aware of the ongoing situation, but they could also accurately locate naval surface units." [376]

From Washington DC, Secretary Haig cables the US Embassy in London.

> *"I am instructing our Ambassador in Buenos Aires to convey my concern to the Argentine Foreign Minister and to urge that his government take no steps which would aggravate the present crisis. Furthermore, I am urging the Argentine Government to abide by existing arrangements and understandings concerning regularizing the status of foreign residents on South Georgia Island.*
>
> *We will, of course, have a greater chance of influencing Argentine behavior if we appear to them not to favor one side or the other. We will continue quietly to try and move the Argentines away from taking further steps which would make a peaceful resolution more difficult to achieve."* [377]

From London, Prime Minister Thatcher sends a message for the US President, Ronald Reagan.

> *"Dear Ron, You will know about the disturbing intelligence reports both from your sources and from ours that the Argentine Navy could be preparing to invade the Falkland Islands within the next 48 hours. There are less than 2,000 inhabitants there. We maintain only a small garrison of about 75 Marines at Port Stanley—the capital of the Falklands—and the only Royal Navy vessel which we have in the area at the moment is an ice patrol ship. An Argentine assault would undoubtedly result in loss of life. We could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation: The Falkland Islanders have always made it clear they wish and intend to remain British. Will you talk urgently with the Argentine President and ask him to give you an immediate assurance that he will not authorise any landing, let alone any hostilities. You can tell him that we will not escalate the dispute or start fighting. Meanwhile, we are pursuing urgent diplomatic initiatives with the Argentine to reach a settlement and I would ask for your support in this effort too. Warm personal regards,*
> *Margaret"* [378]

"Acquiesce, meaning "to accept something reluctantly but without protest", is a most un-Thatcherish choice of word in the circumstances. One would have expected something Churchillian. It suggests FCO drafting, leaving open the possibility of acquiescing to something less overtly damaging to HMG, the line the FO long wanted to take. At this moment of crisis, with the Foreign Secretary in Israel, FCO officials were required to speak

373 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 p.91. It is not clear how much information regarding Argentine intentions was attached to the requests.

374 This order appears to have come directly from the MOD in London, where Leach was stamping his new authority.

375 Barker 1997. See also Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.680 for details as to the means by which *Endurance* avoided detection by the *Bahia Paraiso*.

376 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 Unconfirmed.

377 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982*

378 *Ibid.*

frankly to the prime Minister about what they knew of the actual arrangements between Carrington, the Americans and the junta, which must have been a difficult conversation." [379]

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman telegrams Washington DC.

> *"Foreign Minister Costa Méndez called me in late this afternoon ... The Minister said he had conveyed my demarche of yesterday to the governing Junta. ... he gave me the following response from the three commanders: the GOA is prepared to accept the proffered good offices of the USG, but only on the basis that HMG first recognize the sovereignty of Argentina over the Malvinas and agree to deliver those Islands and their dependencies to Argentina within a reasonable period of time. The good offices of the USG would then be employed to help arrange such details as the future status of the Islanders under Argentine rule and the establishment of a permanent British fuelling station to support operations in the Antarctic. ... he reiterated that there would be no confrontation unless the British tried to take the working party off South Georgia. I said we would regard any confrontation as most serious. ... Costa Méndez closed the meeting by delivering himself of some harsh observations on the British, asserting that the GOA had had enough, that HMG had tried to dupe and string along Argentina for years and that the GOA was prepared "to break relations" without any qualms."* [380]

Shlaudeman adds a comment; *"The Junta's response is, of course, absurd. It sounds like Galtieri playing Patton. In any event, the GOA is clearly bent on pressing to the utmost the advantage it thinks it has. ... If the press reports of British Navy ship movement towards the South Atlantic are true, the Argentines may simmer down a bit. Our impression from contacts in the Argentine navy is that no armed action is expected in that quarter for the time being at least."*

The US Ambassador also notes that Haig's message for Costa Méndez had arrived while his current cable was being drafted, adding; *"I would prefer not to deliver any high-level message until after the CNO has had a chance to talk to the navy here and to give us his insights."* [381]

In Washington DC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) circulates an intelligence cable.

> *"On the evening of 31 March 1982, Argentine President Leopoldo (Galtieri) and the other two members of the ruling military Junta were determined that Argentina will take military action, if necessary, to resolve the current conflict with the United Kingdom over conflicting claims of sovereignty over the South Georgia Islands (sic) in the South Atlantic.*
>
> *In meetings late on 31 March, Galtieri and the other two members of the Junta were in firm agreement that Argentina will not back down on this matter. ... Late on 31 March, Costa Mendez told members of the Junta that the current impasse with the UK is a military problem, not a diplomatic problem; Galtieri forcibly echoed this statement."* [382]

"Argentina evidently plans an invasion as early as tomorrow of the disputed Falkland Islands, if its increasingly tough diplomatic posture does not yield results. ... Argentina's Foreign Minister has stated that it will require British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia groups

379 Elgood 2025

380 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 31, 1982 2208z* in *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).*

381 *Ibid.* CNO = Chief of Naval Operations

382 *Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontain files, Falkland Islands [04/01.1982-04/02/1982], Secret.*

and expeditious transfer of them to Buenos Aires. He said, however, that there would be no confrontation unless the British try to remove the Argentine nationals from South Georgia." [383]

April 1st, in the early hours, US Secretary of State Haig telegrams the US Embassy in London.

> "*British Ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, under instructions from London, called on the Secretary evening of March 31 to inform him that HMG believed it had solid evidence that the Argentine Government was moving a large Naval task force toward the Falkland Islands. The information, which the British believe the US also has, indicates that the task force is due to reach Port Stanley at 0006 hours April 2 and will join a submarine which has orders to observe a beach as a possible landing site.*
>
> *The Ambassador stated that Argentine aircraft overflew the Falklands March 30. More serious, according to the British, is other intelligence which they believe shows that the Argentine Junta is contemplating military action on April 2 no matter what kind of assurances they are giving us.*
>
> *Henderson reported that the UK is still trying to defuse the situation and that Lord Carrington had offered to send a high level figure to Buenos Aires to try and deal with the problem of the workers at Leith Harbor. The British believe, however, that the GOA is not interested in negotiating over the status of the workers, but only on the question of sovereignty over the Islands.*
>
> *HMG is convinced that the Argentines will only hold off if the US immediately raises the issue with the Argentine President. Henderson said that the situation is serious and that Mrs. Thatcher is very worried.*
>
> *The Secretary answered that he had been concerned that Carrington thought we had not been supportive enough at the outset of the dispute. The USG had not wanted to take sides as long as the dispute appeared to be only over workers status. Now that that there is plainly a military dimension, we will urgently contact the Argentine Government at the highest level. The Secretary said he recognized that the British have done much for us and in turn Carrington should be told that we will do what we can to assist in this matter."* [384]

Secretary Haig also cables the US Embassy in Argentina.

> *"Request you contact Galtieri immediately. Tell him we have disturbing reports. Tell him that we don't want to overreact, but would like very much to be reassured. Tell him that from the US point of view we believe that we are embarked on one of the most fruitful periods in the history of our relationship, in which we can become not only the partners in the struggle against Communism in the Hemisphere, but together we can again achieve that standing in international life which we both can rightfully claim. Tell him that should any military action occur, for whatever reason, it is a simple fact that overriding internal and external pressure would be brought to bear on us to abandon the new and promising relationship we are building."* [385]

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman cables Washington DC to report; "*... That Williams had received from Costa Mendez a verbal answer that morning regarding the proposed visit of a high-level British official to discuss the workers at Leith Harbor. Costa Mendez said the Government of Argentina was "not interested" and that "from the Argentine point of view the Leith Harbor affair is closed". Conveying this reply*

383 *National Intelligence Daily.* A regular briefing prepared by the CIA

384 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 03/31/1982–04/01/1982.*

385 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* in *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).*

to Shlaudeman, Williams added that Costa Mendez did indicate that "the GOA would be prepared for immediate discussions on the sovereignty issue".” [386]

In New York, at the United Nations building, during the morning, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar asks both Permanent Representatives, Eduardo Roca and Anthony Parsons, to meet him.

> *“The Secretary-General summoned my Argentine colleague and myself successively and spoke to us in similar terms. He said that he was distressed at reports of rising tension between the two countries and urged that we should settle our differences through diplomatic channels. He made clear that he will publicise his appeal....*
>
> *The Secretary-General told me that Roca (Argentina) was completely taken aback by being summoned. He told Perez de Cuellar that he was on the point of presenting a note to the President of the Security Council. He showed Perez de Cuellar the text which amounted to a rehearsal of the Argentine position over the years, laying the blame on us.*
>
> *I told Perez de Cuellar that I was glad that he had sent for me. I added in confidence and without any supporting detail that we were seriously worried that the Argentines might be contemplating using the South Georgia incident as a pretext for military action. I therefore believed that his initiative, particularly since it would be made public, could have a useful deterrent effect.*
>
> *Perez de Cuellat said that, if the Argentines were contemplating military action, this would be partly to divert attention from their internal difficulties and from the mess they had got themselves into with Chile over the Beagle Channel.”* [387]

At midday, the UN Secretary-General issues a press release regarding his meeting with the Permanent Representatives of both Argentina and the UK; repeating his call for a diplomatic solution.

In Stanley, Vicecomodoro Gamen receives information; *“Around 1400, on April 1st, Reinaldo Reid, an Anglo-Argentine man who had been living for a long time in Malvinas’ capital, informed Gamen that the runway was blocked with vehicles to prevent landings. Only a small portion was available for the Britten Norman Islander, the aircraft owned by Governor Hunt, which was patrolling the area around the adjacent sea.”* [388]

In New York, early afternoon local time, Britain's Sir Anthony Parsons requests that the President of the Security Council convenes a meeting; to call upon the Argentine Government to refrain from the use of force.

> *“By letter’ dated I April 1982 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom requested an immediate meeting of the Council as his Government had good reason to believe that the armed forces of the Argentine Republic were about to attempt to invade the Falkland Island.”*[389]

“... we had never been to the Security Council before with this dispute. It had only touched the Fourth Committee; it had scarcely been to the plenary of the General Assembly and it hit everyone by surprise. The day before the invasion I got word to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council which I did. I rang up colleagues in turn personally, saying would you be down at the Council in an hour's time, the invasion of the

386 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)*
387 *UKMiss New York telegram 352 to FCO April 1, 1982* in *FCO12/384 f352*
388 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 Unconfirmed.
389 See - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/security-council-discussion-1-to-3-april-1982.pdf

Falklands is pending. My American colleague (Jeanne Kirkpatrick), who was very mixed up with Latin American policy, said that I had gone mad and that she would block the vote.. I said that if you are going to block me from having a meeting you will have to do it in public and I shall insist on a public meeting so ...? My Russian colleague said: it is April 1st and I know this is an April Fool's joke, the kind of thing you do the whole time, but you don't know your own rules; it is after mid-day. I had quite a problem persuading him that this was serious ..." [390]

On being informed that a meeting of the Security Council is being requested, Argentina's Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, responds that; *"It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser."* Roca, submits a note to the President of the Security Council.

> *"The tense situation which is a cause of serious concern to my Government has been created by the following facts: the (fraudulent) claim of the British Government not to recognise the 1971 declaration for the Islands of South Georgia and not to recognise the documents created for them, and the British threat to use force by means of sending naval warships (to the area). ...*
>
> *The conduct of the British Government has provoked the incident I have described, combined with a military presence which is unjustified and against the basic principles of international peace and security, constitute the culmination of a systematic policy of the United Kingdom aimed at maintaining a position of total rejection of the sovereignty of my country over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich. ...*
>
> *It is appropriate for me to emphasise in the clearest terms that the means employed by the British Government and their unilateral acts have created a situation of serious tension whose continuation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security."* [391]

UN Security Council President Kamanda wa Kamanda calls for restraint; announcing a meeting for that evening despite the opposition of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the US Permanent Representative to the UN.

"Jeanne Kirkpatrick was Ambassador to the UN at the time and she believed that the UK was being imperialist and that the US should stand aside. The consequences of backing Britain, she said, would be disastrous for the US, whose long-term interests lay in preserving good relations with Latin America. She was unmoved by arguments which contrasted America's oldest alliance with a convenient arrangement based on promoting anti-Communism in Latin America, or a democratic government with a military dictatorship; nor did she appear to be impressed by the thought that military aggression had taken place in the American hemisphere and that it might perhaps be a good idea for the US to disapprove." [392]

"Kirkpatrick,.. was less than pleased, having told Roca that such a move was unlikely... Parsons was suspicious of Kirkpatrick's 'close and sympathetic relationship with Roca.' He suspected that she had given the Argentine Ambassador to understand that, if Argentina could support the US over Nicaragua, she would return the compliment over the Falklands." [393]

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390 Sir Anthony Parsons interviewed by Jane Barter March 22, 1996

391 *UKMiss New York telegram 354 to FCO (1530Z) April 1, 1982*

392 Dick 2003

393 Freedman 2005 vol.2. The Presidency of the Security Council revolves monthly among its members. The USA had held the position during March, 1982 with the US Permanent Representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick, an Argentine sympathiser, taking the chair. On April 1, the position moved to the Republic of Zaire with Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda taking the presidency. A stroke of luck considering Kirkpatrick's subsequent behaviour.

From London, information regarding the approaching invasion fleet is relayed to Governor Hunt. [394]

> *"We have apparently reliable evidence than an Argentine task force will gather off Cape Pembroke early tomorrow morning 2 April. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly."* [395]

"Faced with that Hunt arranged for his staff to sleep at houses in the town rather than near Government House, then he put all available staff to work shredding or burning secret papers,...Then he summoned the two Marine Majors, Gary Noott and Mike Norman, to Government House ..." [396]

Major Noot, officer commanding NP8901, briefs his marines before deploying them in small groups to sites around the town.

In Argentina, at 5pm, crews from the 1st Air Brigade are summoned to a meeting.

"On April 1 at 1700, the crews, who were unaware of the purpose of the meeting, were summoned with overnight gear to the Officers' Mess Assembly Hall. Comodoro Martínez began by saying: "Gentlemen, you will have the opportunity to achieve what you have dreamed of your entire lives –to recapture the beloved Malvinas Islands". The audience was deeply surprised, and then an intense and overwhelming joy followed. He then explained the reason for the meeting, the Aries 82 operation order, the airborne assault, and the details of the task to be carried out by the military air transport. Squadron commanders provided specific aspects, and the meeting concluded with a review and update of sea survival techniques." [397]

From Stanley, a coded message is transmitted to Argentina; *"... at 1810, Vicecomodoro Gilobert informed the command of the runway status, using code words such as "obstacles" and "comfortably accommodated"."* [398]

Out in the South Atlantic, at 6.30pm local time, Major-General Garcia signals the commanders of the Argentine Amphibious Task Force regarding the behaviour expected of them during and immediately after the invasion.

> *"Our mission is to disembark in the Malvinas Islands and evict the military forces and British authorities who are there. That's what we are going to do. Fate has wanted us to be responsible for repairing the 150 years of usurpation. On those Islands we are going to find a population which must have special treatment. They are inhabitants of Argentina territory and therefore must be treated like all those who live in Argentina. You must strictly respect the property and integrity of all people. You will not enter any private residence if it is not necessary for combat reasons.*
>
> *You will respect women, children, the elderly and men. Be harsh with the enemy but courteous, respectful and kind to the population of our territory whom we must protect. If someone commits rape, robbery or pillage, I will immediately apply the maximum penalty. ...*
>
> *Tomorrow you will be the winners. Tomorrow we will show the world an Argentine force that is brave in war and generous in victory. May God protect you."* [399]

394 By telegram, which arrived in Stanley at 3.30pm local time.
395 *FCO 7/4490 f113* The Governor is alleged to have responded; *"They might have added goodbye and the best of British!" cf. The Guardian* November 12, 2012
396 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.684
397 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
398 *Ibid.*
399 Quoted in Yofre 2011.

"No. 1. The mission must be complied with on our own territory, so it must be bloodless as permitted by the situation, so as to gain support among the population and (gain) worldwide approval. ... No. 5. The success of the operation... will be obtained if we can tilt the opinion of the population and the world in our favour, an outcome that will depend on each of the members of this Task Force. A wrong move, cunningly exploited by the propaganda, may bring about a serious problem at international level for the Nation whose greatness we are trying these days to enhance, both territorial and spiritually." [400]

At Stanley, 8.15pm local time, Governor Hunt goes on Falklands local radio to warn the Islanders.

> *"I have an important announcement to make about the state of affairs between the British and Argentine Governments over the Falkland Islands dispute. We have now sought an immediate emergency meeting of the Security Council on the grounds that there could be a situation which threatens international peace and security. I don't yet know whether it has been possible to arrange a meeting today, but our spokesman has been asked to make the following specific points. The Secretary General has today summoned the British and Argentine Permanent representatives to express his deep concern over the situation in the South Atlantic and has urged restraint on both sides. It is right that the Security Council should endorse and back up his approach. We, for our part, have continued to make every possible effort to resolve the current problems by diplomatic means.*
>
> *The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires yesterday delivered a further message to the Argentine government urging a negotiated settlement to current problems, and offering to send a senior emissary to Buenos Aires. The Argentine Foreign Minister had today responded to this approach in negative terms. He had declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia, and he had specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia. In addition to the Foreign Minister's unwillingness to pursue diplomatic exchanges, there is mounting evidence that the Argentine armed forces are preparing to invade the Falkland Islands. In these circumstances it is essential that the Security Council urge that there should be no resort to armed force and that diplomatic negotiations should be resumed.*
>
> *In these circumstances, I think it is necessary to take certain precautionary measures here in Stanley. I have alerted the Royal Marines and I now ask for all serving members or active members of the Falkland Islands Defence Force to report to the Drill Hall as soon as possible. They will be on guard tonight at key points in the town. Schools will be closed tomorrow. The radio station will stay open until further notice. If the Security Council's urging to keep the peace is not heeded by the Argentine Government, I expect to have to declare a state of emergency, perhaps before dawn tomorrow. I shall come on the air again as soon as I have anything to report. But in the meantime I would urge you all to remain calm, and to keep off the streets. In particular, do not go along the Airport Road. Stay indoors, and please do not add to the troubles of the security services by making demonstrations or damaging Argentine property. This would play into their hands and simply provide them with the excuse they need to invade us."* [401]

"We were all dumb, ... We couldn't believe it. In the dining room, there were four English journalists, eight state gas operators, a British visitor by the name of Carisley, (and) the owners of the hotel... After the speech the silence continued ... We all watched, silent, but I felt that the eyes were fixed more on me because they knew

400 *Ibid.* Different version in Van der Bijl 2023
401 Bound 2007. Also *The First Casualty* R. Phillips 2017 pp.115-116

I spoke English. Then they asked me what I thought. I told them I didn't believe that news. We got up, left the food almost intact (Lamb, as every night, every day) and along with the four English journalists we walked to (the) telex office to try to speak, each (man), to his country. They passed the news to their newspapers. I couldn't talk to Buenos Aires. Nothing could be heard across the line. Cut." [402]

"Rafael Wollmann, a photojournalist for ILA (Imagen Latinoamericana) agency, along with British correspondents Simon Winchester (of The Sunday Times) and Ian Mather with his photographer Tony Prime of The Observer were the only reporters on the islands when the occupation occurred. Wollmann arrived earlier (March 23) in order to make a report for the Gamma agency on the islands, while the British came to report on the South Georgia incident." [403]

"Before 1900, following British tradition, Gilobert and Gamen were having dinner at Borland's house. The atmosphere was rather tense, with an air of strange courtesy. From the next room, as though coming from far away, orders and information being broadcast on the radio could be heard. Both Argentine men tried to understand the messages spoken in distorted English, maybe a mixture of cockney accent or London slang and Gaelic. Dinner finished at 2100, and the Argentines left for Gamen's residence. Once there, they found the house guarded by four armed FIDF militiamen. Both men assessed the situation: the guards prevented them from moving, the runway was blocked, and troops were deployed and ready. Since they were convinced that the air assault would not be executed, they did not go to the airport. Meanwhile, policemen and defense forces searched the houses of Argentine residents. All adult men were sent to the Town Hall under armed guards. ... On April 1 at 2200, Gilobert and Gamen began their radio communications attempts with the Task Force 40, at the scheduled times. They repeated the procedure every two hours, until the early morning of April 2,..."[404]

From Buenos Aires, a signal to Argentina's invasion force informs General Garcia and Rear-Admiral Allara that the Islanders, and the Marine garrison, are aware of their approach. Without the advantage of surprise, the invasion plans are quickly revised. Afraid that the target beach will now be defended, another landing site is selected. A squad whose objective was to be Goose Green is reassigned to reinforce those attacking Stanley. The new plan calls for Government House to be seized by the sixteen members of the Amphibious Commando Group, under the command of Lieut-Commander Pedro Giachino.

"*... making a total of 940 Argentine troops who would be attacking eighty-one British marines and sailors.*" [405]

In the Falklands, civilian Defence Force (FIDF) members make their way to the Drill Hall.

"... corps spirit is a strong thing, and Anthony Davies, known as Taff', was the only experienced soldier among them. Taff had been a Marine and met his wife Jackie when serving with Naval Party 8901 in the late 1970s. He left the Corps in 1979 and settled in Stanley. That night he felt he had to do something to help and became the FIDF's newest member. Taff recalled that, in spite of the lack of experience and the understandable nerves, the men were calm." [406]

"... the Marines took most of the FIDF General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and magazines for SLR rifles, leaving the FIDF with SLRs in the racks but no magazines to put in them, so quite number of the 32 FIDE

402 Rafael Woolman, Argentine photo-journalist, who had arrived in Stanley a few days before on a LADE flight. Quoted in *La Gesta de Malvinas y sus protagonistas, conocidos y no tanto* in *El Diario del Fin del Mundo* January 4, 2008 citing *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Rafael Woolman in *La Nueva Provincia de Bahía Blanca* April 2, 2007

403 *The relationship between the military and Argentine correspondents authorized to report from the islands during the Falklands War* Eva Lavín & Jorge Gallardo-Camacho 2017

404 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

405 Middlebrook 2013

406 Bound 2007

volunteers who reported for duty were armed with Second World War .303 rifles. … Once each man had been issued with a weapon (of whatever vintage) and 100 rounds of ammunition, the FIDF dispersed to their allotted posts around the town." [407]

From Stanley, Governor Hunt reports to London.

> *"(1) Royal marines disposition will be made near expected landing beach and will do what they can to contain landing and to defend airport.*
>
> *(2) FIDF will round up Argentines in Stanley before dawn tomorrow and bring them to Government House for safe-keeping. They will then deploy at probable helicopter landing sites.*
>
> *(3) Marines will fall back to outskirts of Stanley but will not fight in Stanley. Survival party will take off to the hills as Argentine forces reach Stanley. I shall remain at Government House. …"* [408]

HMS *Endurance* is ordered to return to South Georgia.

> *"I made for the south-east corner of the island. This was because we had a report that two corvettes, two destroyers, a submarine and a tanker were heading for South Georgia; the assumption was they would make their approach from the north."* [409]

At South Georgia, Argentine corvette, *ARA Guerrico*, with two helicopters and 40 marines, joins the *Bahia Paraiso*.

In Washington DC, Secretary of State Haig summons Argentina's Ambassador Takacs to see him.

"The Secretary called in Argentine Ambassador Takacs at 7:45 p.m., April 1. They met for 15 minutes, …. The Secretary told Takacs that the President and he are deeply concerned about the situation in the South Atlantic. Our assessment suggests that the use of force is contemplated on the Falkland Islands and in South Georgia as well. We know that the UK will take a counter action if this happens. The situation would become a tragedy. Nothing would be more self defeating for Argentina's interest in good relations with the United States. The Secretary described our present relations as those of unprecedented cordiality after many years of languishing. GOA use of force would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days. The Secretary said he had been in touch with Lord Carrington and received the clear impression the British will react. He said he had urged the President to call Galtieri. He was shocked to learn that the Argentine President would not take the call. …" [410]

Secretary Haig then sends a message to Lord Carrington indicating that the USA will do all it can to help, and that their Ambassador in Buenos Aires is seeking an urgent meeting with President Galtieri; who is resisting an invitation to speak with President Reagan.

"In his memoirs, Haig wrote that Reagan had attempted to telephone Galtieri at 6:30 p.m., but had been informed by Galtieri's aide that he was "unavailable" to take Reagan's call." [411]

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407 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.695. With two detachments of marines in the Islands, the NP8901 stores were quickly depleted.
408 *FCO 7/4490 f124 Telegram No. 64 0f 1 April 1982*
409 Barker 1997
410 *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom: Washington, April 2, 1982 0304z Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982).* See - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d39
411 Footnote 2 in *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and the United Kingdom: Washington, April 2, 1982 0304z Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982). General Galtieri "resisted" for 4 hours.*

In Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman finally speaks to President Galtieri.

> *"... I emphasised to him, as I had to the Foreign Minister, that any armed confrontation would do serious damage to the excellent relations we have been developing between our two countries. I asked for the assurances on the use of force as set forth in para five of the reftel.*
>
> *Galtieri did not address that question... but when later I pressed it (he) said bluntly that he was not going to tell us whether or not he intended to use force....With respect to US/Argentine relations, the President insisted that Argentina has the support on this issue of the great majority of nations and that the failure of the U.S. to understand its position would do us damage in the Southern Cone and elsewhere. He referred several times to Argentine support for our position in Central America—support which I acknowledged—and seemed to suggest there should be a quid-pro-quo in this case.*
>
> *The talking paper, which the President handed to me at the end of the meeting, reviews the Argentine complaints about HMG's lack of response to the Argentine proposals of January and February. It describes the current situation as "intolerable and impossible to maintain" in terms of "our national honor."*
>
> *The paper contains the following sentence: "We have not considered for a moment that at a time when the freedom of the American people is seen to be seriously threatened your government (USG) would be inclined to defend a colonial system represented by fewer than 2,000 persons thousands of kilometers from the metropol. We believe firmly that such situations belong to the history of past centuries and that it is not rationally possible to ask us to be the last example of a colonial aggression." ...*
>
> *The last point in the paper responds in a way to our request for assurances. The Foreign Minister commented that this point was the key. It states: "We can offer all the tranquillity and security required if public and express recognition of our sovereignty is made real, along with the stipulation, also public, that in a period not to exceed the end of the year 1982 the consequences of said recognition will be made concrete".*
>
> *I told the President that we were not talking about US support or lack of support for the British position, that we were not taking sides, and that we were only speaking of the possibility of military action, a possibility which concerns us greatly. I said that such action could bring unforeseen and very grave consequences. The President said that Argentina was prepared to face such consequences."* [412]

Informing Washington DC, Shlaudeman comments; *"Galtieri was emotional and, I believe, quite nervous. I'm still not certain that he means to take action tomorrow. It would be in his nature to run a bluff to the very end. On the other hand, his ego shows signs of serious inflation and I'm afraid that he is capable of doing something stupid."* [413]

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador, Henderson, receives a message from the US State Department; *"... that their Ambassador has informed them from Buenos Aires of his meeting with the Argentine President. The latter would not say what the Argentines were going to do. The Americans have deduced from this that the Argentinians are therefore planning to go through with their military operation. The Argentine President*

412 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, Buenos Aires, April 1, 1982 2345z: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982)*

413 *Ibid.* Also *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (01/01/1982–04/02/1982*

muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about surrendering sovereignty…"

In the South Atlantic, closing on the Falklands, Argentina's invasion forces begin to deploy.

"At 9.30pm on 1 April, … the Type 42 destroyer Santisima Trinidad anchored one mile south of the Falklands coast. Twenty-one inflatable rubber boats were lowered into the sea, and the marines of the Amphibious Commando Company transferred to the small craft." [414]

In Buenos Aires, at the same time, Argentina's President Galtieri finally agrees to take a telephone call from US President Reagan –

> Reagan: *"I have reliable news that Argentina is about to adopt force in the Falkland Islands. As you will understand, I am very worried about the repercussions such an action would have. I want to express to you Mr. President, the concern of United States in this matter and the need to find an alternative to the use of force."*
>
> Galtieri: *"... I want to remind you that my country has always maintained a favorable attitude towards negotiations in this dispute with Great Britain. This is demonstrated by seventeen years of fruitless discussion under the auspices of the United Nations. We have conducted these negotiations with a nation which, more than a century and a half ago, used force to usurp a territory which by right belongs to Argentina. Our negotiating position remains the same – but the patience of the Argentine people has a limit. Great Britain has threatened Argentine citizens legitimately going about their business in South Georgia, and my government has an obligation to protect them. Besides, the United Kingdom persists in ignoring Argentine claims in order to put an end to the negotiations and has not responded – in spite of our insistence – to the last proposal that we formulated in order to speed up the process. I want to repeat to you, Mr. President, that our negotiating stance has not changed..."*
>
> Reagan: *"I understand, Mr. President, but I consider it essential to continue the discussions and seek an alternative to force. ... Believe me, ... I have good reason to assure you that Great Britain would respond with force to any Argentine military action."*
>
> Galtieri: *"Argentina has always been in favor of a peaceful solution to this dispute. It will only be possible to find the alternative you seek, Mr. President, if there is recognition on the part of the United Kingdom of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. And that recognition would have to be explicit and public."* [415]

Reagan offers mediation via Vice-President Bush and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, but Galtieri rejects the offer.

> *"...* Galtieri*: "There are all those resolutions of the General Assembly, such as 1514, 2065 and others which repeatedly call on the parties to seek a negotiated settlement to this sovereignty dispute".*
>
> Reagan: *"Mr. President, I believe that it is my obligation to bring to your notice that Great Britain is ready to respond militarily to an Argentine landing. This has been made known to me by the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Mrs. Thatcher, a friend of mine, is a very determined woman and she would have no other alternative than to make a military response. The conflict will be tragic and have*

414 Middlebrook 2003

415 Quoted in full in Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 pp.83-86. There are, apparently, two versions because the Argentine recorder attached to Galtieri's telephone failed to work. Argentina's version, therefore, had to be reconstructed by those who had been present with Galtieri. See Yofre 2011

grave consequences for the Hemisphere. ... I want to make clear, therefore, that the relationship between your country and mine will suffer greatly. American and world-wide opinion will take a negative attitude to an Argentine use of force".” [416]

“On the eve of war, Galtieri avoided taking Reagan's call for hours. Finally they talked for fifty minutes. Galtieri couldn't believe the President was asking him to halt the operation. "Did he really say that?" he asked his interpreter incredulously. The conversation was a revelation to both, the moment when Galtieri discovered that he could not rely on the Americans and Reagan discovered that he did not control the Argentines.” [417]

From London, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, responds to Governor Hunt's earlier telegram, urging caution in the treatment of Argentines present in the Islands.

“... This must be for your judgement, but you will wish to bear in mind that although the evidence of Argentine intentions to attack the Islands tomorrow is highly suggestive, it is not yet entirely conclusive. The action we are taking in the Security Council and US representations in Buenos Aires could yet deter them. To arrest the few Argentines in Port Stanley before it is entirely clear that a landing is about to take place could simply provide the Argentines with the excuse they need. On present information we would not anticipate that a landing itself would take place until later in the morning. It would however seem a sensible precaution for the FIDF to keep a close watch on any Argentine citizens. We leave it to your discretion on when to inform the civilian population but it would seem right to do so with adequate warning...” [418]

From Washington DC, President Reagan telephones PM Thatcher with regard to his conversation with Galtieri.

“... I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your Government in the effort to resolve this dispute. Both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.” [419]

“The over-riding complication is the President's closeness to Mrs. Thatcher. The President called Galtieri and Galtieri told him to mess out.” [420]

In New York, the United Nations Security Council meets in public session. [421]

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416 Yofre 2011
417 Elgood 2025
418 *Carrington to Hunt ALQ/050/5*
419 *PREM 19/657 Telegram from White House to Cabinet Office, London*
420 *Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary International Security Affairs (Noel C. Koch) to the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense April 2, 1982. Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003*
421 See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/security-council-discussion-1-to-3-april-1982.pdf

"We decided in the Mission that if we were going to get a Resolution – we didn't think the odds were good but we must do it quickly, avoid all the negotiations over blue drafts and black drafts and I don't know what other drafts, we must slap down something we could live with – we must demand that Argentina withdraw and we must get a vote on it within 24 hours because if we allowed it to drag out it would be fatal. So we did exactly that;.." [422]

Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Security Council.

> *"As members of the Council will be aware, there have been differences for many years between my Government and the Government of the Republic of Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands. My Government has asked for this emergency meeting of the Council because it now has reason to believe that the Government of Argentina is planning to attempt to invade these Islands. ... For several years, the affairs of the Falklands have been discussed by the General Assembly. The Falklands are one of those territories about which the United Kingdom reports to the United Nations under Article 73(E) of the Charter. At the most recent session of the General Assembly, a decision was adopted to the effect that the Committee of 24 should keep the situation in the territory under review.*
>
> *The Assembly has not adopted a Resolution on the subject for several years but has contented itself with taking note of developments. My Government and the Government of Argentina have held a series of meetings to discuss the situation in the Falkland Islands. In these meetings, elected representatives of the local population have regularly taken part. Reports have been submitted to the General Assembly about these meetings, most recently in Notes dated 1 April 1981 (document A.36/156). In this Note, it is stated that: "Both delegations agreed that this question should be examined in further negotiations at an early date." Such discussion did in fact continue, most recently in New York at the end of February. Representatives of the two Governments confirmed on that occasion their wish to continue their discussions within the negotiating framework referred to in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. But regrettably the Argentine Government appears to have decided, following those discussions, that it did not wish to continue on this course.*
>
> *The Joint Communique which had been agreed at these talks in New York was not published in Buenos Aires. Recently, relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina deteriorated as a result of an incident in South Georgia, one of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands,...*
>
> *On 31 March the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister that a senior official should visit Buenos Aires to discuss a diplomatic solution, adding that the diffusing of this incident would help prepare the way for a resumption of a dialogue on the broader sovereignty issue. Earlier today, the Argentine Foreign Minister gave the reply of his Government to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. His reply was negative. He declined to discuss further the problems occasioned by the illegal presence of Argentine nationals on South Georgia. He specifically stated that he no longer wished to use diplomatic channels to discuss the situation in South Georgia.*
>
> *Mr President, ... the purpose of my Government in calling this meeting of the Security Council is to consider the threat not to South Georgia but to the Falkland Islands,.. We have evidence that the Argentine Navy is about to launch an invasion, possible as early as tomorrow morning. ...*

422 Ambassador Parsons quoted in *British Diplomatic Oral History Project (Interviewing Sir Anthony Parsons)* J. Barder 1996

Mr President, my Government views the present situation with the utmost seriousness. We call on the Security Council to take immediate action in order to prevent an invasion.

We ask this Council to exercise its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.

We ask this Council to call upon the Government of Argentina to refrain from the threat or use of force against the Falkland Islands and to exercise restraint.

I can assure the Council that my Government has conducted the recent negotiations in perfect good faith and that the British Government stands ready to continue these negotiations in the future.

What is unacceptable is an attempt to change the situation by force. ..." [423]

Argentina's Ambassador Roca responds.

"The representative of Argentina stated that his country had once again been the object of aggression perpetrated by the Government of the United Kingdom by the dispatch of vessels to its national waters in order to exercise force against workers who, with the full knowledge of the United Kingdom authorities, had been engaged in peaceful commercial activities on San Pedro Island, in the South Georgia group of islands, a dependency of the Malvinas Islands. That aggression constituted one more episode in the violence that had been perpetrated by Great Britain on 3 January 1833, when it had taken possession of the Malvinas Islands, seizing the Argentine authorities residing there and expelling almost all of the inhabitants. ... The speaker said that his narration showed undeniably that for nearly I50 years the Argentine Republic had been and continued to be the object of continuous acts of aggression perpetrated by the United Kingdom. It was nothing other than the maintenance of a colonial situation which had originated in an act of force, which was then followed by illegal occupation, usurpation, without the metropolitan Power having demonstrated any desire to put an end to it, despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly. There was a serious and imminent threat by the United Kingdom to utilize force against Argentina's islands, waters and mainland, leaving Argentina no other course than immediately to adopt the necessary measures to ensure its legitimate defence ... It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser." [424]

After consulting with the Security Council, Council President Kamanda wa Kamanda makes a statement.

"The Security Council has heard statements from the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina about the tension which has recently arisen between the two Governments. The Security Council has taken note of the statement issued by the Secretary-General, which reads as follows: "The Secretary-General, who has already seen the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina earlier today, renews his appeal for maximum restraint on both sides. He will, of course, return to Headquarters at any time, if the situation demands it."

The Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, expresses its concern about the tension in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

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423 *UKMIS to FCO April 2, 1983. Telegram 363.* See https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/parsons-to-security-council-emergency-meeting-april-1-1982.pdf

424 UN record. Link above.

The Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and, in particular, to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and continue the search for a diplomatic solution. The Security Council will remain seized of the question" [425]

"After a brief exchange between myself and Ambassador Roca, who appeared to be taken by surprise by this development, the (SC) President read out the statement. I immediately took the floor to assure the Council that my government would be guided by the Presidential appeal and challenged Ambassador Roca to respond similarly. He remained silent." [426]

"Clearly, the members of the Junta miscalculated. ... They saw Britain's unexpected vehement response to the South Georgia incident as the first act of aggression in the conflict. From their perspective, it was Argentina, not Britain, which had to choose between appeasement and demonstrating resolve. As Galtieri puts it, "Everything has to be put in the larger context of Britain pushing Argentina up against the wall". They also incorrectly gauged the extent to which the international community would sympathize with Argentina. They expected that world leaders would accept or even applaud a bloodless use of military force in the pursuit of a just end, especially since Argentina was sending troops into what many countries – including virtually all of Latin America – considered to be Argentine territory. Moreover, they believed, Argentina was carrying out the operation in pursuit of decolonization, a principle endorsed by the United Nations.... they believed that either China (because of Hong Kong) or the Soviet Union (because of its geopolitical rivalry with the United States and Britain) would veto any resolution unfavourable to Argentina. They also believed that the United States would restrain Britain and encourage Thatcher to negotiate a final diplomatic settlement because of Argentina's support for American policy in central America." [427]

From London, Governor Hunt is sent permission to destroy Stanley airstrip; *"... if you can do so, to prevent it being used after invasion to resupply an invasion force."* [428]

"The 1st Air Transport Group would participate with four Hercules C-130H aircraft for transporting special forces, troops, and equipment; five Fokker F-28 aircraft for transporting personnel; one IA-50 G-II aircraft for liaison tasks; and one Fokker F-27 aircraft for search and rescue." [429]

A little before midnight, twelve men of Argentina's *Buzo Tactico* paddle away from the submarine *Santa Fe*. Their task is to check the beaches for obstacles and defences, and lay out beacons for the assault force. [430]

Cape Pembroke lighthouse is turned off.

"Another unforeseen event: the ARA Santa Fe submarine that was transporting special forces verified that the English had turned off the Cape Pembroke lighthouse, something strictly prohibited by international law." [431]

At Stanley, two hydrographers left behind by HMS *Endurance* board the FIG vessel *Forrest*. Sailing out they hope to give the Governor an early warning of approaching vessels, using *Forrest*'s radar.

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425 *Ibid.*
426 *The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982* A. Parsons 1983 p.170
427 Welch 1997
428 *FCO 7/4490 f104 Telegram No. 50 of 2 April 1982.* A hand written note suggests that this was not received by Hunt.
429 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
430 Argentina's equivalent of US Navy Seals.
431 Yofre 2011. Presumably, Argentina's invasion was not strictly prohibited by international law?



April 2nd, at midnight,[432] members of Argentina's Amphibious Commando Group arrive on the Falklands foreshore in inflatable dingies; commencing *Operation Rosario*.[433]

"The ninety-two marines were all present. They removed their neoprene outer suits, took their weapons and other equipment out of waterproof packs and prepared to move. The small party under Lieutenant-Commander Giachino who were to capture Government House had the shortest distance to go – two and a half miles due north – but Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party, was six miles away over a high ridge." [434]

"Once on shore at Mullet Creek, a few miles south of Stanley, the group divided into two – one to pin down, kill or capture the Marines at Moody Brook, and the other to snatch Rex Hunt from Government House, which, it was hoped, would be undefended." [435]

In Argentina, the junta entertain concerns that Chile may be tempted to take advantage of their focus on the Falkland Islands.

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432 Times in the Falklands/Buenos Aires are given as Falklands Standard Time, which in 1982 was 4 hours behind Greenwich Mean Time. Known, throughout the conflict, as Z or Zulu time.

433 Originally code-named *Azul*, the name was changed to honour the Virgin of Rosario. *cf. Argentina's Failed Crusade* J. Burns published in the *Tablet* 2002.

434 Middlebrook 2003. Sources give the numbers variously as 50, 84 and 92. It would take the main group, led by Lt.-Commander Sabarots, six hours to cross the difficult ground in the darkness. Far longer than planned.

435 Bound 2007

"Brigadier Ernesto H. Crespo, Chief of the 4th Air Brigade in El Plumerillo, Mendoza, was urgently summoned to the Air Operations Command headquarters. ... completely unaware of the ongoing action planning, he had to take up his appointment as Air Commander of the Southern Theater of Operations (CATOS); in the form of a tactical air force, this air component was called Argentine Air Force Southern Command (FAS). ... It was also pointed out that, in case of a potential conflict with Chile, the FAS should support the mission of the Southern Theater of Operations (not yet established), control and secure the western border to prevent Argentine military power from weakening if offensive actions were carried out on national territory." [436]

"From the beginning of Operation Rosario, some of the best-trained units of its army and navy—the 6th and 8th Mountain Brigades and Marines—were deployed along Chile's border in Patagonia, to prevent a Chilean offensive that could take advantage of the armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom to attack Argentine Patagonia." [437]

At 0030 local time in the Falklands, Governor Rex Hunt broadcasts on local radio.

> *"You probably heard the outcome of the Security Council Meeting on the BBC – both Britain and Argentina were called upon not to use force to settle their dispute over the Falkland Islands. We must now wait and see what effect this has upon the Argentine Government. As I speak there is no indication that the Argentine Navy task force heading this way has changed course. Unless it does, we can expect it off Cape Pembroke by dawn. Now please don't be inquisitive and go see for yourselves. You'll just get in the way. Stay indoors and we shall keep you informed by radio."* [438]

"Coups and battles had been covered before on live radio, but Patrick Watts, the manager of the government-owned Falkland Islands Broadcasting Station (FIBS), made broadcasting history with the first invasion phone-in. Rex Hunt had a dedicated line to the FIBS studio and used it to update Islanders and issue whatever instructions he thought necessary. But before the day was out locals would be calling in with tactically useful reports of the Argentine advance." [439]

From London, at 0127 local time, HM Ships *Hermes, Invincible, Fearless, Alacrity, Antelope* and RFA *Resource* are put on four hours notice for operations in the South Atlantic. *Antrim, Glamorgan, Glasgow, Coventry, Brilliant, Arrow, Plymouth* and RFAs *Applefleet* and *Tidespring* are ordered to Ascension Island. [440]

Enquiries are made regarding merchant vessels which may be suitable to support a task force. British Petroleum tankers *British Esk*, *British Tay* and *British Tamar* are listed (STUFT). [441]

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436 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.133. An indication of how restricted the planning for an invasion had been. Worthy of note that, from the ouset, the Junta had considered using force against Chile to snatch the Beagle Channel Islands, long the subject of dispute including a thwarted invasion in 1978.

437 *El rol de Chile en la Guerra de Malvinas* Mario Sznajder 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

438 Quoted in *Strangers in the Night: The Falklands conflict as a Radio War* Alasdair Pinkerton 2007

439 Bound 2007

440 In 1982, Ascension Island was a British Dependency (now part of the St. Helens Overseas Territory). Under an Anglo-US agreement of 1956, the US was granted permission to develop and operate facilities on the Island including the reactivation of Wideawake Airfield built in the 1940s. The Island remained British territory overseen by a Resident British Administrator. In early 1982, facilities consisted of a fourteen-bed hospital, two civilian doctors, a padre and accommodation for the 1000 people generally working on Ascension (FCO, BBC, Cable & Wireless, USAF, Pan Am and NASA). There were rumours in 1982 that the USA had initially objected to any use of the airfield. That was not true. See April 5, 1982 below.

441 STUFT = Ships Taken Up From Trade. Requisitioned under the Royal Prerogative by an Order in (Privy) Council. Fifty-four civilian ships would eventually be requisitioned for military use from thirty-three different private companies.

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's News Agency issues a report for the press:

"It said the invasion force was on its way and that the Army Chief of Operations, General Mario Menendez, has been named as Military Governor of the Islands, with three other senior officers to help him. The Argentine aircraft carrier was reported to have fifteen hundred assault troops on board, and many more, including airborne troops, had been mobilised in the southern ports of Rio Gallegos and Comodoro Rivadavia, facing the islands about three hundred miles away in the South Atlantic." [442]

At 0400 local time, on the Argentine mainland, troops start to board aircraft for flights to the Falklands.

"At the 9th Air Brigade located in Comodoro Rivadavia, the early hours of 2 April started with some unusual activity. The F-28, registration mark TC-51, landed at 0015 carrying the Comando Aéreo de Transporte (CAT, Argentine Air Transport Command) commander Brigadier Enrique R. Valenzuela. Immediately afterwards, three C-130Hs and two F-28s more arrived. After 0100, a C-130 and a KC-130 landed, as well as the vehicles carrying the Regimiento de Infantería 25 (25th Infantry Regiment) troops which had not traveled with the Task Force 40, the Compañía de Ingenieros de Combate 9 (9th Combat Engineers Company), and elements of the Command of the IX Brigada de Infantería (9th Infantry Brigade). Personnel and materiel boarding began at 0400. The Assault phase of the Operations Plan Aries 82 had started. At 0515, aircraft call sign LITRO 1 (C-130H, registration mark TC-68) took off from Comodoro Rivadavia heading to Malvinas. The men who would consolidate the Islands occupation traveled in the aircraft cargo hold: a total of 108 passengers who would make up the Staff of the Air Component of Teatro de Operaciones Malvinas (TOM, Malvinas Theater of Operations), commandos of the Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (GOE, Special Operations Group), the Elemento Control de Transporte Aéreo (ECTA, Air Transport Control Element), material for the Terminal Aérea de Carga (TAC, Air Cargo Terminal), personnel and materiel of the Grupo 1 de Comunicaciones Escuela (G1CE, 1st Communications Group Institute), and Army troops with two Jeeps. Argentine Air Force personnel were responsible for the airport control and the organization of assets to support air transport operations." [443]

At Stanley, at 0430, Governor Hunt makes a declaration before deploying his available forces.

> *"I have no alternative other than to declare a state of emergency with immediate effect under the Emergency Powers Ordinance of 1939. Under these emergency powers I can detain any person, authorise entry to any premises, acquire any property, and issue such orders as I see fit. I must again warn people in Stanley to stay indoors. Anyone seen wandering on the streets will be arrested by the security forces. I have no further news about the Argentine Navy task force, but may I just say that the morale of the Royal Marines and the Defence Force is terrific, and it makes me proud to be their Commander in Chief."* [444]

Observers are positioned on Sapper Hill, and at Cape Pembroke. [445]

"Norman based one third of his small force in and around Government House, and the remainder he split into sections to cover the airport peninsula and the approaches to the harbour and the town.... The airport runway was blocked with vehicles and oil drums." [446]

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442 BBC despatch of 0600 GMT April 2, 1982 in Briley 2022. 0600 GMT would have been 0200 Falklands/Buenos Aires time.

443 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.102

444 Quoted in Bound 2007

445 The contents of Hunt's radio messages appear to have been quickly passed to the Argentine command. Undoubtedly by the LADE representative, Hector Gilobert, who had returned to Stanley on March 31st.

446 Freedman 2005 vol.2

0515 three ships are seen off Mengeary Point, turning into Port William. [447]

> *"... one landing craft heading for the narrows and two others in Port William west of Yorke Bay. I instructed Wells to send off our message that invasion forces were landing. Cable and Wireless were having problems with their emergency circuit and they suggested trying to reach you through Portishead. That was the last we heard from Cable and Wireless."* [448]

0530 Moody Brook barracks is attacked by Lt.-Commander Sabarots' team.

> *"Explosions were heard from Moody Brook and shortly after movement was reported behind Government House from Sappers Hill. I instructed Wells to destroy our last Cypher machine."* [449]

> *"Disturbed night. 1st shots heard at 5.00amish. The invasion is on."* [450]

"Everything was silent and dark. On my watch I saw that it was five o'clock when the first shots were heard. Machine gun bursts and mortar blasting. Very close, in the governor's house. We listened, without being able to decipher, the orders that the sailors gave to organize the defense." [451]

"It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas, to force the British out of the buildings and capture them. Our orders were not to cause casualties if possible.... We surrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north of Stanley harbour, so that anyone who did get away would not reach the town and reinforce the British there. Then we threw the tear-gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty." [452]

"The commandos undoubtedly planned to hit both targets (Moody Brook and Government House) simultaneously, but their timing was out and the abandoned barracks were attacked some ten minutes before Government House. Their attack was supposed to be a coup de main; so sudden, precise and overwhelming that the Marines would not have been adequately organised to defend themselves or the Governor, and would have surrendered quickly in disarray." [453]

Some four miles from Stanley, amphibious vehicles land on a beach. [454]

> *"At 0637 (sic) hours, the first 5 vehicles carrying the platoon from 25 Inf Regt reached the beach on the north coast of the airfield peninsula, without encountering any resistance. The vehicles immediately deployed ready to open fire if necessary, while Infantry soldiers from the Army charged at full speed towards the high ground which dominated the Airfield from the South East."* [455]

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447 *Reasons in Writing: A Commandos View of the Falklands War* E. Southby-Tailyour 1990

448 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO. The 'Narrows' are the entrance to Stanley Harbor. The problems in maintaining radio contact with London are intriguing and largely unexplained. Freedman (2005 vol.2) put this down to Cable & Wireless having issues with their emergency circuits. Pinkerton (2007) asserts that it was due to a planned "*readjustment of the radio link with the United Kingdom earlier that morning*."

449 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

450 *Valerie's Diary* in *A Falklands Family at War: Diaries of the 1982 Conflict* Neville & Valerie Bennett 2021

451 Argentine photo-journalist Rafael Wollmann quoted in *La Gesta de Malvinas y sus protagonistas, conocidos y no tanto* in *El Diario del Fin del Mundo* January 4, 2008 citing *Malvinas. El desembarco de una primicia* Rafael Wollmamn in *La Nueva Provincia de Bahía Blanca* April 2, 2007

452 Lt.-Commander Sabarots quoted in Middlebrook 2003. The large number of bullet holes discovered in the walls of the buildings raises doubts about Argentine claims that the primary objective of the invasion was to take control without inflicting casualties. After the war, Argentina would allege that the barracks had been strafed by British aircraft. See Phillips 2017

453 Bound 2007

454 Twenty LVTP-7s and five LARC-Vs carrying Argentina's 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion. More troops were moved to Stanley airfield by helicopters from the landing ship ARA *Cabo San Antonio.*

455 Translated Argentine Report; provenance unknown

0550 local time, Government House comes under fire. Governor Hunt makes a further radio transmission to the Islands' population.

> *"This is just to let you know that the first Argentine ships have been sighted in Port William and one landing craft approaching the narrows. Everything is under control, we are keeping them under surveillance. That is all for now. There have been one or two bangs at Moody Brook, but we consider that this is a diversion… That's all for now."* [456]

> *"WHAT THE HELL WAS THAT? Quickly out to the kitchen, Rex Hunt was saying that a boat had come in through the narrows and was firing on Government House … no it wasn't … something blew up in The Narrows, anyway it was a big explosion."* [457]

0600 the BBC's airs a broadcast by its Latin American Correspondent, Harold Briley.

> *"Argentina's threatened invasion of the British Colony, the Falkland Islands, is reported to be underway. A fleet headed by Argentina's flagship Veintecino de Mayto (25th of May) was reported to be heading the invasion assault in which thousands of troops and aircraft were taking part. Official confirmation was expected from the President, General Leopoldo Galtieri, in a nationwide television and radio broadcast."* [458]

"The Governor of the Falkland Islands, Rex Hunt, with communications to the outside world cut off, told me he listened to my broadcast crouched under a table in Government House, radio beside him and revolver in hand to repel Argentine intruders. 'As I listened to you' he said, 'Argentine troops arrived, shooting out all the windows in my conservatory." [459]

An Argentine cargo plane, which had left Comodoro Rivadavia at 0515, is ordered remain in the air.

"At dawn, close to the Islands, the TC-68 made radio contact with the fleet vessels and was ordered not to land. The situation was yet to be defined while the battle continued in the vicinity of the airport, so the aircraft flew a holding pattern for two hours." [460]

0615 local time, Lt.-Commander Giachino's commandos attack Government House. While the majority attempt to pin down the defenders with gunfire, Giachino leads a small group towards the building. Unable to find a suitable entrance, they move into the rear garden of Government House where they are seen. Giachino is shot. Three others are captured in an outbuilding. [461]

"Enemy forces attacked Government House and got within 20 yards before they were repulsed (Three prisoners were subsequently taken from outbuildings)." [462]

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456 Quoted in Phillips 2017 p.161
457 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021. *cf.* Phillips 2017
458 Quoted in Briley 2022.
459 *Ibid.*
460 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.103
461 The fog of war. How many men Giachino moved forward with is variously given as five or six. It may have been more. Three ended up in a dead end part of an outer annex and were captured. Two or three followed their leader into the rear area of Government house where they came under fire from the defenders. Giachino died of his wounds either at the scene or later in hospital – reports are not consistent. His death certificate notes that he died in Puerto Rivero, possibly the only person to ever do so (Argentina's new name for Stanley would only last for 14 days before being changed again). Posthumously he was awarded Argentina's *Cruz-La Nacion Argentina al Heroico Valor en Combate*.
462 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.

"At 0615 Government House itself, defended by just thirty-one Marines and the Governor's driver armed with a shotgun ("determined to shoot the first Argie that tries to haul down the Union Flag"), came under direct attack ... causing at least three dead and seventeen wounded among the attackers in its immediate vicinity. ... the Argentinians paid dearly for their 'bloodless occupation:..." [463]

"The lack of detailed plans caused an early failure. Giachino and his party did find a door, broke it open and entered, but they were in a separate, smaller building which contained the servant's quarters. It was empty. The five Argentines came out again and made for the back of the main building. ... A hail of fire from the defenders in the rear of the house fell on Giachino and his men. Giachino fell..." [464]

"At Government House, the initial assault was repulsed, leaving one Argentine dead and three wounded, although the Marines believed that they had inflicted much greater casualties. Later three commandos who had got into the servants quarters were disarmed and taken prisoner." [465]

"Marine sharpshooters at Government House also claimed, credibly, to have killed more men than the single man the Argentines acknowledged." [466]

Argentina's attack on Government House stalls.

"At 6.25, abruptly, the fire stopped. From the terrible silence we heard the screams of a man who, in perfect English, asked Governor Rex Hunt to surrender. It was still dark." [467]

0645 Hunt is informed that armoured personnel carriers are *"coming ashore."* [468]

"As dawn broke, it was relatively quiet, but the local radio transmitter was off the air and some 120 Argentine troops were on the hillsides overlooking them." [469]

0715 after leaving the beaches, Argentine troops moving towards Stanley are engaged by a section of Royal Marines commanded by Lieut. Trollope: 2 missiles hit an Argentine Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) before British troops retire.

> *"Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down Airport Road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles, two 84mm and one 66mm, missed. Subsequently one 66mm fired Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger compartment and one 84mm (Marines Brown and Betts) hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle. The remaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and opened fire. We engaged them with GPMG, SLR and sniper rifle (Sergeant Shepherd) for about a minute before we threw a white phosphorus smoke grenade and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens. Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy, but mostly inaccurate."* [470]
>
> *"In the early light, I could make out the forms of six or seven Marines, crouching down at the corner, using my uncle's house and the pillarbox as cover. They were firing continuously at the trees at the back of Government House, or where the trees would be if there was enough light to see them by. One*

463 Southby-Tailyour 1990.
464 Middlebrook 2003.
465 Freedman 2005 vol.2
466 Bound 2007
467 Argentine photo-journalist Rafael Wollmann, *op.cit.*
468 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.
469 Freedman 2005 vol.2
470 Report of Lieutenant William Trollope quoted in Phillips 2017 pp. 169-170. Also Bound 2007. Argentina's official report (Phillips 2017 p.168) notes that one APC (#07) was hit by machine-gun fire only, without serious casualties.

*tall 'Bootie' with a General-Purpose Machine Gun was blazing away to the westwards and getting some answering fire. He was complaining he had put 'so many rounds into the bastard but the f***ing idiot didn't know when to give in'...”* [471]

“Tracked amphibious vehicles forced their way westwards along the 'airport road' until stopped at the outskirts to the town by accurate anti-tank fire. One tracked vehicle was engaged by a 66mm weapon forcing the driver to manoeuvre his limping vehicle off the road. A Royal Marines' Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon was brought into action, again registering a hit. None of the occupants emerged and the vehicle lay dead in the mud. Fifteen more vehicles took the place of the first casualties and against such odds (now including heavy mortars and machine guns) the remaining defenders were obliged to make a fighting withdrawal... In the meantime another Carl Gustav-armed section was attempting to hold up the enemy advance by sinking a landing craft that foolishly assumed it could transit The Narrows with impunity.” [472]

“The fact that no one was observed to emerge from the first Amtrac to be engaged encouraged the Royal marines to think that one of their rocket rounds had punched a hole in it and that some of the machine-gun fire had penetrated the hole and caused serious casualties among the men inside. Local civilians who observed the action optimistically supported this view later. There was no rocket hit, however, just the scars of ninety-seven machine-gun bullets. Only one Argentine marine was slightly wounded by a sliver of metal cutting his hand.”[473]

“(This) brings into question the Argentines' insistence that they lost only one man during the invasion... Whether or not the Argentines lost men in this incident remains a moot point. They certainly never admitted it. ... The Argentine death toll may have been embarrassingly high, and it is worth remembering that covering up death was not new to the junta; they had kidnapped, murdered and disposed of thousands of their own people – the 'disappeared' – over the preceding six years.” [474]

Around 0730, Argentine forces reach the airfield.

“...CO 25 Inf Regt reported that he had captured the Airfield and that he had prepared it for the air landing. He had experienced virtually no opposition, since the forces which had been defending that sector had pulled back towards the built-up area after putting up weak resistance. The more complicated task of clearing the runway, which was occupied by approximately 25 vehicle of different types (light trucks and tractors), required considerable effort to carry out but was achieved within the time-frame anticipated. By then troops of 2 Marine Bn had succeeded in occupying the locality.” [475]

“More shooting and explosions. The radio announcer came on again, this time to say that the Argies had cleared away all the obstructions on Stanley airport and a large number of tracked vehicles were on their way up to the town. ... Two houses had been hit by mortar bombs. No fire resulting although there was some damage. Tome (Davies) couldn't say much more as his roof had collapsed on him and he could hear running water as the water supply tank in the loft space had been hit by bullets.” [476]

471 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
472 Southby-Tailyour 1990. See Phillips 2017
473 Middlebrook 2003
474 Bound 2007
475 Translated Argentine Report; provenance unknown
476 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

"At 0700 (sic), the airport was finally recaptured. As they found no opposition, a Company C section of the 25th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Teniente Coronel Mohamed Alí Seineldín, and supported by a company of the Batallón de Infantería de Marina 2 (2nd Marine Battalion), removed the obstacles, road machines and the vehicles scattered around preventing air operations. At 0730, the runway was clear." [477]

0800 in Stanley, Argentine commanders broadcast a message calling upon the, now surrounded, British forces at Government House to, "*act prudently*" and surrender.

> *"This is a call to the British colonial Government of the Islas Malvinas. In order to fulfil orders from the Argentine Government, we are here with a numerous task force remaining faithful to our Western and Christian principles for the purpose of avoiding bloodshed and property damage among the population, we hope that you will act prudently. Our concern is for the welfare and safety of the people of the Malvinas."* [478]

Over Falklands Radio, Patrick Watts announces that an Argentine flag is flying at Moody Brook Barracks.

0810 after being requested by the Governor to help, Vice-Comodoro Héctor Gilobert approaches the Governor's residence holding a white flag. [479]

> *"Made contact with Gilobert who was most reluctant to come out of his house and professed ignorance of the whole operation. … Armoured personnel carriers reported entering town. Managed to persuade Gilobert to walk from his house to Government House with a white flag to act as emissary (he was shot at by his own troops as he reached Government House) … Persuaded Gilobert accompanied by my Chief Secretary to walk down road from Government House to meet approaching armoured personnel carriers. They reached Town Hall without seeing them and reported from there. We issued local radio announcement and reply came from commander of Argentine forces to say that he would meet them at the Town Hall."* [480]

"At 8.10 I saw through the window that Vice-Gilobert appeared at a bend in the path that leads to Hunt's house. I lifted the camera and pointed towards it with the 180 mm telephoto lens. I managed to press the shutter twice. Two pictures. Someone, I don't know where, at that moment, pulled a trigger and fired a bullet that exploded the glass of the two-leafed window through which I was peeking. That bullet went to a meter and sank into the wall, less than half a meter from one of the English journalists." [481]

"According to Wollmann,... Wollmann received an intimidating shot at the window of his lodge while photographing the Argentinean Vice-chancellor Hector Gilbert heading for the governor's house." [482]

One section of Royal Marines, under Corporal York, unable to reach Government House; are instructed to make their way out of the town and disappear into the countryside.

"Recalling Norman's joke about the best thing to do if the Argentines invaded, Corporal York replied, "Right boss, we're going fishing". They booby-trapped their GPMG with a grenade (it subsequently exploded injuring

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477 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.103

478 Quoted in Pinkerton 2007

479 From 1980 to February 3, 1982, Gilobert had overseen the LADE operation that maintained an air link between Argentina and the Islands. He returned to the Islands on March 30, 1982, ostensibly to check on the situation following damage caused to the LADE office in Stanley. In reality, he had been tasked by the Junta to oversee a civilian administration in the Islands following the invasion. Gilobert had also smuggled a radio into the Islands; keeping the Argentine fleet informed of the situation in Stanley in the hours before the invasion.

480 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO

481 Argentine photo-journalist Rafael Wollmann, *op.cit.*

482 Lavín & Gallardo-Camacho 2017

or killing an Argentine) and jumped into the Zodiac for a hair-raising ride across Port William. In broad daylight, they dodged an Argentine frigate, hiding between the few Polish fishing vessels in port, and escaped. Their continued evasion became a morale booster for the Islanders. Other units were ordered to hold their fire, stay where they were and await orders." [483]

0815 after going to the Town Hall, Admiral Busser, with two aides, approaches Government House with Hector Gilobert and Hunt's Chief Secretary.

> *"Our phone rang, 'Would Valerie please get over to the hospital as soon as she could as there is a bit of an emergency. … I had a look out through the front porch and saw that Gerald Cheek was being escorted home to the Police Cottages by two armed men. He seemed to be minus a fair bit of his FIDF uniform."* [484]

"… We managed to agree an effective ceasefire so that he could remove his three badly wounded from outside Government House and three Prisoners of War. … He appealed to me to call a halt to the fighting otherwise they had such a superior force that they would inflict heavy and needless casualties. I had no alternative but to agree, and gave the order to our forces to hand over their arms." [485]

"The night of 1 April, Vicecomodoros Gamen and Gilobert, confined to the Argentine residence, learned about the course of action over Stanley's radio broadcast. Around 0900, when firefights concentrated on the Government House, Hunt telephoned Gilobert and sharply demanded his intervention to stop the assault. As he was unable to contact Argentine troops, both men decided they would meet at Hunt's office to work on a solution. Gilobert walked the 300 meters between his residence and the Government House waving a white flag, while Argentine Navy Marines continued the firefight, unaware of the ongoing negotiations. The Islands' defenders seemed relieved as they watched him from their positions, and encouraged him to keep going. When he arrived, the leader of the Marines received him and led him to Hunt and Baker. On his way, he noticed that some documents had been burned and several cryptographers lay destroyed on the ground. Without saying a word, the Governor asked him to contact the Task Force commander and to demand, on behalf of the Crown, the immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. Though Gilobert knew it was just an expression, he could not believe what he had just heard, and reminded him that the disproportion between the forces could make the position untenable for the British. He also informed him of the decision to prevent casualties and the commitment to respect the Islands' military and civilian personnel. Gilobert's arguments did not convince Hunt. Only the weight of reality persuaded him to accept the capitulation. As the siege of the Government House continued, they decided to meet with the landing forces commander." [486]

0830 at Stanley airfield, an Argentine *Hercules* aircraft lands carrying infantry support. [487]

"Landing clearance was issued at 0830, and, as a precaution, aircraft doors were opened during the flight so that GOE commandos could take up their positions with their weapons since they would fly over a thousand meter open field before reaching the airport. The LITRO 1 touched down in Malvinas at 0845. Though there was no armed resistance, according to Argentine Air Force doctrine, that air assault task with landing delivery was the first combat air operation of the Malvinas conflict. As soon as the aircraft stopped, the 29 GOE commandos, under the orders of Vicecomodoro Esteban Luis Correa, descended forming two rows in a combat crouch position. They surrounded the aircraft to protect it in case of a possible attack, since it was

483 Bound 2007. York and his men surrendered on April 4, 1982. See below.
484 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
485 *Telegram No. 41* of April 3 from Montevideo (Hunt) to FCO.
486 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.104
487 For a full account of the aircraft from Argentina that landed at the Falklands airfield, see *Ibid.* pp.105-106

uncertain whether the airport was indeed clear. After confirming that there was no enemy resistance, GOE's leader authorized the rest of the passengers' descent. While machine gun fire was heard in the city, commandos thoroughly searched the premises looking for booby traps, weapons and other elements that could entail a risk. As they secured the different areas (TWR, hangars, communications facilities, fuel station, etc.), they handed them over to those in charge of setting up general and special services for airport operation and air traffic control. GOE troops, divided into patrols, spread throughout the airport raking through the surroundings, and found abandoned ammunition and materiel. When the task was completed, they occupied a hangar and unloaded equipment and provisions, while sentry posts were getting ready to guard the airport."[488]

0915 Governor Hunt walks to the Town Hall with Vice Comodoro Gilobert.

"Gilobert informed the Argentine authorities' measures to be implemented, and assured Islanders their interests would not be affected. Then he addressed Contraalmirante Carlos A. Büsser, and explained the Governor's decision to make the surrender official. Since his presence was necessary, he invited Büsser to meet at Santa María catholic church to go together to the meeting with Hunt. Nobody knew for sure if Büsser had received the message. While they waited, news was received that the cargo ships were near Stanley and that another C-130H was landing on the runway. Minutes later, Büsser arrived at the church, unarmed and accompanied by his assistants. On their way to the Government House, Gilobert gave him details of his conversation with Hunt. ... Büsser entered the (Town Hall). .." I urge you to leave the islands." Büsser answered: "We landed as you did in 1833. I have orders to evict you and restore these lands to Argentine sovereignty." Hunt wanted to insist, but Büsser interrupted: "Be reasonable and surrender quickly. We have overwhelming superiority." The British official understood that he had already shown sufficient dignity. There was no point in delaying capitulation. ... It was 9.25 on April 2, 1982. ... Büsser ordered the ceasefire. ..." [489]

1030, the Governor formally surrenders the town to General Osvaldo Garcia. On it being proffered, Hunt refuses to shake Garcia's hand, telling the General that; *"This is British property and you are not invited"*. Garcia responds; "*It is very ungentlemanly of you to refuse to shake my hand"* to which Hunt replies; "*It is very uncivilised of you to invade my country."* [490]

The Governor is permitted a final message to the Islanders.

> *"Hello Kelpers and Islanders, I hope you can hear me on the phone. The machine here doesn't work. I'm sorry it happened like this... The Admiral came along to me and I told him that he had landed unlawfully on British Sovereign territory and I ordered him to leave forthwith. He refused, claiming that he was taking back territory that belonged to Argentina and that it was Britain that was unlawfully in possession... I'm sorry it's happened this way. ... rest assured, that the British will be back."* [491]

"Hunt was told that he would be flown out of the Falkland Islands that evening. It was agreed that he could broadcast to the islanders so long as he also contacted the Royal Marines at Grytviken in South Georgia to tell them of the position in Stanley. Hunt refused to ask them to surrender without resistance." [492]

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488 *Ibid.* p.103
489 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.104.
490 *FCO 7/4490 f57*
491 Quoted in Pinkerton 2007
492 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Pinkerton (2007) suggests that the Governor's last message was an impromptu affair with Patrick Watts holding a telephone to a microphone while three Argentine soldiers argued with each other outside the studio.

1017 Argentina's national anthem is played over the Islands' radio. The *Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service* is renamed *LRS 60 Radio Nacional Islas Malvinas*.

It is also announced that the captive Royal Marines will be deported to Argentina. [493]



Rafael Wollmann 1982



Rafael Wollmann 1982

493 Corporal York's section remained free until April 4th.

"The images of British colonialism literally brought to its knees were deeply humiliating, and allowing such photographs to be taken was the Argentines' biggest mistake after their decision to invade. The pictures shocked and enraged the British so deeply that the Thatcher government had to restore the country's honour or fall." [494]

A few Royal Marines are escorted to Moody Brook Barracks to collect personal items.

"The old barracks had been devastated in what looked like a classic house-clearing operation: walls were riddled with bullets and scorched by white phosphorous grenades. Again, there was no sign that the Argentines did not intend to kill." [495]

Governor Rex Hunt, in full regalia, leaves the official residence. He, together with his family and the surrendered Royal Marines, are airlifted to Montevideo via Comodoro Rivadavia. [496]

> *"We carried Cheryl Black's bags across for her… Felt dreadfully sad for Cheryl and the other wives… It was here for the first time I turned and saw in the pale evening sunlight the Argentine flag flying from the mast at Government House. I really felt physically sick and emotionally drained; the cold light of awful reality set in."* [497]

"The warships under Rear Admiral Allara returned to the mainland while the transports completed the unloading of heavy equipment. Stanley airport became Base Aerea Militar Malvinas, and four Pucara aircraft flew in on 2 April. General Garcia and Rear Admiral Busser returned to the mainland..." [498]

"The agents of British authority were quickly removed. ... Major Norman commented that his men were reasonably treated by their original captors, the amphibious Commandos, but that the men of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion acted as 'arrogant victors' who had done no fighting and who set out to humiliate the Royal Marine prisoners." [499]

"Around 1600, wearing his flamboyant uniform, Hunt got into the old car together with his wife and son. Gilobert observed that intimate moment and bid them farewell before the vehicle started. Hunt thanked Gilobert deeply touched, while his wife comforted him saying: "Don't worry, Héctor. This is the third time we are dismissed from an assignment". Along their way to the airport, the Islanders waved them goodbye. British troops, taken prisoners during the recapture of the Islands, arrived at the airport together with the former Governor and his family. Unnoticed by the Argentine authorities, Tony Hunt —Rex Hunt's son— was hiding inside his shoe a news dispatch by Simon Winchester, the Sunday Times' journalist who was in Malvinas to cover the news on Davidoff's incident. ... At the airport, the Navy Intelligence personnel searched through the Hunts' personal belongings, looking for the Royal Navy cryptographic codes. The former Governor never forgot the humiliation. From that moment on, he became a bitter enemy of Argentina, and started leading the most radical groups. Hunt, who had always been impartial, would twist facts so as to diminish our country's image. Hunt and his family were transported to Comodoro Rivadavia aboard an F-28 escorted by a guard led by Alférez Guillermo Sorensen." [500]

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494 Bound 2007. Comments later made by the photographer, suggest when an Argentine officer saw what was happening he ordered the marines back to their feet.

495 *Ibid.*

496 Many of NP 8901 would volunteer to return; forming the nucleus of J Company, 42 Commando, Royal Marines.

497 *74 Days: An Islanders' Diary of the Falklands Occupation* John Smith 1984 p.31.

498 Freedman 2005 vol.2

499 Middlebrook 2003

500 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.108. 'Radical groups' may be a reference to Sir Rex Hunt becoming Chairman of the Falkland Islands Association after his retirement in 1985 and President of the Falkland Islands Trust. Hardly radical.

From Buenos Aires, a number of *communiques* are issued by the Argentine Military.

> *"Communique No.1. The Commanders of the Malvinas Theatre of Operations, in compliance with the missions entrusted by the Argentine Government, hereby materialises (sic) the historical continuity of Argentine sovereignty on the Malvinas Islands. At this moment, so significant for all of us, it is an honour for me to greet the population of Malvinas and invite them to cooperate with the new authorities by complying with the instructions to be issued through oral and written communiques, for facilitating the norma life of the population."* [501]

In the Falklands, all Islanders are told to remain in their homes until further notice; all schools and businesses are shut.

"As part of the public strategy to embrace Las Malvinas into the Republic of Argentina, the Military Government deployed a strategy of 'must obey' edicts and 'information communiques', first given in Spanish by an authoritarian voice, and then in English with an Argentine accent by a man who seemed slightly embarrassed."[502]

Further edicts address law and order with punishments ranging from 7 to 180 days imprisonment; including 30 days for "*inconsiderate gestures against the military forces*". The most severe punishment of 180 days is for, *"anyone who assumes attitudes which disturb normal co-existence or public order"*. [503]

In London, Sir Humphrey Atkins posts a message in the House of Commons. [504]

Telegrams are sent to British Embassies in Commonwealth countries, with a message to be passed to the local government leader.

> *"The Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland Islands, … will I fear have the gravest consequences. I am sending this… to seek your support in giving the strongest and earliest possible condemnation… You should of course bear in mind that the right of self-defence is applicable."* [505]

With little verified information to hand, instructions are sent from London to the UK's Mission at the UN to make a further approach to the Security Council.

In Buenos Aires, *Decree No.681* is sanctioned. Brigadier General Mario Menéndez appointed as the Military Governor in the Islands, and ordered to make his way there. [506]

> *"The territory of the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, with the exclusion of any other jurisdiction over the same, as of 0000 hours on April 03, 1982, is constituted as a Military Government."* [507]

> *"Statement from the Military Junta No. 10: The Military Junta informs the Argentine people that it has decided to constitute the territory of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands in the military government, discarding them from the national territory of Tierra del Fuego,*

501 Signed by Lt.-General Osvaldo Jorge Garcia and quoted in Van der Bijl 2023
502 *Ibid.*
503 *Ibid*.
504 The announcement was limited as the lack of contact with Stanley meant that the British Government was still unable to confirm that the town had been captured. It would be another hour or so before reports were received from *Endurance*.
505 *Telegram No.99* of 2 April
506 Menéndez had been appointed by the Junta on March 2nd, 1982
507 *Decree S681/1982 National Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional)*. Published *National Bulletin* of May 6, 2019.

Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands, starting at 00:00, April 3, 1982. In addition, Mr. Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez has been appointed military governor of the territory of the Malvinas, Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, he will exercise all the powers of the military and civil government in its jurisdiction. This resolution has been promulgated by Decree No. 681." [508]

"Menéndez was appointed by Decree Number 681/82 as Governor to Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands from the national Territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands as of 12.00am on 3 April 1982, thus establishing a new province. Under Decree 700/82, the Malvinas Theatre of Operations was replaced by the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations encompassing South Sandwich, South Georgia and the Falkland Islands with Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo appointed as Commander. ... The Malvinas Military Government appointed Air Force Vice-Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve to be General Secretary." [509]

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri makes a short broadcast to the Argentine nation.

"Compatriots: We have recovered, safeguarding the national honor, without rancor, but with the firmness that the circumstances require, the Austral Islands that make up the national heritage ... by legitimate right. The step just taken was decided without taking into account any political calculation. It was designed on behalf of each and every one of the Argentines, regardless of sectors or factions and with the mind set on Governments, institutions and people that in the past, without exceptions; and through 150 years, have struggled to claim our rights. I know, and we acknowledge with deep emotion, that already the whole country lives the joy of a new gesture and it is preparing to defend what you own regardless of sacrifices, ..."

"Within a few hours, a large crowd had gathered in the Plaza de Mayo, reminiscent of 1978, when the Argentine national team won the World Cup, or September 1979, the day the youth team won the World Cup in Japan. Galtieri came out to greet the fans and limited himself to observing and listening to the crowd's choruses with the tones of a football field. "Let the President come out, lara, lara, lara." "Everyone knows that Argentina is having a good time, the Queen cries, the Queen cries." "Oh, oh, how funny it is, now let him take care, let him take care, Pinochet." As the hours passed, the crowd's cries became more insistent, they echoed in the square and Galtieri felt the need to go out and speak from the balcony of the Casa Rosada. Before that, he called his colleagues from the Military Junta. "Come and accompany me," he said to Anaya on the phone, as well as to Lami Dozo, but they decided to leave him alone on the occasion. The three of them had a conference call beforehand: Anaya told him: "Look Leo, I want to remind you what the plan says. We can't go to war, we're not in a position to do so." A witness to the conversation said that his commander warned the head of the Army not to be carried away by the impulse, the magnet, of the applause in the Plaza de Mayo. When they spoke of "the plan" they meant the "D plus five" that Lombardo, García and Plessl had written, which understood that after "D" day, the military occupation of Puerto Stanley, and after five days Argentina would withdraw its troops, leaving only a small garrison awaiting diplomatic negotiations with the United Kingdom. Lami Dozo supported Anaya's words: "My general, we have to stick to the plan"." [510]

508 Repealed by decree No. 879 of 1985.

509 Van der Bijl 2023

510 *Malvinas confidencial: la conversación secreta entre Galtieri y Ronald Reagan y el día que Margaret Thatcher decidió enviar la flota* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* April 5, 2019. It is suggested that Argentina's planning for the invasion of the Falklands Islands only went as far as D-Day +5. That they intended to withdraw after five days, leaving only a small garrison in place with the expectation that the UK would be forced to negotiate. Naive, if true.

Galtieri goes out onto the balcony of the Casa Rosada to address the jubilant crowd outside.



"*People of the Argentine Nation. I know that this day, April 2, 1982, marks a transcendental milestone for the Argentine history of the century in which we live. At this moment, thousands of citizens, men and women, throughout the country, in all the towns, on the small farms, in the cities, and in this historic Plaza de Mayo that has marked courses throughout national history, you Argentines are publicly expressing the feeling and emotion held back for 150 years through a dispossession that we have now washed away. The noble Argentine people, I repeat, the noble Argentine people, extend their hands to the adversary but do not admit discussion about their rights that we have patiently and prudently tried to claim through diplomatic channels […] Today, April 2, we have just begun with our attitude of recovering the Malvinas and all their zone of influence…"* [511]

He tells the crowd that his government has "*interpreted the sentiments of the Argentine people.*"

"The reaction of the Argentine people was extraordinary and much greater than expected. Many believed we could keep the Islands forever, without concessions. This reaction limited the Government's negotiating stance." [512]

"The same people who had demonstrated against the regime just days before flooded the Playa de Mayo cheering, screaming, crying, singing and waving the Argentine flags. Galtieri was overcome with emotion standing on the balcony of the Casa Rosada, basking in his reception as Libertador de Las Islas Malvinas. On the spur of the moment – and without consulting his colleagues in the Junta – he proclaimed that Argentina would never withdraw. According to one senior official who asked not to be identified: "He did not expect this [reaction]. But the crowds made him feel like a hero, and it went to his head. He decided unilaterally to countermand the withdrawal and to declare that Argentina would never leave the Malvinas. It was an understandable emotion, but with hindsight it was a big mistake. It tied our hands.."." [513]

In early afternoon London time, the BBC reports from Buenos Aires that people are dancing in the streets.

"In Buenos Aires, intense military activity fuelled invasion fervour. I witnessed raucous rejoicing for a long-cherished ambition, at last achieved..." [514]

All those arrested during the March 30th protests against the Junta are released, so that they *"... can associate themselves with the events of this historic day for the Republic."* [515]

"Buenos Aires now erupted in a day of ecstasy ... Galtieri announced that his government "had no alternative than to do what has been done."... the square was filled with men and women weeping tears of joy." [516]

511 *Ibid.*
512 Costa Mendez quoted in Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.149
513 Welch 1997
514 Briley 2022
515 Carbone 2008
516 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

"Buenos Aires was euphoric. Never had Argentina gained territory in conflict or diplomatic dispute. Argentina had not had a war since 1870. Ever since Spanish colonial rule Argentina had lost land to its neighbors. In the city's shops there were school text illustrations that recalled 1806 and 1807, when Buenos Aires creoles under the rule of Castille had defeated two British expeditions to the River Plate."[517]


LA NACION

Segunda edición

Desembarco argentino en el archipiélago de las Malvinas

Efectivos de las tres fuerzas, mediante una operación comando, iniciaron la toma de Puerto Stanley. Gran Bretaña pidió la intervención del Consejo de Seguridad de la UN. El embajador argentino en ese organismo señaló que "la razón de la crisis es la irracional negativa británica a una justa y lógica solución"

ULTIMO MOMENTO

OCEANO ATLANTICO SUR

Isla Pebble

Isla Soledad

Puerto Stanley

Isla Gran Malvina

Isla Rafael Grande

Isla Beauchene

Isla de los Estados

Cabo Pembroke

Derivaciones diplomáticas

"... the news of the recovery of sovereignty, accompanied by the publication of photographs of the Argentine flag at Port Stanley... elicited one of the most enthusiastic popular responses that the regime had ever experienced, with the possible exception of the organization of the World Cup in 1978." [518]

The Soviet Ambassador, Serguei Striganov, is summoned to Argentina's Foreign Ministry.

"At that time, attempts were being made to explain to the Eastern bloc authorities the reasons for the recovery and, mainly, to obtain a veto from the Soviet Union in the United Nations of any resolution that attempted to privilege British interests. ... Shortly afterwards, various Soviet offers began to arrive, both in terms of weapons (ships, planes and missiles, among other things) and intelligence information." [519]

From Geneva, Switzerland, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offer their good offices to both Argentina and Britain. London accepts immediately, Buenos Aires does not respond. Staff at the Argentine Embassy in London instruct *Banco Nacion* to start transferring funds out of the UK.

Britain breaks off diplomatic relations. Argentina's Ambassador is given four days to leave the country, while Britain's Ambassador is recalled from Buenos Aires.

"... four British officials remained behind to man a British Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires." [520]



At the Foreign Office in London, Foreign Secretary, Peter Carington, seeks advice from the FCO's legal advisor, Sir Ian Sinclair.

"Any action Britain now took could depend upon the 'inherent right of individual or collective self defence' as confirmed in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Not only was a firm declaration (of war) unnecessary it would also attract considerable baggage in international law. States at war not only acquire a distinct legal status but so do states not at war, who become neutrals, a status with its own rights and duties. A British declaration of war in 1982, for example, would have had immediate implications for all Argentines resident in or carrying on business in British territory. They could be subjected to a variety of restrictions, up to internment, and the

517 *South Atlantic 1982: A Forgotten War (Part 1)* A. Graham-Yool 2007. *cf.* 1806

518 *Argentine Soldier Known unto God: The Darwin Cemetery and Conflicts in the Retelling of the Falklands/Malvinas War* Jeremy Rubenstein 2011 in *Le Mouvement Social* 2011/4 no.237

519 *Malvinas, documentos desclasificad: los partes de inteligencia del "amigo invisible" soviético y los satélites que "espiaron" a la flota británica* Mariano Sciaroni in *Infobae* April 18, 2019

520 Freedman 2005 vol.2

process could lead to the effective abrogation of all contracts involving Argentine nationals, and turn any trading with Argentina into a criminal offence, allowing for the seizure and requisitioning of Argentine merchant ships in British ports and the suspension of all bilateral treaties…. Because of these far-reaching implications the tendency, unsurprisingly, is to consider entry into a state of war as a technical legal matter rather than as a reasonable description of events…. The absence of such a state might suit both parties to a conflict as a means of keeping it limited and avoiding difficult questions in relation to third parties. …" [521]

In Britain, a Naval Staff Advisory Group convenes to assess the options.

"The Group was concerned overall about the size and readiness of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), a civilian -operated agency in the MoD with responsibility for twenty-seven support ships. More than half were tankers. One was a helicopter support vessel. Other performed various supply roles. The most important vessels within the RFO at this time without doubt were six speciality ships named after the Knights of the Round Table. Known as Landing Ships Logistic or LSLs, each could carry over 300 troops, sixteen main battle tanks, thirty-four assorted vehicles, and 150 tons of fuel and ammunition. They were designed to unload their cargo on to beaches from ramps at either the bow or stern. Helicopters could operate from their decks. Up to twenty helicopters could be stowed on board each ship in place of tanks and vehicles. Of the six, four were available almost immediately and could sail within a matter of days." [522]

In New York, at the UN Building, Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, seeks permission to put forward a resolution to the Security Council.

"(Parsons) persuaded Kamanda to allow him to introduce the resolution at a meeting called for another purpose at 1030 New York time on 2 April." [523]

In Washington DC, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig calls for information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) only to discover that they too, were caught unawares; reliant on public media outlets for information;*"… Argentine press reports indicate that some 4,000 to 5,000 troops are on the Islands, and the 10 to 14 naval ships in the area include the country's only aircraft carrier as well as several guided missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, transport and amphibious craft, and at least one submarine."* [524]

With little information, Secretary Haig meets with President Reagan.

> *"We must proceed cautiously and objectively on this question - not endorsing Argentine force while not unnecessarily jeopardizing our relations with Argentina."* [525]



Haig then instructs the US Mission at the United Nations in New York, to vote for a resolution; *"… which the British have informed us they will introduce in the Security Council calling on all parties to refrain from the use of force in the Falkland Islands dispute …"* [526]

In the Falklands, the Argentine Air Force takes control of Stanley Airport.

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521 *Ibid.*
522 *Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare* K.L. Privratsky 2014
523 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda
524 *CIA Situation Report #1 CIA-RDP84B00049R000701780020-2*
525 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig's Evening Report (03/25/82–04/21/82)*
526 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820173–1064.*

"On 2 April, the Islas Malvinas Military Air Base was created, and Comodoro Héctor Luis Destri was appointed in command. That same day, the Argentine national flag was hoisted and a yellow sign bearing the inscription "Fuerza Aérea Argentina - Aeródromo Malvinas" (Argentine Air Force - Malvinas Airport) was placed in the front of the building." [527]

In London, at 1700 GMT, Argentine Minister Atilio Molteni, standing in for the Ambassador, is summoned to the Foreign Office.

"He was made to wait for about half an hour in the ceremony room, a dimly lit room decorated with paintings reflecting glories of the United Kingdom's past. When he was invited in, the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Michael Palliser, informed him of the breaking off of diplomatic (and consular) relations between Argentina and Great Britain. The senior English official told him that the measure had been decided because Argentina had invaded British soil. Molteni replied that Argentina had only returned to what was its own. The official replied that the matter was going to be discussed at the United Nations..." [528]

In London, at 1930 GMT, the Cabinet meet to approve the formation of a *Task Force* to retake the islands.

> *"I received advice from the Foreign Office ... I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power. All the considerations were fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking:... And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen's subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister."* [529]

"This decision was assumed as much as taken, a reflection of genuine indignation at the Argentine act of aggression and a determination to demonstrate that the Government was not completely helpless. Once it became apparent that a Task Force could be sent there was never any doubt that it would be sent." [530]

Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Terence Lewin, visiting New Zealand, is ordered to return to London.

A Soviet spy ship, *CCB-501 Zaporozhye*, diverts from its normal operations off the Atlantic coast of the USA and sails south. [531]

In New York, at 1030, at the United Nations, Ambassador Parsons addresses the Security Council.

> *"As we sit here, a massive Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands is taking place."* [532]

"(I) set out the salient facts and read out, in final form, the text of the resolution which I was tabling. I took the almost unprecedented step of bypassing the customary stages of circulating a 'working paper' leading to a preliminary draft resolution, a 'blue draft', in order to put the Council on notice that (a) we would not accept amendments to our draft, and (b) we would, according to the conventions, insist on a vote within 24 hours of tabling. My first intention was to demand a vote the same day but I readily acceded to pressure from members

527 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.121

528 *Malvinas confidencial: la conversación secreta entre Galtieri y Ronald Reagan y el día que Margaret Thatcher decidió enviar la flota* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* April 5, 2019

529 Thatcher 1993

530 Freedman 2005 vol.2

531 This particular vessel spent 154 days at sea monitoring the British fleet. See April 12 and 15, 1982 below.

532 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2.

of the Council to wait until 3 April as the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Mr Costa Méndez, was en route for New York to present his government's case to the Council." [533]

Argentina's Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, responds by arguing that British negotiators had refused to address the issue of sovereignty. He then restates his country's belief that the Islands had been seized by force from Argentina in 1833. Roca concludes by suggesting that the Security Council should be pleased that the long-running dispute has now been settled. The meeting is then ended in order that representatives can contact their various governments for instructions.

In the evening, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the USA Ambassador to the UN, controversially attends a dinner given in her honour by the Argentine Embassy. Together with other leading figures from the US political establishment.[534]

At Stanley, by the end of the first day, some 600 Argentine troops are ashore.

> *"So ended a quite traumatic day: having one's home invaded, the established representative of the head of state being deported, and being confined to one's own home by the people who said they had come to liberate us from British oppression. I think that they had wanted us to have been down on the beach waving banners and shouting 'Viva'. What a silly idea, we don't even get excited about a church bazaar."* [535]

April 3rd, in Britain's *Guardian* newspaper.

> *"At a ... press conference in the Foreign Office Mr. Nott denied as "ridiculous and quite untrue" rumours at Westminster that he had offered his resignation.., and Lord Carington rejected with a shake of his head any suggestion that he might resign. But the irony of a government elected to strengthen Britain's defence posture finding itself in this position will not be lost on MPs..."*



Newspapers in the UK express outrage.

"The British Lion caught with its Pants Down." [536]

"Sack the Guilty Men." [537]

Spain's *ABC Sevilla* newspaper reports:

> *"In a swift military operation, Argentina yesterday occupied the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and Sandwich Islands, which were under British sovereignty but had been the subject of Argentine claims since the day of its independence from Spain, to which they belonged. The news is still confusing, and Great Britain continues to insist that no such invasion has taken place, although it considers it*

533 Parsons 1983
534 *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House* L. I. Barrett 1984. In his memoirs, Alexander Haig noted that Kirkpatrick; *".. persevered in her intention to attend."* Kirkpatrick would later claim that she was misled.
535 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
536 *The Guardian* April 3, 1982 p.3
537 *The Sun* April 3, 1982 p.6

imminent. Therefore, a fleet has been sent to the area, including the aircraft carrier Invincible and the nuclear submarine Superb. The Buenos Aires press has reported the invasion with great typographical splendor, while there is still no direct news from Port Stanley—capital of the Falklands—and the British government met in an emergency session under the presidency of an ageing Margaret Thatcher in an attempt to find a solution to the crisis. The United Nations Security Council has asked both parties to "refrain from the use of arms"."

In Montevideo, at 0300, Governor Hunt and NP8901, with others, arrive en-route for the UK.

"About 0300 in the morning, they arrived at Carrasco airport, where prisoners were handed over to the British ambassador in the neighboring country, Patricia Hutchinson. Neither the crew nor the custody members got off the aircraft. Once the mission was accomplished, the aircraft returned uneventfully to the 1st Air Brigade in El Palomar, and the four GOE members were taken to their home base, the 7th Air Brigade in Morón. The rest of the GOE members stayed in Malvinas." [538]

Off South Georgia, at 0730, the commander of Argentine troops aboard *ARA Bahia Paraiso,* demands the surrender of British civilians and forces at Grytviken. [539]

"Following our successful reoccupation of the Malvinas, the Governor, Rex Hunt, has surrendered the Malvinas, South Georgia and the British Antarctic Dependencies. A ceasefire is now in force and as part of this agreement we have come to occupy South Georgia. All British personnel are to gather on the beach for repatriation to the UK." [540]

"Mills pretended that the message was unclear due to interference and asked the Argentines to repeat their message on Long Wave which they duly did. ... Endurance and the other BAS bases in Antarctica could now be party to the conversation." [541]

Not believing that the Governor would have surrendered the Dependencies, Mills requests time for clarification.

In Buenos Aires, Libya's *charge d'affairs*, Alsharushi Albarrani, visits the Casa Rosada with an offer to supply weapins, money and oil without conditions. [542]

In London, PM Margaret Thatcher speaks to an emergency session of Parliament. [543]

"The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time for many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power. After several days of rising tension in our relations with Argentina, that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands.... I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment….

The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are

538 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.108 GOE = Special Operations Group.

539 Sixty men of the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion supported by 14 specialists from the Buzos Tacticos; commanded by one Alfredo Astiz (see below).

540 *The Battle of Grytviken* by Lieut. Keith Mills in *Glimpses of the Falklands War* Andy & Jerry Cockeram (eds) 2022. Mills was the senior officer on South Georgia on April 3, 1982. Slightly different version in Freedman 2005 vol.2 - *"I have important message for you involving the successful operation by Argentine forces at Malvinas, the ex-Governor has surrendered the Islands and Dependencies unconditionally and I suggest you do the same."*

541 *Ibid.*

542 *Infobae* June 18, 2019. The offer was rejected due to Libya's links to Soviet Russia. However, see May 23, 1982, below.

543 *HC Deb 03 April 1982 vol 21 cc633-68*

complete. HMS Invincible will be in the lead and will leave port on Monday. ... The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House."

"The Prime Minister, shortly after she came into office, received a soubriquet as the "Iron Lady". It arose in the context of remarks which she made about defence against the Soviet Union and its allies; but there was no reason to suppose that the right hon. Lady did not welcome and, indeed, take pride in that description. In the next week or two this House, the nation and the right hon. Lady herself will learn of what metal she is made."[544]

"Even with action in hand, however, the experience was a painful one. MPs from all parties spoke of their anger and disbelief. For a Government that was so avowedly patriotic it was galling to be castigated by an Opposition that was so clearly to its left for losing sovereign British territory to a military dictatorship..." [545]

Michael Foot, Leader of the Official Opposition, Britain's Labour Party, responds in support of the Government.

"The rights and the circumstances of the people in the Falkland Islands must be uppermost in our minds. There is no question in the Falkland Islands of any colonial dependence or anything of the sort. It is a question of people who wish to be associated with this country and who have built their whole lives on the basis of association with this country. We have a moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure that that is sustained.

The people of the Falkland Islands have the absolute right to look to us at this moment of their desperate plight, just as they have looked to us over the past 150 years. They are faced with an act of naked, unqualified aggression, carried out in the most shameful and disreputable circumstances. Any guarantee from this invading force is utterly worthless — as worthless as any of the guarantees that are given by this same Argentine junta to its own people.

We can hardly forget that thousands of innocent people fighting for their political rights in Argentine are in prison and have been tortured and debased. We cannot forget that fact when our friends and fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands are suffering as they are at this moment."

"The opening outburst of Michael Foot, in his speech of 3 April, was considered to be excessive not only by Labour left-wingers, but even by Denis Healey, the moderate deputy leader. Labour MPs were divided between those who declared their opposition to the task force expedition, and those who instead held the deployment of force in the Southern Atlantic to be inevitable. ... These divisions were destined to grow even more pronounced... The result was the continual re-positioning of the PLP (Parliamentary Labour Party). At first, the Party supported the sending of the task force, while insisting that it should be used only as a means of applying pressure to obtain the retreat of the Argentines via diplomatic actions." [546]

544 J. Enoch Powell, MP for South Down, speaking during the debate April 3, 1982.
545 Freedman 2005 vol.2
546 *A Leader at War: Margaret thatcher and the Falklands Crisis of 1982* Domenico Maria Bruni 2018 in *Observatoire de la société britannique*, 2018, 135-157

"Labour leader Michael Foot understood that freedom was at stake in the Falklands, as did others on the left. On 1 April he had attended a meeting of Socialist International in France where Francois Mitterand told him that French Socialists would strongly support Britain if the Argentines attacked. At the Saturday Debate on the 3 April, Foot, no pacifist ... stunned his own Party but delighted the House with a fiery speech that eclipsed Thatcher's hesitant performance." [547]

Backbench MPs are also heard during the debate.

"Julian Amery, a former FO Minister, spoke for many ... when he criticised Carrington, Ridley and the FO: "On television yesterday my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary said that diplomacy was the only instrument that the Government had to hand. I fear that my noble Friend on this occasion, as on others, confuses diplomacy with foreign policy. Diplomacy is the day-today handling of conferences and international relations. Foreign policy involved having a clear aim and making sure that one has the means to carry out the aim. We supposed, and we were told, that the aim was to maintain British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, but I am bound to say, having followed the earlier negotiations of ... (Mr Ridley), and having had some experience of the Foreign Office's views about the Falkland Islands, that that aim was pursued with singularly little conviction. As for the means, they were non-existent"." [548]

During the debate, MP Edward (Ted) Rowlands reveals that the British security services have the ability to read Argentine diplomatic codes. [549]

> *"I have great difficulty in understanding how the intelligence failed. Our intelligence in Argentina was extremely good. That is why we took action in 1977. We found out that certain attitudes and approaches were being formed. I cannot believe that the quality of our intelligence has changed. Last night the Secretary of State for Defence asked "How can we read the mind of the enemy?" I shall make a disclosure. As well as trying to read the mind of the enemy, we have been reading its telegrams for many years. I am sure that many sources are available to the Government, and I do not understand how they failed to anticipate some of the dangers that suddenly loomed on the horizon."* [550]

"It is unlikely we shall ever know how much damage this betrayal of trust did to national security, but if anyone else than an MP had given the information to the Argentines they would have been prosecuted." [551]

"What Rowlands called "a very personal emotional statement" shattered prior standards of discretion about Comint (Communications Intelligence) by politicians. Rowlands' loathing of the government's failures to deter Argentine aggression – which he believed a Labour government had managed successfully during the crisis of 1976-77 – dovetailed with the Labour Party's partisan assault on the Iron Lady. He compromised British intelligence at a time when war was likely: perhaps not the best moment to remind foreign states, especially one's enemy, to mind their codes and cyphers." [552]

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547 Elgood 2025

548 *Ibid.*

549 And rather more than Argentina's diplomatic codes. Its navy was compromised through their use of expensive European cipher machines purchased from a Swiss company, *Crypto AG.* Ostensibly a private company, this was in reality owned jointly by the CIA and the German secret service (BND). Britain's GCHQ was apparently in receipt of the produce of this decoding. Future researchers should consider the Maximator Alliance. There is some evidence that Argentina was not slow to react to this revelation, bringing in Israeli equipment that the Americans could not decipher. It has been suggested that two Israeli engineers arrived in the Falklands during the first week following Argentina's invasion, to install this equipment. One of the engineers, then remained until just before the surrender to ensure its effectiveness.

550 *Hansard, House of Commons April 3, 1982 vol.21, col 648*

551 *Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War* Hugh Bincheno 2006. Rowlands was criticised but, protected by Parliamentary privilege, he could not be prosecuted.

552 Ferris 2020

After the Commons debate, Conservative back-benchers (1922 Committee) hold a meeting.

"In the afternoon of 3 April, the 1922 Committee held a decisive meeting, during which the rancour of numerous back-benchers emerged with even greater vehemence. Both Nott and Carrington took part in this meeting. The former managed the encounter better than the latter. ... Additional heat arrived from critiques made by the press, starting with The Times. All these factors led to Carrington's resignation ..." [553]

Britain's Defence Secretary receives an official proposal to requisition civilian ships.

"The prerogative of the British government to requisition ships from trade had been established under English Common Law for centuries, ... It had used this prerogative already in the twentieth century, during both world wars and in the Suez Campaign in 1956, but had not exercised the authority since then. Again the British wasted no time in taking action in response to the Argentine invasion on 2 April ... The Secretary of State received the proposal to requisition ships from trade on 3 April. The Queen signed the order on 4 April, ..." [554]

From London, the US Embassy reports to Washington.

> *"The military difficulties for Britain of sustaining operations in the South Atlantic are awesome. If they want to go beyond gesture, Mrs. Thatcher's government must reckon that the task would be not only to dislodge the Argentines and restore the status quo, but to defend the Falklands for an indefinite time in the face of continued Argentine hostility. This certainly could not be done without a large and protracted diversion of military assets to the South Atlantic – where no other U.K. security interests are at stake. Conceivably, it could not be done at all."* [555]

In Buenos Aires, a representative of the Government of Libya, Albarrani Alsharushi, approaches the Argentine Government with an offer of weapons, money and oil, without conditions. [556]

At South Georgia, at 1140 local time, Argentine troops are transported by two helicopters (an *Alouette* and a *Puma*) from the *Bahia Paraiso* to King Edward's Point. Royal Marines engage both helicopters, bringing the *Puma* down and damaging the other.

1147 ARA *Guerrico* provides supporting fire for Argentine forces.

1159 small arms fire, together with anti-tank rockets fired by the Royal Marines on shore, blow a hole in the side of *Guerrico* and damage the 100mm gun housing; *"It was the first time in history that shoulder launched anti-tank missiles had ever been used against a warship."* [557]

Further reinforcements from the *Bahia Paraiso* land to cut off the Marines withdrawal. Outnumbered, Royal Marines commander Lieut. Keith Mills surrenders, together with 22 marines and 13 BAS staff. [558]

"The Argentines later disclosed that 1,275 hits were scored on the Guerrico. (Endurance's) detachment had knocked down two helicopters, killed an entire landing party and crew, and pretty much put a corvette out of action .." [559]

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553 Bruni 2018
554 Privratsky 2014
555 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820177–0587*
556 Yofre 2011
557 Lieut. Keith Mills in *Glimpses of the Falklands War* A & J Cockeram (eds) 2022
558 Another 13 BAS staff in field parties were distributed around the Island. Also wildlife film-maker, Lucinda Catherine *"Cindy"* Buxton. Buenos Aries was informed of the locations of these groups on the 5th but no action appears to have been taken as they were all still in radio contact with the BAS station on Signy Island on the 12th. *cf. PREM19/617.* The Royal Marines arrived back in the UK on April 20, 1982. Mills was awarded a DSC.
559 Barker 1997

"One Royal Marine had been wounded, while the Argentines had suffered several killed (Endurance later reported three) and wounded, lost a helicopter and had the Guerrico extensively damaged." [560]



In the Falkland Islands, at 1600 local time, four Pucarás arrive with a supporting TC-70.

"This Pucará formation had the distinction of being the first attack flight to touch down on Malvinas soil, and the first to be part of the air unit of the Malvinas Air Component." [561]

In New York, at the United Nations, the Security Council resume their debate on the Falklands invasion.

"Costa Mendez spoke first, the burden of his statement, backed by a lengthy historical survey, being that Argentina had done nothing more than recover national territory which had been seized by the British by an illegitimate act of force in 1833. ... The debate continued and I spoke in refutation of the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, in particular of the dangerous proposition he had put forward that the peaceful settlement Articles of the UN Charter applied only to disputes which had arisen since the Charter entered into force in 1945. At the close of the debate the Panamanian Foreign Minister tried to rob me of my vote by claiming that, under Article 27(3) of the Charter "in decisions under Chapter VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes] of the Charter a party to a dispute-in this case the United Kingdom-shall abstain from voting". I counter-attacked that the resolution had been drafted in relation to a breach of the peace and had been proposed with Chapter VII [Actions with respect to threats to the peace ...] of the Charter in mind: hence the provisions of Article 27(3) did not apply. I was supported by the Permanent Representative of Spain, an accepted expert on UN procedures, and Panama decided not to call for a procedural vote. Then, during the debate, he (Mendez) made one enormous mistake. I was really basing all my arguments, and I spoke again and again, on the breach of Article 2 of the Charter, about "peaceful settlement of disputes" and non-use of force. He asked to speak in right of reply to me at one stage. He said he thought that I, the British representative, did not realize that this provision only applied to disputes which had come into existence after 1945, when the Charter came into effect. When he said this, I could feel the whole atmosphere in the Security Council changing – because just about every delegation came from a country which was embroiled in disputes going back to the nineteenth century, if not the eighteenth century... That error of judgement on his part was very helpful to my cause." [562]

Australia's envoy to the UN, David Anderson, denounces Argentina's invasion.

> *"We have considered carefully the statements made in this Council yesterday and this morning... Nothing contained in those statements could justify the act of aggression which has been committed by the Argentine armed forces in clear violation of Article 2.3 and Article 2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations."*

US Ambassador Kirkpatrick is notably absent throughout the Security Council debate.

"Britain's most strident opponent on the Security Council was Panama. Foreign Minister Illueca, whose statement was described by Parsons as 'long and vicious,' introduced his own draft resolution which went

560 Freedman 2005 vol.2
561 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.109
562 Parsons interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.201. Also Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.138

through all past UN and non-aligned resolutions on the topic and called upon Britain 'to cease its hostile conduct, refrain from any threat or use of force and cooperate... in the decolonization of the ... islands.' Illueca proposed suspending the meeting so that a draft could be prepared in all working languages for tabling. He lost the vote..." [563]

"Between 2 and 3 April, Argentine ambassador Roca attempted to obtain the veto from the Chinese or the Soviets. Soviet ambassador Troyanovsky deflected the request by deferring to "higher authorities" and the Chinese ambassador evaded the issue altogether." [564]

The UN Security Council adopts Britain's resolution.

Security Council Resolution 502 -

> *"Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Security Council on 1 April 1982 calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),*
>
> *Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,*
>
> *Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),*
>
> *1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities;*
>
> *2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);*
>
> *3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."*[565]

"The result was better than we had dared to hope for – ten in favour (United Kingdom, United States, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Togo, Zaire, Uganda and Jordan), one against (Panama) with four abstentions (China, USSR, Poland and Spain)." [566]

"Predictably, Costa Méndez hastened to reject the terms of this resolution. The position would alter later when Argentina declared itself as accepting the mandate "in its entirety," stating that it only objected to the British interpretation of it." [567]

"... in many instances, it is difficult to tell who violated the rules: which State "started" the crisis. But when that is clear, as it was in the Falklands invasion, then States tend to lean on the violator, as did Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Chile, even while occasionally genuflecting to the cherished icons of hemispheric solidarity." [568]

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563 Freedman 2005 vol.2

564 *Anti-Colonialism Versus Self-Determination: International Alliance Dynamics in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War* Michelle Paranzino 2023

565 See https://undocs.org/S/RES/502(1982)

566 Parsons 1983. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union did not use its veto. Russia's Ambassador later blamed communication problems for his abstention.

567 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983. Argentina's attempt to reinterpret SC Resolution 502; *"...depended on separating this first operative paragraph from the second..."* (Freedman 2005 vol.2)

568 *Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War* Thomas M. Franck

"Resolution 502 was taken as a clear statement of opposition to the Argentine action. It linked Argentina to a breach of the peace. Only Argentina was asked to withdraw its forces. … The Resolution was a blow for Argentina. … if implemented there would be nothing to stop Britain retaking the Islands … It could then refuse to negotiate seriously in the future." [569]

"It could hardly have been a worse setback for Argentina." [570]

"It did not, however, go so far as to denounce Argentina as an aggressor. This would have implied an expectation of a collective response, in the form of economic sanctions if not military action. This could not have been extracted from the Council at this time. The objective was therefore more modest: to put the onus on Argentina to withdraw its forces after the cessation of the current hostilities but then respond to inevitable Security Council concerns by suggesting a peaceful, negotiated route out of the dispute." [571]

"The plan was to occupy, provoke the intervention of the United Nations, the Security Council specifically, and then withdraw the troops … The first step had been completed, and a real negotiation had to begin before the United Nations. … The first part, as Admiral (Carlos) Busser points out, was achieved with complete success. The second part, the vote, is lost at the United nations, but the effect had been achieved. How? First because the United Nations does not condemn Argentina as an aggressor, and secondly and very importantly, … its does not order, as would have been normal, the return of the British authorities. … We got part of what we wanted, what we were looking for." [572]

"By insisting on the fact that the invasion of the Falklands was an unjustified act of aggression, a violation of the principle of sovereignty, and a suppression of the right of political self-determination, Margaret Thatcher was able to remain within the boundaries designated by the United Nations Charter, which sanctioned the right to self-determination as well as that of self-defence. This position gained solid support from Resolution 502 of the UN Security Council, approved on 3 April. This resolutions did not authorise London to use military force. It did, however, stigmatise the invasion as a breach of the peace, and it did request the government of Buenos Aires to withdraw from the Falklands, to respect the United Nations Charter, and to find a solution to the territorial dispute through negotiations between the two contenders. Moreover, appealing to the principle of self-determination, and emphasising the risks of appeasement made it more difficult for the United States not to support London." [573]

In Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government issues a statement rejecting UN Security Council approval of SC resolution *502;* claiming that it violates Argentine rights.

"By going to the UN, Britain did not have to declare war on Argentina in order to use force, since its action fell under Article 51 of the UN Charter." [574]

"Argentina, … expected that NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) members would support their cause. It is important at this stage to note that most Arab states were members of the NAM. Argentina underestimated the objections by NAM members to the use of force. Guyana, the South American Security Council member, voted with Britain because it could not allow Argentina to set a precedent with the use of force. Zaire had similar

569 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.141
570 Middlebrook 2003
571 Freedman 2005 vol.2
572 Costa Méndez interviewed in 1992 in *1982: Los documentos secretos de la guerra Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del pro* J. B. Yofre 2011
573 Bruni 2018
574 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* P. Bratton & W. Thies 2011 p.7

considerations. France persuaded Togo on Britain's behalf. After a phone call from Prime Minister Thatcher, Jordan voted with Britain. After all, Britain supported Jordan and the Palestinians in the Middle East peace process. It would appear some interconnections and commonalities of interests were created by the leveraging of unrelated relationships. The British draft resolution was supported by ten votes and was passed as UNSC Resolution 502/1982. Uganda had decided to vote with Britain. Spain and the three Eastern (aligned) countries abstained. China and the Soviet Union would not use their veto power over a matter that was not of great importance to them. Moreover, the Soviet Bloc was ideologically anti-imperial and therefore tended to stay in step with the Non-Aligned vote. However, in a surprising turn of events the NAM was leaning towards the British vote. For the anti-imperialist Soviet Bloc and its allies, the most prudent course of action was thus suddenly to abstain, as they could not vote for the British out of principle. The Soviet predicament beautifully demonstrates the interconnectedness of the Cold War, the NAM and the Falklands War, resulting in absurd political balancing acts." [575]

"I was in the Argentine Foreign Ministry when officials testily tossed the cable down for me to see. They were dismayed that the resolution was not vetoed by the Soviet Union, Argentina's biggest trading partner, with which relations had grown greatly. Ministers believed they had lost the diplomatic initiative to Britain while securing their military objectives." [576]

Forty Argentine journalists are flown to Stanley. [577]

"... the military chartered the day after the invasion, on April 3, a plane so that about 40 reporters could portray the Argentinean occupation on the islands. That day, the military did not exercise censorship, although reporters who came in the afternoon could only take positive photographs because, .., the prisoners were gone and there were no traces of the invasion, the amphibious tanks were gone and the soldiers were with their faces washed." [578]

Two Argentine Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters, fly out to the Falkland Islands. [579]

At South Georgia, arriving too late to assist its Marines, HMS *Endurance* takes up station close to the southern tip of the Island; sending observations teams to overlook Grytviken.

Britain's Bank of England freezes all Argentine assets. Argentine imports are banned - to which Argentina responds with a tit-for-tat freezing of British assets and imports. To avoid the possibility of a technical default on its debts, Buenos Aires announces that it will continue to pay interest via an escrow account in New York. [580]

"The value of the Argentine assets involved was estimated to be approaching $1.5 billion, almost one-quarter of Argentine total liquid assets in all financial centres. They would remain frozen except in rare cases where the Treasury might grant permission for release. Only later, after the higher figure had been given to journalists, was it realised that in the first few days of April substantial sums were transferred from London to New York, meaning that the actual amount frozen was $900 million." [581]

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575 *Drawing a Line from the Falklands to the Persian Gulf* Johanne Marie Skov in *Epoch* June 1, 2022

576 Briley 2022

577 They were able to visit for just a few hours before being returned to the mainland. Nicolas Kasanzew was the only Argentine journalist allowed to remain throughout the war.

578 Lavín & Gallardo-Camacho 2017

579 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.179

580 Already in financial difficulty, the effect was to push Argentina further into debt; forced to borrow a further $7 billion in the remaining months of 1982. *cf. Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland islands Conflict* Lisa L. Martin in *International Security* vol.16 issue 4 1992

581 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Britain approaches the European Economic Community (EEC) and, in particular, West Germany – Argentina's largest trading partner – for an embargo of Argentine imports and exports.[582] At the same time, British Embassies throughout the world initiate approaches to the various Heads of State with requests for support.

A dozen C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft take off from airbases in the UK, bound for Ascension Island.

"Aboard the first plane was a handful of Navy personnel with the mission to set up a forward operating base on Ascension Islands for British forces heading south. ...C-130s would start landing on Ascension later that day and commence offloading dozens of pallets of military equipment as the advance party rushed to figure out where to put the cargo." [583]

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's President summons the German Ambassador; *"Galtieri, who looked nervous, began by saying that he wished to explain the Argentine position to friendly countries with the aim of bringing about a diplomatic solution to the Falkland crisis.... the German Ambassador asked whether Argentina was still prepared to hold talks aimed at reaching an honourable solution ... Galtieri replied that everything was negotiable with the exception of final recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands."* [584]

Two Argentine postal officials are ordered to the Islands. [585]

In the Falkland Islands, with only one police constable remaining, Military Police Company 181, led by Major (Douglas) Patricio Dowling, take over responsibilities for law and order from Argentina's 25th Regiment.

"By and large Argentine forces behaved properly towards the islanders. There were some exceptions. Major Patricio Dowling soon got a reputation for being tough and threatening." [586]

"He was an example of the 'population control' being exercised in Argentina. Some Argentine officers disapproved of his strategy in a territory that had hitherto not resisted." [587]

"Over dinner with another officer in the Upland Goose, Dowling argued the merits of exterminating the Islanders, favouring a 'final solution', because he believed that if the population ceased to exist the British would have no reason to retake the Islands. The two waitresses, Islanders who had been to school in Montevideo, spoke fluent Spanish though they concealed this." [588]

In Europe, France agrees to stop supplying Argentina with *Exocet* missiles, *Super Etendard* aircraft and *Pucara* aircraft engines; and also to withdraw her technical teams from Buenos Aires. [589]

"Using the Defence Attaché in Paris as a conduit, the British sought lists of military sales to Argentina, details of any imposed modifications/limitations to systems, precise capabilities of key aircraft as well as serviceability rates, spares consumption and known shortages, and proficiency of those Argentine pilots

582 In 1980, EEC trade with Argentina had been worth $4 billion.
583 Privratsky 2014
584 *PREM19/614*
585 Argentine philatelic societies were ecstatic. During April the post office at Stanley recorded a daily average of over 7,000 letters and packages. *cf. Miniature Messages: the semiotics and politics of Latin American postage stamps* J. Child 2008.
586 Freedman 2005 vol.2
587 Van der Bijl 2023
588 Elgood 2025
589 *Exocet* missiles came in two types. The older *MM38* ship-launched missile, and the new *AM39*, which could be launched from an aircraft. Of an order for 10, France had only delivered 5 of the *AM39* by the start of the war. *Aérospatiale*, the French company that manufactured the missiles had sent a technical team to assist in adapting the *Exocets* to Argentina's aircraft. With the invasion, Paris ordered those technicians to cease work. There is some evidence that they disobeyed that instruction. However, a DGSE investigation after the war, did not lead to any prosecutions. See, *How France helped both sides in the Falklands War* Mike Thompson *BBC Radio 4* March 6, 2012. *cf.* May 7, 1982

trained by the French. The French even sent over some aircraft to conduct mock dogfights against British pilots. Detailed technical information on the Exocet was also provided. Nott later observed that: "in so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies".” [590]

In Washington DC, America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) presents an assessment for President Reagan.

> *“The Argentines continue to provision and reinforce their initial landings … The British, who will lack a land base and probably face logistical problems, will be hard pressed to oust a force of the size anticipated. … Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador have given unqualified support to Argentina's claims, but have expressed hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Venezuela, traditional supporters of Buenos Aire's claims, has thus far withheld open support and called for a negotiated settlement. The Chileans, now negotiating with Argentina for control of the Beagle Channel, refuse to support Argentine claims.”* [591]

April 4th, in London’s Whitehall, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) conclude that a daily briefing paper is required to cover Argentine military dispositions and intentions.[592]

British submarine, HMS *Conqueror* sails for the South Atlantic.

“On 4 April, faced with the British forces deployment, the Argentine government suspended the planned return and ordered the reinforcement of defenses. DEMIL 1/82 had assigned a level 3 probability to the UK’s reaction, that is, deployment of forces seemed very unlikely to happen. Such an inaccurate hypothesis revealed that no real contingency plan had ever been considered: neither on 23 March when the COMIL decided to occupy the Islands, nor on 26 March when such decision was actually implemented; even less so on 2 April when the Islands were reincorporated into the national wealth. The only measure actually taken for such a scenario was the inactivation of the Malvinas Theater of Operations and the activation of the Teatro de Operaciones Atlántico Sur (TOAS, South Atlantic Theater of Operations).” [593]

Senegal offers staging facilities via Dakar airport for British military aircraft. [594]

“Ascension Island was vital to our operation but, at 4000 miles from the UK and 3500 miles from the Falklands, the standard Hercules could not cope with the distances involved. We handled the UK to Ascension leg by receiving welcome co-operation from Senegal who allowed us to use their major airfield at Dakar as a staging post, with accommodation being provided for our slip crews and engineers.” [595]

From the UK, transport is sent to Montevideo to bring home Governor Hunt; *“… A VC 10 aircraft from the 10th Air Transport Squadron took off from Brize Norton base (England) headed for Montevideo, in order to transport Governor Hunt and his family back home.”* [596]

In the Falklands, administrative staff fly in from Argentina. It is announced that Port Stanley is to now be known as Puerto Rivero. [597]

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590 Freedman 2005 vol.2
591 *CIA-RDP84B00049R000701780020-1*
592 Seventy-five daily assessments were produced between April 4th and June 18th
593 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.111
594 The Republic of Senegal is the westernmost country in Africa. A French colony before 1960.
595 *RAF Lynham and the Air Bridge* Clive Evans 2003 in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal* 2003 no.30
596 *Ibid.* p.111
597 By who is not very clear, and a controversial choice even within Argentina (see 1833 & 1966). Puerto Rivero appears to have only lasted until the 5th, when it was changed to Puerto Soledad for a day, and then to Puerto de las Islas Malvinas (April 6). See April 16, 1982 below

"On the morning of 4 April, an Argentine Air Force Fokker F-28 took off from Jorge Newbery Airport carrying cabinet members and civilian personnel assigned the task of liaison and assistance to public officials. … Once they arrived, public officials received the news that Stanley would be renamed Gaucho Rivero. Looking rather alarmed, they informed General Menéndez that history did not justify the new name, at least for the Islands' most important city and seat of government. Immediately afterwards, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs was consulted and the project was canceled. … At noon, they met at Moody Brook —Marines' former lodgings— with the leader of the 25th Infantry Regiment, Teniente Coronel Mohamed A. Seineldín. There, they learned that most Navy troops had withdrawn and that the 2nd Marine Battalion (BIM 2) would be replaced by BIM 5, commanded by Capitán de Fragata Carlos H. Robacio. At dusk, Comodoro Bloomer Reeve stayed at the Upland Goose hotel, and General Menéndez and his assistants stayed at the Governor's residence." [598]

Unnoticed, a Falklands lighthouse keeper establishes radio contact with the UK.

"Reg Silvey, one of the keepers of the Cape Pembroke lighthouse and a keen radio ham, had managed to maintain a secure contact with another radio ham in Yorkshire… By keeping his despatches short and having disguised his high-power aerial rig as a washing line strung across the back garden … Silvey's broadcasts thwarted all attempts at location detection and his identity remained undiscovered for the duration of the occupation…. Silvey was able to relay vital strategic details to London despite the enormous personal risk." [599]

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's junta decide not to withdraw any more troops from the Islands.

"The D+5 plan was beginning to collapse." [600]

"So as to understand the seriousness of having assumed that the UK would attempt to recapture the Islands only through claims before international organizations, it is only necessary to mention that the return of assets of the Task Force 40 included in the original plan was completed on the same 4 April. In fact, that same day the Argentine Navy corvette Granville set sail from Port Stanley to the mainland carrying on board a large number of troops and heavy material." [601]

In the Falklands, Corporal York and his section of NP 8901, the only remaining British Marines uncaptured, reach Long Island Farm occupied by Neil Watson and his wife. After two days, and without a radio, York decides to surrender. Watson contacts Vice-Commodoro Bloomer-Reeves. Three helicopters are despatched from Stanley with military police under the command of Major Patricio Dowling.

"*The most brutal example of Mayor Dowling's actions among Islanders was against a young 12 year old girl in 1982. Lisa Watson, currently the editor of the Falklands weekly, Penguin News. Her father Neil called the Argentine to report that six British marines who managed to escape when the 2 April landing were prepared to surrender. Not long after two Pucara aircraft overflew the Watson farm and three helicopters landed. With the marines hand cuffed Dowling kicked open the door of the house and forced all the Watson family against the wall, but the girl remained seated, despite the begging of her parents and the shouts of Dowling who then pointed a rifle at her face and several times threatened to shoot. Finally the Argentine officer gave up and the girl remained seated."* [602]

598 *Ibid.* p.112
599 Pinkerton 2007
600 Yofre 2011
601 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.111
602 *The Argentine officer who terrorized and favored a final solution for Islanders during the Falklands' occupation* MercoPress April 22, 2022

"... a 181 Military Police platoon arrived by helicopter and although the Royal Marines were prisoners-of-war and protected by the Geneva Conventions, the military police roughed them up, posed for photographs and then flew them to Stanley and locked them up in the police station cells" [603]

In Stanley, the Islanders have to deal with a new reality.

> *"I spent part of the day burning up papers and documents which I had collected during my service as an elected member of the Falkland Islands Executive and Legislative Councils – nothing really incriminating but certainly not the sort of thing which should be allowed to fall into Argentine hands. I also put our large Union Jacks in a place of safety where hopefully they will not be found. With things as they are at the moment, though, it seems a bit doubtful if we will ever need them again."* [604]

" ... on that same day, the Argentine Air Force Secretary, Brigadier Mayor Rodolfo A. Guerra and Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido Plessl summoned Comodoro Bloomer Reeve so that he could report on the Malvinas military government organization carried out by General Menéndez... in Malvinas. They also told him that they were staying in Stanley with no definite return date. In turn, Comodoro Bloomer Reeve asserted that events would unfold negatively." [605]

In Buenos Aires, newspapers report that the loss of the Falkland Islands means that Britain will also have to forgo its claims to its Antarctic territories. *La Prensa* tells its readers that; *"The recovery of Malvinas, by our country, was a matter of international priority in the entire world."* [606]

Argentina's Rear-Admiral Eduardo Girling summons the German *military attaché* to announce that the Falklands would be defended with all available means, including Soviet assistance; which would be accepted for this purpose. [607]

A CIA telegram from Buenos Aires reports on information received.

> *"When the decision was made to seize the Islands, the certainty that the British would not intervene militarily was shared by President Leopoldo (Galtieri)) and by Brigadier Basilio ((Lami Dozo)), Commander in Chief of the Air Force and a member of the governing Junta. (Field Comment: The source has no information on the attitude of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.) The Argentine planning for the seizure was based on the premise that the British would react to the seizure as gentlemen react to a duel: when the first blood was drawn (the Argentine seizure), the winner (Argentina) would be declared, and the loser (the UK) would gracefully retire from the field."* [608]

From New York, US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, to invite him to dinner; for a discussion on how the USA can collaborate in a peace effort. [609]

In *The Washington Post; "Britain's Prime Minister spoke the simple truth when she labelled the Argentine act, "unprovoked aggression." It is more than likely that the Argentines have made a serious mistake ... for Mrs. Thatcher is a tough woman... the British do not appear to be in a mood to be pushed around."*

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603 Van der Bijl 2023. York and his Marines were quickly flown out to Comodoro Rivadavia military base in Argentina, where they met up with the rest of NP 8901.

604 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.35

605 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.111

606 Article by Manfred Schonfeld quoted in *Representations of the enemy during Malvinas War. A contribution to the bicentennia*l Federico Lorenz 2010

607 *PREM19/615*. The report was passed to the British Government on April 8, 1982

608 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/06/1982*

609 Yofre 2011

April 5th, in Argentina, a housewife from Monte Grande writes to the Interior Ministry.

> *"I would like to ask you to be included on the possible list of families willing to relocate to our Malvinas Islands. This is a well-thought decision, not driven by the heat of the moment. We were thinking about moving to Patagonia but I believe that Argentine citizens are expected on the islands and we volunteer, all six of us members of our family (…)*
>
> *What we really expect is to settle in our own land with many other families who, I believe, are willing to do their best to have the Malvinas be and feel Argentine. (…) I'm sure that many more will come along, we know that our soldiers are there and that Argentine blood is being spilled on that soil, we wish that that piece of land keeps its name forever and ever. I know that farming resources on the islands are not plentiful, I also know that wool is basically the only resource but with new technologies and lots of work we can obtain more than just wool.*
>
> *As I said before Patagonia was our goal, we prepared for that, I took a farming course and we practiced raising some animals to gain experience on the subject."* [610]

HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible* sail from England for Ascension Island. [611] They are joined by two Type-21 frigates, *Alacrity* and *Antelope*, and RFA *Olmeda.*

"On the deck of Hermes were eleven Sea Harrier jets and eighteen Sea King helicopters … (but) not simply to impress the populace. The aircraft carrier's hanger had become so jam packed with cargo, including 200 tons of ammunition for marines, that there was no room left inside the hanger for aircraft." [612]

HMS *Yarmouth* and HMS *Broadsword* are ordered to Gibraltar.

"The vessels had not left sight of the English homeland before helicopters were already slingloading additional supplies to their decks." [613]

"The first surface ships sailed from Portsmouth on 5 April but by then I was sending eight aircraft a day down to Dakar and thence to Ascension. Although all the aircraft carried loads which would be vital for the Task Force when it arrived at Ascension, on my early aircraft I sent engineering and support personnel which would be essential if I was to establish a routine flow of aircraft through the island; I also sent a number of Flight Commanders to ensure that everything was properly organised … aircraft would stage down to Dakar where they would take on a fresh crew and enough fuel to fly on down to Ascension and back to Dakar without using any of the precious reserves on the island; another crew would then bring the aircraft back to Lyneham. Our loads were all high priority items, weapons, missiles, medical kit, spares and the like," [614]

"Frigates HMS Alacrity and HMS Antelope led the way from Devonport to link up with four of the six LSLs that were ready to sail and which carried about 400 troops apiece, including all but a handful of Commando Logistic Regiment. Two of the LSLs had loaded and sailed from Marchwood, and the other two from

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610 *Malvinas/Falklands War: Changes in the Idea of Nationhood, the Local and National, in a Post-Dictatorship Context—Argentina, 1982–2007* Federico Lorenz 2020. Lorenz notes that the junta had no policy of settlement or colonization. See also *Veinte mil argentinos en un barco. Cartas de voluntarios para poblar las islas recuperadas, abril de 1982* Federico Lorenz 2014. Available here - https://journals.openedition.org/corpusarchivos/676

611 *Invincible* sailed with only one of her propellers turning. A replacement starboard gearbox would be fitted as she sailed.

612 Privratsky 2014

613 *British Combat Service Support during the Falkland Islands War: considerations for providing Operational Sustainment to remote areas*. Kenneth L. Privatsky 1986

614 Evans 2003

Devonport. In the days ahead, the remaining two LSLs would join the flow south, one from Belize and the other from Gibraltar." [615]

In Washington DC, a Department of State daily press briefing deals with a question about Ascension Island. [616]

> *"Q, Has there been any British request for refueling or resupply facilities on the part of the United States?*
>
> *A. I noted some press reports regarding British use of the facility on Ascension Island. Our view on this is that Ascension Island is a British possession. The United Kingdom has the legal right to land military aircraft there after notifying the U.S. Air Force Commander at the airfield. The U.S. Government is obligated, under a 1962 agreement governing its use of the air field, to cooperate in the United Kingdom's use of logistic, administrative, or operating facilities; and therefore, such use of the airfield does not, in any way, constitute U.S. involvement in the United Kingdom-Argentine dispute."*

In London, following recriminations in the press, Foreign Office Ministers Richard Luce and Humphrey Atkins resign. Defence Secretary John Nott offers his resignation, but Prime Minister Thatcher declines it. However, Thatcher accepts the resignation of Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington.

> *"The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands has led to strong criticism in Parliament and the press of the Government's policy. In my view much of the criticism is unfounded, but* ***I have been responsible for the conduct of the policy****. I think it right that I resign. As you know, I have given long and careful thought to this. I warmly appreciate the kindness and support which you showed me on Saturday. But the fact remains that the invasion of the Falkland Islands has been a humiliating affront to this country. We must now, as you said in the House of Commons, do everything we can to uphold the right of the islanders to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance.*
>
> *I am sure that this is the right course and one which deserves the undivided support of Parliament and of the country. But I have concluded with regret that this support will more easily be maintained if the Foreign Office is entrusted to someone else.*
>
> *I have been privileged to be a member of this Government and to be associated with its achievements over the past three years. I need hardly say that the Government will continue to have my active support. I am most grateful to you personally for the unfailing confidence you have shown to me."* [617]

"The FCO was held largely responsible, in April 1982, for the Argentine invasion of the islands – for neither anticipating nor guarding against it. During the first weekend of the crisis, the media in Britain led a campaign for the 'guilty men', who had allowed the invasion to occur, to be expelled from their positions in the Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Peter Carrington, thus, was the first casualty of the war. It has been argued by historians, such as Badsey and Hastings and Jenkins, that Carrington resigned as a direct result of the media's crusade to out the guilty. Certainly the humiliation of articles such as, 'The British Lion is Caught with his Trousers Down', and calls for Thatcher to 'Sack the Guilty Men!', contributed to the resignations of Lord Carrington and his juniors at the FCO, Humphrey Atkins and Richard Luce. Thatcher herself perhaps put the situation most clearly: "Having seen Monday's press…he decided that he must go"." [618]

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615 Privratsky 2014

616 Anglo-US arrangements were covered by the *Agreement Relating to the Use of the Airfield at Widewake (sic) on Ascension Island by Aircraft of the Royal Air Force* of Aug 29, 1962.

617 Lord Carrington's resignation letter quoted in *The New York Times* April 6, 1982. My emphasis.

618 *Government Media Policy during the Falklands War* Joanna Margaret Thornton 2015 (published thesis) p.102

"Carrington subsequently claimed ... that Ambassador Williams "failed to represent the UK to the Argentine Government and properly report Argentine intentions", blamed Ridley for the way he made his case for leaseback and blamed the Commons for rejecting it and causing the war. ... Carrington addressed furious Conservative MPs in a Commons Committee room: "I have been accused – and was accused violently after 2nd April in the House of Commons and the press and elsewhere – of wilfully ignoring signs and statements of evidence and just ignoring it. I can truthfully say I did not do any of these things ... they were not there". ... Thatcher's biographer wrote that she regretted Lord Carrington's resignation ... The truth is that Mrs Thatcher sacked him." [619]

Lord Pym is appointed to be Britain's new Foreign Secretary.

"Personal relations between Thatcher and Pym were not of the best. In addition, Mrs. Thatcher harboured the same mistrust regarding the desire of the FCO to defend British interests that was diffuse among many Conservatives. In the case of the Falklands, the roots of the debates can be traced to the difference between pursued objectives. The FCO was fundamentally convinced that, even if they were reconquered, the Islands would have posed a problem for Great Britain. In any case, it would be necessary to sit down at the table with the Argentines, and reach some kind of an agreement. A war, however, would have inevitably made such negotiations impossible for many years to come. Thus the FCO's goal was to resolve the crisis through a diplomatic process." [620]

From Guyana, Shridath '*Sonny*' Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, sends a message to all Commonwealth Heads of Government.

> *"... stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with your support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination and the rejection of the use of force.."* [621]

"Ramphal was a very popular and influential figure within the Commonwealth and it was much due to his influence that the initial offerings of support from the member states came the way of Britain at the outbreak of the crisis." [622]

In Argentina, the Air Force create an administrative Southern Command.

"The Argentine Air Force, taking into account the British reluctance to negotiate, had drafted four different plans: two of them were already being implemented, CAE's Azul y Blanco, and CAT's Aries 82; while CAE's Mantenimiento de la Soberanía and CAD's Caburé Azul y Blanco needed a few minor adjustments before the commanders' approval and signature and the Military Junta's authorization, which would not be given until 7 April 1982. Still, on 5 April the Air Force had created the Argentine Air Force Southern Command and kept deploying assets to airfields in Patagonia." [623]

In the UK, Falklands Governor Rex Hunt, with the marines of NP8901, arrive back. Hunt reports.

> *"The Argentine occupation forces have imposed strict military rule ...The Islanders are under house arrest until further notice, and anyone defying this order is threatened with immediate imprisonment. ... Other penalties have been imposed in the face of growing hostility from the Islanders. These*

619 Elgood 2025
620 Bruni 2018
621 *PREM19/614*
622 *'Not Britain's Cause Alone': The Commonwealth, Britain, and the Falklands Crisis 1982–1989* John Bagnall 2018 in *Global Histories* vol.4 no.1 May, 2018
623 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.111

include 30 days in prison for rude gestures against the military, 60 days for irreverence to the Argentine flag... Messages from radio hams … say that troops are searching homes and confiscating equipment."

Royal Marine Majors Norman and Noott also brief the Prime Minister; *"The Prime Minister congratulated the party on the courage they had shown ... She ... enquired whether those in Port Stanley in the days preceding the invasion had been any more aware of the likelihood of an invasion. The Governor replied in the negative. He had been inclined to think that the Argentine President was sabre rattling as on previous occasions. ... Major Noott said that the Argentine forces had not appeared to be particularly skilled or brave. They had, for example, shown reluctance to go outside Port Stanley because they had heard that a section of six marines were still at large..."* [624]

From New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, speaks to the UN Secretary-General, who is in Rome, about the possibility of negotiations.

"The Secretary-General now wanted to talk to the British to see if he could do anything. Parson's immediate response was that the only action open to him at present was to urge the Argentine Government to implement SCR 502 in all its parts. Perez de Cuellar did not see the merit in making a move at this stage... and had no intention of cutting short his trip lest he give the impression that he was seeking to mediate." [625]

In London, messages of support from the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Belize, Nepal and Mauritius, arrive. Other countries make statements deploring the Argentine invasion. Portuguese Foreign Secretary, Dr. Leonardo Mathias, is reported as saying that if Britain asks to use the *Lajes* Air Base, in the Azores, to refuel, that request would probably be granted.

The Governments of New Zealand and Australia summon their Ambassadors to Argentina for "*consultations*". Canada also recalls its Ambassador, and imposes an arms embargo on Argentina. [626]

Chile condemns Argentina's use of force.

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Endurance* sails north to rendezvous with HMS *Antrim*. In Stanley, instructions are issued that, from henceforth, all vehicles will drive on the right. [627]

"The post office has now been closed until further notice. Cable & Wireless open for distress cables only … Two armed guards on duty at the counter aged about eighteen, very dirty and fed up; gave one a cigarette." [628]



624 *PREM19/614 f72*
625 Freedman 2005 vol.2
626 A temporary withdrawal of Ambassadors on the part of Canada and Australia. Canada's Ambassador returned to Buenos Aires on April 21st. Australia's on April 28th.
627 Falkland Islanders took to driving down the center of the road, instead. See photograph above.
628 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.37

April 6th, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, writes to US President Ronald Reagan.

> *"I seek your personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina. I am already approaching our Community partners on this, since we are bound to consult together on many economic matters. But I very much hope that you will join us too. Coordinated action by the Community, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand would bring home to Argentina the consequences of their illegal actions."* [629]

In London, the Cabinet meet again. The formation of a War Cabinet is announced. [630]

"... the Prime Minister explained that day-to-day political oversight was to be provided by a special Ministerial Sub-Committee of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD) on the South Atlantic and Falkland Islands (OD(SA)), which came to be known as the War Cabinet... Its terms of reference, as set down that day, were 'to keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands, and to report as necessary to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee." [631]

From the Foreign Office, instructions are sent to Britain's Ambassador in Brazil to inquire whether that government would be prepared to assist; *"Even though the Itamaraty (Foreign Ministry), at first, had been inclined towards the British, the Armed Forces tilted towards Argentina. On 6 April, Delio Jardim de Mattos, Minister of Aeronautics, announced a policy guideline that 'Brazil will not help supply the British fleet.'..."* [632]

Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, sends an envoy, Terry Waite, to the Vatican. Waite carries a request that the Pope appeal to Argentina to obey international law; *"The Archbishop believes the Pope has already done this privately but the Archbishop (whose Province includes the Falklands) believes that a public utterance by the Pope would have an impact on Argentinian opinion as it is a strongly Catholic country."*

The Ministry of Defence host a meeting with representatives of the National Union of Seamen, the General Council of British Shipping and P&O to discuss civilian crews on vessels intended for the South Atlantic.

"With the offer of substantial bonuses for union members, all but a few elected to stay with their ships and under the normal discipline of their masters until 'active service' was declared, at which point they would become subject to the Naval Discipline Act.. The bonus was agreed at 150% ..." [633]

From the Falklands, a letter is smuggled out.

> *"On behalf of the civilian population of the Falkland Islands, we, the undersigned Civil Servants and Administrators, request that a protecting power be appointed to help to arrange the temporary evacuation of the civilian population of these Islands under the terms of the Geneva Convention. We further request the immediate dispatch to Port Stanley of an Observer from that power."* [634]

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629 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive April 1–9 1982*

630 Comprising the PM, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Defence Secretary John Nott, Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe and Conservative Party Chairman Cecil Parkinson. The full Cabinet continued to meet twice, a week throughout the campaign, to review the situation.

631 Freedman 2005 vol.2.

632 *A view from the South: The Falklands/Malvinas and Latin America* Stella Krepp 2017 p.358

633 *Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water* M. Clapp & E. Southby-Tailyour 2012. In 1982, Commodore Michael Clapp commanded the UK's amphibious assault group (Task group 317.0) from HMS *Fearless*. Tasked with planning and implementing the actual invasion of the Falklands (Operation Sutton).

634 Received in London on the 9th, but signed by only 13 people. Signatures included those of the Chief Constable and the Registrar General. *cf. PREM 19/617 Telex 14 April 1982*

"Senior Medical Officer, Dr Daniel Haines, ... decided that the civilians should demand to be evacuated from the war zone en masse. He produced a highly controversial draft letter to the British Secretary, requesting that all civilians, not just expatriate British Civil Servants, be evacuated from the Islands before any fighting commenced. There was spirited discussion for and against the letter, but eventually cautious agreement that such a request could be made. ... Dr Haines did get the letter to the UK with a departing Briton ... When word of the petition filtered out, many Islanders were furious. It seemed to many like the patronising of expatriate officers who did not share their deep bond with the Islands, Locals did not intend to abandon their homes. They knew that, once out of the Islands, a deal would be hammered out through the United Nations, and if they ever returned it would be to a place that had changed utterly." [635]

In Buenos Aires, in the Condor building, Rear Admiral Carlos Busser briefs the Junta.

> *"I expressed to them what it had meant to comply with the requirement that the operation be kept secret, and how I thought that to some extent Giachino's death and the injuries we had suffered might have been due to the indiscretions that I believed had occurred. I expressed to them that I thought it necessary to assume that the greatest probability was that we would come to a military confrontation, and that in that situation we should prepare to play as hard and seriously as we could. I dared to express to them that if there was war, two things could happen: if we won, they would be the protagonists of the most important event of the 20th century in our country, but if we lost, they would be held responsible as the authors of the greatest disaster of the 20th century. The three of them were looking at me very intently."* [636]

> *"When I received the instructions to plan the operation, I was given three conditions – surprise, bloodlessness and occupation within a minimum time. Well, I must say that the enemy knew the time and places of our arrival. If there were no more casualties it was by the will of God. Surprise? The operation seemed to be announced well in advance through newspaper reports. Many people knew about it and foreign agencies speculated about it. There was criminal irresponsibility."* [637]

Argentina reinforces its garrison; despatching the 8th Regiment from its barracks at Comodoro Rivadavia, with orders issued for the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion to follow. In Stanley, the Argentine authorities demand that all civilians must carry some form of identification and that all local (ham) radio transmissions must cease. All radio equipment to be handed over to the military forces.

> *"... now all communication between Camp settlements is cut off, resulting in complete isolation from each other and from Stanley."* [638]

"Daily life under occupation, with uncertainty about the long term, was inevitably difficult. The Islanders were, at least in Stanley, able to talk to each other and even hold meetings in the West Store... Argentine preparations for the civil administration had been rushed and were inadequate. Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve was appointed Head of the Secretariat and acted as a liaison officer between the civilian population and military administration. He was an Air Force officer who had spent time in the Falklands some years previously and was well known to and respected by many islanders. During the occupation he managed to retain that respect by being fair and considerate in his dealings with the islanders, in contrast to Dowling." [639]

635 Bound 2007

636 *Reflexiones y Experiencias sobre la actuación de la Infantería de Marina en la Defensa de las Islas Malvinas en 1982* Carlos A. C. Büsser in *Boletin del Centro Naval* no.818 Sept/Dec 2007

637 Büsser quoted in Yofre 2011. For the events leading up to the invasion, see Chapter 11 in this series *1971-1982 Negotiation.* https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/1972-1982-negotiation/

638 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.42

639 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Argentine troops discover that the Falklands terrain can prove challenging; *"... on 6 April a column of Unimog lorries using a track to take supplies to C Company at Goose Green became bogged down a short distance after the asphalt road west from Stanley. Tractors could not move the Unimogs, so the equipment was unloaded and man-packed to the road. The lorries were extricated by a Chinook helicopter."* [640]

Argentine newspapers report that Soviet submarines are deploying around the Falkland Islands.

"... the Soviet line was more anti-British and anti-American than pro-Argentine. Since there was a distinct possibility that, in case of a war, Argentina would be defeated, Moscow did nothing that could be interpreted as a commitment to the prospective loser. It did please Buenos Aires by promptly concluding the pending negotiations for the sale of nuclear equipment and two additional trade agreements. However, keeping economic and political interests separate, it never unequivocally endorsed Argentina's claim to the islands. ... It was Argentina, rather than the Soviet Union that schemed to bolster its position by floating rumours to the effect that Moscow's backing extended considerably further than was the case." [641]

In the Sound off Port William, two small uninhabited islands are bombed with napalm.

"At the beginning of April, the Pucará Squadron had tested the mixture for the Napalm bombs. Since there was no appropriate bombing range, on 6 April a launch was carried out over one of the two uninhabited islets of Groussac Bay, to the north of the Puerto Argentino airport. The test was supervised from the TWR. The test, ordered by BAM Malvinas commander, was authorized by the Argentine government which had previously consulted with the islands' advisers. Out of the two islets, the westernmost one was chosen since it was made of pure rock. The latex burned and gave off smoke for days. Hence, it was baptized "burned" (quemada) island by the airport's defenders." [642]

From London. the US Embassy provides its interpretation of events for the State Department in Washington.

> *"... memories of Suez are just below the surface, especially in the Conservative Party. We cannot be sure HMG will do our bidding if we simply tell them to stop. They already fear being presented with an ultimatum by us, tying their hands militarily when diplomatic options fail. But they are anxious to have our help, knowing that probably only we have the weight to achieve a diplomatic solution. Indeed, their pugnaciousness aims in part to get us to act."* [643]

In New York, Costa Mendez speaks to Kamanda wa Kamanda, President of the Security Council. He says that while Argentina respects *SCR 502*, the British Task Force is clearly in breach of the call for a cessation of hostilities. Informed, Parsons responds that *SCR 502* is clear and that Britain will negotiate when Argentine forces are withdrawn. [644]

In Washington DC, US Secretary of State Haig and Britain's Ambassador Henderson meet.

> *"The Secretary said that while we are confident of British naval superiority, a military clash would be politically disastrous for everyone. Therefore, we must accelerate diplomatic efforts over the next seven days in an attempt to achieve an agreement before the British fleet arrives near Ascension Island, which is close to the regional area covered by the Rio Treaty. Henderson said the fleet would*

640 Van der Bijl 2023
641 *The Soviet Union and the Falklands War* Vojtech Mastny 1983 in *Naval War College Review* May/June 1983 vol.36
642 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.382. See also April 21, 1982, below.
643 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (3)*
644 Freedman 2005 vol.2

not stop at Ascension and Article One of the Rio Treaty should prevent Argentina from invoking mutual assistance measures in the pact. ...

When pressed by the Secretary about HMG views on the elements of a possible agreement, Henderson would only reply that the Argentine military must withdraw from the Falklands, even if it meant the fall of the Galtieri government. Anything less would topple Mrs. Thatcher.

The Secretary asked if the British fleet might be temporarily slowed if the Argentines agreed to a phased military withdrawal from the Falklands, and if there was an understanding that the task force would not return home until the US or some group of impartial nations assured the complete military evacuation.

He added that it would assume no prior agreement on sovereignty, that the customs and way of life of the British Islanders be guaranteed, and that a UK-Argentine condominium- type administration could be arranged. Henderson reacted to the Secretary's suggestions. He noted that the British had poor experiences with condominium arrangements, that after what has happened, in the past weeks, a joint administration would not work, and in any case he could not imagine the Argentines accepting the formula." [645]

After Henderson leaves, Secretary Haig meets with Argentina's Ambassador Takacs.

"The Secretary told Takacs that he had called these meetings as follow-up to the President's offer of our good offices.... The Secretary suggested it might be desirable to set up a quadripartite group with Canada, the U.S. and two Latin American countries as members and that a satisfactory solution might involve some form of joint administration of the Islands under OAS or other auspices. Implicit in this context was the withdrawal of Argentine forces. The Secretary did not see how the sovereignty issue could be resolved now; that would take time. Asked for his opinion, Takacs described the Secretary's ideas as "at the extreme of what the Galtieri government might be able to accept."..." [646]

Haig also has a meeting with Argentina's Foreign Minister Costa Méndez.

"... the Secretary said he needed to know from the GOA if we can keep the sovereignty issue out for now, yet find a formula that will represent a sufficiently great change from the previous status so that the GOA can explain the partial back-down to its own people. The Secretary suggested that if the GOA can agree to defer the sovereignty issue in this fashion, he would be willing to go to London immediately and, depending on the response from Prime Minister Thatcher, from there to Buenos Aires. Costa Méndez said he would talk to President Galtieri tonight and get back as soon as possible." [647]

"It was a prolonged conversation, in which Haig offered, on behalf of Ronald Reagan his "assistance" to help the parties. Not "mediation" nor "good offices". Later the chancellor would inform Galtieri by telephone: "They say that we must find a formula that will allow Thatcher to save face. That the matter is not understood by anyone because no one has taken the trouble either in England or in the United States to analyse it in depth."[648]

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645 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Western Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982 (4))*

646 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/07/1982 (1)*

647 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/06/1982–04/10/1982).* No memorandum of conversation from this meeting has been found. GOA = Government of Argentina.

648 Yofre 2011

Secretary Haig speaks again with Britain's Ambassador Henderson.

"Having met with Costa Méndez, … Haig reported back to Henderson on what sounded to the latter like Argentine intransigence, arguably confirming the pressure was needed. This led Henderson to suggest that Buenos Aires should be Haig's first stop, on the grounds that he already knew the British position and he needed to see whether there really was any Argentine room for manoeuvre. Haig took the view that he had to go to the ally first, if only to dispel any suggestion that he was colluding with Argentina. Henderson was unconvinced…" [649]

Shortly after leaving the meeting, Mendez telephones Haig to inform him that the offer of US mediation was acceptable to Argentina and that the US Secretary of State would be welcome in Buenos Aires. [650]

Secretary Haig reports to Reagan; *"In keeping with the initiatives you have taken with both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Galtieri and your offer of our good offices to help settle this most unfortunate dispute, I have begun to explore what we might be able to do. Today, I have talked personally with the UK and Argentine Ambassadors, as well as with the new UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, by phone, following receipt of a letter from him. Tonight I met with the visiting Argentine Foreign Minister. My objective in these discussions has been to listen to both sides and look for opportunities for diplomacy. I believe we have found a few. We need now to move quickly, while there is still uncertainty on both sides and while each is having second thoughts. … Subject to your approval, and an indication from the British that they agree, I propose to go to London and Buenos Aires, leaving tomorrow or Thursday. …"* [651]

America's Bureau of Intelligence and Research submits an analysis.

> *"The British fleet will reach the Falkland area around April 20. We believe that Thatcher will be under heavy pressure to order it into action if no compromise has been negotiated or is in prospect. She will not have the option of delaying indefinitely while diplomatic efforts continue. The effectiveness of the fleet, far from its maintenance bases, will rapidly deteriorate after its arrival on station. Her damaged leadership could not survive a futile "voyage to nowhere"."*

To this, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs adds a military perspective which; *"… concludes that the UK naval force could inflict high casualties on the Argentinian Navy and possibly retake some territory, but recovering the main territory of the Falklands would be extremely difficult."* [652]

649 Freedman 2005 vol.2
650 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/08/1982 (1)*
651 *Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 6, 1982 Falklands*
652 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1413*

April 7th, in England, SS *Canberra,* at Southampton, commences conversion into a troop carrier. [653]

"... the first vessel to be taken up in order to add troop-lift capacity quickly for 3 Commando Brigade, ... At the time, Canberra was in the Mediterranean near Gibraltar with a full compliment of passengers at the end of a world cruise. Representatives from the services and the government boarded the ship discreetly at Gibraltar. Canberra steamed toward Southampton, arriving on 6 April, disembarking passengers and then starting extensive modifications, just four days after the Argentine invasion." [654]

Britain's War Cabinet (OD[SA]) meets in London. Part of the discussion focuses on how to remove the nuclear depth charges,[655] from the ships carrying them before they are engaged in combat operations. [656]

From Argentina, an Argentine Aerolineas Boeing 707 flies to Tel Aviv, Israel, to negotiate a supply of missiles, anti-personnel mines, machine guns, mortars and bombs. [657]

From Buenos Aires, telegrams from members of the British community, arrive for the attention of the Prime Minister.

"On 7 April the British Community Council (BCC), established in 1939 as a coordinating body to centralize "the cultural, philanthropic and charitable activities of native born Britons and peoples of British descent living in Argentina", urged Thatcher "to seek a peaceful solution to this situation and give due consideration to the strong British presence in Argentina and the size of the community living here"." [658]

In London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym addresses the House of Commons.

> *"The whole House and the country is struck by the appalling nature of the aggressive action the Argentine regime has committed… The British ambassador in Buenos Aires and most of his staff are being withdrawn. ... A small British interests section will continue to work in the Swiss embassy, and we are most grateful to the Government of Switzerland, who are most expert in these matters, ... What we in Britain must now do, with the support and backing of all freedom-loving countries right across the world, is to see to it that Argentina's illegal and intolerable defiance of the international community and of the rule of law is not allowed to stand."* [659]

From London, Britain's government declares a 200 mile *'maritime exclusion zone',* to take effect on the 12th. [660]

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653 Southby-Tailyour 1990

654 Privratsky 2014

655 A variant of the WE177 free-fall bomb also in service with the RAF, for use in an anti-submarine role. Referred to as 'Bomb Aircraft HE 600lb MC'.

656 A number of options were considered, all of which would have meant at least a 36 hour delay for the vessels concerned. This was unacceptable, and so the decision was made on the 11th, that the nuclear depth charges would have to stay with the fleet. The instruction was that any vessel carrying nuclear weapons could at no time sail into the 3-mile territorial waters of the Falklands (Amphibious Operations Area) as this could be viewed as a breach of the *Tlatelolco Treaty* of 1967. On May 28, 1982, a decision was made to move the weapons back to the UK, but this still encountered practical problems and it was not until June 26 that the last were taken off HMS *Hermes*. See - https://www.nuclearinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Operation-Corporate-1982.pdf

657 *Israel Sold Argentina Arms in 1982 during Falklands* in *The Jewish Chronicle* May 3, 2012

658 *War of the British Worlds: The Anglo-Argentines and the Falklands* Ezequiel Mercau 2016 6 in *Journal of British Studies* vol. 55 January 2016 pp.145-168. It was estimated that there were some 90,000 Anglo-Argentines living permanently in Argentina at the beginning of the conflict. Galtieri had assured them that they would be protected, but many felt insecure. See April 16, 1982, below.

659 *HC Deb 07 April 1982 vol.21 cc959-1052*

660 Pym provided Haig with advance warning; albeit without sufficient time to allow Haig to present an argument.

"From the time indicated, any Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found within this Zone will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British Forces. This measure is without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under article 51 of the United Nations Charter." [661]

"When the British announcement was made the impression was given, and it was generally understood, that the British nuclear submarine Superb was on station in that area and this was undoubtedly the major reason for the failure of the Argentine fleet to emerge from its base at Puerto Belgrano, south of Buenos Aires. There were later complaints that the press, as well as the Argentines, had been intentionally misled when it was discovered that the Superb was at its base in Scotland. However, this was a perfectly valid and successful piece of "disinformation" by the British. Since the 1856 Declaration of Paris it has been a settled rule of maritime warfare that a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is, the blockading belligerent must be able to enforce its announced blockade. The British declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels were not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy naval vessels. It was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to the Argentine naval forces. A state of armed conflict certainly existed between Argentina and Great Britain and, hence, the armed forces of each, including naval vessels, were, apart from some limitations not here applicable, subject to attack wherever found. In any event, if, by disinformation, a belligerent can convince the enemy (and neutrals) that there is an effective blockade in existence, then there is an effective blockade." [662]

"It was called a 'maritime exclusion zone' and was set up initially because the first force to arrive there was the nuclear submarine. A nuclear submarine is very limited in what it can do. By international law it cannot sink merchant ships without first stopping them, warning them and giving the crew a chance to abandon ship. A nuclear submarine will not expose itself on the surface, because it is then at its most vulnerable... We set up the maritime exclusion zone at two hundred miles, which is where the submarines were operating to try and dissuade the Argentines from reinforcing the Falklands." [663]

"A rider to this announcement, which went unnoticed at the time, stated that even though Britain had declared a 200-mile MEZ, this did not preclude "the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."..." [664]

In Washington DC, Haig notes; "*Proposals:... Argentina and Britain to negotiate ultimate disposition of Islands within framework of respect for sovereign rights and for the right of the inhabitants of the Islands to self-determination,"* before attending a meeting of the newly formed *National Security Planning Group*. [665]

"... a core-group get-together which the White House heavies use to avoid the sprawling group gropes and inevitable leakage which come with more formal sessions of the full NSC. ... Bobby Inman, truly one of the best and the brightest! He ... will shortly retire, but not before attacking Jeane Kirkpatrick's view that the key issue in the South Atlantic crisis is the preservation of the Inner-American System (whatever the fuck that is) and the viability of the Rio Pact. ...

661 John Nott in *HC Deb 07 April 1982 vol.21 cc1045-1046*

662 *The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War* in *Levie on the Law of War* Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green (eds) 1998 pp.203-204. Argentine military authorities had believed that a submarine sailed for the South Atlantic from Gibraltar on March 26, 1982. In fact that submarine was bound for Scotland. On March 30, 1982, press reports asserted that a submarine had sailed for the Falklands.

663 Lord Lewin interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.214

664 Bratton & Thies 2011 p.9

665 *Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, April 7, 1982 Falklands.*

The main outcome of that meeting, however, was the decision to send Haig to the two feuding capitals,…" [666]

In Buenos Aires, the British Ambassador, Anthony Williams, closes the Embassy after destroying sensitive material. Before leaving for the airport, the Ambassador sends one last telegram to London.

"Knowing full well that current British policy with regard to the Islands could not lead to any satisfaction of Argentine aspirations and that the Argentines were becoming increasingly restive, we refused to face the fact that our encouragement of total intransigence from the Islanders involved a physical risk to them, to counter which no adequate provision had been made or could have been made. Nor did we make adequately clear to the Islanders the stark choice they faced. They were never really brought face to face with the full realities of their position." [667]

Williams flies out on a Swissair flight to Canada; *"... after receiving a severe note of protest for the decision of his country's government to prohibit Argentine exports ... because it was considered "unfriendly"."*[668]

HMS *Antrim* and HMS *Plymouth* are ordered to proceed to Ascension Island at full speed, and prepare for operations at South Georgia. [669]

Argentina's junta creates the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations (TOAS) under the command of Vice Admiral Juan José Lombardo, covering the continental shelf of Argentina, the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

"Thus, one of the first requirements made to the Joint Staff on April 2 was the maritime transportation of the equipment necessary to extend the runway at Stanley. When analyzing the possibilities, the fact the runway was very close to the sea and, therefore, exposed to naval bombing represented a challenge. During April, competent personnel from the National Highway Administration were summoned to estimate the magnitude of the task and, especially, the time required. However, due to the soil type, the work involved removing rocks and moving a considerable amount of earth that would take months, even counting on the necessary heavy machinery. The only possibility was to place aluminum plates on the rest of the already leveled ground. There were some inconveniences in coordinating the departure of the shipping vessels in Buenos Aires, which delayed the shipment of 80 crates with 231 aluminum plates to extend the runway, a front-end loader, a bulldozer, a motor grader, two dump trucks, and a mobile workshop truck. It was only around April 7 that the equipment was finally loaded onto the ELMA Ciudad de Córdoba along with the 3rd Infantry Brigade heavy weapons."[670]

In the Falklands, Brigadier General Benjamin Menéndez is formally sworn in as Garrison Commander and Military Governor of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Witnessed by a delegation of politicians and trade unionists flown in from Buenos Aires. Lt-General Videla among them. Archbishop Desiderio Elso Collino, Chaplain General, officiates. [671]

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666 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*. Attendees included President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Judge Clarke (National Security Advisor), Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, David Jones (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff), Admiral Inman (CIA) and James Rentschler (National Security Council). No official minutes from this meeting have been published.

667 Quoted in Elgood 2025

668 Yofre 2011

669 Privratsky 2014

670 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.129. With the introduction of the British blockade, the ship was directed to Puerto Desaedo where it collided with the quay, causing a two-metre long breach in the bow and delaying shipment.

671 Burns 2002.

The ceremony is broadcast from Stanley Town Hall to Argentina's national television and radio channels. [672]

"... on 7 April, Brigadier-General Menéndez took office as Malvinas Military Governor by Argentine politicians, business representatives and cultural and media personalities flown in as witnesses. Falkland Islander representatives were invited to the ceremony, but none accepted the invitation." [673]

"On 7 April, an Argentine Air Force F-28 arrived at Puerto Argentino carrying national authorities and military leaders, political personalities, and members of workers' unions and cultural organizations. All of them were to attend the inauguration of the military government. The austere ceremony was held at the Town Hall hotel. Within half an hour the National Anthem was sung and the usual oath was taken. Afterwards, attendants stayed at the hotel where a cocktail party was organized." [674]

A large Argentina flag is hoisted on the only available flagpole outside Government House.

> *"By 10 o'clock the wind had got up again to 30-35 knots from the north-west, increasing during the afternoon to something over 50 knots… The tents up at the Ionospheric Observatory blew down; then the huge Argentine flag hoisted on the pole outside the Secretariat flapped itself out of control, snapped the pole and flew off in great confusion down Ross Road, chased by anguished soldiers and watched by delighted locals."* [675]



Rafael Wollmann 1982

Governor Menéndez circulates a message to the people of Port Stanley.

> *"Message of the Military Governor of the National Territory of the Malvinas and South Atlantic Islands. To All Inhabitants of the National Territory of the Malvinas Islands, Georgias and South Sandwich.*
>
> *The Argentine Republic has returned to these Islands on the sovereignty of which has undeniable titles, after 150 years of useless claims to the United Kingdom, which occupied them by force in 1833.*

672 Yofre 2011. Owing to some technical difficulty, the television channels only received the audio link.
673 Van der Bijl 2023
674 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.112
675 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.43. Apparently taken as a poor omen by some of Argentina's more superstitious troops.

Furthermore, we have had discussions for 15 years with the British Government to re-establish that sovereignty, without achieving any progress, notwithstanding the repeated resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations on this subject. The only progress made consisted in actions intended to improve our links with the Islands, to provide a minimum knowledge about our country and contribute to improve the standard of Living of their inhabitants, even at a high cost for us, in acts of good will often not appreciated.

We had no other way than the occupation to achieve the definitive integration of the National Territory waving our Flag again over the Malvinas that belonged to us since 1810, date of our Independence and as territorial heirs of Spain, whose possession of these Lands was effective and undisputable (sic).

I am deeply sorry that this fact has taken place in this way, in such circumstances that had to be violent instead of being pacific due to the obstinacy and stubbornness (sic) of the Colonial Government, with a sad toll of casualties on our side. This covers with grief and sorrow a day which we could have wished to be one of calm and shared joy. But this will not change our spirit and attitude.

Therefore, I wish to state very clearly to you that we have not come here as conquerors to take possession of your property or to consider you our prisoners or vassals.

On the contrary, I reaffirm in this act that, as it has been pointed out permanently during the discussions held since 1967, we wish to respect in every possible way the present style of life of the inhabitants of the Islands, to make the strongest effort to maintain their present level of economic activity and personal welfare, respecting private property and the basic freedoms and rights of all.

We also wish to perform a steady action to fully achieve the "Malvinas Program" which is being carried out, and study other tending to propel the rational exploitation of the natural resources of the Islands and their area of influence, so in this way provide better possibilities and progress for their inhabitants.

We wish, as soon as possible, to work together, in cooperation, with all men and women of this Land who wish to come to us with ideas, discuss measures in benefit of the Community or criticize what could be wrong. In this sense you will always be welcome, with an open spirit, either by me or by my assistants. It should be clear that as from today on, we consider you all inhabitants of the Argentine Republic, with the full rights established by its Constitution, listed in its Article 14, such as, to work and perform any lawful industry, to navigate and to trade, to petition the authorities, to enter, to stay, to travel and to leave the Argentine territory, to disseminate their ideas through the press without previous censorship, to use and to dispose of their property, to associate with useful purposes, to profess freely their worship, to teach and to learn.

You can see that the Argentine Constitution, sanctioned in 1853, establishes the rights, freedoms and privileges of Citizens which are similar to those the British Subjects are accustomed to enjoy. Although some of these rights have been suspended on the mainland due to the anti-terrorist struggle, we hope that here they will be absolutely in force.

I know that you must have serious doubts and prejudice (sic) towards our presence here and your future life as inhabitants of the Argentine Republic. Anyone who wishes can take steps to become full citizens, as many aliens, including British subjects, have become since many years ago. We hope that future acts will allow us to clarify those doubts and open a venturous period of work and progress together.

> *Therefore, I ask for the protection of God and I hope to count with the cooperation and good will of everybody, putting at the service of this enterprise, all my will, my strength of spirit and understanding. At the same time I engage myself, my word as general of the Argentine Army to you."*

"The new governor gave a short speech addressed to the local population of the Malvinas, in perfect Spanish"[676]

From Washingto DC, the US State Department announces that President Reagan has; *"... directed Secretary of State Haig to continue consultations with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina on the interests of assisting both parties in the search for a peaceful resolution of the dispute in the South Atlantic."*

An American intelligence report notes; *"Second thoughts are surfacing among Argentine politicians about the wisdom of President Galtieri's adventure as it becomes clear that the cheap victory so confidently expected may still elude them."*

April 8th – Australia bans Argentine imports; *"Mr. Fraser said that his Government would not have done this for any other country in the world."*

In London, two brothers, Andrew and David Banks, are arrested outside Argentina's Embassy after throwing tins of corned beef through the Embassy's windows. [677]

Britain's Chiefs of Staff propose an operation (*Paraquet*) to retake South Georgia before the end of the month.

> "*... the Defence Staff have drawn a distinction between an operation against South Georgia (which they regard as certain) and operations against the Falkland Islands (which they regard as subject to parallel political or diplomatic activity).*" [678]

PM Thatcher is briefed; *"... you should be aware that the United States intelligence agencies are helping and supporting our own intelligence effort with unreserved openness and generosity. Mr. Haig himself has assured Sir Nicholas Henderson that if there is anything we need in the area of covert support and assistance we have only to ask. Profiting from this, a telegram of requests has already gone over to Washington."* [679]

On his arrival in London, US Secretary Haig is welcomed by Foreign Secretary Pym.

> *"In this initial meeting the resolute mood of the Brits is very clear, but only a mild taste of what we will soon get across the way in Number Ten."* [680]

"Thomas Enders asked point blank what way out the British were giving Argentina. Sir Antony Acland... asked about the way out the US would give Cuba if it invaded Puerto Rico." [681]

Alexander Haig arrives at Downing Street at 6pm for a meeting with Margaret Thatcher.[682] During the discussion Haig accepts that, although British Intelligence had failed to see the invasion coming, it had put together a file that was; *"... much better than anything which the United States had compiled."* [683]

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676 Yofre 2011.
677 UPI April 8, 1982
678 *FCO 7/4472*
679 *AO8091* signed by the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong on April 8, 1982
680 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary.* US Director of West-European Affairs
681 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Acland was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Enders was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
682 *Memcon: Secretary's Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher April 8: Falklands Island Crisis", 10 April 1982, National Security Archive.* See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21329-19820410-secretarys-meeting-prime-minister
683 *PREM19/616 f165.*

"The Secretary said he viewed the next 72 hours as very important in Argentina. While we need to demand withdrawal and achieve it, we need to do it by Monday (4/12/82). London was chosen to visit first because the British are our closest friends and allies and we wished to start discussions with them; it was pointless to go to Buenos Aires first and listen to macho rhetoric without a fundamental feel for Britain's limits. ... He foresaw that the British could succeed in military terms in a limited way. However, the Argentines would go into port and land-based air would become a problem. ... The Secretary said the hope was to work for withdrawal in such a way that Galtieri is not toppled and replaced by someone more rigid. He emphasized withdrawal of military and security related forces; to get that step he thought the Argentines need to be convinced that they are not losing face in the process. At the same time, there must be a victory for principle. ... The Secretary said he wanted to find some approach that protected principle ..." [684]

Secretary Haig suggests a three part solution, involving – a) Argentine withdrawal, b) a return to the administrative *status quo* that had existed before the invasion, and c) a return to negotiations between Britain and Argentina. He adds that stages a) and b) should be supervised by an international body.

> *"Maggie is having none of it. Her position – strongly supported by Defense Minister John Nott and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Terry Lewin, somewhat less so by Francis Pym – calls for the status quo ante, period. High color is in her cheeks, a note of rising indignation in her voice, she leans across the polished table and flatly rejects what she calls the "woolliness" of our second stage formulation, conceived in our view as a traditional face-saving ploy for Galtieri: "... Interim authority! – to do what?" Tough lady. ...*
>
> *Al Haig sits there, nervously tapping his leg and chain-smoking his Merits, but at the same time keeping his cool, trying to reason, ever so gently encouraging the Brits to think through the course on which they have embarked and to recognize the limits – as yet unspoken – beyond which the US cannot and will not go in its support of this staunchest of all our Western allies, ...*
>
> *Thatcher insisted the people have a right to stay on the Islands. The Secretary replied that was what he was seeking to achieve in conformity with the UN Charter. The Prime Minister said rights under the UN Charter were removed by force. She indicated the Secretary was suggesting the Argentines get by force what they failed to get before. The Secretary said his intention was to achieve withdrawal of the force, restoration of an administration that could guarantee the freedom of the people while negotiations go on. The Prime Minister said the people had everything they wanted before. She sought withdrawal and restoration of British administration— which merged with sovereignty. Then there could be negotiations. As a guardian of the Islanders' rights, she cannot put up something these people turned down, she said. ... The Secretary said principles would be preserved; but the only way to get the problem turned around in the short term is to achieve an interim arrangement on authority in the Island. ...*
>
> *The Secretary asked what happened if we don't find a solution and conflict develops. The Prime Minister said it had developed and was initiated by the Argentines. The first principle of America, she said, is the right to use force to recover your own home. Once British administration is restored of course Britain will negotiate. ... she could not tolerate their getting by force what they failed to get otherwise."* [685]

684 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.162
685 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

"The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. had no intention of forcing the UK to negotiate under duress. Nothing could be further from the truth. The U.S. stood by the UK, we were allied, we had already shown we were not treating the UK and Argentina as equals through our vote on UNSC 502. … all we could do now was continue on to Buenos Aires and probe the Argentines. We would be sure to carry with us the message of British unity and resolve and convey to them the strength of feeling which exists over the Falklands dispute. The Secretary went on to say that in all frankness he felt the British should be fully aware of the many factors at play in the present crisis, including the substantial interests we have in the hemisphere and the potential for Soviet exploitation of the crisis." [686]

"The British assessment after the meeting, … was that Haig did now understand the strength of British feeling. Ideas on an interim administration were imprecise, and apparently largely geared to saving Argentine face… The only work that it seemed necessary to set in motion was on how Argentine withdrawal could be organised and supervised, supposing it could actually be secured. The American assessment was slightly different. There was no doubting the Prime Minister's resolve… Nor had she actually tried to persuade the Americans against going to Buenos Aires. By the end of the evening she was prepared to see advantages if Haig was able to bring home to the Argentines the potential consequences of their action… The Americans had also been struck by the sharpness of Thatcher's exchanges with Pym, indicating that the British Cabinet was not of one mind…" [687]

"The gap between Margaret Thatcher's and Francis Pym's positions was immediately clear to the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, during his first visit to London as a mediator. … astonished by the fact that Pym "went surprisingly far" in expressing his own strong dissent in the presence of the Prime Minister. Haig also underlined how the modest results obtained were reached "only after much effort by me with considerable help not appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher from Pym"." [688]

Haig reports to Reagan.

> *"The Prime Minister has the bit in her teeth, owing to the politics of a unified nation and an angry Parliament, as well as her own convictions about the principles at stake. She is clearly prepared to use force, though she admits a preference for a diplomatic solution. She is rigid in her insistence on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed seemingly determined that any solution involve some retribution. … All in all, we got no give in the basic British position …"* [689]

In Port Stanley, the Post Office reopens; *"Argentine servicemen were allowed to send and receive aerogrammes free of charge. … The province of Misiones in northern Argentina provided a TV transmitter that was placed in a studio close to the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service (FIBS). It was managed by Senor Norman Powell, the announcer and three Argentines and broadcast between 10am to 12 noon and 7pm to 9pm daily. …"*



An Argentine radar system become operational at Stanley airfield. [690]

686 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/11/1982 (1)*
687 Freedman 2005 vol.2
688 Bruni 2018 citing *James Rentschlers Falklands Diary* p.11
689 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191650, 191754, 192115].* This memo is dated April 9, 1982.
690 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 20233 p.183. Subsequently moved to higher ground.

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy telegrams its counterpart in London with a message for Haig.

> *"Under Secretary Ros called me in this morning to discuss arrangements for the Secretary's visit. He complained about the harsh statements coming out of London ... He emphasized that the Foreign Ministry wants and has always wanted a negotiated solution. The problem is that Ros and Costa Mendez do not speak for the navy. We are getting ultra-tough sounds out of that quarter, including statements that the Secretary (Haig) should not come here ... feelings are running high in the navy. One bitter complaint is that the commandos failed to have complete surprise and thus took casualties ... because we had given the British advance intelligence obtained by 'satellite'."* [691]

Argentina's 10th Mechanised Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Oscar Jofré, is ordered to reinforce the coastal defences of Buenos Aires and the Rio de la Plata. [692]

In New York, at the United Nations, Argentine representative Eduardo Roca condemns the 200-mile maritime exclusion zone announced by the UK.

"... Roca, denounced this as a blockade and so an act of aggression as defined in Article 3 (c) of General Assembly 3314 (XXXIX). The response was that this was not aggression as Britain was not the first to use force and could not blockade its own territory." [693]

Roca asserts that his country is also entitled to exercise a right of defence under *Art.51* of the UN Charter; and announces Argentina's own 200-mile defence zone off the Argentine coast and around the Falklands. [694]

"... the TOAS was created in 1982 by Executive Order "S" No. 700, although its jurisdiction was determined on 8 April by the Military Junta's Joint Statement No. 19. The latter established 200 nautical miles from the limit of the mainland (12 miles offshore from the baseline) and around Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands." [695]

From Washington, Britain Ambassador Henderson reports to London.

> *"There is an intense debate among the OAS delegations here, including the American one, about the legal questions involved in invoking the Rio Treaty. Some contend that the Falklands dispute falls outside the legislative (not geographic) scope of the Treaty .... others are reluctant to see the Treaty invoked lest it be used by Argentina to legitimize its invasion. ... To convene the OAS under the Rio Treaty and to pass a Resolution requiring action would need 15 to 16 votes which it (Argentina) is not at present finding it easy to obtain."* [696]

America's *Washington Post* reports:

> *"Argentina will have to give first, for Britain is determined, as it must be, that the English-speaking Falklanders choose their own fate and affiliation. At issue is not so much a disputed claim to abstract sovereignty as the principle of negotiated self-determination on which Britain's peaceful dissolution of the Empire has been based since World War II."* [697]

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691 *State Department No.093478*
692 Van de Bijl 2023. Rescinded the following day; the Brigade was ordered to reinforce the Falklands.
693 Freedman 2005 vol.2
694 Schmitt & Green (eds) 1998 p.203
695 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.117. TOAS = South Atlantic Theater of Operations
696 *PREM19/615.* OAS = Organisation of American States
697 *The Washington Post* April 8, 1982

"Margaret Thatcher had absolutely no doubts: since the United Kingdom held sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the invasion constituted a manifest violation of international law, which in addition denied the will of the Islanders to remain under the Queen's rule. This allowed Mrs. Thatcher to turn to positive advantage the element that had determined her own and her predecessors' incapacity to resolve the Falklands problem: the right of the Islands' inhabitants to decide their own destiny. It was necessary to re-establish the status quo, in order to guarantee the Falklanders' rights of self-determination, and to demonstrate in the clearest terms that acting in an illegal and violent manner on the international scene would not bring any advantage. For the Conservative leader, the ongoing crisis went beyond the contingent episode involving an archipelago in the South Atlantic Ocean. In reality, it involved a much more important matter: the necessity for Western liberal democracies to demonstrate to any kind of dictatorship their ability and readiness to fight for the defence of their political values, without being tempted by forms of appeasement." [698]

> *"The lunchtime news from the BBC said that there was to be a blockade round the islands as of 0400 Monday, this would be midnight Sunday to us as our time was 4 hours behind GMT.... there is a Task Force on the way, and talks are ongoing between Argentina and the United Nations. It would soon be all over and they could go home and leave us with the serious business of getting on with our own lives our own way."* [699]

In London, in the House of Commons, following a question from Dr. David Owen MP, PM Thatcher announces an review of events leading up to the Argentine invasion.

> *"I think that some form of review is appropriate. We are considering exactly what form that review or inquiry should take and what its timing should be. I am quite happy to consult on that matter. What I want to make clear is that we think that some form of review or inquiry is advisable under the circumstances, and we shall consult later."* [700]

"On April 6th (sic), the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, announced the setting up of an inquiry into the first of the Falklands misjudgments. She did not elaborate on its form or chairmanship. ... Inquiries into the preludes to war have always been major political events which often hurt the instigator more than those at whom they are directed. This inquiry was established in a fit of parliamentary rage, directed by politicians at those in the administration they thought were guarding British interests abroad." [701]

"Margaret Thatcher assumed responsibility for instituting a commission of enquiry into the events leading up to the Argentine attack, once the crisis was resolved. This move made it easier to have the collaboration of the SDP and the Liberals, in order to guarantee political support for the armed forces that were about to be deployed in Southern Atlantic. It also further reduced Labour's margins of manoeuvre. To avoid appearing more interested in contesting the government rather than the Argentine invasion, even the Labour MPs decided to walk the path that the Prime Minister showed them. In this way, the debate over the government's faults was temporarily suspended,..." [702]

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698 Bruni 2018
699 *Neville's Diary* from Bennett 2021
700 *Hansard: Commons: 8 April 1982: Oral Answers to questions: col.1086*
701 *The Economist* June 19, 1982. *cf.* July 6, 1982
702 Bruni 2018

April 9th, SS *Canberra* sails from England carrying 40 Commando, 42 Commando, a company from 45 Commando and 3 Para. [703]

"Never in a century full of wars and conflicts had a country pulled together so fast to protect its interest, with no prior planning and under such unclear circumstances... No country in the world, not even the United States, expected the British to dispatch a force so quickly." [704]

From Ascension Island, RFA *Fort Austin* sails for the South Atlantic with supplies for *Endurance*. Also on board are men from the SAS and SBS.

In the UK, *The Times* newspaper reports on Thatcher's commitment to a formal review of events by way of an inquiry, speculating that it may focus on failures by the Foreign Office.

"The civil service, and in particular the foreign office, bitterly resented the implied accusation of negligence." [705]

In London, daily on-the-record briefings commence at the Ministry of Defence.

"The purpose of these briefings, ... was to 'maintain a point of contact with the press'. The briefing was held at noon and soon became known to the journalists as the '12 o'clock follies'. ... The daily statement was often vague and did not provide the correspondents with complete information required to compose full stories. Guardian journalist, Richard Norton-Taylor, wrote: "We reporters back in London had to rely on the MoD's official spokesman... for thin and heavily vetted daily summaries of the action". ... Reuters claimed that "statements by the spokesman often raised more questions then [sic] they answered". ... The dearth of information had a serious impact on the reporting of the campaign. Starved of material, the media increasingly turned to alternative sources, such as Argentine communiqués. Further, in order to fulfil their daily quota of material on the Falklands, the media resorted to speculation." [706]

In Rio de Janeiro, the *Jornal do Brasil* publishes an editorial:

> *"We are on the edge of a confrontation. The fact that a powerful fleet was ready to sail after only 5 days preparation when the normal time for an operation of such scope is usually much greater, is a clear indication of English intentions. ... It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that there took place a violent action – and that any possibility of a successful outcome to any negotiations depends on the fact that acceptable satisfaction is given to the country that suffered the action – in this case England.... The possibility that Argentina could invoke, in its defence, the Rio Treaty, is fading away:... it cannot, because it was, in this case, the aggressor. ..."*

US intelligence notes; *"... the Argentines are reportedly lengthening the air strip in Port Stanley to accommodate A-4, MIRAGE, PUCARA, and C-130 aircraft and reinforcing the island with additional troops and air defence equipment..."* [707]

The first elements of Argentina's 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment arrive in the Falkland Islands. [708]

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703 Less than 60 hours after she had disembarked 1,500 cruise passengers at Southampton. *Canberra* was overloaded by some 10,000 tons, sitting in the water thirteen inches below her maximum legal load limit. She was returned to legality when Department of Trade officials showed up and painted new lines. See Privratsky 2014.

704 Privratsky 2014. What they didn't have were gridded maps, which would be air-lifted to them on the way south.

705 *The Economist* June 19, 1982. *cf.* July 6, 1982

706 Thornton 2015 pp.112-113 & 114

707 Heavily redacted. See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21356-19820409-argentine-uk-situation-update

708 Contrary to many assertions, the Argentine forces stationed in the islands were not all newly-called up conscripts.

At Brasilia, a Cuban plane bound for Argentina is found to be loaded with electronic surveillance equipment.

From London, flying to Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig sends a message to President Reagan.

"In it, he expanded on his assessment of Thatcher's outlook on the crisis, noting that "it is virtually as important to us" that Thatcher achieve "success" in this situation "for the principle at stake is central to your vision of international order, in addition to being in our strategic interest." Haig also observed: "The key question is whether I can bring back enough from the Argentines to convince her [Thatcher] that she has within reach a successful, peaceful solution. Obviously, if Galtieri accepts a political defeat it's the end of him. Just as Mrs. Thatcher must be able to show that Galtieri got nothing from his use of force, he must be able to show that he got something. Whether this rules out a diplomatic solution, or whether there is a narrow band in which some ambiguity will permit both parties a way out of their respective corners, I do not know."..." [709]

In Buenos Aires, US envoy Vernon Walters speaks to President Galtieri.

> *"I explained that I came at Secretary Haig's request to convey privately some thoughts to consider before our general discussion later in the evening. We understood that President Galtieri had unified his people in a way none of his predecessors could. His mandate in the Malvinas affair is clearly broad and sound. If we can resolve the matter without war, Galtieri will go down in Argentine history as the man who reconquered the Malvinas Islands without firing a shot. He will be perceived as a leader of the free world and a man of peace. If his government accepts a proposal that is recognized as reasonable and fair his place in history is secure even if the British reject it. A war between Argentina and England will serve only the Soviets and their allies. ...*
>
> *If he would not insist upon having his own governor, we would insist that the negotiations conclude by December 31, 1982 and in a manner to suit his domestic needs. Both sides must make concessions if peace is to continue. History, however, seems to favor the Argentines. The matter has been pending for 130 years and has now come to a head. An interim arrangement can hardly be seen as anything other than progress for Argentina. ...*
>
> *The Argentine choice today is to accept a half loaf now and wait to gain the rest in a year or to face a war. We are working on a draft we hope he will find acceptable. President Galtieri replied, "Walters, the one thing you cannot ask me to do is to haul down the Argentine flag. If I do that, I will be kicked out of this building. You must work out something that does not leave me empty-handed."* [710]

Secretary Haig arrives in Argentina at 10pm local time. He is greeted at the airport by Foreign Minister Costa Méndez and US Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, before moving on to the city of Buenos Aires. [711]

> "*… the local patriots are waving their blue-and-white flags and chanting AR-GEN-TIN-A AR-GEN-TIN-A!"* [712]

Speaking to Argentina's press, Secretary Haig says that Washington's years of historic cooperation with Argentina should help him avert a war over the Falkland Islands.

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709 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.171

710 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2)*. Walters was, in 1982, US Ambassador to the United Nations. Also described as '*Ambassador at large*'. When questioned by the press, the US State Department refused to comment on "*reports of Vernon Walters being anywhere*". UPI archives, May 13, 1982.

711 No record of this conversation survives.

712 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

"The Argentine air force issued a communique saying it had "reinforced its operational deployment in the face of the new threat and sent forces to the Falklands fit to detect, identify, intercept and destroy hostile air invaders". Political parties and Peronist labor leaders Friday called for a mass demonstration Saturday when Haig meets Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri to show the U.S. leader the people support Argentina's claim to the Falklands." [713]

"Many people carried signs, some in English, for the benefit of foreign television cameras: "We are people of peace/Death to Margaret's army. "Another said: "Goodbye Queen/God save Argentina. The more severe nationalists had written: "English, pirates, Masons, infidels, go home". And some jumped and chanted: "No cabe duda I no cabe duda / la reina de Inglaterra Es la reina más boluda" ("There is no doubt /There is no doubt /The Queen of England/Is the biggest jerk of all")." [714]

"Haig arrived in Argentina late in the evening of 9 April to a mass demonstration organised for his benefit. The Argentine Government was determined that the United States should be aware not only of the strength of patriotic feeling in Argentina, but also the extent to which support for Britain would jeopardise its position in Latin America." [715]

April 10th, shortly after midnight, a Boeing 707 departs Ezeiza airport in Buenos Aires, loaded with three *Dagger* turbines. Destination is Israel. [716]

In Moscow, *Pravda* reports.

"The times when disputes could be settled by gunboat diplomacy are gone … it is clear that Britain is responsible for the consequences of this reckless policy, for it is precisely Britain that over many years stubbornly refused to carry out UN decisions on decolonization."

"On 10 April the Buenos Aires Diarios y Noticias cited a "reliable diplomatic source" from the eastern bloc as saying that Moscow was ready to support Argentina by any means, the military ones not specifically excluded. The report alleged a routine presence in the Falkland waters of Soviet submarines, adding pointedly that the British fleet could not possibly escape their attention. It denied rumours that a special Soviet envoy was soon to arrive in Buenos Aires, but noted insidiously that the Soviet Ambassador and the Argentine foreign office were in close daily contact. It is uncertain whether in Washington any of these outrageous insinuations were taken seriously …" [717]

Europe's Economic Committee (EEC) approve sanctions against Argentine imports for one month.

"The Ten have discussed the serious situation arising from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina.

The Ten recall that, by their statement of 2 April, they condemned the flagrant violation of international law constituted by the armed action of Argentina.

The Ten remain deeply concerned by the continuation of this crisis which endangers international peace and security. They therefore attach the greatest importance to the effective and immediate

713 UPI archives April 9, 1982

714 Graham-Yool 2007

715 Freedman 2005 vol.2

716 *Malvinas. Los vuelos secretos* Gonzalo Sánchez 2012. On arrival at an unnamed airbase in Israel, the *Dagger* turbines were replaced with new ones and crates of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines added to the cargo. Also, a large number of cold-weather jackets. Sánchez suggests that this was a second flight, with the first returning to Argentina after being seen by British *Sea Harriers*. A third flight, bound for South Africa, on May 2, 1982, was also cancelled with the aircraft in mid-Atlantic. Negotiations with the South African arms trader having broken down. See May 23, 1982, below.

717 Mastny 1983

implementation of Security Council resolution 502 in all its aspects, namely, the cessation of hostilities, the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands and the search, by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, for a diplomatic solution.

To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity among the countries members of the Community, the Ten decide to take a series of measures with respect to Argentina which it is important to carry out as soon as possible.

In this connexion, the Governments of the Ten have already decided to apply a total embargo on the exports of arms and military equipment to Argentina.

They will also take the necessary measures to prohibit all imports of Argentine origin into the Community.

As these measures are of an economic nature, they will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of the treaties of the Community.

As the situation arising from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentine armed forces is a matter of serious concern for the international community as a whole, the Ten call upon other Governments to associate themselves with their decisions in order to ensure, within the shortest possible time, the full implementation of Security Council resolution 502." [718]

"The third aspect of our pressure against Argentina has been economic. We have been urging our friends and allies to take action parallel to our own, and we have achieved a heartening degree of success. The most significant measure has been the decision of our nine partners in the European Community to join us not just in an arms embargo but also in stopping all imports from Argentina. This is a very important step, unprecedented in its scope and the rapidity of the decision. Last year about a quarter of all Argentina's exports went to the European Community. The effect on Argentina's economy of this measure will therefore be considerable and cannot be without influence on her leaders in the present crisis. I should like warmly to thank our European partners for rallying to our support. It was an effective demonstration of Community solidarity. The decision cannot have been easy for our partners, given the commercial interests at stake, but they were the first to realise that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands, it would be encouraged the world over." [719]

"... most EEC members were willing to support Britain with sanctions prior to military engagement, as long as they were assured that the rest of the Community would act in the same manner. ... Since the EEC accounted for approximately 20 percent of Argentina's exports, a Community-wide ban on imports could, politician's believed, put intense economic pressure on Buenos Aires." [720]

"As it took time to sort out all the legal aspects of the ban, the sanctions did not come into effect until 17 April, and were to last, initially, for four weeks. Most member States were unlikely to authorise further export credits under the circumstances. The provision of new loans was also unlikely." [721]

In London, the legality of the maritime exclusion zone around the Falklands, is considered.

"The General Assembly's definition of aggression (contained in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) recalls that it is for the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.

718 *UN Document S/14976* of April 14, 1982
719 Thatcher in the House of Commons *HC Deb 14 April 1982 vol.21 cc1148-1149*
720 *Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland islands Conflict* L. L. Martin 1992
721 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Article 2 of the definition states that - "The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression." Resolution 502 (1982) adopted by the Security Council on 3 April 1982 referred to – "an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina" - and went on to determine that a breach of the peace existed …

Article 3(a) of the definition states that – "the invasion … by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of another State" – qualifies as an act of aggression.

Accordingly, a true reading of the definition of aggression together with resolution 502 (1982) leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is Argentina which is committing aggression by its invasion and first use of force in defiance of the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Council on 1 April 1982 (s/14944).

Moreover, Resolution 502(1982) leaves no doubt that it is Argentina which bears responsibility for the current breach of the peace in the region. …

Article 3(c) of the definition of aggression lists - "the blockade of the … coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State" – as an example of aggression. …

The UK is not "another State" because the maritime exclusion zone surrounds British territory." [722]

SS *Uganda* is requisitioned

"The British lacked a capable hospital ship at the time. … At the time, Uganda was in the Mediterranean, at Alexandria in Egypt, on an educational cruise carrying a thousand children. After her owners received requisition instructions on 10 April, Uganda proceeded to Naples to unload those children, and a Bath survey team, engineers from the owners P&O, and a consultant surgeon went aboard. Uganda then headed to Gibraltar for modifications …" [723]

At Ascension Island, HMS *Antrim* leads the first group of Royal Navy ships into the anchorage.

"The, albeit remote, threat to Ascension from Argentine seaborne forces, and/or aircraft, was an early, and constant, concern. A Soviet ELINT vessel was permanently stationed three miles off the runway, and we did not know if it was providing information to the enemy, and Argentinean merchant vessels, which could have been carrying assault personnel, had been detected in adjacent sea areas. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, it was judged that, as the Argentine Hercules had an AAR capability, Ascension was a possible target for a limited airborne assault. The DIS discounted any such threat; not a view shared by the CinC and Air Commander, and defensive measures were put in place. The Navy provided a guard ship; Nimrods flew surveillance sorties; a radar from the UK was positioned on the highest point of the island and, pending the arrival of Phantoms, air defence cover was provided by Harriers waiting to deploy south." [724]

In the Falkland Islands, letters start to appear addressed to Argentine conscripts.

"*Dear Friend, Argentine Soldier – From the depths of my heart, today I send you these few lines and hope that as you receive them you find yourself in very good health. I hope that in defending our sovereignty you do it for the love of God and love for the Motherland. Every day we pray that God help you and that it might end soon, we are proud of you."* [725]

722 *PREM 19/616 Telegram No. 440 of 10 April*

723 Privratsky 2014. A week after the approval to take ships from trade, a dozen had been requisitioned. By the end of April that figure was more than 40.

724 *A View from the HQ at Northwood II* George Chesworth in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal 30* 2003

725 Child 2008. Mostly from school children, and obviously dictated – many examples were found after the surrender.

"... among many examples is the corny, sentimental song popularized during the Falkland/Malvinas war, "Las Hermanitas Perdidas" ("The lost little sisters"). In terms of the fallacious discourse, the Falklands/Malvinas Islands are "sisters" of the "great Argentine family." This metaphor helps to consolidate a culture in which very few people think seriously and honestly about the people who inhabit the islands, at least as a priority issue. And the human rights or the right to self-determination of the Falkland Islanders becomes a laughable consideration when what is at stake is the amputation of one of the nation's hands or feet. One does not abandon a little sister who has been abducted and raped by perfid(ious) Albion. The call is to a holy war." [726]

Argentina's commander of the 3rd Mechanised Infantry Regiment, Lt.-Colonel David Ubaldo Comini, attends a function at Moody Brook.

"That night, in the improvised "casino" in Moody Brook, the former barracks of the English "marines", together with officers, non-commissioned officers and Argentine soldiers we celebrated Easter. Simple words from a Lieutenant Colonel, a piece of a gigantic Easter egg. Easter arrived from the continent and a toast with French wine from the "marines" cellars sealed this celebration that coincided with the beginning of the naval block(ade)." [727]

Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo arrives at Port Stanley.

"In the meeting that Admiral Lombardo held with the Military Governor, General Menéndez, who was accompanied by General Daher, we heard a presentation about the operational scheme on which the defense rested at that time, which included the BIM5 and the 25th Regiment of the Army. Almost at the end of the meeting, Admiral Lombardo asked if there were any logistical problems. General Menéndez's response was quick. "No. On the islands we have six hundred thousand sheep"." [728]

In Buenos Aires, during an initial meeting at the Casa Rosada, President Galtieri explains to Secretary Haig why Argentina sees itself as justified in its action.

> *"Since 1833 when the British took the Malvinas Islands by force, the Argentines have never ceased to claim sovereignty and to demand their return. The United Nations in 1965 recommended negotiations between the two powers in order to accomplish the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. The United Kingdom accepted under the framework of decolonization. The Argentines tried for the next 17 years, by every possible means, to convince the British government to arrive at a solution. The British have never conducted any substantial discussions concerning the transfer of sovereignty of the territorial integration of the Malvinas into Argentina. No one can accuse the Argentines of a lack of patience or prudence throughout this period. Unlike the United Kingdom, the Argentines have not used diplomatic legerdemain and evasion. The Argentine claims are and have always been clear. We are patient, but patience, like water, can run out. We now face a crisis initiated perhaps by Argentina but aggravated by the over-reaction of the United Kingdom government.*
>
> *The British reaction to the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas is out of all proportion to the Argentine action. ... I will talk to you about something quite frankly that the Argentine government does not like, and that is the furnishing of intelligence to Great Britain and the use of Ascension Islands for supply for the British. ... The measures taken by Mrs. Thatcher are creating a delicate domestic situation for us. Her statements lack balance. We want to help her to achieve a balanced position. ...*

726 *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* Carlos Escude 1997 p.44
727 *Alerta Roja* Eduardo Anibal Rotondo 1982 p.3. A Marines wine cellar? Seriously?
728 Büsser 2007

The Argentine people tend to react instinctively and emotionally. I must lead them to a solution which will not recreate an Argentina of the 1940s. Our crisis today can easily result in the destabilization of South America and thereby weaken the defense of the West. The Argentine people took the decision on the second of April to recover our legitimate heritage. Our fleet and five thousand Marines acted. If the British want to send an expedition, we will receive this anachronistic colonial expedition with the appropriate honors…" [729]

Denying that the USA has furnished intelligence or satellite information to the British, Haig responds.

"… he had watched over the years with special concern the valiant struggle of the Argentine people against the dark forces of Marxism and radicalism. "Too often in my own country people forget the basic stake that we have is a fundamental struggle that is going on in the world against the threat of Russian and Marxist imperialists. We are grateful for the direction in which Argentina is moving." … Today the same vital struggle continues in Central America. I know the President understands the character of this struggle and understands the essential character of the partnership which we have forged in recent months. We cannot allow this to be broken up by a "thousand Scottish shepherds." …" [730]

President Galtieri assures Haig that he is prepared to negotiate anything and everything – except sovereignty.

"Secretary Haig said perhaps he should now speak in specific terms. The first thing to be done is to break the ultimative character of Margaret Thatcher's proposals. We must find an integrated comprehensive program based on the UN resolution which includes simultaneous withdrawal, creation of a zone excluding UK forces, an interim administration, perhaps with an international entity of some sort to break the umbilical line of control from London to the islands, recognition of autonomy or local government or local institutions that will permit avoiding, from the Argentine point of view, appearing to return to the status quo ante. General Galtieri said that this would be very difficult. … (and added) that with regard to the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the Argentine fleet, and armed forces there are two points. He said there is one problem he could not see how to resolve. It is the question of the government of the islands. He was really regretful but the government must be Argentine with whatever entity the UN, the British, the US, or the Canadians might set up until normalization. The Argentines are prepared to offer the British facilities of every sort to join in developing the resources of the seabed, resources of fishing, for refuelling British naval ships or aircraft; but Argentina is not disposed to step back from what it considers to be its rights." [731]

Galtieri agrees to a further meeting later that evening, to allow the negotiating teams some time to draw up proposals. Haig is persuaded to return to his hotel by helicopter, so that he can see the crowds gathered in the Plaza de Mayo.

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729 Quoted in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* pp.184-190. Points to ponder? England first claimed the archipelago in 1594, and established itself there in 1765. Quite when Argentina, as it is, came into being is moot – 1816/1823/1853/1880?. Buenos Aires only claimed the Islands in 1829. Following written protests in 1829 and 1832, Britain ejected a garrison from Buenos Aires in January, 1833. The UN has never recommended a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. Negotiations regarding the issues commenced in 1968, but at no time did the UK recognise any right in Argentina to the territory. For the British, the wishes of the Islanders were paramount. Something Argentina continually attempted to ignore. There is no doubt that successive British governments during the 1960s and 70s were prepared to hand over the Islands, which were viewed, wrongly, as a burden on the Exchequer; but only if the Islanders could be persuaded to approve. See Vol.3

730 *Ibid.*

731 *Ibid.*

"*...given the pitch of jingoistic sentiment whipped up hereabouts, I can't possibly see how he (Galtieri) is going to walk this cat back – a fact which adds to the pessimism I already felt anent our mission's prospects starting back in London...*"[732]



"The rally held yesterday in Plaza de Mayo at the request of the government has constituted one of the most serious errors committed here since the conflict began. Once again our leaders have laid bare the international isolation in which they live, which is also that of a large part of the nation. [733]

"The Secretary of State was frankly alarmed: the combination of Argentine-style demonstrations and men like Galtieri evoked fearful memories of Hitler and Mussolini." [734]

"... a popular demonstration was planned to fill the Plaza de Mayo with the aim of demonstrating to the American envoy and international public opinion, the unity of the Argentines around the Falklands issue. Organized by the metropolitan radio station with the largest audience (Radio Rivadavia) and by ATC, the initiative was supported by political and trade union leaders, the newspapers published maps of the Buenos Aires center to facilitate access to The Square and, in order to achieve a massive turnout at the event, the public transport was provided free of charge that day." [735]

President Galtieri speaks to the rally in the Plaza de Mayo:

> *"The people of Britain have not yet heard a single word of attack or a single word outraging their honour and reputation, until now. I ask as President of the Nation to the English Government and the English people to moderate their expressions and show restraint in their actions.*
>
> *This Argentine Government together with the Argentine people, represented here in this meeting, will be very angry and will reply with strong emphasis if you continue to offend us. You know and the world knows that the Argentine people have a strong will. If they want to come, come and we will offer battle."*

"You turned the television on at the end of the day, trying to forget it all, and you were greeted by patriotic marches and speeches telling you how the poor Kelpers were paid their wages in currency that had no value outside their country, and that they were subjected to a harsh class system where everybody was not "equal", and so on. You walked into your own home, and the moment you started talking about the Falklands, your relatives - who feared for your safety, "since Americans are a bit too used to free speech", started closing windows, lest the neighbours overhear. You had to be ashamed for Argentines, and were swept along in the landslide of irrationality and desperate credulity. You had to keep your faith in the face of negative news. And very few will ever know how the staunchest believer can be made to wonder and start to fear he was wrong in his judgement by continuous and steadfast misinformation. You had to keep yourself together when your friends and relatives stopped calling you up, because you suddenly became "the enemy", or at least "unpleasant to face". Or neighbours invited you to their homes so that you could hear their insults of everyone,

732 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*
733 *False Steps* Jesus Iglesias Rouco April 11, 1982 quoted in Yofre 1982. Journal title not stated but probably *La Nacion.* Rouco compared the rally with one for Mussolini in 1936.
734 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 p.144
735 Carbone 2008

starting with Mrs Thatcher - "that hysterical woman" - and passing through the Queen to end with Ronald Reagan. You also had to walk the streets and see fanaticism taking over, parks and roads changing names and places defaced. Reading The B.A. Herald in public became a sin; you were not able to say a word in English or even your own name without meeting with aggression. And in the midst of it all your very soul was shattered, thinking maybe your friends in the Falklands or England or the States are now regarding you as "the enemy" too. Who knew? We could guess at what was going on in the outside world, or in the minds and hearts of your very friends for whose safety you were in anguish. No, it wasn't easy. All you met with was the "official feeling", and barring a few brave and commendable exceptions, you just couldn't trust anything or anybody any more." [736]

Haig telegrams Thatcher noting *"intense discussions"* and urging that any military confrontation be avoided.

President Galtieri receives the Cuban Ambassador, Emillio Aragones Navarro at the Presidential residence. Aragones conveys from Fidel Castro an offer for Cuban troops to fly to the Falklands, in support of the Argentine garrison there; *"However, Argentinean leader General Galtieri turned down the offer because he feared it would turn Ronald Reagan's US administration against him."* [737]

In the Falklands, speaking to the press, Major-General Menéndez questions the ability of British forces to recapture the Islands; *"To take the Islands that we now occupy with our forces of approximately five thousand men, war statistics show that and operation of this type, that is , from ships to shore, would require the superiority of five attackers for each defender. This means that the English would need about thirty thousand men to attempt the enterprise."* [738]

From London, Prime Minister Thatcher responds to Haig's call for restraint; *"I should certainly prefer to avoid military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The Argentine Government has had plenty of warning. I am sure that you will have impressed this point upon the Argentine leaders."* [739]

In Buenos Aires, Haig is presented with Galtieri's *"minimum requirements."*

"In the eyes of the State Department officials, the only thing to emerge as a half-hearted sign of flexibility was the fact that the draft memorandum suggested that Argentina would accept a British refusal to recognise its claims of sovereignty prior to negotiations. For compensation, the document contained provisions to ensure that the ... form of administration during this transition period should guarantee effective control by Buenos Aires." [740]

"We had very long meetings, very hard, very difficult, even more difficult because of the way he conducted them, but we were never able to overcome ... the point of self-determination and I told him: "Mr. Haig, I know the English, I have been in this for ten years, twelve years, fourteen. ... Look for another formula because this one doesn't work. ... Unfortunately, that could not be done, because Great Britain subordinated everything to self-determination, that is, to the expression of the 'wishes' of the Islanders." [741]

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736 From a letter written by Anglo-Argentine Elizabeth Hosking, published in *Falklands News* October 11, 1982

737 *Revealed: Tyrant Fidel Castro wanted to bomb British Ships in Falklands War* Steven Taylor in *The Sunday Express*, December 4, 2016. Conversation in full in Yofre 2011.

738 Quoted in Yofre 2011.

739 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.193

740 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983

741 Costa Méndez interviewed in 1992 quoted in Yofre 2011.

"Argentina's position, as Haig discovered..., was that sovereignty over the islands was not negotiable. Moreover, the British fleet must turn away from the Falklands area before any Argentine forces would withdraw. However, once the British withdrew their naval task force, talks could begin that could discuss everything except sovereignty." [742]

A little before midnight, President Galtieri has a meeting with the USA's roving Ambassador, Vernon Walters.

"The meeting took place in Galtieri's personal office. ... Galtieri: "I can't go back". Walters: "I think that's the problem". ... Galtieri: "Starting Monday don't blame me for what is happening in the world". Walters: "Essential part, ... finding a solution"." [743]

April 11th, in London, interviewed on BBC radio, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym is asked whether Argentine shipping will be sunk if found within the Falklands' exclusion zone. Pym replies; *"That is the position."*

From Montevideo, information is received from the Swiss *charge d'affairs*, that the 22 Royal Marines, and three civilians, captured on South Georgia, are being moved. Their destination is unknown; *"It was assumed that one reason why Argentina had repatriated British prisoners so quickly was to frustrate ICRC attempts to get to the Islands."* [744]

In the USA, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, is interviewed on national television. Kirkpatrick says that she does not see a need for the US to make a choice between Argentina and Britain, and that the only appropriate action is for the US to help both countries avoid war. She goes on to state that the US has never taken a position on the Falklands, adding; *"... that if the islands rightly belonged to Argentina its action could not be considered as 'armed aggression'."* [745]

From Ascension Island, HMS *Plymouth* and RFA *Tidespring* sail, with HMS *Antrim* due to follow. Designated TG 317.9 (or Task Group South Georgia), their orders are to sail towards South Georgia and rendezvous with HMS *Endurance*.

"This group had to be supported beyond the range of the Nimrod and to provide the necessary surveillance Victors, to operate in the MRR role were deployed to Ascension. Supported by AAR Victors these aircraft covered the areas down to South Georgia some 3000 miles from Ascension." [746]

At the Falklands, Argentina's 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade start to arrive. [747]

> *"... we are told that 9,000 are here now. Hardly seems possible but I think probably true. They are in tents as far out as Mount William, out along the Darwin Road and all over the Common towards Eliza Cove and Mullett Creek. God help them when the weather breaks. ... It has now been announced by the military that any soldier asking the civilian population for food will be shot. The civilian population may, however, give food if they wish."* [748]

> *"Malcolm made his milk deliveries to customers in a former military Land Rover. He was told by the Argentine authorities to paint an identifying mark on the doors. So, being a good Yorkshireman, of*

742 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.8

743 Yofre 2011 citing a poorly recorded conversation. Apparently, the reference to 'Monday was to a decision to commence placing land mines around the Falkland Islands.

744 Freedman 2005 vol.2. ICRC = International Committee of the Red Cross

745 *PREM19/616*

746 *A View from the HQ at Northwood II* George Chesworth in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal* 2003 no.30

747 *Brigada de Infanteria X*'s transfer from the Chubut province would take a week. There was no accommodation and, with a majority of field kitchens still on the ships (or still in Argentina), only cold food. The impression is one of chaos.

748 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.54

course he painted the White Rose on the door panels, and they stayed there right through the occupation." [749]

"Supporting the headquarters was the Intelligence Technical Platoon (consisting) of an officer and seven soldiers who arrived on 11 April. It had a combat intelligence role of collecting and analysing information on the enemy, the terrain and state of roads, locations and cultural 'rural establishments' ... It also had a counter-intelligence role of unearthing evidence of 'resistance forces' by collecting and collating information on those who could cause mischief..." [750]

From Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig sends a message to the White House for President Reagan.

"I have concluded nearly twelve hours of gruelling and emotion filled talks with President Galtieri and his Foreign Minister, amidst a public mood approaching frenzy. The proposals I introduced here were accepted in large part, except with regard to the pivotal question of interim governing arrangements... and Argentine insistence on an early date certain for completion of negotiations on a final settlement. These two issues will have to be resolved in order to trigger Argentine withdrawal and thus avert war. We made some progress on these issues, though very probably not enough to secure British agreement. The Argentines began by demanding that they, in effect, administer the island in the interim period, and that the British agree a priori that the outcome of the ensuing negotiations would provide for a transfer of sovereignty. In the end, we came up with a formula that would involve interim U.S.-UK-Argentine tripartite supervision of local administration, and we have blurred the question of whether the negotiations would result in Argentine sovereignty. We have specified December 31, 1982, as the date for completion of negotiations... At one point late in the day the Argentines returned to their demand for sovereignty, ... I am not optimistic ..." [751]

Haig then telegrams Thatcher.

"... I now expect to arrive in London about 0630 am Monday April 12. ... In the meantime, I am sure you would agree that any military confrontation must be avoided at all costs until you have been able to consider this draft proposal. Although it is clear serious problems remain; some progress has been made."

"Haig's request for restraint had in fact come at an awkward moment. As Haig well knew, the MEZ (exclusion zone) was about to come into force and in principle submarines might start attacking Argentine ships... If the new orders were implemented just as Haig was stepping off his plane, then it would appear, whatever the intention, as a serious rebuff and could have damaging political consequences internationally... There was a further problem. It might seem the easiest thing to send an order to an SSN to hold fire, but when the FCO first made investigations... they were told that, unfortunately, it took some 30 hours to be sure of communicating with SSNs... the Prime Minister did not make any promises." [752]

About to depart for London, Secretary Haig is met at the airport by Foreign Minister Costa Méndez.

"At the airport, ... Costa Méndez handed me a paper. It contained some personal thoughts of his own, he said. He hoped that I would read them on the plane. Aloft, I scanned the paper Costa Méndez had given me. It constituted a retreat from everything we had accomplished at the Casa Rosada the night

749 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
750 Van der Bijl 2023
751 *Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/11/1982–04/14/1982)*
752 Freedman 2005 vol.2. SSN = nuclear powered submarine.

before. The Argentinians were demanding either de facto authority over the islands through administrative arrangements that would give them immediate control of its government, or a British promise that sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina no later than December 31, 1982, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. This was a formula for war." [753]

The Méndez paper contains five basic points: *"1. The governor of the Falkland Islands must be appointed by the government of Argentina, The flag must continue to fly on the Islands. 2. Assurances must be given to the Argentine government that at the end of the negotiations Argentine sovereignty will be recognised. Any formula that implies that sovereignty is being negotiated should be avoided. 3. The same rights will be recognised for Argentines who come from the continent and for the inhabitants of the Islands. 4. the demilitarization agreement must be considered as complying with Resolution 502 of the UN Security Council. 5. The draft agreement must be compatible with the elements mentioned above."* [754]

"They were not aware that Haig thought he had a major concession. To the extent Haig did think this he was soon disabused." [755]

In England, at Northwood, Wing-Commander Sidney Edwards is tasked as liaison to the Chilean junta in Santiago. [756]

"... it would be for me to judge the diplomatic and military factors on the spot in Chile and make recommendations or take actions accordingly." [757]

In Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez has a meeting with the Ambassador of the Soviet Union.

"According to the Military Junta's account, the diplomat ... reported that his Government believed that this incident had been caused by the colonialist vocation of Great Britain and that it was opposed in fact to Resolution 502, to the point of violating it ... the USSR would support Argentina as much as it could without expecting anything in return." [758]

753 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.195

754 Quoted in Yofre 2011

755 Freedman 2005 vol.2

756 Northwood was a military facility in Hertfordshire, England. It became the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Fleet in 1982. At the time of his appointment, Edwards was employed in the Ministry of Defence's Sales Organisation; offering good cover for a trip to South America. At around the same time, three RAF *Canberra PR9* reconnaissance aircraft were prepared for a "*potential sales demonstration*" in Chile. See *Canberra PR9s over the Falklands – Fact or Folklore?* Rowland White 2022 https://www.key.aero/article/canberra-pr9s-over-falklands-fact-or-folklore

757 *My Secret Falklands War* Sidney Edwards 2014. Reliant upon memory (notes having been required to be destroyed) Edward's book is light on dates, so some doubt remains as to which conversations took place quite when.

758 Yofre 2011

April 12th, at 0400, Britain's declared 200 mile maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands archipelago, comes into effect.

"... defined as a circle of 200 nautical miles from Latitude 51° 41' South and longitude 59° 39' West, approximately the centre of the Islands. The advantage of a circle was precision, although it did mean that some parts of the Islands were only 100 miles from the edge." [759]

In Buenos Aires, the *La Prensa* newspaper announces that Peruvian armed forces have been put on alert to assist Argentina. This is quickly denied by the government in Lima. [760]

"Peruvian Douglas DC-8 transport aircraft from the 8th Transport Group would carry out flights from Lima to Tel Aviv to Lima to Buenos Aires to transport necessary materials given the urgent situation and thus circumvent the embargoes and military retaliations imposed on Argentina. Other logistical support equipment was transported directly from Peru by Hercules L-100/20 aircraft, also from the 8th Transport Group of the FAP..." [761]

In England. just prior to landing at Heathrow airport near London, Haig sends a radio message to Thatcher.

> *"... our conversations have revealed tentative cracks in the Argentine stone wall on the withdrawal of military forces and the restoration of British administration... We are more than ever convinced that an Anglo-Argentine War would severely damage Western interests in containing Soviet expansionism."*[762]

Secretary Haig arrives in Britain's capital city to be greeted with the information that there are 34 Soviet fishing vessels in the area of the Falkland Islands; providing intelligence to the Soviet Union and possibly Argentina. [763]

At Downing Street, at the first of three meetings with Thatcher's team, Haig describes events in Buenos Aires.

> *"The approach I took in BA was true to our discussion here. I was brutally frank with them. I said the UK was ready for war and that the nation was united. I said this was inevitable if Galtieri did not alter course. He was not bellicose but he has whipped up the people almost out of hand, though many of them are more pacific than jingoistic. The air force is fearful, the army is moderate, and the navy wants a fight. Your pressure has worked. There is an undercurrent of fear down there. The basic problem is that the threat of force alone is not enough to bring about withdrawal. Your fleet could be down there a long time. I think what they will try to do is run the blockade with Eastern European and Soviet ships. We have worked up proposals that they may be willing to accept. ... Every effort we made in BA was to support your aims: (1) withdrawal of the Argentines; (2) restoration of British administration; (3) preservation of self-determination. It was ideal for me to stop here first. The Argentines were totally intransigent. They wanted Argentine rule or a commitment on sovereignty within a fixed, short period. We brought them a long way. If they could confirm our final ideas, your needs would be met. The basic concept we have developed necessarily provides for some Argentine presence and a commitment on negotiations... but they pulled back. ..."* [764]

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759 Freedman 2005 vol.2

760 The Peruvian government had little control over its armed forces.

761 *1982: el Perú en la Guerra de Malvinas* Andrés Gómez de la Torre Rotta y Arturo Medrano Carmona 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

762 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

763 See *PREM19/616 f165, PREM19/617 f221, PREM19/617 f227* and *PREM19/617 f189*

764 *Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert.*

"Questioned by Thatcher, Haig agreed that Argentina probably was trying to seek practical arrangements that would enable them to change the character of the Falkland Islands, but he did not think that they could get very far by the end of 1982... If he could reach an agreement with Britain then he proposed to fly back to Buenos Aires. The meeting ended at 1100 to enable the British Government to consider the American text." [765]

Following the meeting, at 1545, the War Cabinet assembles to discuss the proposals.

In Washington DC, information from an Argentine source is reported.

> *"This is an information Report, not finally evaluated intelligence. Report Class – Secret. … Subject: Contingency Plans for Violence against U.S. and British Citizens... 1. As of the early evening of 11 April 1982, the 601st Intelligence Battalion, the Operational Arm of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service was making contingency plans to "DISAPPEAR" U.S. Citizens in Argentina if the U.S. Government adopts the British position in regard to the dispute in the Falkland Islands. Comment: In the terminology used by the 601st Battalion "DISAPPEARED" does not mean "PUT IN JAIL". Comment: "DISAPPEARED" probably means "KILLED". (redacted) Did not provide any information on the identities or numbers of persons who would be "DISAPPEARED" However … referred to intelligence and security personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires. 2. These contingency plans could be put into effect within 48 hours if the U.S. Government adopted a pro-British position. 3. At least some personnel from the 601st Battalion have been ordered to inform their superiors on the morning of 12 April of everything they know about U.S. Embassy personnel. Also, on the early evening of 11 April teams from the 601st were moving into position to be ready to take immediate action to – DISAPPEAR – 500 British subjects in Argentina as soon as hostilities begin. Comment: On 9 April, the 601st Intelligence Battalion had received a copy of a firm order from Mario 1 ...Head of the Mononero Organisation instructing Montoneros to attack British-owned installations in Argentina. If the 601st Intelligence Battalion takes action against British subjects, this instruction will be used as cover and it will be made to appear that the actions were taken by the Montoneros."* [766]

"There has always been speculation about why the Americans appeared to stall in their support of the British invasion. This document shows they were stalling to allow innocent Brits and Americans time to get out of Argentina." [767]

In Buenos Aires, Minister Costa Méndez briefs the junta; *"He... referred to the conversation he had with the Soviet Ambassador, in which was promised a future veto in the Security Council. ... Regarding the OAS, he said that there would be 11 votes guaranteed to convene the TIAR..."* [768] Vice-Admiral Lomdardo informs the meeting that the defence of the archipelago would be completed; "*within two or three days.*"

Elements of Argentina's 5th Marine Battalion (BIM5) start to arrive in the Falkland Islands. [769]

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765 Freedman 2005 vol.2

766 It seems likely that Haig would have been informed, but when is not known. Nor is whether Haig informed Thatcher. See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/06698573

767 Historian Ricky Phillips quoted in *Exposed: Junta plot to massacre hundreds of British citizens on eve of Falklands War revealed by newly discovered CIA documents* Caroline Graham in the *Daily Mail* August 30, 2025.

768 Yofre 2011. TIAR = Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947), otherwise known as the Rio Pact. A security agreement between the USA and a majority of Central and South American nations whereby an attack on one, would be considered an attack on all with a requirement that assistance would be given. *cf.* 1947

769 Assigned to the defence of Mount Tumbledown, Mount William and Sapper Hill.

"The Navy High Command decided to send it because it was the best prepared to fight on the kind of terrain on the islands and because it was well equipped and highly trained (specially on air cooperation and night fighting), so that its personnel was best suited for this kind of operation." [770]

In London, British and American teams reconvene at 1755.

> "*… in the middle of the Brit team the Iron Maiden is really toughening up her already robust talk, especially on the question of the fleet standing off: "Unthinkable, that is our only leverage, I cannot possibly give it up at this point, one simply doesn't trust burglars who have tried once to steal your property! No, Al, no, absolutely not, the fleet must steam on!" In this gutsy recital she is getting vigorous support from her Defense Minister, John Nott, who believes the Brits have already gone too far down Haig's diplomatic track. "I wouldn't do it, Prime Minister, I'm against it, we've really conceded too much as it is." Thanks, John, you're a great help – particularly now that you've got poor old Pym wringing his hands in anguish, the only British peace party we seem to have in this room! The spark of optimism which may have been generated earlier in the day looks pretty well snuffed in this session,…"* [771]

"Haig did want the Task Force to stop and stand off, though not turn back, once the agreements were signed. The Prime Minister insisted that she would not survive in the Commons if the Task Force stopped before Argentina had completed its withdrawal… There was no basis of trust… The meeting ended at 2030." [772]

Haig telegrams the US Embassy in Buenos Airies with messages for Galtieri and Méndez.

> *"I have introduced ideas here along the lines discussed at the Presidential Palace Saturday night. … The talks have been exceedingly difficult, but some progress has been made. I hope to leave here this evening for Buenos Aires, arriving around mid-afternoon tomorrow. Time is of the essence. The British will not withhold the use of force in the exclusion zone unless and until there is an agreement. I hope to bring to Buenos Aires a US proposal that holds the prospect of agreement, thus averting war. I urge you to hold off on any decisions until I have a chance to present the proposal. I am convinced that any substantial deviation by your government from the ideas discussed on Saturday night will doom this mission."* [773]

Legal advice presented to the British Cabinet confirms that no formal declaration of war is necessary.

> *"War may begin, first, by a declaration of war. Second, it may begin after the commission of an act of force against another State which that State elects to regard as creating a state of war. We did not so elect following the invasion of the Falkland Islands but are relying instead on our inherent right of self-defence."* [774]

In the US, the New York Times publishes a story describing the "*personal thoughts of Minister Méndez*" titled – *Argentine Officials Say Prospects of Falklands Settlement are Dim*. Haig telephones Méndez to seek an explanation. Méndez says that he needs to discuss the situation with Galtieri and will telephone Haig later.

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770 *A Study of Professionalism during the Falklands/Malvinas War: The Case of the Argentine Marines* Alejandro Luis Corbacho 2006

771 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

772 Freedman 2005 vol.2

773 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/12/1982 (1)*

774 *OD(SA)(82) 8 April 12, 1982 Formal Consequences of a State of war between the United Kingdom and Argentina: Note by the Secretaries*. In the UK, the formal method of declaring war is by proclamation, passed under the Great Seal.

In the Falkland Islands, the final elements of Argentina's 5th Marine Battalion arrive.

"Unlike their Army brothers, the Argentine Marines were well fed, and they had good clothing and improved communications equipment. Also unlike the Army conscript soldiers, the Marines had undergone night combat training, and, principally because the battalion had been based in Tierra del Fuego in the far south of Patagonia, its members were adapted to the rigorous climatic conditions." [775]

At Stanley, the Argentine Governor announces military exercises for the new troops, in accordance with a newly devised plan for the defence of the archipelago.

> *"A new flagpole has been erected outside the Secretariat to replace the one blown down a few days ago. It was made by our locals in the dockyard, who have cleverly arranged the band supporting the stays so far up the pole that it is impossible to fly anything larger than a very small flag from it."* [776]
>
> *"It's official: the Falklands are a war zone as of 0400 hrs. Started doing a pile of washing, but something went wrong with the machine so ended up at the hospital with the girls doing some. Early night, must have been the excess of gin in the system!"* [777]

"... the Outline Plan of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations would be issued on 12 April 1982, ten days after the Islands' occupation. This means that the UK launched the recapture operation before Argentina had even conceived a defense plan." [778]



From Buenos Aires, Argentina's government writes to the UN Secretary-General; *"(Announcing)... its readiness to withdraw its forces as called for under the 3 April Council resolution, on condition that the United Kingdom ceased hostilities and did not attempt to use the resolution to justify a return to the previous colonial situation..."*

In the South Atlantic, British submarine, HMS *Spartan,* arrives on station.

April 13th, shortly after midnight, London time, Secretary Haig takes a telephone call from Minister Méndez.[779] Méndez refers to the paper he gave Haig at the airport, underlining the importance of the first two points: 1. The governor of the Falkland Islands must be appointed by the government of Argentina, The flag must continue to fly on the Islands. 2. Assurances must be given to the Argentine government that at the end of the negotiations Argentine sovereignty will be recognised. Any formula that implies that sovereignty is being negotiated should be avoided.

Haig responds; *"That constitutes an ultimatum"*. Méndez responds; *"An Argentine island will be governed by an Argentine governor—if that is not done, the public reaction will be in a very negative way. We cannot tell them there were two governors and a committee and then we will discuss self-determination—after all the risks we have taken."*

Haig tells Méndez that he'll inform President Reagan of the ultimatum. Méndez responds; *"I don't think this is an ultimatum if you bear in mind all the collateral offers we are making in order to give to the people on the*

775 *Reassessing the Fighting Performance of Conscript Soldiers during the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982)* A. L. Corbacho 2004
776 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.57-58
777 *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021
778 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.111
779 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2).* See - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d101

Island. We mustn't forget the ultimate aim of this exercise. England has always fought. England at one time will be compelled to relinquish something. The whole idea in the UN came when Britain presented a list of places to be decolonized. Britain's list included the Falkland Islands. When we saw in the list the name of the Falkland Islands, then our presentation was made to the UN. This was created by Britain herself. We don't see why they would retreat now when they were the first to include it in the list of countries or colonies to be decolonized. I'm sorry to hear from you this is an ultimatum. On the contrary, we are ready to consider every aspect of lives and properties of the Island and of ourselves."

Haig asks whether there is any point in him returning to Buenos Aires. Méndez responds that the decision is up to Haig. [780]

"Haig … spoke by telephone with Costa Méndez. The chancellor mentioned the Argentine presentation to the Security Council, considering that the blockade contradicts the "cessation of hostilities" decreed by Resolution 502. The Secretary of State replied that he had not been able to advance anything in London, but that his team was working with the drafts prepared in the Situation Room of the Casa Rosada (unofficially) and in the terms of the meeting he had had with Galtieri in the Presidential office. Costa Méndez… cut him short: "No, Secretary, those papers have no official value to negotiate based on them, since the only official thing regarding the Argentine position are the five points given when (Haig) left for London." [781]

Haig reports his conversation with Méndez to Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym; *"I have been on the phone with this lad for about an hour. He quibbles right and left. On the one hand, he says we cannot break this off; he would send somebody to London or he will come to Washington. On the other, he doesn't change his ultimatum at all."* [782] Haig tells Pym that he is uncertain about returning to Buenos Aires, but will sleep on it.

New Zealand bans all imports from, and exports to, Argentina.

In the Falkland Islands, elements of Argentina's 3rd Artillery Group arrive.

In London, in the morning, the American and British negotiators meet again. Haig relates his conversations with Costa Méndez.

"… he had heard overnight from the Argentine Foreign Minister that his (Argentina's) Government needed an outcome to the negotiations which embodied a de facto change in the administration of the Islands and a process leading to ultimate Argentine sovereignty. … the proposal for an interim Commission did not represent a sufficient degree of change towards de facto Argentine administration. The provision for negotiations on the definitive status of the Islands was inadequate as a commitment to ultimate Argentine sovereignty." [783]

"Costa Mendez had implied that the first two of these points were the most important, and Argentina needed at least one of them." [784]

The meeting ends at 1040. Thatcher considers the implications of Haig's information.

> *"By this stage it was becoming obvious that the proposals the Americans had presented to us the previous day had no measure of Argentine approval. In fact, the status of all these proposals was doubtful. The more closely I questioned Al Haig on this point, the more uncertain it became. Since these proposals had not been agreed by the Argentinians, even if we accepted them, they might therefore not form the basis of a settlement. …*

780 A conversation apparently frustrated by a bad line and Haig's annoyance.
781 Yofre 2011
782 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2).*
783 *PREM19/617 f189*
784 Freedman 2005 vol.2

This fact was made painfully clear at the meeting that morning when Mr Haig handed us a document embodying five points which he described as essential to the Argentine position. As he himself said, the practical effect of the Argentine tactics was to buy time. I always thought that this was their main purpose in negotiating. I was becoming impatient with all this. I said this was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy. Galtieri wanted to be able to claim victory by force of arms. The question now was whether he could be diverted from his course by economic sanctions or, as I suspected all along, only by military force.

Mr Haig replied that he had made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if a conflict developed the United States would side with Britain. But did he wish to bring negotiations to an end today? He could say publicly that he was suspending his own efforts, making it clear that this was due to Argentine intransigence. But if he did so other less helpful people might try to intervene. I was keenly aware of that and I also felt that public opinion here required us not to give up on negotiations yet." [785]

"There appeared to be no point in Haig returning to Buenos Aires unless he could take assurances on these matters, yet he also did not want to break off talks. Thatcher did not push for an immediate break, although she had a strong case for doing so. Instead she asked for definite progress to be registered 'this week.'.." [786]

Secretary Haig and Minister Méndez speak again on the telephone. [787]

"(Costa Méndez) We have been working the whole night. I have a formula. What would you like me to do?

(Haig) Can you give me an idea what it contains. I have been waiting until I spoke with you before I speak to the press.

(Costa Méndez) We will yield.. add "both parties affirm absolute sovereignty on the Island, but the British will relinquish their claim in the UN." The interim period would be by government along the lines we discussed.

(Haig) The interim period would be along the lines we discussed?

(Costa Méndez) Provided Britain says she will decolonize the Islands as announced in the UN. …

(Haig) That offers some possibilities. What about in the context of self- determination. Would that then come in?

(Costa Méndez) The General Assembly has ruled out self-determination in the case of the Malvinas. We can imagine some sort of minority status for the Islands in the meantime.

(Haig) Let me consider this. …"

At 1240, Haig informs Pym of his conversation with Costa Méndez. Pym promises to consider the matter; *"… if the Secretary of State believed that the Argentine suggestion was an opportunity to keep the dialogue going it was difficult for them to call a halt."* [788]

"*… a call from Costa Méndez suggests a tiny crack of Argentine daylight – language from some 1960 General Assembly resolution on decolonization which the UK had not voted against, merely abstained*

785 Thatcher 1993 p.198
786 Freedman 2005 vol.2
787 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2)*
788 Freedman 2005 vol.2

on, and which fudges the basic sovereignty/self-determination issues – and Foreign Secretary Pym is on his way over to the hotel to confer with Haig on this development. Who knows what's going to happen next? Pym, when we next meet him in the noisy little corner room at the end of the corridor, overlooking the rush of Upper Berkeley Street traffic, seems open to exploring the Argentine move, and at the very least we may have bought some additional time…" [789]

Secretary Haig decides to return to Washington. Meeting Pym just before his flight, Haig assures the British Foreign Secretary that he stood by the rights of the individual, and mentions that a referendum on the Islands could be part of the solution. At London's Heathrow Airport, Haig speaks to the Press.

"As you know, yesterday I had planned to go on to Buenos Aires in continuation of our effort to help in this crisis, but difficulties developed to change those plans. We have now received some new ideas, and while the parties are considering those ideas it will provide an opportunity for me to return to Washington to report to President Reagan."

Thatcher pens a personal letter to Brazil's President Figueiredo, requesting that he comply with UN SC Res 502.

"The rather 'hard and harsh' communication profoundly irritated the military elements in the government. ... 'We have little leverage over Brazil and even less prospect of getting them to lean to our side', the British Ambassador in Brasilia reported back." [790]

In the Falklands, Stanley's Chief of Police, Registrar General and Chief Secretary, plus 10 other civil servants, are deported. Executive Council member, Bill Luxton, and his wife, are included for "*political reasons.*"

"They have been picked up by helicopter from their farm at Chartres and brought to town… We shall all have to watch our step a bit now, if this sort of thing is going to happen …

A party of Argentine troops has been today searching the beach down past the FIC offices for bodies from one of their landing craft which was sunk during the invasion. Some have already been washed up." [791]

Calling Buenos Aires from London's Heathrow airport, Secretary Haig tells Costa Méndez that he believes there are grounds for a breakthrough, and that he'll return to Argentina after he's spoken to President Reagan. Unknown to Haig, the Argentine Government are briefing newspapers against any deal.

"Alexander Haig, Secretary of State of the United States, left Buenos Aires last Sunday with an Argentine proposal for the establishment in the Malvinas Islands of a "Transitional Government" until next December 31, headed by an Argentine Governor, but he also carried a "Working Draft" which was analyzed only by advisers from both sides here, and was not examined at the Presidential level or by Foreign Minister Costa Mendez, as was revealed yesterday by Government sources... Secretary Haig sought to use that draft – which at no time became an official document of the Argentine Government – in his conversations with British authorities during the late hours. ... In the opinion of the officials, "with this draft the United States became a defender of Prime Minister Thatcher, instead of a friendly broker"." [792]

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789 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary.* The UN resolution referred to would be Res. 1514 of 1960. The UN General Assembly has never "*ruled out*" self-determination for the Islanders. A strange interpretation that Argentina latched on to following Res. 2065 of 1965. The Islanders' right is determined by the UN Charter and UN covenants on human rights.

790 Krepp 2017 p.358

791 Diary entries in Smith 1984 pp.58 & 60

792 US Embassy Buenos Aires to Secretary of State, Washington April 14, 1982. See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21333-19820414-goa-version-haig-mission

As Haig flies out, news reports are published of US assistance to the UK in the form of intelligence, fuel and satellite communications. Initial reports are denied by the White House, which then opts for "*no comment*".

Responding to a proposal from Peru for a 72-hour truce, the UK tells the UN that; *"... since Argentina had initiated the armed confrontation, the first requirement for any solution was the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Islands and their dependencies, in accordance with the Council resolution of 3 April."* Argentina retorts; *"... the UK committed an act of armed aggression by decreeing a naval blockade..."*

"Within the UN, three countries on the (Security) Council appeared to anticipate any failure of the Haig mission as an opportunity for the UN to step in; Ireland, Spain and Japan, along with Ahmad of the Secretariat. On 13 April Parsons briefed the representatives of European Community members, including Dorr, the Irish delegate, explaining that so long as Haig was still in business Britain could not entertain any other moves at the UN, although nothing was ruled out for later. He then quizzed Dorr about reports from Dublin suggesting an Irish initiative, involving proposals for a tripartite administration with the UN as the third party. Door protested that the Irish had no intention of wrong footing Britain or of bringing anything into the Security Council that Britain might oppose." [793]

In Brazil, General Medeiros, the Minister in charge of that country's National Intelligence Service, speaks to US Ambassador George Harding; *"Medeiros ... said that he thought the Argentine action in invading the Falklands was completely crazy and incomprehensible. He did not see an easy way out of the present impasse."*

In Venezuela, a meeting of the Organisation of America States (OAS) Permanent Council, hears claims that Security Council Resolution 502 is biased against Argentina; which had suffered the theft of its territory and was; *"justly responding to that robbery."* The final OAS Council resolution merely expresses the organisation's; *"profound concern."*

"On 13 April, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted a resolution formally outlining the organisation's position on the conflict. This saw the first formal involvement of the OAS in the conflict and it was clear that its response was tapered by the Caribbean and those Latin American states with reservations regarding the Argentine use of force. The resolution of 13 April offered its 'friendly cooperation' to both Britain and Argentina to reach a peaceful resolution to their dispute, contrary to the vociferous support for the Argentine position from some Latin American nations during the UN debates. The emphasis of the resolution remained on maintaining peace in the hemisphere which satisfied the intentions of all Latin American states." [794]

In Argentina, three British journalists are arrested on charges of espionage in Ushuaia. Simon Winchester (*Sunday Times*), Antony Prine (*Observer*) and Ian Mather (*Observer*) are reported to have been discovered taking photographs near a naval air base. [795]

"The three were detained 11 days after Argentine forces seized the Falkland Islands. ... They said they were arrested at the airport coffee shop in Rio Grande, 1,800 miles south of here, during a two-hour layover between flights from Ushuaia, the country's southernmost city, and Buenos Aires. The airport handles military and commercial flights. They said they were sitting by a window taking notes and asking questions, as most reporters would have done, about the warplanes that were coming and going." [796]

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
793 Freedman 2005 vol.2

794 *Britain and the Falklands: International Perspectives 1982-1990* J. Bagnall 2021

795 Announced on April 17, 1982. According to a *New York Times* report of April 25, 1982, seven other journalist had been detained in the two weeks leading up to these arrests. These British journalists were detained until June 30, 1982 before being released on $20,000 bail. No trial was ever scheduled, nor was the bail returned. See https://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/apr/01/pressandpublishing.business

796 *The New York Times* June 30, 1982

April 14th, *Atlantic Conveyor* is requisitioned by the British Government to be an aircraft ferry and cargo ship.



"A team started redesign work aboard her as she sailed to Plymouth for full retrofit. Directions followed for the manufacture of steel panels weighing fifteen tons apiece. Upon arrival at Devonport, workers cleared obstructions around her hatches, and installed panels for landing complete with lighting." [797]

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher addresses the House of Commons.

> *"... we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic effort. This, too, is in accordance with the Security Council resolution. In this approach we have been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the Argentine aggression has aroused across the world, and also by the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig, who has now paid two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires.*
>
> *On his first visit last Thursday we ... made clear to Mr. Haig that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the islands is not affected by the act of invasion; and that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish.*
>
> *On his second visit ... Mr. Haig put forward certain ideas as a basis for discussion – ideas concerning the withdrawal of troops and its supervision, and an interim period during which negotiations on the future of the islands would be conducted. Our talks were long and detailed, as the House would expect. Some things we could not consider because they flouted our basic principles. Others we had to examine carefully and suggest alternatives. The talks were constructive and some progress was made.*
>
> *At the end of Monday, Mr. Haig was prepared to return to Buenos Aires in pursuit of a peaceful solution. Late that night, however, Argentina put forward to him other proposals which we could not possibly have accepted, but yesterday the position appeared to have eased. Further ideas are now being considered ..."* [798]

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Antrim,* RFA *Tidespring* and HMS *Plymouth* (Task Group 317.9), carrying Royal Marines and SAS specialists, rendezvous with HMS *Endurance*.

> *"As we steamed up towards Antrim they 'cleared lower deck' for us. All their sailors manned the sides, hands on guard-rails, as we approached, and, as we passed them, they cheered to a man. It was quite unexpected."* [799]

From Moscow, the Soviet Union belatedly protests the British proclamation of a 200-mile exclusion zone, alleging that it breaches the 1958 High Seas Convention.

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797 Privratsky 2014. *Atlantic Conveyor* sailed just 11 days later on April 25, 1982 loaded with critical supplies and aircraft.
798 *HC 21/1146-50.* During the debate, Denis Healey MP referenced Thatcher's promise of an inquiry and urging clarity on the inquiry team's scope.
799 Barker 1997

"Soviet ships, nevertheless, did keep out, thus giving evidence of Moscow's reluctance to materially hamper the British venture." [800]

In Santiago, Chilean Air Force Intelligence contacts General Fernando Matthei; a member of Chile's ruling junta.

"In the first days of April 1982, shortly after the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands, the Head of Intelligence of the Chilean Air Force relayed to me that a Wing Commander of the Royal Air Force had arrived in Chile .., and requested an urgent interview. I received him immediately. It was Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, who at once presented his credentials and asked me if I would be inclined to help the British at this hour. The help they were requesting was mainly in matters of intelligence – As they had never considered Argentina a potential enemy, they had not bothered to gather adequate intelligence on them. He also told me that he was empowered to negotiate directly any urgent requests in aeroplanes, spares or other equipment that the Chilean Air Force needed, in order to strengthen our own defences in view of the Argentine menace. He further pointed out that we should bypass diplomatic channels. That neither the British Ambassador in Chile, nor the British Defence Attaché had any knowledge of him. " [801]

Edwards hands Matthei a letter of introduction from British Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Beetham.

"He (Matthei) offered full cooperation within the bounds of what was practical and diplomatically feasible. He stressed the need for secrecy ..." [802]

Edwards informs Matthei that six surplus RAF Hunter aircraft are being prepared for shipment to Chile; *"I also explained that we were identifying some more Hunters for later delivery and that a portable air defence radar and some surface-to-air missiles would be included in the package."*

The atmosphere being convivial, Group Captain Edwards asks if it possible for the UK to operate a small number of photo-reconnaissance aircraft from Chilean territory. General Matthei suggests that such would be a breach of Chile's neutrality, however, if the UK would consider selling some Canberra *GR9*s, then anything was possible. [803]

"I told him that before promising anything, I had of course to discuss this with General Pinochet, and get his blessing on the whole idea. I saw General Pinochet, who was not at all surprised at the British request. We carefully analysed the request and its possible consequences. He authorised the operation on the condition that under no circumstances could Chilean territory be used by the British (to) mount any operation against Argentina. General Pinochet also instructed me to keep our own Ministry of Foreign Affairs out of the picture. I would like to point out that there was no other person present at this meeting. Wing Commander Edwards was given a complete briefing on the Argentinean Air Force by our own intelligence team. He was then given free access to our air operation centre in Punta Arenas, where we monitored all Argentinean air force operations through our long-range radar and our ground-based communications equipment. Wing Commander Edwards carried a portable radio with a direct satellite link to the staff of the British Task Force. During April 1982 we worked hand in hand with the British. An RAF Nimrod was flown to Chile to perform an electronic and communications mission for mutual benefit. As it flew strictly over Chilean territory, I considered that we were not violating the land rules laid down by General Pinochet. The Royal Air Force also shipped six disassembled

800 Mastny 1983

801 *Matthei Memorandum to Margaret Thatcher March 25, 1999*. In fact, the British Ambassador was fully aware, if only because Edwards was sleeping in the Embassy. See - http://www.josepinera.org/RevChilena/chile_democracia_memomatthei_en.htm

802 Edwards 2014

803 *Ibid*. At, or around, the same time, the Chilean junta appears to have offered to delay taking possession of two Royal Navy vessels that it had purchased - HMS *Norfolk* and RFA *Tidepool*. The offer regarding the latter was accepted, as *Tidepool* was needed for the Task Force. See April 20, 1982 below.

Hawker Hunter planes to Chile on board a C-130 transport airplane. Other C-130s brought a long range military radar, which we installed following British wishes opposite Comodoro Rivadavia. I would like to mention that the C-130s came via Tahiti and Easter Island, because at the time no other South American country would allow overflight of British military airplanes. … So, when the British Task Force arrived in Southern waters, everything was working smoothly." [804]

"My personal opinion – and I think one which was shared by my bosses at the Ministry of Defense and by Margaret Thatcher – is that the help we received from Chile was absolutely crucial," he said. "Without it, we would have lost the war." [805]

"In Operation Fingent, the British provided Chile with a Marconi S259 radar belonging to the Royal Air Force (RAF) mobile reserve, which was airlifted to Balmaceda and initially installed and operated by British personnel. The symbolic price was 1 pound sterling—and included further aerial equipment detailed below—thus enabling the RAF and the British Task Force to receive information from Chile on Argentine military movements. This British radar, with a range of 200 nautical miles, covered the Argentine province of Chubut and the Comodoro Rivadavia operations center, from which a significant portion of Operation Rosario was carried out." [806]

In Rio de Janeiro, considering the coming conflict and the status of the Falkland Islands, the *Jornal do Brasil* argues that the issue is not one of sovereignty, but of self-determination and the end of colonialism; questioning *"… the right of Buenos Aires to replace British colonisation with Argentine colonisation …"* [807]

In letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Panama expresses; *"… concern and indignation at … the punitive expedition by the United Kingdom whose naval combat forces, including nuclear submarines, were on their way to Argentine territorial waters..,"* while Venezuela reaffirms its solidarity with Argentina and deplores; *"… the fact that the alarming movement of British armed forces was being observed in silence by the Council,…"*

In the Falklands, during the afternoon, an Argentine F-28 aircraft, over-runs the runway at Stanley airfield; nosediving into the mud. [808]

> *''The opposition was building up, and there were guns and ammunition being moved through the town…Poor little Argies, all cold and hunched up in their thin cotton uniforms.''* [809]

From Washington, Haig telephones Méndez to deny the reports of US assistance to Britain.

"In those hours, the journalist Carl Bernstein, through ABC News, informed his audience that the United States was providing satellite intelligence information to the British fleet. "Will Alexander Haig be able to continue his 'good offices' management?" the journalist asked. … the Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Enders, called Ambassador Esteban Takacs to deny the news and explain that "since the beginning of the situation in the Malvinas, instructions had been given in the sense of not providing any type of data to the military intelligence of Great Britain, if it had been so, regardless of internal action, our government would be given immediate assurances that this would not happen again." .." [810]

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804 Chilean Air Force General Fernando Matthei in *The Matthei to Mrs Thatcher Memorandum* March 25, 1999.
805 Sidney Edwards quoted in *MercoPress* July 8, 2014.
806 Sznajder 2022
807 *PREM19/618*
808 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.211
809 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
810 '*Fuck!': la furia de Haig por las duras negociaciones con Galtieri por Malvinas y el fracaso que llevó a la guerra* J. B. Yofre 2022

From Buenos Aires, Méndez raises the application of the 1947 Rio Treaty with the US Secretary of State.

> *"Costa Méndez: "Let me point out two issues. 1) we have strong pressure from public opinion and from many people within the government to request a meeting with reference to the Rio Treaty … (Do) I understand that (if) you come here and for the next forty-eight hours, more or less, the fleet will not continue advancing towards the Malvinas, am I right?"*
>
> *Haig: "No, no, that's not correct. I cannot get Britain to change the movement of its fleet until we have an understanding."…"* [811]
>
> *"Haig: "Our position is that the Rio Pact is going to be a very difficult legal question as to whether it is applicable. So we would be opposed to invoking it at this time. Secondly, if we were faced with a two-thirds majority, the great difficulty would be it would entail our having to apply sanctions and we have refused, as you know, to join the efforts to have us apply sanctions against you. You understand that?"…"* [812]

Haig then calls Thatcher. Concerned about leaks regarding US assistance with arms, Secretary Haig says he intends to publicly reaffirm US neutrality.

"Thatcher was appalled… After discussing the matter with Pym, Thatcher rang back and insisted that this statement… would cause an adverse reaction in the UK. …" There was already a feeling that the US was doing less for us than we deserved, given the support we had given to President Reagan and the help which Argentina seemed to be getting from the Soviet Union"… The British Government could not accept being placed "on an equal footing with the Junta."." [813]

Secretary Haig speaks to President Reagan.

> *"I am convinced that Mrs. Thatcher wants a peaceful solution and is willing to give Galtieri a fig leaf provided she does not have to violate in any fundamental way her pledge to Parliament…*
>
> *Her strategy remains one of pressure and threat; by and large, it's working. … Galtieri's problem is that he has so excited the Argentine people that he has left himself little room for maneuver. He must show something for the invasion – which many Argentines, despite their excitement, think was a blunder – or else he will be swept aside in ignominy."*

Following his discussion with the US President, Secretary Haig calls a press conference.

> *"As a result of my conversations in London, plus telephone conversations today,… I have developed new ideas which I have described to the Argentine Government. Based on these new ideas, the Argentines have invited me to return to Buenos Aires. I propose to do so tomorrow."* [814]

From the Argentine Embassy in Washington DC, Ambassador Takacs sends a message to Buenos Aires; suggesting that General Galtieri speaks directly to the US President to reinforce Argentina's willingness to seek a peaceful solution within the terms of Security Council resolution 502.

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811 Quoted in Yofre 2011
812 Quoted in *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (1)*
813 Freedman 2005 vol.2
814 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840626–0175*

"At 11:40 p.m. the same day, a secret cable was sent from Washington to Buenos Aires "for the exclusive information of the foreign minister." ... The text of the message written by Takacs reported that following instructions from Nicanor Costa Méndez, he had a meeting with North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms and his advisers. During the conversations, (Helms) mentioned the difficulties posed for Secretary Haig by the influence of individuals and groups, one of which stated before different personalities that in the event of a conflict, the United States must side with the British and that President (Ronald) Reagan is being influenced by a growing campaign that objects to (a) friendly approach towards Argentina." [815]

The *New York Times* reports:

> *"The Argentine position, as outlined by officials here today, is that while it is willing to allow some form of transitional government that could include Britain and a third party such as the United States or the Organization of American States, Argentine sovereignty would have to be recognized by the transitional government. In addition, Argentina would be the final authority on the island even in the transitional phase. One high-ranking military official said that only the Argentine flag could fly."*

April 15th, from Buenos Aires, in the early hours of the morning, the US Embassy forwards to Washington the latest Argentine proposals.

> *"1) Immediate cessation of hostilities.*
>
> *2) Beginning ..... the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom shall begin the withdrawal of all naval units in the area surrounding the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. Within seven days of this agreement, the Argentine Republic will have withdrawn half of its military forces from the Islands to the mainland and the United Kingdom will have withdrawn its naval units to a distance of at least 3,000 nautical miles from the Islands. Within fifteen days beginning from the date of this agreement, the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom will have withdrawn the totality of their units to their usual operational bases or areas.*
>
> *3) The British Government shall adopt measures to comply, with respect to the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, with Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, completing the decolonization of the same by 31 December 1982, taking into account that, in accordance with Resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), and 31/49 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in this case the principle of Argentine territorial integrity is applicable.* [816]
>
> *4) From the date of this agreement no military forces will be introduced into the Islands and the surrounding areas, which will remain demilitarized until December 31, 1984*
>
> *5) The rights and guarantees which inhabitants of the Islands have enjoyed until now will be respected..."* [817]

The proposal is passed on to London.

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815 Yofre 2022

816 Since UN GA resolution 1514 of 1960, Argentina has consistently misinterpreted UN resolutions. See the *Falklands Wars* vol.3. Also 2019, when the ICJ concluded that the "territorial integrity" mentioned in art.6 of resolution 1514 was that appertaining to the territories (NSGTs) only.

817 *US Embassy, Buenos Aires to Secretary of State, Washington 0040 April 15, 1982.* The proposal also dealt with compensation for Islanders and transitional arrangements for the administration of the Islands under an Argentine Governor. See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21335-19820415-falklands-dispute-argentine-proposal

"The Argentines have now provided us with their language on decolonization as promised … The problems with this language are all too obvious. Nevertheless, perhaps taking as a starting point the language we left on Tuesday morning, we would appreciate receiving a formulation without delay so that we can try to bring the Argentines to it." [818]

President Galtieri tells the *La Nacion* newspaper; *"The recovery was planned and executed with great care to avoid damage to people and property in the Islands, despite that this would increase the risk to Argentine troops."*

Britain's destroyer group, hold position in mid-Atlantic.

"1. On 12 and 13 April, two Argentine Aires Force generals said that the Argentine Navy and Air Force are currently avoiding any operations that might bring them into contact with elements of the British fleet or that might cause Argentine units to enter the British announced zone of exclusion around the Falkland Islands. The Air Force generals said that this policy must be changed soon because the Argentine Government wants to put some of its fleet out to sea to detect the location if British ships. However, they said, the Argentine Government does not have accurate information of the general disposition of the British fleet and will thus be sending its units out "blind"; they added that a confrontation with the British is likely under this circumstance.

2. The Air Force generals said that the Argentine Government, using its Embassy in Washington, has already requested U.S.[less than 1 line not declassified] on the disposition of the British fleet as an aid to avoiding contact. They reiterated the necessity for this intelligence support; they said that if the United States does not provide this assistance, the Argentine Government will accept a standing offer from the Soviet Union to provide such [less than 1 line not declassified]. The two generals added that they are well aware that the U.S. Government has provided [less than 1 line not declassified] on Argentine forces to the British Government, and the U.S. Government must provide similar support to the Argentine Government if it wishes to remain neutral in the current dispute.

3. Unsubstantiated reports have been filtered into the Embassy by Argentine Government officials, claiming that the Soviet Union has offered or has provided [less than 1 line not declassified] intelligence to the Argentine Government on the disposition of the British fleet. Those claims have not been confirmed. However, evidence has been received that the Soviet Union has provided other information to the Argentine Government on the aircraft carrier 'Invincible' [1½ lines not declassified]." [819]

From Washington DC, Secretary Haig departs for another round of negotiations in Buenos Aires.

In the US, the *New York Times* reports that the Soviet Union has been supplying Argentina with intelligence regarding the movements of the British fleet, quoting President Reagan as saying that he "*would like to see them butt out.*" [820]

"While publicly denying any intention to share intelligence data with the Argentines, the Soviet Union launched, in the course of the war, seven reconnaissance satellites over the South Atlantic." [821]

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818 *Haig to Pym April 15, 1982*

819 *Telegram from the CIA to the White House Situation Room and National Security Staff* April 15, 1982 0114Z in the Reagan Library. The sections not declassified in 1 and 2 undoubtedly refer to satellite intelligence.

820 Mastny 1983

821 *Ibid.* citing *The Falklands Crisis: An Open-Source Chronology* Floyd D. Kennedy Jr. 1982

"Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and number three in the Department of State, met with British Ambassador Nicholas Henderson. The American told him of his country's fears of a more active Soviet involvement in the Malvinas issue. Furthermore, he indicated that "they feared that the Soviets would participate in military activities," something that shocked the English interlocutor." [822]

In the South Atlantic, an RAF *Nimrod* drops orders for HMS *Antrim* and Task Group 317.9. These require that Capt. Brian Young lead his group to South Georgia, with a proposed landing date there of April 21.

Overflying Brazil, Secretary Haig messages President Reagan.

> *"The situation has become distinctly more ominous. I base this assessment on several recent developments: a) today's Argentine press has an especially dark tone. Despite the fact that the British fleet is now entering the South Atlantic, Argentine commentary has become more inflexible and bellicose. This may be a response to British rhet(oric) and yesterday's tragic revelations about US intelligence and logistical support for the UK.*
>
> *More than anything, it betrays a self-hypnotizing war hysteria that may be taking over in Buenos Aires, with the prospect of military defeat, political isolation, and economic ruin eclipsed by patriotic fervor; b) I have also received the first detailed Argentine negotiating proposal. Although this gives us a clearer framework in which to engage the Argentines, the substance is little different than their basic demand all along: control of the Falklands, de facto if not de jure. …*
>
> *I should have a much clearer fix on the Argentine state of mind by late tomorrow. But we should begin to prepare ourselves for the worst. In this regard, I may need very soon to seek your decisions on two critical questions: a) whether and how far to push Mrs. Thatcher to come forth with a significant concession; b) whether and how to break off this mission if its futility becomes clear.*
>
> *Whether you should, or could, push Mrs. Thatcher to this bitter conclusion – that they cannot in any event resist the course of history and that they are now paying the price for previous UK vacillation on the sovereignty question – with all that it would mean for her, for our relationship, and our own principles, will require very careful thought. On the second question, we must think – and think quickly – about whether there is value in continuing this process and our role even though it will lead nowhere…"* [823]

From Buenos Aires, Leopoldo Galtieri telephones Ronald Reagan. [824]

> *"(Galtieri) Mr. President, I think it is highly important for Argentina, for us to have assistance, the assistance of your government, in this very difficult situation, that we are experiencing in our relationship with Great Britain which, among other things, is affecting the solidity of the Western World.…*
>
> *Mr. President, it is the profound wish, my personal wish, and that of the government, and the people of Argentina, to see to it that this situation does not continue to deteriorate. And it is furthermore our wish that with the assistance of the United States, that both countries seek an acceptable solution within the framework of UN Resolution 502 taking into account the whole background of this problem that goes back 150 years both from the standpoint of the bilateral relationship as well as all that has been debated, all that has been, the way the problem has been dealt with, the whole record of the UN in its*

822 *Malvinas, documentos desclasificad: los partes de inteligencia del "amigo invisible" soviético y los satélites que "espiaron" a la flota británica* Mariano Sciaroni in *Infobae* April 18, 2019

823 Quoted in *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

824 Transcript in Yofre 2011

debates of the problem of the past 16 years with reference to the issue of decolonization around the world. …

I also wish to have you realize that with the advance of the British fleet toward the South Atlantic region we feel that there is an increasingly dangerous situation, not only between our two countries, between the two countries involved in the South Atlantic, but it also our concern that this issue not deteriorate to a point where other nations might become involved and that this might not become tangled up and exacerbated by outside interests. … it is my fear that if the British continue their hostilities in the direction of the South Atlantic region the situation may slip out of our grasp; may slip out of our control and become an extremely delicate issue for the world at large…" [825]

A verbatim transcript is forwarded to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, for the attention of Secretary Haig, after which Reagan passes the gist of the conversation on to the Cabinet Office in London. Thatcher responds; *"Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced. The implications for other potential areas of tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands would be shattered."* [826]

Argentina's ruling junta publicly announce a *South Atlantic Operations Theatre.*

"… is an important element of the defence of our national sovereignty in the large area it covers: 200 maritime miles from the continental coast and around the reconquered islands of Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich. Once the "Theatre" has been established, the military Committee may order actions of self-defence in situations that could endanger national security. Vice-Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, Commander of Naval Operations, has been appointed Commander of the South Atlantic Operations Theatre." [827]

April 16th, Task Force ships start anchoring at Ascension Island. HMS *Sir Tristram* arrives from the West Indies, while other vessels sail south. Rear-Admiral John 'Sandy' Woodward flies out to HMS *Fearless* from his flag ship, HMS *Hermes,* to brief the officers. [828]

Ascension Island registers 300 aircraft movements, making the island's Wideawake Airport the busiest in the world for a single day. Among those landing are Lockheed C-5 *Galaxies* from the USA loaded with *AIM-9L Sidewinder* missiles. [829]

In Argentina, on reaching the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, US Secretary Haig immediately cables President Reagan in Washington.

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825 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.278. In the exchange, Galtieri repeated his concerns regarding the advancing British fleet, while Reagan actually said very little; other than emphasising his wish for a peaceful settlement and his faith in Alexander Haig.

826 Thatcher 1993. Also *PREM19/618 f106 (T73/82)*

827 Announced in *La Nacion* on April 23, 1982. It is worthy of note that while the UK had restricted its theatre of operations, Argentina chose a huge area of the South Atlantic. This would take on particular relevance with the sinking of the ARA *General Belgrano* on May 2, 1982. See below.

828 Rear-Admiral and Flag Officer First Flotilla (FOF1) commanding the *Hermes* aircraft carrier group (TG317.8).

829 The *AIM-9 Sidewinder* was a short range, air-to-air, missile. On sailing from Britain, the Task Force had only carried the older *AIM-9G* missiles, so a request was put in for the updated *AIM-9L*s from NATO stocks. However, there had been an agreement that the UK would not be supplied with arms allocated for NATO use, and this necessitated an alternative source. In this case a stock of missiles in the US intended for Israel. The older *AIM-9G* were only effective when fired from behind a target, while the newer model could be used from any angle. As it transpired, all the British air-to-air successes where from behind enemy aircraft, so any advantage the *AIM-9L*s had was not utilized. The US initially supplied 100 of these missiles, with a further 200 available from stocks in Europe. In the event, less than 30 were used.

"Today's Argentine press has an especially dark tone. Despite the fact that the British fleet is now entering the South Atlantic, Argentine commentary has become more inflexible and bellicose. ... More than anything, it betrays a self-hypnotizing war hysteria that may be taking over in Buenos Aires, with the prospect of military defeat, political isolation, and economic ruin eclipsed by patriotic fervor. I have also received the first detailed Argentine negotiating proposal. Although this gives us a clearer framework in which to engage the Argentines, the substance is little different than their basic demand all along: Control of the Falklands, de facto, if not de jure. ...

It may well be that the Argentines make significant concessions and adopt a position that is fair and reasonable when seen in the historical context of this crisis. In that case, we should certainly go on to London and be prepared to place heavy pressure on the British, ... The burden of flexibility, and the onus for failure to achieve a peaceful outcome, will then be squarely on the British. If the Argentines are intransigent, we will have to consider having me return to Washington. We may find that we are not in a position to make a basic decision on our role until after a full round in both Buenos Aires and London. But we must be ready to decide as early as this time tomorrow. At this point, the odds of avoiding war still appear very long."[830]

"When ... Alexander Haig set foot on Argentine soil again, the atmosphere, as he noted, was different: "...there was a less optimistic climate ... obscured by patriotic fervor". [831]

From London, Thatcher writes to Reagan.

"...We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government. I regret we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of the Argentines. ... General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me ... that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain that broke the peace but Argentina. The mandatory Resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland islands. That is the essential first step..."[832]

A *memo* is prepared for consideration by the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD). [833]

"Surrender of our sovereignty in the Falklands and their dependencies might be interpreted as indicating a lack of resolution to press our claim to any Antarctic hydrocarbons… If, in the longer term, Argentina concluded that it had been worsted in their adventure in the Falkland Islands and dependencies, our long term position in the British Antarctic Territory would probably be politically strengthened. The converse, however, is also likely to be true." [834]

At Britain's Ministry of Defence, the Chiefs of Staff Committee meets. They note that the Foreign Office (FCO) is intending to take the necessary diplomatic steps with West Germany, Italy, Austria and Israel regarding reported approaches by Argentina, seeking arms and equipment.

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830 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/16/1982 (1).* Freedman (2005 vol.2) gives the date of Haig's arrival as April 15, 1982.

831 Yofre 2011

832 *PREM19/618 f86 (T77/82)*

833 *Hydrocarbon, minerals and fisheries potential of the Falkland Islands, their dependencies and Antarctica* April 16, 1982 CAB 148/206. A sub-committee of the OD known as OD(SA) was also called the 'war cabinet'.

834 *Ibid*. quoted in *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82* Grace Livingstone 2018

"Anthony Duff, the coordinator of the intelligence services for the Cabinet, told GCHQ: "At this time, with the prospect of diplomatic negotiations continuing for at least a week or two, it is particularly important to obtain every scrap of intelligence we can about the advice, counsel and information being given to the Argentine government." [835]

In Argentina, President Galtieri issues a decree (no.757). [836]

> *"HAVING SEEN that on April 2, 1982, the Argentine Nation has recovered for its patrimony the effective possession of the Malvinas Islands and their dependencies in the South Atlantic, and CONSIDERING:*
>
> *That by Decree No. 681 of April 3, 1982, it constituted in the Military Government the territory of the Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur Islands and its owner was designated.*
>
> *That the Military Governor currently exercises his functions with a seat in the town known as "Port Stanley", a name that is alien to the history and traditions of our country.*
>
> *That the realization of sovereignty over the aforementioned islands allows for the realization of government actions that demonstrate the will of the Argentine People and its Armed Forces, sustained throughout its history.*
>
> *That the Ministry of Culture of the Presidency of the Nation has proposed as the new denomination of that town that of "Puerto Argentino".*
>
> *For this reason, the President of the Argentine Nation Decrees:*
> *Article 1.- The name of "Puerto Argentino" is hereby referred to the town of the Malvinas Islands, currently the seat of the Military Governor, which was previously known as "Port Stanley". ..."*

In the Falkland Islands, Argentine defences around Stanley are reinforced.

> *"More anti-aircraft guns are going up onto Sapper's Hill and the surrounding area. Buenos Aires Herald reporters have been visiting the hospital."* [837]
>
> *"I was called up to the Secretariat building by Vice Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve ('Bloomer'). ... He asked me about the fire service... wanted to know how we would stand if there were to be air raids..."* [838]

From Patagonia, Argentina's air force conducts an exercise.

"On 16 April, the first flight to Malvinas performing an attack profile, (with) passages over Puerto Argentino was conducted by squadron commander Mayor Juan C. Sapolski (C-407) and Capitán Norberto Dimeglio (C-434). The most significant conclusion was that, departing from the 9th Air Brigade, they would not be able to operate using weapons in Malvinas. Endurance (sic) did not allow flying at a safe level before an attack.

> *We flew for 02:43 hours, of which only five minutes were flown over firm ground, at the most. Unfortunately, we did not apply to get a Guinness World Records title. We went through an incredibly significant experience when we landed, myself in particular, as I could not move my legs. I had to grab each of them, raise them and place them on the brakes (top of pedals), and push them forward using*

835 Quoted in Ferris 2020 citing *Anthony Duff to Johnson/Palliser April 16, 1982 D/2304/14 pt.II*
836 Dated April 16, 1982. Published in the Official Gazette of April 23, 1982
837 *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021
838 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

my hands since I could not feel my legs. They were numb due to the anti-exposure suit −I was wearing the French model−, because the socks, the osito azul and the suit itself did not fit inside common boots.So, we requested two sizes bigger flight boots. Until they arrived, I think that took a few days, we flew wearing non-steel toe combat boots. But the most important experience we had was that we confirmed what we had already told the Argentine Air Force Southern Command: "we cannot get to the Malvinas Islands with weapons, departing from Comodoro Rivadavia", as it was physically impossible." [839]

In Stanley, a delegation of Anglo-Argentines arrive; *"It appeared their task was to allay the fears of the Islanders about becoming part of Argentina ... 'in effect .. a form of plea to the islanders to accept what had happened and try and make a new life out of the situation.'... The visitors were allowed to hold a public meeting at Stanley, but all this produced were some bitter exchanges."* [840]

"Eight members of the British Community in Buenos Aires arrived for the day. ... The eight got a very cool reception from the locals. They were accompanied by some press and TV people, said to be Italian…. People travelling into town on the Darwin Road during the past couple of days have passed several heaps of dead soldiers – the total varies between thirty and fifty – stacked up on the side of the road up near Sapper Hill. There are also a large number of soldiers on stretchers. Our climate is not agreeing with them; exposure seems to be the problem." [841]

"The Anglo-Argentines seemed to forget their ancestry, according, at least, to public record. What they really felt was anybody's guess. Everyone was afraid to speak - to speak differently, that is. Mistrust was everywhere. Anonymous calls denouncing lack of "coverage" of the "Malvinas history" in the schools were being heeded by the authorities. A friend was pitied by some because she first married a Jew, and now an Englishman" (the Englishman referred to was, in fact, an Anglo- Argentine)." [842]

"The idea seems to have originated from a proposal made to Dr. Richard Cutts, Anglican bishop of Argentina and the Archbishop of Canterbury's Episcopal Commissary to the Falklands, to allow a group of Anglo-Argentines to join him on his planned pastoral visit to the Falkland Islands. ... The first delegation, made up of six Anglo-Argentines, and not including Cutts, finally traveled to the Falklands on 16 April. During this brief visit, they met members of the Falklands' Executive Council as well as several locals, whose reaction was almost uniform: distant, cool, and ultimately not prepared to accept any advice from the Anglo-Argentines." [843]

In Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig arrives at the Casa Rosada, to be greeted by President Galtieri.

"... he wished to assure the Secretary that he had full confidence in the U.S. Government, in President Reagan, and in the Secretary himself. But speaking with the frankness that is possible between members of a family, he would tell the Secretary that he is not pleased with the fact that a number of people in the American Embassy were asking for visas to go to Uruguay. After all, it is not the summer season for people to go to the beaches in Uruguay, and this evidence of evacuation by Embassy people caused a bad impression and gave people the feeling that the U.S. might be preparing for a break in diplomatic relations. ... there was a British Community here of over 20,000 people who, with the other members of their families, must total some 100,000 people, and they did not feel themselves in any danger. ... Secretary Haig must seek a peaceful solution for all of the

839 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.156
840 Freedman 2005 vol.2. The group remained until the 23rd.
841 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.71. Two weeks after Argentina's invasion the suggestion of "*heaps*" of bodies is intriguing. With no action underway, perhaps hypothermia was the cause? Nothing has been published.
842 From a letter written by Anglo-Argentine Elizabeth Hosking, published in *Falklands News* October 11, 1982
843 Mercau 2016

reasons he had expressed; otherwise, we run the risk of splitting the Americas in two – those north of the Rio Grande and those south of it; some more and some less but such a split would alter substantially the strategic panorama of the world." [844]

Before meeting the Argentine negotiating team, Haig proposes a 7 point scheme:

1) withdrawal of Argentine troops and a halt to the progress of the British fleet;

2) Argentina's flag to remain flying on the islands under a tripartite administration (UK, Argentina & USA);

3) an expansion of Argentina's role in the islands during the interim period;

4) negotiations to conclude by the end of 1982;

5) negotiations to be guided by the principles of decolonization;

6) normalization of relations between the Islands and South America;

7) lifting of sanctions.

"The negotiations proceeded throughout the whole of that day in two sessions ... Haig believed it appropriate on more than one occasion to warn that he was ready to call a halt to the whole procedure." [845]

Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez informs Haig that his government can accept the establishment of an interim government and undertake further negotiations, but that this had to be done within a framework guaranteeing sovereignty for Argentina. Importantly, the UK must abandon its interpretation that the Islanders' wishes are paramount under UN resolutions.

> *"The Secretary, after reading it, said that it was certain to be rejected in London. He asked whether the Foreign Minister had any flexibility on that paragraph. Costa Méndez replied that he had none;... The Secretary then said, "This means war." Ambassador Enders added that this is tantamount to a declaration of war. Costa Méndez replied that this was simply the position Argentina had always maintained and that the UN Resolution affirmed. Ambassador Enders said that there was quite frankly no mention of Argentine sovereignty in those resolutions.*
>
> *Costa Méndez replied that he honestly felt that the wording included the territorial integrity of Argentina. ... Ambassador Enders then asked whether the authorities of this country knew that their inflexibility meant war. Costa Méndez replied that if the Secretary wanted to see the President and/or if President Reagan wanted to talk to the President, they could. He then asked whether the Secretary wanted to talk to the Junta.*
>
> *The Secretary replied that he did. He had earned and deserved the opportunity to speak to them and tell them the consequences of their decision. Costa Méndez replied that the Secretary had made superhuman efforts and deserved anything he wanted. The Secretary said he would not want to go home without having had the opportunity to tell the Junta that their position probably means war as a consequence. He would not be hesitant to tell them. Costa Méndez, visibly shocked, said that he felt he had been clear and honest and had been consistent in what he was saying all along. The Secretary said that this would be a disaster for Argentina, and we would have to take a position in the case of an armed conflict. Costa Méndez said it was not a consequence of any intransigence on the part of the Argentines.*

844 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires*
845 Cardoso, Kirschboom & van der Kooy 1983

The Secretary said he had made a real effort to bridge the gap between the two positions. He had told the Foreign Minister that neither side could obtain everything it wanted. He thought that everyone had seemed to accept that. Costa Méndez then said that the Argentines had done their best. ...

Secretary Haig said that he was sure the British would shoot when they received the message. ...

Ambassador Enders asked whether they had any doubt that this meant war with the British. Costa Méndez said that the Argentines had not been in touch with the British; but he would rely on our word for it. He was surprised that the United Kingdom would go to the edge of war for such a small problem as these few rocky islands. Ambassador Shlaudeman said that they would. Ambassador Enders said they would fight for the same reason as the Argentines would fight – for honor." [846]

In the evening, at the Buenos Aires Sheraton Hotel, a message is delivered to Secretary Haig.

"The account of the Military Junta goes on to say that Costa Méndez, at 10:45 p.m., held another meeting with Haig at the Sheraton Hotel in which he delivered the last Argentine objections to (Haig's) proposals. However, the events actually happened differently: Nicanor Costa Méndez did not go to the hotel. "Take him the answer," the foreign minister told Secretary Roberto García Moritán, who went to the Sheraton Hotel. After a few minutes, Haig greeted him in his pyjamas. He opened the envelope, read it and extemporaneously threw it in the officer's face exclaiming "fuck"." [847]

Annoyed, Secretary Haig demands to meet with all the members of the ruling junta.

"... a Secretary of State who is becoming increasingly pissed. Why? Because it is more and more apparent that these clowns in the Foreign Ministry, led by Costa Méndez... are jerking him around. He has engaged in god knows how many hours of good-faith talks, works hard on the language they propose, develops some kind of working consensus at their level – only to have the junta at the end of the day reject these mutually agreed positions and take us back to a point which is even tougher now than it was at the start. "A charade," sez the SecState, "a fucking charade – these guys are diddling me."

"Of course they are," chimes Shlaudeman, "they aren't hearing us, we can't negotiate with them, our relationship means nothing" – a line he was not giving us when we first arrived in these precincts! ...

I think we are about to wrap it, boys. But the Secretary's idea is to have one last meeting with Galtieri tomorrow morning and possibly the whole junta as well, cable Francis Pym the key paragraphs in contention, and then head on back to D.C. Continues Haig: "We must tell these guys, and then we must tell our own public, one basic thing: it is unimaginable that a responsible democratic country could accept the position they have put forward. We can't reward the force of arms." Punto." [848]

846 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Vernon Walters, Lot 89D213, Trip to Buenos Aires (w/Secretary Haig); Spin-off to El Salvador/Honduras April 15–April 22, 1982.*
847 Yofre 2022
848 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

April 17th, a little after midnight, Secretary Haig telegrams Britain's Foreign Secretary Pym.

"Tonight, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and his team met with President Galtieri and his entire Junta. At 10:40 pm local time we received a very discouraging response which I have asked to discuss tomorrow morning with the Junta and the President. I will advise you of the results of this meeting." [849]

In Washington DC, a White House Situation Room assessment is circulated.

> "*... Argentina has requested LANDSAT photographic coverage of the Falkland Islands for 21-23 April… Terrorist organisations have threatened British citizens and interests in Argentina and Uruguay. Argentina has prepared a draft note for invoking action under the Rio Treaty. The Soviet Union is reported to be ready to offer Argentina ships, aircraft and land based missiles in exchange for grain.*
>
> *The Argentine Foreign Ministry has denied in a telegram to the Argentine Embassy in Venezuela that the Soviet Union is providing intelligence material. The high level of Soviet photographic coverage of the area is unusual."* [850]

In the South Atlantic, submarine ARA *Santa Fé* sails from Puerto Belgrano with a compliment of marines and fresh supplies for the Argentine troops garrisoning South Georgia; *"... papers subsequently captured in the submarine, and discussions with her officers, indicated that she had been instructed to sink any British ships that she found off South Georgia."* [851]

In Buenos Aires, Secretary Haig and Vernon Walters meet junta members Galtieri, Anaya and Dozo. Costa Méndez is also present.

> *"We must find a way to change the internal arrangements on the Islands but not in such a way as to cause a breakdown in relations between the US and the UK and, consequently, Western Europe. All of the Soviet efforts and policies were directed at splitting Europe away from the U.S. This we had to avoid at all costs. We could not, as a government, accept that the use of force, no matter how justified, could bring about changes. President Reagan himself could not survive such an acceptance. The Secretary had been in communication with other European governments, France, West Germany, Italy, and had found no support for the use of force, whereas there was widespread support for evolutionary change. ... he had last night received proposed wordings that would inevitably lead to war. That was the unanimous view of all of his colleagues. ...*
>
> *Where are we now? We are at a point that would lead straight to armed conflict. The tragedy is that such a conflict would inevitably push the US toward support of Great Britain... They would win. Our analysis is that, at the first shot fired, Argentine ports would be mined, the Argentine forces on the islands would be isolated, the first British objective would be the destruction of the airfield, and surface and air resupply for the Argentine forces would be increasingly difficult. Since both nations are limited in what they could do to one another, the only winner under such circumstances would be the Soviet Union. ..."* [852]
>
> *"The line-up within the junta is pretty much as we expected: the Air Force general is mod(erate), the Navy admiral is hawkish and ideological, while President Galtieri – no match intellectually for either of the other two – substitutes bluster for thought."* [853]

849 *Haig to Pym April 17, 1982* See - https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB374/
850 *Ibid.* LANDSAT was a NASA programme which entitled subscribing nations to satellite images.
851 Freedman 2005 vol.2
852 *Dept. of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis*
853 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

"Finally, the Secretary of State was able to see the dark and sharp face of Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya and exchange some harsh words, when the naval chief told him that his son, a naval pilot, was "willing to die for the Malvinas and in our family we feel that it would be an honor to know that his blood would mix with sacred homeland". ... Haig replied, "Let me assure you Admiral, that no one truly appreciates the meaning of a war until he sees the corpses of young men being brought (home) in bags." [854]

In Europe, EEC sanctions against Argentina take effect.

"... Italy continued to express reservations about the proposed sanction and refused to approve the official documents until the last minute, on Friday, April 16th. Ireland and Belgium also showed a notable reluctance to impose sanctions. President Mitterrand and the rest of the governments fully supported the British effort ... In West Germany, public, government and press support appeared strong." [855]

In London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee notes that; *"A large part of the Argentine fleet is believed to be at sea."* [856]

Arriving back in Britain, Islander Bill Luxton is debriefed.

"Perhaps 40% of the former population of the town have moved out into the hinterland, where morale is high ... There has been no collaboration with the occupying forces. Indeed several Islanders have been openly defiant. ... Mr. Luxton was confident that many were determined to stay as long as possible, even if there was fighting. But some might well wish for temporary evacuation ... Nor is the Argentine's attitude to evacuation clear. They are making those who want to leave pay for their passage ... it may be that the Argentines would not wish to see a mass exodus."

Australia's Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser telegrams the US President.

> *"In the aftermath of a failure of Al Haig's efforts, ... it would amount to a serious blow to western values, and to the western alliance itself, if the United States did not unequivocally support Britain."*

From Moscow, Russia's Foreign Ministry issues a statement.

> *"We consider impermissible the attempts by the United Kingdom to re-establish colonial status and we openly oppose such attempts. We qualify them as contradictory to the decision of the UN General Assembly on decolonization .. and as creating a threat to peace and security."*

In Buenos Aires, early afternoon, Secretary Haig returns to the Casa Rosada.

"Haig was again invited to meet at 2 pm on Sunday in the Situation Room of the Casa Rosada. On this occasion, after ten hours of discussions, Haig starkly saw that the Junta also lacked power, since each decision had to be approved by each Corps commander and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force. "If I give in too much, I won't be in this position any more," Galtieri told him in a moment alone. "I asked him how long he thought he would survive if he lost a war with the British." .." [857]

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854 Yofre 2011. Yofre, citing an unidentified "*original report*", asserted that Haig agreed that the final result of negotiations would have to be the "*return*" of the Islands to Argentina. Unconfirmed. Unlikely.

855 Martin 1992

856 *Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee 1936 – 2013* Richard J. Aldrich & Rory Cormac 2014.

857 Yofre 2011

Near midnight, the meeting concludes. Secretary Haig prepares a report for President Reagan.

> *On balance, I consider the meeting helpful because it heightened Argentine awareness that time is running out for a solution short of war. The leadership is now clearly reluctant to see our mission suspended – especially while we are now in Buenos Aires. The stakes are so high that we agreed to look at revised language now being prepared by the Argentine side on the critical issue of the islands' ultimate status, which they are bringing to the hotel later tonight.*
>
> *We discussed this one issue for nine straight hours today – and the future of our efforts may hang on a single word. To sum up, we emerged from today's marathon session slightly better off than we were when we ended last night. In all probability, however, I will conclude tomorrow that Argentine intransigence requires me to carry out your instruction to suspend the mission and return to Washington."* [858]

Alexander Haig telegrams Washington.

> *"It has become increasingly clear that we are not dealing with people in a position to negotiate in good faith. I have spent hours negotiating with the Foreign Minister, as well as time with Galtieri himself, only to find that what is agreed ad referendum is then toughened substantially each time the Junta gets in the act. ...*
>
> *If, as I anticipate, I make no headway in the morning, I should depart immediately for Washington. It would be fruitless and unfair to Mrs. Thatcher for me to carry these proposals to London, thereby shifting the spotlight and onus onto her."* [859]

From the White House, President Ronald Reagan telephones Margaret Thatcher.

> *"I know how far you've gone and how much you've compromised in an effort to settle this peacefully, and I don't think you should be asked to go any further than you have."* [860]

Governments in Peru, Venezuela,[861] Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia announce that they will increase trade with Argentina to compensate for the economic embargo imposed by the European Union, and other countries.

Off the Falkland Islands, British submarine, HMS *Splendid*, arrives on station.

858 Quoted in *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*. Rentschler notes his growing contempt for the Argentines, and mentions that a friendly *Time* correspondent pointed out that he should probably stop whistling "Rule Britannia". See - https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114344

859 *Reagan Library, Exec. Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/15/1982-04/17/1982)*

860 *Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation – President Reagan (April 1982)*

861 Not known until much later, Venezuela, during the course of the war, supplied Argentina with weapons and spare parts for aircraft. Venezuela also offered paratroopers.

April 18th, in Buenos Aires, during the early hours, Haig receives a revised Argentine text referring to 1) a Special Interim Authority; 2) administration on the islands to return to that which existed before the invasion, but to include Argentines with limited participation; 3) a *'definitive solution'* to take account of the inhabitants' *'rights'* but also to recognise the *'principle of territorial integrity'*; 4) December 31st, 1982 to be the final date for agreement. [862]

> *"… another note of last-ditch optimism is creeping into the game plan; the Argies have delivered their revised language on the interim arranges for the Falklands, and there does indeed seem to have been some movement overnight – not much, really a fractional amount, but movement nevertheless, enough to warrant a bit more palaver. Haig will be reconvening with his charming hosts…"* [863]

Secretary Haig immediately telegrams London.

> *"The Argentines delivered to me at the hotel at 2am this morning a revised text resulting from yesterday's marathon session. Although their revisions are still unsatisfactory, I believe we now have – for the first time since we began this mission – some movement towards a workable solution …"* [864]

A 2pm meeting is scheduled for negotiations to continue at the Presidential Residence. [865]

"I can't speak for Mrs. Thatcher, at times I don't speak very well to her, but I know they don't care about the sovereignty of the islands. They are prepared to re-negotiate but we must permit her to do it gracefully and on honorable terms. But I can assure you we will drive it to a solution. Secondly, I personally am convinced that Britain wants this problem off the plate. They will never be able to face another crisis of this kind. They could not politically, and they could not by their own assessment of the cost." [866]

"… there was another marathon negotiating session from 1500 on 18 April until 0155 the next day. Haig now believed that he was getting somewhere and praised the progress already made. But he needed more. For the Argentine team the problem was that they had no idea of whether or not Britain had shown any flexibility, whether their concessions were to be reciprocated. Moreover, they had interpreted Haig's encouraging views on the prospects for an eventual British climb down on sovereignty as being somehow subject to an American guarantee, rather than just the quality of the Secretary of State's political analysis… All the Junta could see was the creation of more opportunities for British procrastination." [867]

At Montevideo, Uruguay, the 29 Royal Marines and 13 BAS personnel deported from South Georgia arrive. [868]

From Argentina, after a series of threatening telephone calls, the British born editor of the English language newspaper, *The Buenos Aires Herald,* moves to Uruguay.

Covertly, Brazil adopts a policy of providing aid for Argentina.

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862 Cardoso, Kirschboom & Kooy 1983 p.178

863 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*

864 *Telegram Secto 6037 to London, April 18; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982)*

865 There is no record of the conversation from this meeting.

866 Haig quoted in a transcription obtained for BBC's *Panorama* programme of April 16, 1984

867 Freedman 2005 vol.2

868 Uruguay remained neutral throughout the conflict, although some 763 Uruguayan citizens signed up to fight alongside Argentine troops. It is not known whether any actually did so.

"Brazil as a traditional rival of Argentina, while publicly proclaiming neutrality, in secret decided to extend aid to the junta... As the conflict intensified, Brazilian junta edged closer to the Argentine position and gave the order to grant 'favourable treatment' to any Argentine solicitude of arms or material. This was driven by the desire to balance out the US backing of the UK, which they considered unfair. However, Brazilian support was only given in unofficial capacity, as the Brazilian junta shied away from formally announcing their support ... In an effort to alleviate the economic hardship, Brazil also acted as intermediary for Argentine exports buying up and reselling them to the EEC." [869]

"Brazil provided Bandeirante and Airmacchi aircraft, which were used to replace those destroyed by British Special Air Service (SAS) commandos on Borbón Island in the Falkland Islands." [870]

At Ascension Island, four Victor tanker aircraft land. [871]

"Initially these were the only immediately available aircraft capable of penetrating the sea areas around South Georgia and the Falklands." [872]

In London, following speculative reports in the *Sunday Times* newspaper, cabinet secretary Robert Armstrong expresses concern that they allow the press to speculate about British intentions; "*In so far as methods are concerned the damage to our capabilities, though possibly not immediate, is likely to be widespread and long lasting".* [873]

"Whitehall pressed media outlets to avoid "speculation about future operational plans and interception of Argentine communications". Neither effort met with success. GCHQ believed that Argentina could easily change its procedures in order to block penetration." [874]

April 19th, in Buenos Aires, at 0200, Haig returns to his hotel.

> *"It is now 3 a.m. and I have returned to the hotel after another 12 hours of up and down talks. Once again we were treated to the now familiar Argentine tactic whereby with agreement almost in hand the Junta stepped in and overruled its negotiators. There followed a soulful meeting at 10 p.m. with President Galtieri who then reconvened the Junta and the impasse was broken. We returned to the negotiating table and put together a draft text except for the single important paragraph covering the modalities for the respective withdrawal of forces. However, the text as it now stands will in all likelihood give the British genuine problems. We resume our talks later this morning at the Casa Rosada. At the conclusion of the round, I should be in a position to recommend – on the basis of the text then in hand—whether to proceed to London for consultations with Prime Minister Thatcher and her Ministers or to return to Washington briefly en route to London."*[875]

After a few hours sleep, negotiations recommence at the Presidential palace.

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869 Krepp 2017 pp.358-359

870 *Hacia una mirada diferente sobre la Guerra de Malvinas* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

871 Modification of a Victor bomber, equipped for aerial refueling of aircraft. Five more arrived on April 19, 1982.

872 *Ascension Island – Gateway to the Falklands* Jeremy Price in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal* 2003 no.30

873 Ferris 2020 citing *PREM 19/621* of April 22, 1982

874 *Ibid*.

875 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/18/1982–04/19/1982)* in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.323. Francis Pym in London, received a similar telegram from Haig.

"Later in the morning, I met with the Argentinians to clear up a number of unresolved points. This, too, was a strenuous session, but by 1 P.M., we had in hand a modified text that anticipated some of the British objections" [876]

"In the last meeting we argued firmly. I told them several times – in front of witnesses – that if they guaranteed us through a document signed by Reagan and by him (Haig) that England would return sovereignty to us within a reasonable time, we would withdraw. He never wanted to sign such a commitment. He just wanted us to comply with Resolution 502." [877]

From Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador Henderson contacts the Foreign Office in London.

"I have just seen McFarlane at the White House who told me that Haig had been on the secure line. He was transmitting to the State Department … the latest text of what the Argentinians were prepared to accept. Clearly, Haig did not think that it would be satisfactory …" [878]

The revised Argentine proposals are: - (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) neither side shall introduce more forces into the *'zone'*, (3) within 24 hours the UK is to rescind its *exclusion zone*, (4) withdrawal of half of Argentina's force within 7 days to Argentina and all of the UK's to a distance of 1750 nautical miles, (5) the UK's Task Force and submarines to return to their normal bases within 15 days, (6) Argentina to withdraw its remaining forces within 15 days, (7) all economic and financial sanctions to be terminated without delay, (8) a Special Interim Authority to verify compliance which will also oversee the local authority on the Islands, (9) the Executive and Legislative Councils to have Argentine members, (10) the flags of the UK, Argentina and the members of the Special Interim Authority to fly together, (11) rights of residence, and ownership of property, to be the same for Islanders and Argentinians, (12) *"December 31, 1982, will conclude the Interim Period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories ... and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity applicable to this dispute. ..."*

In Buenos Aires, before leaving, Secretary Haig speaks briefly to his Argentine hosts.

"Haig does conclude a few more hours of jawboning with the Argies, and though it looks like he may have achieved a small measure of flexibility by the time we move into the motorcade, an alert from the Foreign Ministry informs us that Costa Méndez will be out at the airport to convey an important last-minute message." [879]

Secretary Haig sends a personal telegram to Foreign Secretary Pym in London.

"My own disappointment with this text prevents me from attempting to influence you in any way. As you will see, there are significant steps back from the text you and I discussed in London... It is not clear who is in charge here, as many as 50 people, including Corps Commanders, may be exercising vetoes. Certainly I can do no better at this point... My best immediate judgement in this situation is that I should return to Washington and report to the President." [880]

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876 Haig 1984 p.289
877 Leopoldo Galtieri interviewed by Juan Bautista 'Tata' Jofre on August 18, 1982 in Yofre 2011
878 *PREM19/619 Telegram 1343 of 19 April 1982*
879 *James Rentschler's Falklands Diary*
880 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War [Cables 090131, 091000, 091154, 091640, 181715, 191620, 191740, 191754, 192115]*

At the airport, Costa Méndez has a final encounter with the US Secretary of State. The Minister hands Alexander Haig a copy of Argentina's proposals. However, some of the wording has been changed again.

> *"It is absolutely essential and conditio sine qua non,... that negotiations will have to conclude with a result on 31 December 1982. This result must include a recognition of Argentine sovereignty.. '.."* [881]

"Around 4:00 p.m., when (Haig) was about to board, the Argentine foreign minister told him that the Junta had vetoed one of the central points that he had negotiated in those hours. Although it had agreed that an agreement should be reached on December 31, 1982, the military government had accepted that in that clause there was no mention of the conditional formula for the transfer of sovereignty. The new message established that if by that date an agreement had not been reached, the Argentine government reserved the right to designate the leadership and administration of the Malvinas. The answer left the mediator no room to negotiate in London. In addition, he also announced that Argentina would denounce the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in the OAS; a weapon that Washington planned to use if the situation in Central America got out of control." [882]

Junta member, Admiral Anaya, flies out to the Falkland Islands.

Argentina's 12th regiment is ordered to the archipelago, to reinforce the garrison there.

> *"From the beginning we knew how important the Malvinas were. It was a kind of love; we were going to defend something that was ours. Reaching the "Malvinas" was like a dream to most Argentines. There was no need for speeches."* [883]

At South Georgia, British submarine HMS *Conqueror*, commences a reconnaissance sweep of the Island.

In New York, at the UN building, Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, offers his good offices and assistance should the Haig mission fail.

"In separate meetings on 19 April with the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom and also with the Permanent Representative of the United States, I outlined the assistance that the United Nations could render, if requested, in pursuance of any understanding or agreement that the parties might reach consistent with Resolution 502 (1982). I stated that for example, a small presence of United Nations civilian and military observers could be used to supervise any agreed withdrawal of armed forces and civilian personnel, as well as any interim administrative arrangements. A United Nations "umbrella" for such arrangements could also be provided, as could a United Nations temporary administration. I indicated that any arrangements of this kind would require the prior authorization of the Security Council, that, as a practical matter, they would presuppose the consent of the parties and that such arrangements were mentioned without prejudice to the possibility of other types of action that the Security Council might decide upon. An informal note was given to the Permanent Representatives summarizing these ideas." [884]

881 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2. This was not forwarded to London.
882 Yofre 2022
883 First-Lt. Ignacio Benjamin Gorritti, B company commander, 12th Regiment quoted in Van der Bijl 2023. Following a number of delays, the 12th Regiment were flown out to Stanley over a period of five days from April 24, 1982.
884 Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, addressing the Security Council on May 21, 1982. See *UN Doc S/PV.2350*

Argentina calls for an emergency meeting of the Organisation of American States in order that an invocation of the reciprocal defence agreement under the Rio Treaty can be discussed. [885]

In London, Britain's Government issues a press statement.

> "*We have just received the proposals which Mr. Haig has brought out of Buenos Aires. They are complex and difficult, and at first sight they do not meet the requirements strongly expressed by Parliament, particularly on the need to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders. We shall be studying them carefully...*" [886]

"British patience with the American effort was starting to run out. Leaving aside the very attempt to broker an agreement as if Argentine claims had any real legitimacy, and that somehow saving Galtieri's face was a matter of real strategic importance, the American determination to put on a show of impartiality had been a cause of incessant irritation in London." [887]

In Washington DC, Ambassador Henderson, accompanied by Britain's Naval and Air *attachés*, meets with Senator John Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee. Tower asks Henderson to let him know what assistance the US could provide. Presidential permission has already been granted for a further supply of missiles and night goggles. [888]

April 20th, from Gibraltar, HMS *Hecla*, a hospital ship, sails for the South Atlantic. On the same day, three *Canberra PR9* photo-reconnaissance aircraft of No.39 Squadron, depart RAF Wyton bound for Chile – *Operation Folklore*. [889]

"... Canberra PR9s, normally based at RAF Wyton near Huntingdon; were flown secretly to Belize, the ex-British colony and military' base in central America. They were there repainted in Chilean Air Force markings and flew on, illegally and without clearance, over central America and on to Punta Arenas. ... 'At least' six Canberras were involved, according to official sources. The Canberra PR9 is specially built for long range, high altitude photography. At its normal operating height in excess of 60,000 feet, the Canberras were quite immune to attack by the Argentine Air Force. The operation of the Canberras was easily concealed at Punta Arenas, where Chilean F5 jet fighters were in continual operation to keep Argentine defences stretched towards the west and south as well as towards the Falklands..." [890]

In India, the British High Commission, aware that a meeting of the *Coordinating Bureau* of the *Non- Aligned Movement* (NAM) is being urged by Argentina, asks the Indian Government to press for a statement that is consistent with *SC Resolution 502*. An explanation is attached to the request; *"The fundamental element of the British Government's approach to the dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands is that the wishes of the*

885 Art. 3 of the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* (TIAR) 1947 states "*The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. cf.* 1947

886 *PREM19/619*

887 Freedman 2005 vol.2

888 In particular, the *FIM-92A Stinger* missile, which was a portable ground-to-air defence system.

889 White 2022. For a "*sales demonstration*" (see April 12, 1982, above). Officially, they only got as far as Belize before the operation to base long-range reconnaissance aircraft in southern Chile was cancelled following speculation in the *Daily Star* newspaper, and sensitivity in Santiago. Unofficially, a number of witnesses claim to have seen *PR9*s at Punta Arenas during the conflict; including ITN reporter Jon Snow. The details of *Operation Folklore* remain classified as of 2025. See - https://www.key.aero/article/canberra-pr9s-over-falklands-fact-or-folklore

890 *Falklands: The Chilean Connection* Duncan Campbell in *The New Statesman* January 25, 1985. See - https://www.duncancampbell.org/PDF/the chilean connection.pdf

Islanders themselves must be paramount. For their part, the Argentine's deny that the Islanders have the right to determine their own future and maintain that the issue is simply one of decolonisation. The Falkland Islands issue is not one of decolonization. As normally understood, decolonisation has consisted of the withdrawal of an alien administering power and the transition of new states to independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of their people, to whom sovereignty and the powers of sovereignty are transferred. The UN has never countenanced the decolonisation of a territory by agreeing to hand over its people to alien rule in the face of their persistent opposition. For Argentina to incorporate the Falkland Islands in its territory on the pretext of decolonisation would simply constitute the imposition of colonial status on the Islands by force in violation of all UN agreed norms of conduct ... It would offend the principle of self-determination..."

From Washington DC, Haig sends a message to Pym in London.

> *"I can appreciate your disappointment with the Argentine position. Your off-the-record press guidance is entirely proper. As you know, my aim in Buenos Aires was to squeeze as much as I humanly could out of the Argentines so that you and we could know what we are really up against. At no point did I tell them that what was developed in Buenos Aires would be acceptable to you. Nor did I associate the United States in any way with the position produced. ...*
>
> *Let me suggest that you now reflect on the text. In identifying specific areas where you believe changes are imperative, I suggest you work up formulations of your own. This will give us a precise idea of where we stand. It would have the additional advantage of denying the Argentines any basis for saying that they and they alone have taken a step toward peace. ... I further suggest that you and the Prime Minister consider your coming to Washington as soon as you have arrived at a considered view of the text. I agree with you that this is not the time for me to come to London, but I also believe that we need a face-to-face discussion, so that I can clarify points and convey my feeling of Argentine attitudes and aspirations. I cannot reduce to writing the bitterness, resentment and sense of historic frustration I encountered in Buenos Aires. ... It is imperative that you maintain military pressure. I see no other way of bringing the Argentines to a position satisfactory to you. ...*
>
> *As you know, Argentina has asked for an OAS Council meeting to convoke an organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty. ... We propose to abstain on the ground that* ***the Rio Treaty was not designed to apply to cases in which members themselves took acts of force****..."* [891]

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher speaks to the House of Commons.

> *"The proposals are Argentine proposals. We are grateful to Mr. Haig for the patience and stamina that he has shown over the proposals, both in Buenos Aires and in his visits to this country, but they are Argentine proposals. He has kept us fully informed, when he has been able to do so, about precisely what they are. We now have full details. ...*
>
> *We regard this as a stage in the negotiating process that must now be continued. We are examining the proposals very closely and will seek to put forward our own proposals to Mr. Haig. With that in mind, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary plans to visit Washington on Thursday. I do not believe that there is much point in reporting to the House before my right hon. Friend has seen Mr. Haig in Washington.*

891 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/01/1982–07/31/1982) (2).* My emphasis.

Among the many problems presented by the Argentine proposals is that they fail to provide that the Falkland Islanders should be able to determine their own destiny. The House has always said that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. ....

We are trying to secure implementation of United Nations resolution No. 502, which is clear, but not so easy to implement. We also have rights of self-defence under article 51 of the charter...

Many previous negotiations have been on the basis that the Argentines wanted what is called decolonisation – that has a particular meaning in United Nations terms – but they have not been able or willing to grant self-determination to the islanders." [892]

In the Falkland Islands, Junta member, General Lami Dozo (air force), arrives at Stanley.

Aluminum plates for extending the runway, fewer than needed, finally arrive at Stanley on board the ELMA *Formosa*. [893]

In Montevideo, 12 teachers from the Islands arrive; having refused to work under the Argentine administration.

"Cold, dull, windy and wet. Real April weather. Reports of more Argentine deaths from exposure during the night; numbers vary from three to ten." [894]

In New York, a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) convenes to discuss the applicability of the Rio Pact. While the majority of member countries are supportive of Argentina's position, there is no consensus on action. Mexico's representative is clear that his country will not impose sanctions on the UK, regardless of whether or not the OAS vote for it. He declares that his country; *"... continues to believe that, except in the case of legitimate defence, the collective measures referred to in Article 8 cannot be applied in an obligatory form, given their coercive nature, without the authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations."* [895]

Further discussion is deferred to the 26th.

The New York Times reports; *"Argentina has invoked the wrong Treaty at the wrong time to promote the illusion that all Latin American nations support its seizure of the Falklands. They don't, and some that do serve only their own territorial ambitions."* [896]

In Washington DC, asked at a press conference whether Secretary Haig's effectiveness as a mediator is now at an end, President Reagan responds; *"No, it is not. He's done a magnificent job. And let me just lay one thing to rest now regarding some of the rumours that have gone on. This idea of whether or not we've endangered any prestige of ours in doing what we've done – I think we would have lost prestige if we had not been willing to undertake this job of trying to broker an agreement between these two parties and forestall violence."*

892 *HC Deb 20 April 1982 vol.22 cc119-22*
893 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.130
894 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.80
895 Art.8 of the 1947 Treaty states *"For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the. following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force."*
896 *The New York Times* April 22, 1982

April 21st, flying from Ascension Island, an RAF Handley Page *Victor* conducts a radar reconnaissance of South Georgia. A flight of 14 hours 45 minutes and encompassing some 150,000 miles of ocean. [897]

In New York, from the United Nations building, Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parson's, telegrams the Foreign Office in London regarding the OAS meeting.

> *"If the Argentines succeed on 26 April in getting a two-thirds majority in favour of economic or other measures against the UK, this will be a major defeat for us in UN terms. …*
>
> *The Argentines are continuing to press hard for the early adoption of a communique by the [Non-Aligned Movement] Coordinating Bureau. A drafting group has been set up under Cuban Chairmanship consisting of Argentina, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Yugoslavia.*
>
> *The present plan is for the Coordinating Bureau to meet on 23 April. The Argentines have apparently shown some flexibility and indicated a readiness to accept a reference to SCR 502, provided that there is a resounding reaffirmation of previous NAM pronouncements on sovereignty. We are working hard on the Commonwealth members of the drafting group, amongst whom Bangladesh is being particularly helpful. …"*

In London, Thatcher is informed that Argentina's aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo*, has been located. [898]

> *"After this morning's meeting of the OD(SA) the Chief of the Defence Staff told the Prime Minister that it had been possible to identify the location of the Argentine naval force including the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo in a patrol area between the Argentine coast and the Falkland Islands Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ).*
>
> *He had ordered one of the SSNs in the MEZ to proceed in the direction of the area in which the Argentine naval force was patrolling. Its distance from the area was about two days' steaming. The object of this manoeuvre was to reduce the time which it would take the submarine to carry out an attack on the Argentine naval Force, if Ministers were to decide that it should do so.*
>
> *This manoeuvre would take the SSN outside the MEZ. Outside the MEZ she would be under 'high seas' rules of engagement, and would not be authorised to attack an Argentine surface warship save in self-defence…."* [899]

In the Atlantic, an Argentine Boeing 707 sights the *Hermes* group.

"At exactly 0938, at coordinates 19°40'S/21°37'W (about 1,900 km east of Belo Horizonte, Brazil), the British war fleet was sighted for the first time heading towards the Malvinas Islands. It consisted of two aircraft carriers, three destroyers, five frigates and six support ships. Immediately, Argentine Navy and Air Force specialists photographed the vessels. This caused an immediate reaction. Just twelve minutes later, the Sea Harrier registration mark XZ-460 of the 800 Squadron armed with air-to-air missiles, piloted by Lt. Simon Hargreaves, flew next to the TC-91 aircraft. It remained in formation for a few minutes and, after confirming that it posed no threat and having photographed it, it returned to HMS Hermes." [900]

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897 Two more of these missions, reaching some 7000 miles from Ascension, took place on the 22nd and 24th.
898 Launched in 1943 as HMS *Venerable*, the carrier was sold to Holland in 1948 and then to Argentina in 1968.
899 *Cabinet Office Minute Ref: AO8179* of April 21, 1982. SSN is a nuclear powered submarine. MEZ = Maritime Exclusion Zone.
900 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.215 citing *Falklands: The Air War* Rodney Burden 1986 p.85

In London, Francis Pym makes a statement to Parliament regarding his imminent departure to Washington.

> *"Any negotiation which is concluded satisfactorily must deal with certain critical points: in particular the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal; the nature of any interim administration of the islands, and the framework for the negotiations on the long-term solution to the dispute for which the United Nations resolution calls. We put to Mr. Haig, when he was in London, ideas which we believed would commend themselves to the House and accord with the wishes of the islanders. He subsequently took them to Buenos Aires.*
>
> *The latest Argentine proposals – despite Mr. Haig's efforts – still fail to satisfy our essential requirements in certain important respects relating to these points. They reflect continuing efforts by Argentina to establish by her aggression and her defiance of the United Nations … what could not be established by peaceful means."* [901]

Task Group 317.9 (*Antrim*, *Plymouth* and RFA *Tidespring*), together with *Endurance* and the submarine HMS *Conqueror*, is ordered to proceed as ordered with the recapture of South Georgia. [902]

In appalling weather conditions, and after two failed attempts, SAS Mountain Troop, are placed on the Fortuna Glacier.[903]

At the Falkland Islands, Argentine helicopters bomb some of the islets with napalm.

> *"This afternoon the Pucaras again bombed the Tussac Islands in Port William. Savage flames cover the ground while a huge pall of dense smoke rises hundreds of feet into the air. God knows what all this is doing to the wildlife out there. It is being said, though it is difficult to find evidence to support it, that the Argentine dead still being recovered from the invasion, and the deaths from exposure, are being put on the islands so that no trace remains of their losses, which during the invasion period were far heavier than admitted."* [904]

At Stanley, warned that he is in danger of imminent arrest by Major Dowling, ex-police chief Terry Peck departs on a borrowed motorcycle. [905]

"Faced with so many complaints from islanders about Dowling's attitudes,Vice-Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve and captain Barry Melbourne Hussey entered the place occupied by Counter Intelligence Section, visibly irritated and shouting. They demanded to know the reasons for the actions carried out (breaking into domiciles and detaining members of the FIDF), accusing the intelligence personnel of a lack of capacity to discern between the war against subversion and the conventional one. The response these officers received was that they were 'not going to be able to win over the population because they are the ENEMY'." [906]

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry sends a message for Secretary Haig.

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901 See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-04-21/debates/91cd1d2d-6586-4aa8-b8d2-cd70b8ea60fd/FalklandIslands

902 En-route south, with accommodation filled to capacity on the three ships, No.6 Special Boat Service (SBS) had been embarked onto the submarine. Poor weather conditions ultimately precluded their involvement.

903 Permission to proceed with the reconnaissance missions had been given on April 20, 1982.

904 Smith 1984 pp.83-84. Similar report for April 21 in Bennet 2021, which added that when asked on the 23rd, Carlos Bloomer-Reeve called it "target practice". A source of much speculation, however see April 6, 1982. above.

905 Peck spent the next 5 weeks in North Camp, joining up with British troops on May 24, 1982. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/peck_terry

906 Van der Bijl 2023

"You are aware that Argentina is willing to continue negotiations. ... As it has been remarked so many times, (the) result must include a recognition of the Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. Although said recognition may not be expressly stated in the agreement, nevertheless, the principle and the concept should arise clearly and unequivocally from the wording of the agreement." [907]

In Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador Henderson quietly informs Haig that the fight for South Georgia has begun. [908]

"Haig's immediate reaction, when I told him, was one of surprise and concern … He thought that our proposed action would aggravate the problem and make a return to negotiation more difficult … After he had had time to think about it a bit longer, Haig seemed to me to come round more in support of our proposed action, he quite saw the need for us to show firmness, which was all that the Argentine leaders would understand …"

"A few hours later, however, Haig recalled him, having been worrying about the implications of the British decision if the Argentines could then accuse Washington of colluding with London. As the Americans now had their own independent intelligence about the British operation (although it is unclear where this could have come from) he felt he should give the Junta advanced notice, although not so advanced that they could act on the information. This would help him maintain a display of even-handedness. Henderson was aghast... Haig then assured him that no prior notice would be given." [909]

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlauderman contacts Washington to report that Argentina is expecting an attack on South Georgia. [910]

April 22nd, in the Atlantic, a second Argentine Boeing 707 sights part of the British fleet.

"On 22 April at 0145, the crew found the ships by electronic means; this time, they could not be seen through the darkness, but the radar pickup was accurate. Another Sea Harrier intercepted them and flew next to them about sixty meters away. After a few minutes, the aircraft returned to the site where the vessels were located, according to those onboard." [911]

Foreign Office advice, issued to all British nationals in Argentina, is that they should now leave the country.

In Brussels, the European Parliament announces that it is; *".. profoundly shocked by the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and more than ever convinced that territorial disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiations, ... (and) Condemns unreservedly the invasion of the Falkland Islands..."*

In London, the Cabinet is informed that the fleet has been seen by Argentine aircraft.

"Lewin made the point to the War Cabinet that by shadowing the Task Force, the 707s could direct combat units, including submarines, to attack positions. He proposed that all Argentine aircraft engaged in surveillance should be treated as combat aircraft... The FCO was uncertain about the advantages this surveillance gave to Argentina but very clear politically about how the Argentines might exploit the downing

907 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820069–0211*

908 *Ibid.*

909 Freedman 2005 vol.2. On hearing this, Francis Pym was not impressed, and Freedman notes that from then on the British checked all the information being passed on to Washington fearing that; "*our greatest ally is not wholly on our side.*" Haig had attempted to pressure the junta into a deal on the 19th, by suggesting an '*imminent*' British action at South Georgia. See April 22, 1982, below

910 *Ibid*. An entry in *Neville's Diary* in Bennet 2021 notes a news report heard on an American radio channel to the effect that part of the Task Force was heading towards South Georgia.

911 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.216

of a civilian aircraft. They would undoubtedly claim this was on a normal transatlantic flight with a filed flight plan. At this sensitive moment,... the diplomats wanted a more cautious approach." [912]

In the Falklands, General Galtieri arrives at Stanley. A speech is recorded for a television broadcast. [913]

> *"I am sure and confident that the pale blue and white will not be lowered,.. The necessary defensive measures have been taken on the island....*
>
> *Here is the Argentine flag and, with all due respect to Great Britain and its people, they will have to understand that the world has changed and certain things cannot come back"* [914]

"The official news agency Telam said Galtieri was tearful as he spoke from Puerto Argentina, the island capital that was known as Port Stanley during 149 years of British rule." [915]

Leopoldo Galtieri reviews his forces' defences. Menéndez tells his President that he has insufficient forces to garrison West Falkland Island.

"... the British were most likely to land near to Stanley, in which case the Argentine reserves were inadequate. It was also agreed that a further regiment of infantry was needed, although the local commanders stressed the need to address the logistical issues that the extra men would raise." [916]

On his return to Buenos Aires, Galtieri orders the despatch of another brigade.

"... he ordered, without consulting the authorities involved, and contrary to the request of the Military Commanders, the sending of an additional Infantry Brigade, thereby causing not only an invasion of jurisdictions but also a worsening of the prevailing logistical situation on the Islands.... (Infantry Brigade III) did not have adequate equipment..." [917]

"Without prior consultation with other members of the Junta or the COMIL, Galtieri decided to send the 3rd Infantry Brigade from Corrientes province, commanded by General Omar Parada, with the 4th, 5th, and 12th Infantry Regiments, the 4th Artillery Group, and the 3rd Engineers Company. They were transported to Malvinas between 24 and 29 April. ... Afterwards, assets from the Gendarmería Nacional (GN, Argentine National Border Patrol) and from the Prefectura Naval Argentina (PNA, Argentine Coast Guard) were added as well,.." [918]

At Ushuaia, an Argentine warship, ARA *Belgrano*, following a refit, sails into the port to take on ammunition, *Seacat* missiles and fuel. [919]

"She was commanded by Captain Héctor Bonzo with Commander Pedro Luis Galazi as second-in-command. Captain Bonzo had joined the navy in 1947 and worked his way up the ranks, ... He trained and qualified in

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912 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Following legal advice, a warning was issued to Argentina via the Swiss Embassy on the 23rd. Britain's naval units were also observed by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operating out of Angola.

913 Apparently, Galtieri's visit was as 'military commander' rather than as Argentina's head of State.

914 *Our flag will stay in the Falklands, Argentine Chief says* George de Lama in the *Chicago Tribune* April 23, 1982

915 *Ibid.*

916 Freedman 2005 vol.2

917 *La errada orden militar de Galtieri en su viaje a Malvinas y la negociación fracasada que pudo evitar la guerra* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infoebae* April 22, 2023. While the new troops were quickly air lifted out to the Islands, their heavy equipment went to the docks to be shipped out when a vessel could be found. That equipment never arrived.

918 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.119. No consideration appears to have been given as to how these men would be housed or fed.

919 A light cruiser originally commissioned as the USS Phoenix in 1938. Acquired by Argentina in 1951.

naval systems and taught in several Argentine naval institutions. … To put the ship on a war footing the size of the ship's company was increased with the addition of extra lieutenant commanders, and consisted of 56 officers, 629 permanent crew and 408 conscripts who were serving their mandatory 12 months of national service…" [920]

On South Georgia, still under severe weather conditions, an attempt to pick up the Special Air Service team on Fortuna Glacier goes wrong. Two *Wessex* helicopters crash in *"whiteout"* conditions. However, there are no casualties and the group, plus pilots, are successfully taken off by *Antrim's* helicopter.

HMS *Brilliant,* with its two helicopters, is ordered to reinforce the ships at South Georgia. [921]

Now in Washington DC, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, has a two hour meeting with Secretary Haig.

> *"Secretary Haig opened by describing the negotiating process in Buenos Aires, emphasizing its incoherence, the difficulty of finding a negotiating partner who could speak authoritatively, the relative weight of the Argentine Navy and Admiral Anaya in particular, and the role of the corps commanders. Returning here after three days of negotiation he had asked Foreign Minister Costa Méndez for a letter indicating that Argentines would accept the text established if it were acceptable to Britain, and been promised it, only to have Costa Méndez fail to deliver the letter at the airport, and indeed to advance the specious and unacceptable proposal that Argentina assume the governorship of the islands if the negotiations on their long-term status were to fail.*
>
> *The Secretary described Galtieri as a "Patton-type", not particularly bright, and intensely worried about his survival. …*
>
> *The Secretary concluded that Galtieri's life expectancy as President was very short, that Costa Méndez was not a valid interlocutor and thus that there was no point in having Costa Méndez sit down with Pym, as the former had proposed. The Secretary said that he saw no alternative but to return to Buenos Aires. …*
>
> *Foreign Secretary Pym thought the gap between the British position and the Buenos Aires text was enormous, particularly when it was so hard to tell whom one could deal with. If it were possible for the Secretary's mission to succeed, he would be all for it. But one must face the probable outcome. Clearly time is running out. .. Prime Minister Thatcher is resolute and not inclined towards further compromise. .. Foreign Secretary Pym asked the Secretary what possibility of success he saw and what chance of success there is if he returns to Buenos Aires.*
>
> *Secretary Haig said he was not optimistic and would have given up much earlier if that had been the criterion. He was only going on because of the historic consequence of failure. If there is war, Latin America will (regardless of the finer judgments of some of its leaders) line up against Britain. This would come to a head at the OAS meeting. … Secretary Haig said that there was also no question but that the U.S. would shift if talks collapsed. We had told that repeatedly to the Argentines, and we believe they do not question it. What they do question is whether Britain will actually go to war."* [922]

920 *Abandon Ship: the real story of the sinkings in the Falklands War* Paul Brown 2021

921 Further attempts to insert reconnaissance teams over the next two days were also hindered by the weather, but, eventually, TG 317.9 managed to put men on the ground. HMS *Antrim* remained near South Georgia to monitor communications.

922 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262*

Pym and his team work to amend Argentina's proposals in an attempt to find some middle ground. As amended, the proposals are - (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) neither side shall introduce more forces into the *'zone'*, (3) within 24 hours the UK is to rescind its *exclusion zone*, (4) both sides will withdraw half of their forces and equipment within 7 days; with the UK's force standing off to a distance equivalent of 7 days steaming at 12 knots. Argentina's forces to be put into a condition whereby they could not be reinserted within 7 days, (5) both sides forces to return to their usual operating areas or normal duties within 15 days, (6) the USA to verify compliance, (7) all economic and financial sanctions to be terminated without delay, (8) a Special Interim Authority to verify compliance which will also ratify decisions made by the local authorities on the Islands, (9) the Executive and Legislative Councils to have Argentine members drawn from the local community, (10) the flags of the UK, Argentina and the members of the Special Interim Authority to fly together at its HQ only, (11) residence and ownership of property to be equal between Islanders and Argentinians without prejudice to the rights of the inhabitants, (12) *"December 31, 1982, will conclude the Interim Period during which the signatories shall complete negotiations on removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories .. and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity .."*

Pym asks that the USA be the third member of the proposed Special Interim Authority and offer guarantees of compliance; a request passed to President Reagan for consideration.

Haig telegrams Méndez regarding the need for a negotiated settlement; adding a reminder.

> *"... you will recall I indicated to you on Monday (19 April) that we should all be concerned about the possibility of* ***imminent military action in the area of South Georgia****."* [923]

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy reports a conversation with a source described only as a '*well-informed politician*'; *"a) The Galtieri government would fall if it did not obtain a fixed commitment from the British for recognition of Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas. The date for effective sovereignty ... could be in six months, a year or even perhaps longer, but a deadline would have to be established. b) Galtieri might survive in office if he gets that commitment, but such survival is far from certain. If Galtieri does clearly 'win', his next move might be to seek popular election as President as early as this year. (Comment: Galtieri's prospects in anything approaching an honest election would seem exceedingly thin to us.) c) Galtieri will surely fail if there is no fixed date for Argentine sovereignty. From Galtieri's perspective it would be better to fight a losing war – and our source was sure Argentina would lose – than surrender on the sovereignty issue. d) There are no politicians in the country who think that the invasion of the islands was anything other than a colossal error. There is widespread belief that the President and his advisers are incompetent. e)* ***If there is a major incident in which large numbers of Argentines are killed ("A ship sunk and 400 die")*** *the public will be uncontrollable. Among their targets will be the US Embassy, he said. f) If Galtieri is ousted as a result of the crisis, he will be replaced by an Army General. One scenario would produce a right-wing nationalistic dictatorship. Another, which the source preferred, would be the selection of a General to preside over a transition to democracy ... g) In the last few days or so the Government has pulled back from suggesting publicly and privately that Argentina is reaching out to the Soviet Union. It has also dampened down the anti-American campaign that was getting underway... h) Our source said he is now 41 years old and he now knows that during his lifetime he will never see a "serious" Argentina. He meant by this a stable, democratic and prosperous country... i) The troops now in the Malvinas are young and ill-trained."* [924]

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923 Freedman 2005 vol.2. My emphasis. Despite having assured Ambassador Henderson that he would not warn the Argentines of Britain's plans.

924 Signed off by Shlaudeman. My emphasis. Prescient. See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21341-19820422-considered-argentine-view

In the USA. under the LANDSAT agreement, Argentina submits a request to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). A request for the provision of satellite images of South Georgia on the 24th and 25th. NASA is also asked for images of the South Atlantic to the west of South Georgia on the 25th and 26th. Washington informs London, explaining that they have little alternative but to honour the agreement. [925]

From Argentina's Washington Embassy, Ambassador Takacs contacts the US State department, seeking further information about an attack by British forces on South Georgia.

> *"The evening news started with a statement by Admiral Woodward (Sandy), that he was declaring an air blockade as well as a sea blockade around the Islands"* [926]



April 23rd, in London, Defence Secretary John Nott supports the Ministry of Defence's suggestion of an early deployment of *Vulcan* bombers to Ascension Island.

"(An) option was the conventional bombing capability represented by the Vulcan and it was decided that, in spite of the enormous effort required, it would be worth trying to restore its flight refuelling and conventional bombing equipment, both of which had been moribund for several years. This meant that, apart from the engineering work involved, we would also have to train a number of crews who had never previously done any flight refuelling or, indeed, any conventional bombing." [927]

In Argentina, the junta receive the results of a new opinion poll; *"... that highlighted the "... firm and unanimous opinion of Public Opinion that the islands should not be returned at any price, even at the cost of war"."* [928]

In the Atlantic, Argentine aircraft again overfly the fleet. [929]

In Buenos Aires, the Swiss envoy acting on behalf of the UK, delivers a warning to the Argentine Government.

> *"In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom* ***to take whatever additional measures may be needed*** *in the exercise of its right of self-defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.*
>
> *In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that* ***any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response****. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in*

925 However, the images available were not of a high resolution, and there is some doubt that they would have actually provided much information. It is clear, however, that Argentina had received and understood the warning received from Haig.
926 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
927 *Vulcan Operations* Sir John Curtiss in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal 30* 2003
928 *La errada orden militar de Galtieri en su viaje a Malvinas y la negociación fracasada que pudo evitar la guerra* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* April 22, 2023
929 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.216

surveillance of these British Forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly." [930]

"It is clear from the above text that the warning applied outside the Exclusion Zone as well as within it. This message was notified to the United Nations Security Council and circulated accordingly on 24th April. It was also released publicly." [931]

"... the combination of the MEZ and separate warnings regarding Argentine ships and planes outside the MEZ had a confusing effect on both the British task force and the international community. ... the existence of two separate rules of engagement, .., was seemingly lost sight of by the Argentines and the international community, both of which were intently focused on the 200-mile MEZ." [932]

"Argentinian Rear Admiral Allara, ... said, "After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. ..."." [933]

In Washington, UK and US negotiating teams meet to discuss amendments presented by Haig's team overnight.

"The Secretary said that the pressure to achieve a negotiated, political settlement would not dissipate once military action began. Military action was unlikely to be decisive, and would probably drag on. World public opinion would insist on a solution. Pym agreed with the Secretary's observation, but said that once military action began, "people will have different perceptions". Haig commented that it was easy to slip into thinking in terms of negotiations versus war. This was false. A political solution would become even more imperative if a war started. The Secretary then suggested to Pym that they work through the text ..." [934]

In New York, at the UN, Anthony Parsons considers another British approach to the Security Council.

"Recent conversations which I have had confirm that the longer we can keep out of the Council the better. The Non-Aligned members are already feeling slightly uneasy that a combination of our tactics and Panamanian/Argentine clumsiness led them to support a Resolution which contained nothing about the Argentine case on sovereignty.

I have also had reliable confirmation that, if we use force, and particularly if we inflict casualties, there will be an immediate return to the Council … and that we will be seriously isolated. ...

If the Haig mission collapses, someone is bound to call the Council fairly soon and there will be precisely those calls on us which we wish to avoid, eg. the suspension of military preparations combined with some time-consuming and ineffective mechanism such as the Secretary-General's good offices. All the above reinforces my conviction that we should for the moment continue to soldier on here for as long as we can,... avoiding recourse to the Council.."

In the Falklands, the Anglo-Argentine group that had arrived on the 16th, make another attempt to persuade the Islanders to accept Argentine rule.

"Despite having failed on their first attempt, the delegation returned the following week to propose building a separate town for the Argentines, allowing the Islanders to keep their way of life and customs. They claimed

930 *PREM19/621.* My emphasis. The Exclusion Zone was now only part of the War Zone.
931 *Thatcher to Foukes September 19, 1984*
932 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.9
933 Brown 2021
934 *Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981 – February 1983, Lot 83D210, D. Gompert*

they had submitted this scheme to Lieutenant General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri ... the deputation announced their proposal over the radio-telephone and summoned a public meeting at the post office, eliciting firm rejections from the Falkland Islanders. The post office meeting was particularly ill-tempered, to such an extent that "it almost broke into open violence and all you could hear were cries of 'Get out, and stay out.'" The locals' responses to the proposals reveal how suspicious the Falkland Islanders were of the British community in Argentina: "Most people here consider that they are only there as long as their pockets are full," explained one. "Although most frightfully British," added another, "they are completely in the grip of the Argentines. They don't appear to have any real loyalty; only a noxious mixture of greed and snobbery, probably more dangerous than the Argentines themselves." A young Falkland Islander grumbled, "'[t]here is no creature worse than an Anglo-Argie, their loyalty is purely to their pocket and the country which best suits their pocket at the time and NOTHING else."..." [935]

In Stanley, a meeting also takes place at the Secretariat.

> *"Bloomer opened the proceedings by referring to someone who had told an Argentine officer to leave the West Store. 'Well', said Olga, 'I didn't know he was your Governor Menendez. He was just another soldier in a uniform' ...*
>
> *Bloomer welcomed us as representatives of the population, not in any official capacity, but, so that 'they' could explain what the future was to be for the people and the Islands. ...*
>
> *The Islands would be Argentine, the people would have all the privileges and freedoms of Argentine citizens. ... All people who married after 2 April 1982 would not be permitted to divorce as that is the Argentine law. Children would be taught Spanish at school. The younger the pupil, the more lessons in Spanish. Teachers would be brought over from the mainland as they would be better than teachers from elsewhere. It was hoped that all adults would voluntarily learn the language. People would learn to drive on the right-hand side of the road. Arrows had already been painted on the roads to help the Islanders. ... We were invited to go to Government House on Monday to listen to Argentine Governor General Menendez who would be only too pleased to give us more detailed explanations."* [936]

On station off South Georgia, HMS *Antrim* and HMS *Plymouth* rendezvous with HMS *Brilliant*. HMS *Endurance*, closer to the Island, remains in contact with the observation teams. Commander Young on *Antrim* hears on the BBC World Service that a British fleet is approaching South Georgia. [937]

Endurance picks up emissions from a submarine's radar and issues a warning. Britain's tankers withdraw. [938]

From London, Defence Secretary Nott orders the British submarine HMS *Splendid* to patrol north-west of the Falklands. In the area that Argentina's aircraft carrier was reported to be, on the 21st.

"This would create the option of being able to execute retaliation should ministers so decide following an attack upon a British ship in the South Georgia area. This indicates that politically the critical consideration was where, when and against whom the first shots were to be fired rather than the second shots." [939]

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935 Mercau 2016
936 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
937 This was also reported in the *Chicago Tribune* on Friday, April 23, 1982, referring to a 'US intelligence source.' See Freedman 2005 vol.2
938 *Brambleleaf* had joined *Tidespring* in *TG 317.9*
939 Freedman 2005 vol.2

"GCHQ also penetrated the Argentine plan of attack. Argentine forces fell into three groups: the aged aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and three destroyers to the north; a body of three corvettes; and the General Belgrano and two destroyers to the south. ..." [940]

In Washington DC, following an evening round of discussions between Pym's team and that of Secretary Haig, Minister Pym considers the results; *"... although the Secretary had tried very hard, the Prime Minister would certainly have great problems with the US draft. Nevertheless, he would face that problem tomorrow."* [941]

"Most of these two days was taken up with Pym's team going over the issues again with Haig and his officials. At first Haig was hoping to go once again to Buenos Aires to present 'reasonable proposals from London'..." [942]

Secretary Haig contacts Argentina's Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires.

> *"Have just ended our second day of tiring discussions with Francis Pym and his colleagues. As we had anticipated, the text that I brought with me from Buenos Aires is unacceptable to the British. We found strong resistance in those areas I told you about. Nevertheless, we have made a serious effort and are trying to achieve some progress. Now I hope to have a new text soon that you and I can review when we meet..."* [943]

"Nicholas Fenn, the British spokesman, said there was still "life to the Haig mission" but all signs tonight were gloomy, because Mr. Haig had clearly been unable to persuade Mr. Pym to accept compromise ideas that he could bring to the Argentines." [944]

April 24th, acting on President Galtieri's instructions, but without suitable equipment, Argentina's 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade commences a deployment to the Falklands archipelago.[945]

Argentina's air force commence missions over South Georgia. A Boeing 707 overflies *Endurance*. ARA *Belgrano* sails from Ushuaia to take up a position to the east of Tierra del Fuego; to the south of Britain's Exclusion Zone. She is joined by the destroyers *Piedra Buena* and *Hipólito Bouchard,* together with the support ship *Puerto Rosales* (Group 79.3).

From Florida, NASA tells Argentina that the LANDSAT images requested on the 22nd are unavailable due to *"technical problems."*

> *"Eagleburger made two further points. First, it was vital that this should not leak. Second, it was obvious that the longer the "technical problems" continued, the more clear it would become to the Argentinians what was happening... It would be of great help to him ... to know whether ... this could be of some military value to the Agentinians."* [946]

An Argentine registered cargo ship, *Rio de la Plata* (Capt. Carlos Benchetrit) is sighted near Ascension Island.

"... the Argentine Navy took advantage of the expanse of the South Atlantic to task cargo ships and trawlers to scout for the task force and collect intelligence. On 24 April, the 10,409-ton Empressa Lineas Maritimas

940 Ferris 2020
941 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, No folder. Drafted by Smith. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.*
942 Freedman 2005 vol.2
943 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2
944 *New York Times* April 24, 1982
945 Also lacking suitable accommodation, most of this Brigade would be sent on to West Falkland.
946 *PREM19/621. Telegram No. 1441*

Argentinas (ELMA) cargo ship Rio de la Plata was noted loitering off Ascension collecting intelligence…. air photos taken of the ship near Ascension suggested canoes or mini-submarines beneath tarpaulins and therefore the likelihood of Tactical Divers on board." [947]

In the Atlantic, an Argentine Boeing 707 overflies the British fleet.

"This time, the crew picked up the conversation between the Sea Harrier pilot and the carrier's controller. Although both seemed to be familiarized with the TC-91 incursion, they still checked if the Boeing had any suspicious antenna or external device. After this event, the British government informed -through diplomatic channels- that the 707 aircraft would no longer be welcome and were at serious risk." [948]

Another Argentine Boeing 707 sights HMS *Endurance* near Grytviken. [949]

From Washington DC, US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, telegrams PM Thatcher in London.

> *"Francis Pym and I have just concluded our discussions … He will be bringing back to London a text which I put forward as a basis for a peaceful settlement. Francis made it very clear that some of what I suggested presented problems … Whether the text we have suggested would be accepted in Buenos Aires I cannot say. It would certainly require the Argentines to move well beyond their positions at the end of my latest visit there..."* [950]

Haig also messages President Reagan.

> *"... it would be most useful if you could make clear to Mrs. Thatcher that we now face the last chance for a settlement before hostilities escalate, possibly beyond control. She must be clear that you are prepared to advocate acceptance of the current text with the Argentines, and on the public record, but that you are not prepared to stand behind the text if she makes changes that exclude altogether the possibility of Argentine acceptance."* [951]

Britain's Foreign Secretary sends his own message to Thatcher.

> *"Although I was able to persuade him to modify his position in some important respects during our two days of talks, his final draft still falls far short in several places of what we have regarded as acceptable, notably in respect of Argentine representation in the Islands Councils (para 6), Argentine scope for influence in the economic and related fields (para 7) and in precluding the continuation of the present colonial status (para 8)."*

Francis Pym flies back into London with the latest version of Haig's peace plan, to be presented to an OD(SA) meeting. However, less than enthusiastic, PM Thatcher announces that she is prepared to resign if Britain's Cabinet agree with Pym's proposals; *"The document [Pym] brought back was a complete sell-out... a Foreign Secretary of Britain recommended peace at any price. Had it gone through, I could not have stayed."* [952]

"The moment was a tense one: the operation to retake South Georgia was still uncertain... (Pym) later told the Ambassador (Henderson) that "he failed to realise how feelings were hardening at home so that when he got back he felt light-years away from the sentiment there". To the Prime Minister Pym had come back with a document she saw as "conditional surrender."..." [953]

947 Van der Bijl 2023.
948 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.216
949 *Ibid.*
950 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (4)*
951 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (04/24/1982-04/26/1982)*
952 Thatcher quoted in *The Daily Mail* April 15, 2013
953 Freedman 2005 vol.2

"Pym decisively supported the opportunity to accept the final plan worked out by the Americans, to which he himself had contributed during his visit to Washington in the two preceding days. Mrs Thatcher was determined to reject it. The divergence of positions risked breaking the unity of the War Cabinet, in one of the most delicate moments of the crisis. The solution was the compromise formulated by Nott: the British government requested the US to present the proposals first to those who had set off the crisis." [954]

With a decision not to reject anything outright, but to rely on Galtieri rejecting the plan first, Thatcher telegrams Secretary Haig.

> *"This whole business started with an Argentine aggression. Since then our purpose together has been to ensure the early withdrawal by the Argentines in accordance with the Security Council Resolution. We think therefore that the next step should be for you to put your latest ideas to them. I hope that you will seek the Argentine government's view of them tomorrow and establish urgently whether they can accept them. Knowledge of their attitude will be important to the British Cabinet's consideration of your ideas."*

In Washington DC, Haig agrees to talk again to Costa Méndez and promptly telegrams Buenos Aires.

> *"We believe that full-scale conflict with the United Kingdom is imminent. This information comes from our own sources; the British do not consult with us on such matters; nor do we have any means of restraining them."* [955]

> *"Dear Nicanor. Thank you for the messages transmitted by the Ambassador Takacs. With reference to your view that any military action would put an end to efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis, you will recall that I pointed out to you on Monday that we should all be concerned about the possibility of imminent military action in the South Georgia area. The central idea I wanted to express to your Ambassador on Wednesday is that this possibility of imminent military action highlights the urgent need for a diplomatic solution to this crisis. As I know you understand, we have no influence over the British in these matters. Any decision they could make would be theirs alone, without consulting us."* [956]

"As far as the British understood, Argentina was being asked for a straight 'yes or no' answer by midnight on 27 April on a text that the Americans had put beyond alteration. This indeed was the case." [957]


In the Falklands, General Oscar Joffre, with the Argentine 10th Infantry Brigade, and Brigadier General Omar Parada, with the 3rd Infantry Brigade, disembark. [958] A Naval Air Station – *Calderon* – is established on Pebble Island.

In New York, at the United Nations, a copy of the warning handed to Argentina on the 23rd, is delivered for the attention of the Secretary-General (next page).

Argentina's government promptly issues a *communique*.

954 Bruni 2018
955 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2
956 Quoted in Yofre 2011
957 Freedman 2005 vol.2
958 Both of who, had seniority over Menendez. Confusing the situation on the ground.

"The Military Junta of the Argentine Republic informs the (United) Nations and the international Community that by virtue of the arbitrary and unscrupulous decision of the British Government, informed by the Embassy of Switzerland in our country, according to which, since April 12, 1982 at 04:00 am Greenwich, a true zone of aggression is constituted in international navigation waters, it has resolved to adopt self-defense measures in the aforementioned zone of aggression, in accordance with art.51 of the Charter of the United Nations; therefore, you should note that navigation in the mentioned area has become totally unsafe due to the existence of war material in it. For the same reason, the ships that (use) Puerto Soledad and the coves of the islands, must embark practical (measures) to enter. The Argentine Military Junta holds the British Government responsible for the consequences of the critical situation created, produced in circumstances in which a mission of the United States whose intervention said government accepted, tries to find ways of understanding." [959]



UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

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24 April 1982

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to Mr. Whyte's letter dated 9 April 1982 (S/14963), I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to inform you that the following communication was conveyed to the Government of Argentina on 23 April 1982:

"In announcing the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic, will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly."

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. D. PARSONS

"On the morning of Sunday 25th, the readers of the newspaper Convicción found on its cover the communique No.26 (sic) from the Military Junta, which informed that it had received through the Swiss Embassy a note informing the decision of the British Government to attack any Argentine aircraft, ship or submarine, which (endangered) the fulfillment of the mission of the British fleet in the South Atlantic,..." [960]

"By the end of April, with negotiations deadlocked, the British decided to switch to... a coercive strategy of denial. For a denial strategy to work, four types of Argentine threats to the British naval task force had to be degraded or eliminated. The first was the three remaining Argentine submarines ... The second threat consisted of two Argentine naval surface groups,... The third and perhaps the most serious threat took the form of Argentine military aircraft based on the mainland.... (The TEZ) expanded the MEZ to include aircraft in addition to naval vessels." [961]

"... Argentine Naval officers understood the intent of the message was to indicate that any ships operating near the exclusion zone could be attacked." [962]

Off South Georgia, HMSs *Brilliant*, *Antrim* and *Plymouth* regroup, while SSN *Conqueror's* area of operation is moved towards the north and north-east of South Georgia.

959 *Communique #24* of the military junta, dated April 25, 1982, provided by Fabian Turcato.

960 *La errada orden militar de Galtieri en su viaje a Malvinas y la negociación fracasada que pudo evitar la guerra* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infoebae* April 22, 2023

961 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.10

962 *Britain was right to sink the Belgrano* George Alison *UK Defence Journal* January 27, 2017

Day 24


April 25th, in England, Britain's War Cabinet (OD(SA)) and Chiefs of Staff meet at Chequers. [963]

"This was the critical day in the battle for South Georgia. The Haig plan was on the table and the Argentine reaction was awaited, and there was anxiety about the extent of the American pressure Britain would face if Argentina replied positively." [964]

At South Georgia, ARA *Santa Fé,* having landed 50 reinforcements and supplies for the garrison, is seen leaving Grytviken by the crew of HMS *Antrim's* helicopter. The helicopter attacks the submarine with depth charges, while helicopters from the other British ships join in. Badly damaged and with a casualty, *Santa Fé* is abandoned in the shallow water of King Edwards Point. Its crew flee towards Argentina's Grytviken base on foot.

"There was no sign of any activity ashore, not of distinct observations posts or defensive positions, although machine gun fire was reported. All agreed that the momentum must be maintained and the garrison attacked as soon as possible." [965]

Seizing the initiative, albeit contrary to the original plan, the British commander at South Georgia orders an immediate attack, by an *ad hoc* company of 72 men formed from those Royal Marines, Special Boat Service and Special Air Service personnel who are at hand. This diverse assortment of specialists land under covering fire from *Antrim* and *Plymouth*'s 4.5" guns.



"The first troops moved forward cautiously, but when they got close to King Edward Point at 1705 they saw a white flag flying, which had in fact been raised soon after the start of the intense naval bombardment" [966]

At Grytviken, Argentina's 137 soldiers, together with the submarine's crew, surrender without a fight. [967]

"The fall of South Georgia marked the start of a massive distortion of events by the junta. Official communiques described a prolonged and heroic defence against overwhelming British forces, with commando parties dispersing into the wilderness and holding out long after the main fighting ended – the last part of which was completely untrue." [968]

From the UK, BBC Radio reports.

> *"... at about 6 pm London time, the white flag was hoisted in Grytviken beside the Argentine flag. Shortly afterwards, the Argentine forces there surrendered to British forces. The Argentine forces offered only limited resistance to the British troops. Our forces were landed by helicopter and were supported by a number of warships, together with a Royal Fleet Auxiliary. .. So far, no British casualties have been reported..."*

A message from South Georgia is relayed to London;

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963 The official residence of serving British Prime Ministers.
964 Freedman 2005 vol.2
965 *Ibid*.
966 *Ibid*.
967 With Davidoff's scrap-metal party, the total was 180 prisoners.
968 Middlebrook 2003

"Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God Save the Queen."

In London, outside No. 10 Downing Street, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher speaks to reporters.

> *"Just rejoice at the news and congratulate our forces and the Marines... Just rejoice."*

Informed on his arrival in the USA, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, says, in an off-the-cuff remark, that Argentina is now at war. [969] In New York, at the United Nations, Argentine representatives complain of British, "*armed aggression*."

From Buenos Aires, the BBC reports anti-British demonstrations in Argentina.

> *"Father had heard on the radio that the British had bombarded the island and a helicopter had engaged a submarine, the Santa Fe, and the whole lot had surrendered. … I suppose there won't be lots of happy smiling Argy faces round the town now. Best policy will be tunnel vision and not smile at anything, wonder if there will be reprisals."* [970]

"In the afternoon of 25th April, Primero Teniente [First Lieutenant] Roberto Nestor Estevez arrived at the petrol shed to fill up the Land Rover. I began filling the tank when he asked me, 'what is on the World News today?' I told him, 'Good news today, the Union Flag is flying over South Georgia again'. He exclaimed, 'How did that happen!' and I put my hands up in surrender mode. He left before I could finish filling up the Rover. Within an hour, Gomez turned up with a platoon of RI-25 Infantry, he ordered all wireless sets to be handed over at 9am the next morning. I asked 'Why?' to which he said, 'Your people are demoralizing my troops with bad news from the BBC'. I said to him, 'What a phony war you are fighting!' In passing on his demand, I advised everyone to clear out and handover their old, broken radios and keep the good ones." [971]

The Argentine Government issues a series of denials regarding the loss of South Georgia; maintaining that its troops there are continuing to resist the British attack.

In New York, at a UN press conference, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar appeals to both belligerents; *"... to comply immediately with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and to refrain from any action that would broaden yet further the conflict which threatens to have serious consequences for world peace."*

"Parsons immediately went to see the Secretary General to explain that this suggested that Britain had failed to comply with SCR 502, yet only Argentina was in breach. Perez de Cuellar took the point and 'was most apologetic.' He had tried to produce a neutral text but now saw that it could be regarded as equivocal." [972]

From Lima, Peru, Britain's Ambassador Charles Wallace reports to London.

> *"Sources close to the President told me yesterday that he was deeply worried about the present situation. It was also suggested to me that there might be in existence a secret undertaking between the Argentine and Peruvian armed forces dating from … 1979. … The terms of the undertaking would*

969 Both London and Buenos Aires decided to ignore this remark due to the implications of a formal declaration.
970 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
971 Eric Goss in *1982 Uncovered: The Falklands War Mapping Project* Clack T. & Pollard T. 2022 p.41
972 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Parsons would not allow the apology given by Pérez de Cuéllar to be passed on to the press, as he feared that it would act to the detriment of the relationship that he had forged with the Secretary-General. The result, however, was that Thatcher had an uncomfortable few days under fire from the Opposition parties in the Commons for appearing to ignore an appeal from the UN.

commit the armed forces of each country to the defence of the other in case of aggression by a third, clearly with Chile uppermost in mind." [973]

April 26th, from London, Margaret Thatcher sends a message to Secretary Haig in Washington DC.

"Our repossession of South Georgia has radically changed the situation. In particular it enables us to deal with the Falkland Islands in isolation. Equally it should bring home to Argentina her interest in negotiating for a settlement, but time is desperately short. Our task force is approaching the MEZ and the next stage of operations will have to start very soon. ...

There is now no time to negotiate in detail. What we have in mind is as follows. If the Argentinians withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands we will stop our task force and turn it back once Argentinian withdrawal is completed, provided that from that time onwards the United States will militarily guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. This would secure the withdrawal of Argentinian forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 and would secure the way for immediate negotiations in a conference to resolve the dispute. ...

In the meantime the traditional Administration would be restored to the Falkland Islands but for the time being we should be prepared not to send back the Governor and to appoint an officer to administer the Government ad interim. We should be ready, during that time, to have an Argentinian Resident at Port Stanley to look after the interests of the Argentinians living in the Falkland Islands. If this proposal commends itself to you we need to decide how it should be launched. It would of course need your own wholehearted agreement and backing. ..." [974]

Australia's Prime Minister issues a press statement.

"The British Government's decision to use force to re-establish its administration in South Georgia is a natural consequence of the invasion of the Falklands and South Georgia by Argentine forces, and the failure of Argentina to comply with the demands of the United Nations Security Council to withdraw its forces. Argentina has refused to take effective action to settle the dispute by peaceful means, and has ignored repeated warnings… The British military action should therefore not have come as a surprise..."

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher addresses the House of Commons.

"There is no lack of will on our part to negotiate. The trouble is in getting Argentina to withdraw. It may not be possible to achieve an Argentine withdrawal by negotiation, but that is what we are seeking. Argentina has had more than three weeks in which to comply with the Security Council resolution, but it has shown no inclination to do so. Indeed, it has reinforced its troops." [975]

Thatcher tells the BBC that the time for diplomacy is running out.

"Democratic nations believe in the right of self-determination. ... The people who live there are of British stock. They have been for generations, and their wishes are the most important thing of all. Democracy is about the wishes of the people." [976]

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973 There has long been a persistent rumour that some 42 Peruvian soldiers, were flown out to the Falkland Islands to assist the Argentines. Never admitted, nor denied.

974 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262*

975 *HC Deb 26 April 1982 vol.22 cc609-17*

976 BBC's *Panorama* April 26, 1982

HM Submarine *Onyx*, sails for the South Atlantic. [977]

In Buenos Aires, an estimated crowd of 10,000 people demonstrate against the war. [978]

On South Georgia, at the port of Leith, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfredo Astiz agrees to surrender. [979]



> *"It was decided that we would go in at 08.30 and accept the surrender on the football pitch. However, at about 07.30, I had second thoughts about trying to land in an area which was still effectively controlled by enemy troops. I changed the rendezvous at the last moment and Astiz reluctantly agreed. The surrender went smoothly enough and Astiz confirmed our assumption that the building was heavily mined. In fact … our suspicions were further aroused. … There were wires leading out to the middle of the football pitch where they had marked an H for the helicopter landing. … Astiz told me he had found the prospect vaguely amusing. I told him that the white flag obviously meant nothing to him…"* [980]

"… Captain Astiz formally surrendered on board Plymouth. Together with the 39 scrap metal workers this now meant that the Task Group had nearly 200 detainees and prisoners of war." [981]

"The captain-tormentor on South Georgia was unable to command anything but an instrument of torture. "Commander of the Electric Prod", people called Astiz, a man with French-Basque and Scandinavian ancestry. The "Blond Angel of Death" he was called by his victims. To the end, he was a nasty piece of work. He had mined the football field at Grytviken after he had surrendered, so as to cause maximum damage to captain Nicholas Barker's landing party from HMS Endurance. The one hundred and fifty Argentine troops under Astiz's orders and the thirty-nine scrap metal workers whose presence on South Georgia had precipitated the conflict returned to Buenos Aires in mid-May. They had been well treated by their British captors but English food was abominable. They were ordered to say no more." [982]

"While the Military Junta issued statements expressing that it was fighting vigorously, it was reported from London … that the detained troops would be returned to Argentina." [983]

"Astiz was imprisoned on Endurance where he removed and sharpened a bedspring and stabbed a Marine guard." [984]

On the Falklands, Governor Mario Menéndez appoints himself as Head of the 'Malvinas Joint Command'. [985]

> *"It is Argentine Army Day, which was celebrated on the radio with a great speech to the troops by Gen. Menéndez, preceded by lots of inspiring music. The theme seemed to be that they are to fight*

977 A conventional submarine more suitable than the nuclear submarines for the covert insertion of specialist troops.
978 Carbone 2008
979 Astiz had previously been associated with an interrogation centre in Argentina known as the School of Naval Mechanics, and was wanted by a number of countries with regard to the disappearance of their nationals, including France and Sweden. See May 21, and June, 10, 1982, below.
980 Barker 1997
981 Freedman 2005 vol.2
982 Graham-Yool 2007
983 Yofre 2011
984 Elgood 2025 citing a conversation with Capt. Barker.
985 As Menéndez was junior in rank to both Joffre and Parada, his orders were often viewed more as *'suggestions'*.

like lions for their fatherland. He obviously has not seen some of his lions lately. A vet might come in useful." [986]

In Washington DC, US Secretary Haig addresses the OAS Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Treaty in Washington. [987]

"All of us know that we are dealing today with an enormously difficult and sensitive problem. Both the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom assert that their rights to the Islands have been denied. Argentina is motivated by a deep national commitment to establish possession of the Islands. It is frustrated by years of what it considers to be fruitless negotiation. Britain emphasizes its long standing possession of the Islands and asserts that the wishes of the inhabitants must be respected in any lasting settlement. To understand these competing claims and the emotions on both sides does not mean to pass judgment on their validity. But this organization – and the world community – long ago made the judgment that force should not be used to solve international disputes. We shall all suffer if this fundamental principle of both the international order and hemispheric order, which the Rio Treaty was designed to protect, is ignored. I think all of us are aware of how many members of the OAS are involved in a dispute over territory with one or more of their neighbors. In the current conflict, the surest guide to a peaceful settlement is to be found in United Nations Security Council Resolution 502. It requires an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces on the Islands, and that the resolution of the problem be sought through diplomacy." [988]

"... Most Rio Treaty signatories were represented ... Costa Méndez's violent speech was followed by warm applause. A firm statement by Haig that force had been used by an American State and Security Council Resolution 502 laid down the basis for a settlement was greeted with total silence. .. Costa Méndez claimed ... British aggression threatened not only Argentina but the peace and security of the whole Latin American region. The British attack on South Georgia demonstrated how the UK disregarded the course of peaceful negotiation. The UK had answered Argentina's peaceful intentions with "an act of war". ... Argentina would defend itself to the maximum extent: the Argentine flag would not be lowered until the last drop of blood had been expended by the Argentine soldiers..." [989]

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson reports to London.

"Haig has telephoned me following his speech at the OAS which he said went down like a lead balloon. Nobody was likely again to call him even handed. He had spoken to Costa Méndez and told him that time had run out. Haig said that he would be presenting his proposals to the Argentinians on a take it or leave it basis. They would have 24 hours in which to answer yes or no." [990]

Estanislao Valdes Otero, President of the OAS, sends a message to PM Thatcher.

"I have been instructed to transmit the appeal of the Foreign Ministers of the Americas that the Government of the United Kingdom ... immediately cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 on the Inter-American Treaty of reciprocal Assistance, and also refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security and immediately to call a truce

986 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.102
987 OAS = Organisation of American States.
988 *Secretary's Statement, Organization of American States April 26, 1982, Department of State Bulletin June 1982 p.85*
989 *UKE Washington to FCO April 27, 1982* in *PREM19/621 f31*
990 *PREM19/621 Washington to FCO Telegram No. 1465 of 26 April*

that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the Islanders."

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig notes; *"I met with Costa Méndez, telling him that within forty-eight hours, the British would almost certainly strike again, bombarding airfields, launching commando raids. "We have no more time", I said. "The American proposal is fair and reasonable. If necessary, we will go public with it and let the world judge why these negotiations have produced no result". In Costa Méndez, I sensed a reluctance to forward the U.S. proposal. He told me that there was a virulent anti-American and anti-Haig atmosphere building in the country and in the junta. I offered to return to Buenos Aires and deliver the text to Galtieri and the junta myself. ... I asked that the junta inform me within twenty-four hours whether they could receive me. Costa Méndez promised to pass on the message."* [991]

In Argentina, at Bahia Blanca, the 5th Army Corps HQ, Major Patricio Dowling arrives unexpectedly; *"Little was heard about Dowling's disappearance from Malvinas but he was reported to have reappeared ... in Bahia Blanca during the afternoon of 26 April"* [992]

"Learning that British troops had retaken South Georgia, Patrick Watts at Falkland Radio, broadcasting under Argentine control, played "Georgia on my Mind" until the Argentines noticed and smashed the record."[993]

April 27th – in the UK, Thatcher is informed that Secretary Haig, rather than travel to Argentina again, has transmitted his proposals to the Argentine junta via the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.

"On April 27, as prospects for more intense hostilities arose, the United States put forward a proposal of its own. It represented our best estimate of what the two parties could reasonably be expected to accept. It was founded squarely on Resolution 502. That proposal called for negotiations on the removal of the islands from the list of non-self-governing territories. It specified that the definitive status of the islands must be mutually agreed, with due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity. And it referred both to the purposes and principles of the charter and to the relevant resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. Those negotiations were to be completed by the end of the year. Pending that, an interim authority composed of Argentina, Britain, and the United States was to oversee the traditional local administration, to be sure that no decision was taken contrary to the agreement. Argentine residents of the islands were to participate in the councils for this purpose, in proportion to their numbers. During the interim period , travel, transportation, and movement of persons between the islands and the mainland were to be promoted and facilitated without prejudice to the rights and guarantees of the inhabitants. The proposed interim authority of three countries was to make proposals on how to take into account the wishes and interests of the inhabitants and on what the role of the Falkland Islands company should be. Should the negotiations not succeed in the time afforded, the United States was to be asked to engage in a formal mediation/conciliation effort in order to resolve the dispute in 6 months. The British Government indicated that it would give the most serious consideration to acceptance of our proposal, although it presented certain real difficulties for it. " [994]

In London, the latest plans for the reoccupation of the Falklands - *Operation Sutton* - are presented to the War Cabinet.

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991 Haig 1984 p.291
992 Van der Bijl 2023. Seemingly, complaints had forced Menéndez to conclude that Dowling was a liability.
993 Elgood 2025
994 Secretary Haig address to the OAS on May 27, 1982 in *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.89

Sir Ian Sinclair QC advises that Argentine prisoners should be treated as prisoners-of-war; under the terms of the Geneva Conventions. [995]

On the Falklands, 14 Islanders, deemed *'troublemakers'* are detained at Fox Bay East. [996]

> *"… we saw large numbers of fresh troops, who had clearly just arrived on some of the C-130's which came in during the latter part of the morning. They seem to be a sort of commando unit, very professional in appearance and somewhat older than the majority of those already here; about mid-twenties to early thirties… Hard looking men.*
>
> *We were just having tea in the front room when I happened to look out of the window in time to see Martyn being taken into a military vehicle by the new men…*
>
> *Captain Ramanov said that they were Special Forces whose authority superseded all other military, that those detained were about to be taken to a nearby settlement… life is going to be a trifle different from now on."* [997]
>
> *"The Argies have imprisoned several local people: the Haynes family were taken away at 4pm with a few others: Velma and George Malcolm, Gerald Cheek, Owen Summers, Stewart Wallace and family. We are ordered to observe curfew and blackout from 6pm. Crowds of folk are now looking for safe accommodation in the hospital."* [998]
>
> *"The local announcements said that some members of the community had been taken to a place of safety for their own protection. They would be treated well and looked after properly. There was a great spiel about the blackout and curfew …. We had to comply with the edict of Governor Menendez or else."* [999]

In London, concerned about intelligence that Israel is selling arms to Argentina,[1000] Deputy Under-Secretary John Leahy speaks to Israel's Ambassador Shlomo Argov to request that the sales cease. Argov is less than impressed.

> *"You slapped an embargo on us in 1948 and you did the same in 1973 at a time when we were hanging between heaven and earth not knowing whether we shall ever be able to land on earth at the end of it all. This embargo is in effect to this very day and not only will you not sell us any arms but you also refuse to sell us oil though it has become a glut on the market. Be that as it may, I am perfectly ready to make you an offer right now using all my authority as Ambassador Extraordinary and*

995 Thatcher had previously told the House of Commons that Argentine prisoners would not be classed as POWs as war had not been declared. Arrangements were needed to secure the POWs in an place that was sufficiently far from the area of operations to be safe and, as a result, the UK would choose to repatriate Argentine POWs as soon as it could be arranged – with exceptions.

996 There were many instances of the Islanders passing information back to the UK. Reg Silvey, Terry Peck, Vernon Steen and Trudi Morrison, to name only a few. *cf.* Bound 2002

997 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.103 & 104

998 *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021

999 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

1000 Including, apparently, 26 *Nesher* fighter aircraft (Israel's version of the French Dassault *Mirage 5*) with *Shafrir Mk.2* air-to-air missiles and sixteen A-4E Skyhawk aircraft (to the Argentine Navy). Also, four *Dabur* patrol boats and *Gabriel Mk.2* SSM anti-ship missiles (sea-to-sea). A number of 1,700-litre supplementary fuel tanks were sold to extend aircraft ranges. Routes were not direct, and it is known that Peru facilitated the passage of Israeli weapons through its own ports. These supplies were undoubtedly spread over a period of time and it is not known what arrived when. See also, November, 1984.

Plenipotentiary. You sign a document committing yourselves not to sell 275 Chieftain tanks to Jordan and we will commit ourselves not to sell any arms to Argentina irrespective of whether or not we are actually doing so." [1001]

"There were numerous intelligence reports implicating Israelis, some with governmental connections, in attempts to sell arms to Argentina. Most reports involved the transmission of weapons, and parts for existing systems, through third parties, When confronted by these allegations by the British Government, Israeli diplomats denied them vehemently. ... British troops entering Stanley at the end of the war came across Israeli equipment." [1002]

"*At the time, ties were strained between allies Britain and Israel over the First Lebanon War while charges emerged that then Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin had approved the weapons' supply to Argentina."*[1003]

"... the Israelis saw no reason to prevent the sale of arms to a British adversary when London had been supplying weapons to Israel's adversaries in the Middle East and ignoring its protests on the matter. No less importantly, Britain had maintained an arms embargo against Israel. Only nine years earlier during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, Britain controversially withheld spare parts for Israel's tanks and would not authorize landing rights for US aircraft in Cyprus bound for Israel. Indeed, recently released declassified Israeli papers suggest that Israel perceived its sale of arms to Argentina as a bargaining chip in its efforts to persuade London to halt its supply of arms to its Arab adversaries and to end its arms embargo against Israel." [1004]

In Washington DC, during the US 97th Congress, Senator Joseph Biden proposes a resolution for consideration by the US Senate. [1005]

"Declares that the United States cannot remain neutral towards the enforcement of the Security Council Resolution calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falkland Islands. States that the United States should continue to help in the diplomatic efforts to end the crisis but should also prepare to use all appropriate means to assist the United Kingdom in achieving full withdrawal of Argentine forces and implementation of the principle of self-determination."

The US State Department sends an update to its embassy in Buenos Aires.

"Events are moving quickly here and we will have to take action tonight to continue our effort to find a peaceful solution. The Secretary has talked to Costa Méndez and proposed that he travel to Buenos Aires immediately with the agreement text, as it has been refined since we departed Argentina. The President is prepared to call Galtieri if that is necessary." [1006]

US Secretary of State Haig sends a message to Francis Pym in London.

1001 Quoted in *A Chronicle of Failure Foretold: The UK, Israel and Arms Sales to Argentina in the Era of the Falklands War* Azriel Joseph Bermant 2017 in *The International History Review* December 2017 citing ISA (Israel State Archive) 7375/7- *Cable from S. Argov, Israeli Embassy in London to A. Ganor, MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem)* April 30, 1982. See May 4, below.

1002 Freedman 2005 vol.2. It has been suggested (unconfirmed) that as early as the second week in April, two Israeli engineers were flown out to the Falkland Islands to assist in the setting up and maintenance of encrypted radios.

1003 *Declassified UK files reveal Israel sold arms to Argentina during Falklands War* in *Jerusalem Post* August 24, 2016

1004 Bermant 2017

1005 *S. Res 378 – A resolution urging a statement of United States policy regarding the Falkland Islands*. Senator Biden proposed a further resolution on the 29th:- *S. Res 382 – A resolution stating United States policy regarding the Falkland Islands*. This latter resolution was passed 79:1.

1006 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File, 04/27/1982 (1)*

"*We believe that your success on South Georgia may now give us greater reason to hope that the Argentines will regard the presently drafted framework as a preferred alternative to further armed conflict. … we have proposed to the Argentines that I leave for Buenos Aires as soon as that can be arranged – perhaps in the next few hours. … If I do not go to Buenos Aires, I will instruct our Ambassador there to deliver our text and ask for a prompt Argentine reply, thus … we should know within a day or two whether there is reason to hope that a settlement can be reached..*" [1007]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig receives a message from Argentina; *"Costa Méndez informed me that his government could not receive me in Buenos Aires at this time."* [1008]

Britain's Ambassador to the US, Henderson, telegrams Secretary of Defence John Nott in London.

".. had a general discussion with Weinberger... he is delighted by the South Georgia operation and tells me that the President is also. He is sceptical whether the current negotiations are going to get anywhere."

In New York, the Organisation of American States (OAS) continues its discussions.

"On April 27, 1982, a meeting of the Working Commission of the Conference of American Foreign Ministers took place, in which the resolution that supported Argentine sovereignty in the islands was approved. Great Britain was urged to urgently end the hostilities and the parties were asked to resume negotiations for a peaceful solution to the dispute, while at the same time they repudiated the coercive economic and political measures that the European Economic Community and other States had taken, and that were detrimental to the Argentine people. This resolution was approved with the votes of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Santo Domingo, Uruguay and Venezuela, but with significant abstentions from Chile, Colombia, the United States and Trinidad and Tobago. The absence of Secretary of State Haig in the final session showed how difficult it would be to put this initiative, boycotted by the United States, into practice." [1009]

The Washington Post reports:

"Argentina's military government, breaking a long silence over Britain's recapture of South Georgia, announced this morning that Argentine forces were "maintaining their positions" on the island and that British reports of an Argentine surrender were "absolutely false."

In the first statement by the military junta in more than 24 hours, a communique issued shortly after midnight said reports subsequent to the British reports of the Argentine surrender indicated that special Argentine Navy forces were continuing to operate in the area around Port Leith, "in spite of the superior forces of the attackers."

The junta also denounced reports from London that a commando landed on the Falkland Islands, 800 miles northwest of South Georgia, as "part of a campaign unleashed by Great Britain with the end of confusing international public opinion." The junta's statement early this morning followed a day of studied silence at Britain's actions while Argentina reacted with a mixture of confusion and renewed patriotism to the limited news of the military setback. …

1007 *PREM19/622*

1008 *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy* A. Haig 1984 p.291

1009 *La Guerra de Malvinas, La Doctrina Monroe y La Crisis del TIAR* Leandro Morgenfeld 2023 in *La doctrina Monroe contra America Latina y el Caribe 1823 - 2023* Carlos Oliva Campos (ed) 2023

The silence over Sunday's British military move appeared to be aimed at turning attention toward Argentina's newly bolstered diplomatic offensive in Washington.

Foreign Ministry officials here expressed hopes that the British assault on South Georgia would reverse what has been only moderate support for Argentina among other Latin American countries. Officials here expected the endorsement in Washington of a strong declaration by the 21 nations that are signatories to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Defense, also called the Rio Treaty."

From London, an assessment is sent from the US Embassy to Washington.

"On April 27, the American embassy in London sent an encrypted cable to Washington noting that "... with South Georgia retaken, Her Majesty's Government would be considering additional military steps [...] We believe that Her Majesty (sic) considers that a further assault on the Falklands would be a last resort. In order to keep the pressure up on Argentina, the British Government could continue to build on the success achieved in (South Georgia) through a series of military actions [...] We suspect that the British are hoping that the Argentines will offer 'opportunity' targets in the next few days"." [1010]

April 28th, from Washington DC, Secretary Haig telephones Foreign Secretary Pym to say that he had not received anything from Argentina where there appeared to be a stalemate within the junta; the Navy favouring resistance, the Air Force and Army preferring negotiation.

"Pym and Henderson pressed Haig to acknowledge failure and blame Argentina. This he was reluctant to do, and anxiety about how far he might be prepared to go in search of a deal grew in London. Haig appeared to be expecting Argentine amendments and while he was prepared to dismiss most of their likely demands, he seemed to think that it might be possible to offer more on Argentine representation on the Legislative Council. He was even suggesting that midnight on 27 April had not been so much a deadline as a time when, absent an Argentine reply, the 'whole situation would change.' When pressed by Henderson on Argentine stalling tactics he said that he had 'to go right down to the end of the line before coming down on our side.'..." [1011]

From London, Francis Pym instructs Ambassador Henderson in Washington to; *"... report to us immediately, when there is any clear response from Galtieri and the Junta..."*

From Switzerland, the Red Cross (ICRC) appeals to both Britain and Argentina to fully discharge their obligations under the Geneva Conventions. [1012]

In London, Admiral Leach warns the Chiefs of Staff that the Argentine aircraft carrier, *Veinticinco de Mayo,* is believed to have mounted five *Super Entendard* aircraft with *Exocet* missiles. [1013]

Defence Secretary Nott makes a statement to the House of Commons.

"The following statement was issued by the Government earlier today:

From 1100 GMT on 30th April 1982, a ***Total Exclusion Zone*** *will be established around the Falkland Islands. The outer limit of this Zone is the same as for the Maritime Exclusion Zone established on Monday 12th April 1982, namely a circle of 200 nautical miles radius from latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes South, 59 degrees 30 minutes West.*

1010 Yofre 2011

1011 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1012 *PREM19/622.* The Conventions applied in any state of war; any other type of armed conflict, or when territory was occupied. The junta would not declare the first; was reluctant to recognise the second and denied that it occupied foreign territory. As a result Argentina viewed the ICRC with suspicion.

1013 Ferris 2020. In fact this was not the case due to a limited catapult capability.

From the time indicated, the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation. Any ship and any aircraft whether military or civil which is found within this Zone without due authority from the MOD in London will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British Forces.

Also from the time indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and accordingly is liable to attack.

These measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter." [1014]

In Washington DC, a final resolution is adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS).

"RESOLVES:

1. To urge the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and also to refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security.

2. To urge the Government of the Republic of Argentina likewise to refrain from taking any action that may exacerbate the situation.

3. To urge those governments immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the islanders." [1015]

Colombia, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago and the USA abstain. On leaving the OAS meeting, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, tells the waiting press that; *"The first phase – OAS endorsement of Argentinian sovereignty – is complete."*

"At the end ... Costa Méndez said that "Argentina negotiates, negotiates and negotiates without the sovereignty that has been ratified by all of America". Furthermore "Argentina's strategy does not exclude resorting to the UN, the OAS or war if we are forced". Costa Méndez received a long standing applause from the foreign ministers. Haig sat for a few minutes and then left." [1016]

From London, Francis Pym telegrams Alexander Haig.

"The (OAS) Resolution is not acceptable to us. We cannot forego our undoubted rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as the Resolution suggests we should. The OAS Resolution is to be conveyed to the President of the Security Council. Argentina may additionally seek an early debate in the Council and the adoption of a Resolution on similar lines. We have so far been successful in

1014 *HC Deb 28 April 1982 vol.22 cc296-7W.* My emphasis
1015 *OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 28/82 rev.3*
1016 Yofre 2011

keeping the issue out of the Council since the adoption of SCR 502. … We will be working hard to achieve this."[1017]

In New York, at the UN, Argentina's mission, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, describes the declaration of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) as a, *"new act of aggression"* and calls the British use of force; *"… an unjustified act of reprisal aimed at restoring colonial occupation of the Argentine islands;…"* Argentine representatives also asserts that it is; *"… impossible for the United Kingdom to claim the right of self-defence, under Article 51, in islands situated 8,000 miles from British territory."*

British representative Anthony Parsons provides details of the TEZ to the President of the UN Security Council, adding; *"Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack."* [1018]

Parsons also raises the issue of self-determination.

> *"Self-determination is usually referred to these days in the United Nations not as a principle, but rather as an "inalienable right"; in other words, it is a right which cannot be taken away. This right derives principally from the Charter and the Covenants on Human Rights. Article 1(2) of the Charter refers to self-determination of "peoples" and article 73 recognises that "the interests of the inhabitants" of territories such as the Falkland Islands are paramount.*
>
> *Article 1 of the two international Covenants on Human Rights contains the following provision: "1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. …" Paragraph 3 of the same article establishes that the duty to promote the realisation of this right is imposed upon all state parties and not only upon those administering territories. The Falkland Islanders are a people. The United Kingdom ratified both the Human Rights Covenants on their behalf. They are a permanent population. … The United Kingdom cannot accept that the right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter and the Human Rights Covenants is subject to a special exception in the case of the Falkland Islands. This conclusion is confirmed by the Friendly Relations Declaration, adopted by consensus in 1970. …* [1019]
>
> *Whilst no doubt much time and energy could be spent in reviewing the history of the Falkland Islands between the first settlement in 1764 and 1833, and whilst the United Kingdom is confident about the strength of its legal case over that period, these factors cannot be allowed to override the right of self-determination. … If the international community were to discount 149 years of history, there would hardly be an international boundary which did not immediately become subject of dispute."* [1020]

In Peru, airport workers impose a boycott of British aircraft and cargoes.

Brazil's Navy commanders offer Admiral Anaya anything he wants from their reserves; *"… and they lent us six observation planes."* [1021]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig meets with Costa Méndez.

1017 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370, (2) Falklands Crisis-1982.*

1018 *PREM19/623 telegram No.627 1 May 1982*

1019 Resolution 2625 (XXV) - *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations A/RES/25/2625* 1970

1020 *UN Doc A/37/582*

1021 Yofre 2011. None of which arrived in time to assist Argentina.

"The essential message Costa-Mendez conveyed was the following: the GOA (Government of Argentina) believes the Rio Treaty MFM resolution strengthened its position with Argentine and world opinion, but realizes there are only two options for resolving the Falklands dispute: a continuation of the U.S. effort or through the U.N. The U.N. route would require major readjustments in Argentine foreign policy which the GOA does not want to make (and Costa-Mendez even less), and the outcome would be uncertain. Therefore, Argentina wants the U.S. effort to continue. However, it cannot accept the proposal as it stands; the GOA has difficulties with what it perceives as lack of a deadline for resolving the sovereignty issue, with the administrative arrangements for the interim period, and with the political resolution article, particularly the reference to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants. The Secretary told Costa-Mendez that only the U.S. is in a position to achieve a satisfactory solution. He understood the reference to adjustments in Argentina's foreign policy, but did not believe any Argentine Government could undertake a close alliance with the Soviets. As for the text of the proposal, the Secretary told Costa-Mendez that we see no prospect for any significant changes being accepted by the British. The UK has serious problems with it as it stands; however, if the GOA agrees to the proposal, we are confident that we can prevail upon the UK to accept, provided full-scale fighting has not yet begun. According to our information (the Secretary stressed again that the British are keeping their plans to themselves), a British attack could begin as early as Friday. ... The Secretary and Enders went over the three points Costa Mendez had listed as stumbling blocks, pointing out that the essential concerns of the GOA have been preserved with only minor modifications from the text at the time the Secretary departed Buenos Aires.... It is in our judgment a fair and reasonable proposal, one which the U.S. can stand behind. ... if the GOA concludes definitively that it cannot accept the proposal, there should also be no doubt that the U.S. will have to come down strongly on the side of the UK." [1022]

Alexander Haig gives Costa Méndez 24 hours to respond; *"Costa Mendez did not make any proposals but went out and told the press that the American draft had not been rejected and negotiations continued."* [1023]

Haig telephones Pym in London; *"Costa Méndez ... had made a clear and plaintive request for the negotiating process to continue. Costa Méndez has said that the alternatives were for Argentina to bring in "the others" (by which Haig presumably meant the Russians: Haig commented that he doubted that they would be interested) or go to the UN. He had asked Haig whether he would forward further suggestions to us. Haig had told him that the proposals as they stood offered Argentina more than she could reasonably have expected. There was no hope of improving them..."* [1024]

April 29th, taking off at 0400 local time from San Julian, an Argentine A-4C flown by 1st Lt. Daniel Manzotti, sights; *"a large formation of vessels with their lights on, and in an inverted-V formation. Once they landed, Manzotti said: "The size of the fleet is scary"."* [1025]

At Ascension Island, British *Vulcan* bombers arrive.

In London, a meeting of the Ministry of Defence's Special Project Group (DPS) notes a dispute with the BBC over plans to broadcast to Argentine troops on the Falklands.

"Mr. Douglas Muggeridge, Head of Overseas Broadcasting, has persuaded the FCO to oppose the proposal... Mr. Protheroe, Asst Director General and our earlier contact, does not seem to share his colleagues view." [1026]

1022 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/28/1982*
1023 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1024 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/28/1982*
1025 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.225
1026 Information supplied by Chris Greenway, BBC Monitoring. Broadcasts went ahead despite the opposition.

The DPS also sanctions a paper titled "*Military Options for Repossession of the Falkland Islands*":

"... a reappraisal of the military options ... in the light of the successful recapture of South Georgia and the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone to come into effect from 30 April. The Options have been arranged in ascending order of severity and are presented in a form designed to bring their respective advantages and disadvantages more sharply into focus. They are not mutually exclusive. 1. Psychological operations. 2. Issue ultimatum. Reinforce UK Air Presence in Falkland area. 4. Retaking South Sandwich. 5. Extended cutting of Argentine lines of communication to Falkland Islands. 6. Harassment Operations against Argentine Garrison by Special Forces/Commando raids. 7. Harassment Operations against Argentine Garrison by Air Attacks. 8. OP SUTTON with modified aim of establishing a secure military presence on part of the Falkland Islands without attempting to evict Argentines. 9. Mining/blockading mainland Argentine ports. 10. Unrestricted offensive operations against Argentine Naval units. 11. Landing in the Falkland Islands OP SUTTON 12. ... 13. ... 14. ..." [1027]

British intelligence indicates that Brazil is selling aircraft to Argentina's Air Force.[1028]

At Downing Street, the Cabinet meet.

"... that morning the Cabinet were being prepared for a possible situation in which it could no longer be assumed that Britain would retain American support, important though it was... The American effort to remain conspicuously neutral politically had taken its toll. There had been no economic measures taken by Washington, a refusal to take a stand on the sovereignty issue, and a readiness to conduct business as usual with Buenos Aires. After the Cabinet Pym wrote to Haig expressing the surprise of his colleagues that deadlines had passed without an American response..." [1029]

Margaret Thatcher sends a message to President Reagan.

"... the proposals must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on sovereignty. Al made clear to Francis last week that, if Argentina did reject the proposals, the U.S. would consider its current peace-making efforts to have ended and would from then on give full public support to Britain. In the Cabinet's view, this point has now been reached. I cannot conceal from you how deeply let down I and my colleagues would feel if under these circumstances the U.S. were not now to give us its full support." [1030]

Reagan responds to Thatcher; *"... There can be no doubt about our full support for you and the principles of international law and order you are defending. You can count on that support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can also count on our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance."* [1031]

In Buenos Aires, Ernesto Sabato, a staunch opponent of the junta writes in *La Nacion*.

> *"In Argentina it is not a military dictatorship that is fighting. It is the whole people, her women, her children, her old people, regardless of their political persuasion. Opponents to the regime like myself are fighting for our dignity, fighting to extricate the last vestiges of colonialism. Don't be mistaken, Europe, it is not a dictatorship that is fighting for the Malvinas; it is the whole nation."*

1027 This list was prepared for a Chiefs of Staff meeting planned for May 1, 1982. Options 12 to 14 remain redacted; initially for 40 years under FOI section 27 this now appears to have been extended until 2057. *cf.* September 7, 1984.
1028 Source identified as the Buenos Aires correspondent of the '*Mañana*' journal. In fact, they were a gift. See above.
1029 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1030 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 04/29/1982 (1)*
1031 *PREM19/622 Prime Minister's Personal Message T91/82*

In Washington DC, Argentine Ambassador Takacs presents Haig with his Government's rejection.

"We have carefully reviewed the document you sent us and have compared it with our previous proposals and with the viewpoints we have maintained in our various meetings. From that review, significant differences have emerged, some of which give rise to difficulties that it is essential to overcome. As my Government has already stated to you, the objective the Argentine Government has set is recognition of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. This central element of our discussions is the ultimate justification of the actions taken by my country, and as I have had occasion to tell you many times, constitutes for us an unrenounceable goal.

Along with the question of sovereignty, the current crisis gives rise immediately to the need to establish a provisional regime for administration of the islands, as an essential step in the process of separating the two military forces and as a reasonable pause in the face of the logical impossibility of formalizing their final fate at this time.

The conversations we have held have been based primarily on these two questions - recognition of sovereignty and a provisional administrative regime. Solution of the remaining problems will be simpler if there is agreement on the two points that I have just mentioned. The one certain thing is that the two are intimately connected to each other. To the extent that the provisions relating to the recognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, for us it is necessary - if we do not want to return to the frustrating situation that prevailed before April 2 - to establish mechanisms that give us broader powers in administration of the islands.

On the other side of the coin, if it were clear that Argentina's sovereignty would be recognized in the end, then we could be more flexible regarding the matter of temporary administration.

The document sent by the Secretary of State falls short of Argentine demands and does not satisfy its minimal aspirations for either of the two points. To the contrary, unfavorable changes have been made to both. The number of Argentine representatives involved in administration of the islands has been decreased, and the opportunity of expanding my country's control in the event that negotiations on the basic issue go on endlessly without a solution has been barred. Thus we are faced with the real possibility of establishing a predominantly British administration with no fixed expiration date.

As concerns the matter of sovereignty, the concept of territorial integrity has been stripped of all meaning. Further, the new element of a virtual referendum to determine the "wishes" of the inhabitants has been introduced in open opposition to United Nations Resolution 2065 and the unwavering position sustained by Argentina. The Secretary knows that we cannot accept these changes. In my opinion, other formulas must be found. For this effort, we will always be at the disposal of the Secretary. These formulas should provide for the balance that I referred to above in order to weigh properly the data relating to the matter of sovereignty against the provisions regulating temporary administration of the islands. These provisions should have a fixed term and include gradually larger Argentine participation or, in lieu of this, the provisions should be made precise enough to offer security for recognition of Argentina's rights within a specific period.

If Argentina's position were encompassed, agreement would be facilitated enormously and the final text of the document would not pose any insurmountable problems. ..." [1032]

1032 *Nicanor Costa Mendez to Alexander Haig Jr.* April 29, 1982 quoted in *Department of State Bulletin* October 1982 vol.82 no.2067 pp.86-87.Also *PREM19/622 Telegram 1517 of 29 April.* Also *Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83S210, Falklands [Folder 1]*

"When Costa Méndez asked whether the UK had rejected the American proposal, Haig replied that they did not like it all as the document offered a fundamental change in the status quo of the islands. Yet if Argentina accepted it, he would force Britain into doing likewise. He would not contemplate further changes to the draft."[1033]

In London, updating Parliament, Margaret Thatcher deals with a suggestion of arbitration.

> *"Although we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich or British Antarctic Territory, some of my right hon. and hon. friends have suggested that we refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. Since Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, the issue cannot be referred for a binding decision without her agreement. We have never sought a ruling on the Falkland Islands themselves from that court, but we have raised the question of the dependencies on three separate occasions - in 1947, 1949 and 1951.*
>
> *Each time Argentina refused to go to the court.*
>
> *In 1955, the British Government applied unilaterally to the International Court of Justice against encroachments on British sovereignty in the dependencies by Argentina. Again, the court advised that it could not pursue the matter since it could act only if there was agreement between the parties recognising the court's jurisdiction.*
>
> *In 1977, Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind.*
>
> *There is no reason, given the history of this question, for Britain, which has sovereignty and is claiming nothing more, to make the first move. It is Argentina that is making a claim. If Argentina wanted to refer it to the International Court, we would consider the possibility very seriously. But in the light of past events it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like."* [1034]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig updates his country's Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

> *"We went first to London, then to Buenos Aires, and then again to Buenos Aires, as you know. We had extensive discussions at the highest level. In Great Britain it was relatively easy because the government is structured and organised pluralistically and democratically. The Cabinet sits down with the Prime Minister, and business is done.*
>
> *In Argentina …. there is no one who can make a decision. There are variously from 20 to 40 people who can cast a veto on any decision that is made. And so instead of a consensus of what you would call a majority view, it is the lowest common denominator of the most extreme view that prevails...*
>
> *I must say that the British Government, from the outset, has been reasonable and easy to deal with. Their position has been that sovereignty is not a critical issue. What is a critical issue is that the will of the population, self determination is the key issue. And if the population decides to go with Argentina, so be it; if they decide to stay aligned with Britain or seek independence, so be it. The British are prepared to accept that. ... On the Argentine side, despite all our effort …. the Argentines have insisted bedrock, fundamental a priori relinquishment of sovereignty, … So it's not just a question of decolonization; its a question of recolonization on top of decolonization."*

1033 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1034 *HC 22/980-85*

Asked about taking the issue to arbitration, Haig tells the Committee that such an approach would not be acceptable to Argentina.

> *"I have talked adjudication by the World Court, by the UN, or by a special commission. It was rejected all."* [1035]

"Administration officials said today that Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr.'s diplomatic efforts had apparently failed to produce a solution in the Falklands crisis. They said heavy fighting between Argentina and Britain was likely to begin in the next day or so unless there was an unexpected development. Mr. Haig, in a closed-door briefing for the House Foreign Affairs Committee today, said that he had not completely given up hope for a diplomatic solution but that there was little chance that fighting over the Falkland Islands could be averted. According to several participants in the meeting, Mr. Haig added that once it became apparent there was no longer a plausible prospect for a negotiated settlement, the Administration would publicly make it clear that it stood with Britain in the crisis. He left open the possibility that, even if fighting began, there might still be an opportunity for a diplomatic solution." [1036]

"The U.S. Government is committed to the use of the International Court of Justice to resolve legal disputes , consistent with Article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter. ... The dispute on sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas is an issue which the Court could appropriately decide. U.S. negotiators this spring raised this matter with both sides . Neither has ever indicated a willingness to have recourse to the Court over the Falklands/Malvinas. The case does not fall within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and the agreement of both parties is thus necessary to submit the case for binding decision." [1037]

In Washington DC, the US Senate resolves:

> *"... the United States cannot stand neutral with regard to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502 and recognizing the right of the United Kingdom, and all other Nations, to self-defence under the UN Charter, should therefore prepare, through consultations with Congress, to further all efforts ... to achieve full withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands."* [1038]

"Earlier Thursday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved by voice vote another resolution expressing 'full U.S. diplomatic support' for Britain should it go to war with Argentina over the Falklands. The Senate resolution said 'the United States cannot stand neutral with regard to implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 502,' which accused Argentina of aggression and called for its withdrawal. Recognizing Britain's right to self defense under the U.N. Charter, it called on the administration 'through consultations with Congress, to further all efforts, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 502, to achieve full withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.' ... The Senate resolution noted that 'on April 2, 1982, armed forces of Argentina seized and occupied the Falkland Islands, a crown colony of the United Kingdom.' It added: 'The United States Government has provided good offices to the search for the diplomatic solution required by Security Council Resolution 502 and called for by the Organization of American States.' It noted that 'no treaty obligation of the United States requires or implies United States support of ... any act of international

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1035 *Briefing by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig Jr. Secretary of State before Key House Leadership and House Foreign Affairs Committee – Room 2172, Rayburn Building, Washington DC 4/29/82.* See also, 1968.

1036 *The New York Times* April 30, 1982 p.1

1037 US Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Enders statement to the Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 5, 1982 in *Department of State Bulletin* October 1982 vol.82 no.2067 p.78

1038 *PREM19/623* 79 votes for, 1 against (Helms)

aggression' and that there are long standing bonds of friendship between the United States and the Britain. The House resolution also calls on Argentina to withdraw its military forces from the disputed Falklands Islands in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 502." [1039]

After the meeting, US Senator Joseph Biden is interviewed by CBC journalist Barbara Frum. [1040]

> *"It's clear that the Argentinians are the aggressor; it's clear the British are right & it should be clear to the whole world where the United States stands."*

In New York, at the United Nations, Argentina accuses the UK of; *"unleashing a new colonialist war."* [1041]

Sir Anthony Parsons informs London; *"I have spent most of the day in the company of all other members of the Security Council. There is an atmosphere amongst them of great tension and expectation e.g., of a dramatic military move by us any day now, but no sign that any of them are contemplating calling the Council. This hesitation may disappear if Haig announces failure ... tomorrow..."*

From Buenos Aires, late in the evening, President Galtieri telephones Costa Méndez in New York.

"On April 29, I returned to New York, I am at the hotel 11 at night, and I receive a call from General Galtieri who tells me: "Minister, we are going to withdraw the troops". It had an impact on me. ... "We are going to withdraw the troops. What do you think? That is my idea". "Sounds good to me, President". "Because"? "Why does it seem good to me? Because we are at a time when negotiations with the United States have failed, not through our fault ... and we have promised America to seek a peaceful solution and because there is still time for United nations troops to go". Then I start preparing the papers, but unfortunately the next morning ... the decision is suspended." [1042]

Across Argentina, general censorship is imposed for reasons of - *"national security."* [1043]

> *"All information and news from abroad, whatever its source or form, and all information related to aspects which pertain to the development of military operations and national security will be subject to control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before publication by the news media, whether oral, written or televised."*


"Between 28 April and 2 May, ... GCHQ gave its consumers interceptions of increasingly warlike Argentine orders. On 29 April, the Argentine naval command told commanders: "The lack of progress in the diplomatic negotiations does not permit any expectation of immediate change in the existing situation" while "a continuation of British offensive action is foreseeable". Argentine ships would penetrate the Exclusion Zone in order to test British responses, following its prior offensive plan, "use of arms without restriction". [1044]

1039 *UPI Archives* April 29, 1982
1040 Biden was elected US President in 2020. This news article circulated widely within Argentina during that presidential election campaign.
1041 *UN Yearbook 1982*
1042 Costa Méndez interviewed in 1992 quoted in Yofre 2011
1043 Graham-Yool 2007
1044 Ferris 2020

April 30th, in Buenos Aires, shortly after midnight, US Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman meets with Galtieri.

> *"I told Galtieri that we came without instructions and with the only purpose of seeing what we could do to head off a fatal confrontation. I pointed out to the President that we had not received an adequate response to our proposal and that we would announce tomorrow several measures against Argentina. During more than an hour's conversation, he demonstrated no give whatsoever... He made a point, as we all know, that the navy is hungry for action. "* [1045]

"Harry Shlaudeman made his last and desperate attempt: he asked General Leopoldo Galtieri for Argentina to withdraw its troops from the islands ... the General replied that he was "just one of the three who make the decisions." ... "The Navy is hungry to get into action," Galtieri said, in any case, that he would raise the request with the heads of the Navy and Air Force, Anaya and Basilio Lami Dozo." [1046]



At Ascension Island, British frigates *Argonaut* and *Ardent* arrive in the anchorage, as HMS *Antelope* sails south.

In the South Atlantic, the Total Exclusion Zone, announced on April 28th, comes into force.

"This was now a true blockade - and, presumably, there were now British submarines on station in the area prepared to enforce the declaration." [1047]

In the USA, investigative journalist Jack Anderson, speaking on the *Good Morning America* television programme, alleges that the British Task Force is armed with tactical nuclear weapons and that they have US authority to use. [1048]

"Even taking nuclear weapons into the South Atlantic could appear as a violation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), which had established Latin America and surrounding waters (including the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies) as a nuclear weapon free zone. Strictly speaking there could be no violation because not all states had signed and ratified the Treaty, while extra-continental states with responsibilities for territories within the intended zone of application were required to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I, with nuclear weapons states also acceding to an Additional Protocol II. Argentina had signed the Treaty in 1967 and while it had publicly announced its intention to ratify it had not yet done so. The United Kingdom had signed both protocols in 1967 and ratified them in 1969. ... The presence of a nuclear-powered warship in Falkland islands territorial waters would not contravene the Treaty as it was so clearly unrelated to nuclear weapons." [1049]

1045 *AMEMBASSY Buenos Aires to SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3485.* See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21344-19820430-falklands-crisis-prospective-us-measures

1046 *Cómo fue la noche en la que pudo haberse evitado la Guerra de Malvinas* Hugo Aconada Mon in *La Nacion* April 30, 2007

1047 Schmitt & Green (eds) 1998. Brown (2021) argues that the extension only included the Argentine aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo* outside the exclusion zone, and only in circumstances where it posed a threat to the Task Force.

1048 It would take nearly 40 years before the details emerged fully. In fact, 31 WE177 nuclear depth charges had been taken south for the simple reason that there had been no time to offload those weapons before the fleet's hurried departure. As the Task Force sailed south, the depth charges were unshipped from their host vessels and by the middle of May, 1982, 12 were stored on HMS *Invincible* and 18 on HMS *Hermes*. RFA *Regent* had one in its hold. None of these vessels entered Falklands waters during the 74 day conflict.

1049 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Argentina only ratified the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, in 1994.

"*... we did have some nuclear depth charges. We did have some being carried with the Task Force and they were being transferred from ship to ship for safety reasons and to meet our obligations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The weapons themselves were not deployed in the course of the conflict. We said in 1982 that there was no question at all of our using nuclear weapons in this dispute....*" [1050]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig reports to a US National Security Council meeting.

> *"Unfortunately, the Argentine government which is, in fact, made up of many moving and conflicting parts could not agree to the plan. The Navy holds the veto and is even more intransigent after losing South Georgia, whose Argentine garrison surrendered without firing a shot – a fact known to the Argentine government, but not to the Argentine people."*

During the discussion, Bud McFarlane informs President Reagan that the Soviet Union has repositioned a satellite in order to keep track of Britain's Task Force.

"In the area of Argentina-USSR relations, although the Russian Federation has not declassified military archives from the period, various sources provide evidence of the satellite support provided by the USSR to the Argentine military. Such sources include Evgeny Astakhov, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Argentina (2000-2004), who stated that "[...] The USSR passed the satellite data to Buenos Aires", and Jaime Noguera, who believes - following the revelations of journalist Sergey Borisovich Briliyov - that the photographic information provided by the Kosmos-1365 satellite helped locate ... the destroyer HMS Coventry and the container ship SS Atlantic Conveyor." [1051]

In a press statement, Haig announces Argentina's rejection of his peace proposals.

> *"Argentina's position remains that it must receive an assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an immediate de facto role in governing the islands, which would lead to sovereignty. For its part, the British Government has continued to affirm the need to respect the views of the inhabitants in any settlement. ... in the light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the U.S. cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes ... The President has therefore ordered: the suspension of all military exports to Argentina; the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales; the suspension of new export-import bank credits and guarantees; and the suspension of commodity credit corporation guarantees."*[1052]

"I couldn't tell the Americans what I was going to do in the Malvinas. They would have stopped me. I trusted that that they would maintain an equidistant of positions. ... I did not expect them to later take the position they did." [1053]

"On April 30, in light of Argentina's continued unwillingness to compromise, we took concrete measures to under-score that the United States could not and would not condone the unlawful use of force to resolve disputes." [1054]

1050 Ministry of Defence statement April 2010

1051 *Hacia una mirada diferente sobre la Guerra de Malvinas* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

1052 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982 (1).* See May 2nd

1053 Leopoldo Galtieri interviewed on July 29, 1982 in Yofre 2011

1054 *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation* US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs August 5, 1982 (evidence of Assistant Secretary Enders)

"... mediation attempts failed, and on April 30 the United States openly sided with Great Britain provoking feelings of betrayal in most Latin American nations." [1055]

"The situation was reaching its final stage. A dead end. Argentina could not obtain British recognition of its sovereignty over the disputed islands. Nor that a joint civil administration be established in the Malvinas to manage the transfer. ... Furthermore, the "self-determination" of the Kelpers, as Margaret Thatcher desired, remained to be discussed. The two parties, if they gave in, saw their permanence in power threatened. And the United States felt that they had failed in their mediation efforts." [1056]

US President Reagan notes in his diary; *"Al has announced the turn down of our plan by Argentina and that we must now come down on the side of Britain."*

In New York, at the UN, and coinciding with Haig's press conference, Costa Méndez informs Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar that his country does not see the negotiations as *'dead'*. Méndez asserts that Argentina is ready to abide by SC resolution *502* and accept a transitional administration; *"... until the exercise of full Argentine sovereignty became possible."*

" .., the Argentine Government wishes to state, .., that at no time did it term unacceptable the proposals of the United States Secretary of State. Instead its objection was directed primarily at certain specific points, including some changes that had been made in the document compared to previous drafts, and it suggested that other formulas be sought. It added that if "Argentina's position were encompassed, agreement would be facilitated enormously and the final text of the document would not pose any insurmountable problems". The Argentine Government wishes this important point to be made clear,..." [1057]

In London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym makes a statement to the press.

> "*In deciding not to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the Argentines have confirmed their commitment to aggression in defiance of the UN ..."*

Alan Copeland of the *Daily Express* asks whether Pym's planned trip, to see the UN Secretary-General, precludes any immediate use of force by Britain.

> *"No, because we are facing force now. As I have described they have a fleet at sea, they've got thousands of soldiers on the islands, they're occupying territory which they have no right to occupy. No. We are going to maintain our total exclusion zone. That is the position. If they challenge it, then of course there will be military action and that's how it is ..."*

Ecuador's Foreign Minister also issues a statement for the press.

> *"I have just learnt with profound concern of the attitude of the United States in imposing sanctions against the Argentine Republic and in supporting Great Britain. I must point out that the Resolution of the ... (OAS).. is obligatory for all the States members of the Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance. ... The Resolution recalls the declaration of the Inter-American Legal Committee in the sense that, "the Argentine Republic has an unimpeachable right of sovereignty over the Islas Malvinas." This is a legal and moral obligation which the members of the Treaty have assumed by*

1055 *All You Will See is the One You Once Knew: Portrayals From the Falklands/Malvinas War in U.S. and Latin American Newspapers* Carolina Acosta-Alzuru & P. Lester-Roushanzamir 2000

1056 Yofre 2011

1057 Argentina's Foreign Minster Nicanor Costa Mendez, addressing a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), May 28, 1982.

virtue of the Resolution. In these circumstances the support which has been announced and declared by the United States for Great Britain and the imposition of sanctions against the Argentine Republic constitute disregard of the obligation which the United States assumed …"

Brazil writes to the UN Secretary-General requesting the use of his *'good offices'* in finding a peaceful solution; *"It is the responsibility of the United Nations to take prompt and effective measures, including those of a preventative nature, to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982).."*

Peru's representative at the United Nations also objects to US sanctions; *"The Government of Peru deplores the fact that the Government of the United States has adopted measures that clearly place it in favor of one of the involved parties and that, in effect, virtually concludes Your Excellency's exercise of good offices. Furthermore, my government considers the offer made by the Government of the United States to offer material military aid to one of the parties as contravening the purposes of Resolution 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations by potentially contributing to the aggravation of the hostilities."* [1058]

Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, contacts the President of the UN Security Council.

"… (a) he reaffirmed Argentina's wish for a negotiated settlement: (b) Argentina was ready for the implementation of SCR 502 "as a package": (c) Argentina hoped that there would be no confrontation. The UK was using disproportionate force and an armed encounter could have unforeseen consequences: (d) Argentina was ready to accept a transitional period in which all aspects of the dispute could be resolved: (e) the question of sovereignty was of the greatest importance to Argentina. Argentina was disposed to accept a mutually agreeable formula on sovereignty during the transitional period: (f) so far as Argentina was concerned, Haig was still in action but his latest proposals on sovereignty had not been acceptable to Argentina: (g) Argentina would accept the presence of a UN force in the Islands in order to enable Argentina to withdraw and to begin the transitional period." [1059]

From Washington DC, Ambassador Henderson reports on Argentina's economic position; *"Major US banks are seeking to limit use of Argentine short-term credit lines to the levels reached before the crisis. Smaller banks with a high exposure in Latin America are pulling out as soon as credits mature, and building their liquidity against the possibility of deposits being shifted away from them. One of these banks felt that even if there was an immediate political settlement, there was no way that Argentina could avoid going broke within 2 months or so, …"*

At the United Nations, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar summons Sir Anthony Parsons.

"Costa Méndez had said that Argentina was ready to abide by SCR 502. There would of course have to be a phasing out period for the withdrawal of Argentine troops: and a transitional administration until the full exercise of Argentine sovereignty became possible. Recognition of Argentina's right to sovereignty was a basic condition. Apart from that, Argentina was ready to enter into negotiations on the widest possible basis. She was ready to take into consideration the "interests" of the Islanders but not their "wishes" which had been imposed by the Administering power. But she could accept a form of local administration which retained a British flavour … Argentina was therefore open to all possibilities, except on sovereignty… I said that it was impossible for the British Government to concede sovereignty in advance, or to accept conditions implying that they were prepared to concede sovereignty. I thought that when Costa Méndez said that Argentina was ready to implement SCR 502

1058 Unconfirmed intelligence reports suggested that Peru was in the process of negotiating a loan of military aircraft to Argentina. Ten were eventually delivered to Argentina, but not soon enough or in a sufficient state of preparedness, to be used.

1059 *PREM 19/623 Telegram No. 612 of 30 April 1982*

in its entirety, he was implying that he would start at the bottom end of the Resolution. … Britain could not accept a process of mediation or negotiation while the Argentines dug themselves in... Finally, Pérez de Cuéllar said that, if Argentina stated officially that Haig's mission was dead, a void would exist which he and the Security Council would be expected to fill. …"

Parsons telegrams the Foreign Office in London.

"Costa Méndez's various statements here today amount to a smart PR move... My guess is that his purpose has been to present the Argentine position in the most favourable light particularly in UN eyes and try to distract attention from US and UK responses to the failure of Haig's mission. He has succeeded in creating the impression of a change in the Argentine position …

I do not think however that we need to take Costa Méndez's PR success too tragically. His statements have been small beer by comparison with those of Haig … and they will soon be overtaken by a presumably less diplomatic response from the Generals in Buenos Aires …"

A UN spokesman announces that Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar has offered his *"good offices."*

"On 30 April I met at United Nations Headquarters with Mr. Nicanor Costa Mendez, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Argentina. Later that day I received a letter from Mr. Alexander Haig, Secretary of State of the United States of America, which provided information on the American proposal which had been presented to the parties and a statement of the position taken by the United States in the light of the existing situation." [1060]

British intelligence suggests that Argentina's naval forces have been divided into three groups. The flagship aircraft carrier, ARA *Veinticinco de Mayo*, and its supporting vessels, are sailing towards the north of Britain's declared exclusion zone. Another group, led by ARA *General Belgrano*, is patrolling to the south of the archipelago. Reports suggest that a third group is also headed south.

In the South Atlantic, British submarine HMS *Conqueror* is ordered to search for the *Belgrano* group.

"One curiosity lay in the activity of the southern Argentine Task Force, composed of the Belgrano and two destroyers. A few days earlier it had appeared to be guarding against Chile, and was even believed to have infringed Chilean territorial waters... possibly trying to provoke the Chilean Navy. … By the evening of the 29 April the group was noted to be patrolling between the Isla de los Estados and the Burwood Bank, in order to draw out British forces and test reactions within TEZ. The cruiser took up a course that would take it into the southern edge of the TEZ early Sunday morning where it would remain for a limited time before withdrawing. There were also indications that both Argentine Navy submarines, were operating in the TEZ. Information on Argentina's offensive intent was distributed in intelligence summaries on the evening of 30 April,.." [1061]

"Shortly after entering her patrol area at 11.08 on 30 April Conqueror made sonar contact with a group of ships to the west, about 50 miles east of Staten Island, which correlated with intelligence reports indicating that the Belgrano group was in the area..." [1062]

In New York, Argentina submits a letter addressed to the UN Security Council.

1060 Secretary-General addressing the Security Council on May 21, 1982. See *UN Doc S/PV.2350*
1061 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1062 Brown 2021

"... the United Kingdom has no legal grounds whatsoever for invoking the right of self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter in justification of the military aggression it is carrying out in the South Georgia Islands. The fact that three weeks elapsed between Argentina's recovery of those islands for its national patrimony and the British attacks which began on 25 April, and the fact that the islands are 8,000 miles from the territory of the United Kingdom, clearly show how inappropriate it is to invoke Article 51 of the Charter as justification for this manifestly illegitimate use of force. ...

The Argentine forces ... certainly exercising the right of self-defence in order to repel a grave and imminent danger, have continued their resistance in the South Georgia Islands, thus giving the lie to the United Kingdom's statements that its authority has been restored in those territories. ... continuation of the British Government's punitive actions compels my country to exercise its right of self-defence ..."

Parsons also addresses the Security Council.

"On 3 April 1982, notwithstanding current action in the Security Council and the adoption of SCR 502, Argentina carried out an armed invasion of the island of South Georgia. The small British garrison resisted but was eventually captured. On 25 April, in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, British forces re-established British authority on South Georgia. ...

There is no question of the United Kingdom Government having acted aggressively, having in any way breached the terms of SCR 502 (implementation of para.2 of which by Argentina is still awaited by the international community) or of having caused a breach of international peace and security. ..."

US intelligence reports Argentina's Air Force Chief of Staff, Juan Garcia, as saying that Argentina will not be the first to open fire but that an attack on Stanley airport will trigger a full scale attack on the British fleet.

"Garcia ... reiterated that the Argentine Government could not present a peace plan to its people that did not assure sovereignty over the Falklands. He also said that British commandos have landed on the islands and Argentine forces are attempting to locate them. If the commandos succeed in mingling with the local population, measures to control the civilians would be imposed." [1063]

"... the Argentine General High Command in the Malvinas decided to defend three 'key' zones: Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), the capital of the islands; Darwin-Goose Green on Soledad Island (East Falkland); and, for political reasons, Fox Bay and Port Howard on Gran Malvina Island (West Falkland). ... All the Army units rushed to the islands without their heavy and support equipment. For instance, they lacked sufficient field kitchens, winter clothing, communication equipment, or even spare batteries to properly support the troops."[1064]

"... by the end of April Argentina had some 13,000 men in the Islands, the infantry component being eight regiments with between 5,000-6,000 men... They were equipped with 150mm and 155mm artillery, air defence weapons, APCs and perhaps some self-propelled antitank guns and so, in principle, should be able to inflict heavy casualties in any direct British assault against the capital." [1065]

"By the end of April, the three infantry brigades deployed on Las Malvinas were in three area of responsibility. The Littoral Army Force defended ground outside Port Stanley ... 4th Regiment in Port Stanley was tasked to be a helicopter-borne reserve for the Littoral Force and be permanently ready as a reaction force... The Puerto

1063 See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21345-19820501-falkland-islands-dispute
1064 Corbacho 2004
1065 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Argentino Army force area of responsibility was to prevent the loss of the important Fresinet Peninsula … and the area of East Falkland to the east of the general line of Port Salvador, Mount Darwin and Fitzroy."[1066]

From Ascension Island, late evening, two *Vulcan* bombers and eleven *Victors* carrying fuel, take off – Operation *Black Buck*.



May 1st, during the night, SAS and SBS reconnaissance teams land on East Falkland Island.

"They hid so skillfully that the farm manager at Port San Carlos, Alan Miller, told me he was unaware they were hiding for days in hedges close to his house. He was surprised when an officer popped up from behind a gorse bush and greeted him, 'Ah, good morning, Mr. Miller…" [1067]



Before dawn, at 0440 local time, after a long flight from Ascension Island, *XM607*, a *Vulcan* bomber, attacks the airfield near Stanley. [1068]

"When the British attacked on May 1st, we were able to provide the Task Force Commander with minute to minute information on the Argentinean reaction. We were able to pick up the Argentinean airplanes as they were taking off, and monitored their flight and communications, as they were transmitting in clear voice." [1069]

"That this was accomplished so quickly and successfully is a great credit both to the crews and to the engineers. So it was that the RAF fired the opening salvo in the Falklands campaign by bombing Port Stanley airfield on 1 May, hitting the runway with one bomb. Bearing in mind the Vulcan's very dated systems and its

1066 Van der Bijl 2023
1067 Briley 2022
1068 *Operation Black Buck.* There were 5 bombing raids by these aircraft (two raids were cancelled) and although the extent of damage caused is disputed, news of the attacks were well received by the public at home. The first attack was piloted by Flt. Lieut. Martin Withers, an Australian serving in the RAF. Middlebrook (2003) suggests that three Argentines died in this attack. In Bennett (2021) there is a reference to casualties taken to the local hospital.
1069 Chilean Air Force General Fernando Matthei in *The Matthei to Mrs Thatcher Memorandum* March 25, 1999.

iron bombs, weapons employment experts will tell you that, in order to render a runway like the one at Port Stanley 'unuseable', would have required some twenty-five to thirty sorties, so, despite what some critics may think, that single bomb was actually a pretty fair result. I spent the evening of the first BLACK BUCK operation with Adm Fieldhouse, incidentally, and I can assure you that he was entirely in favour of the operation."[1070]

"... significantly by detecting the take-offs and landings of Harriers, Argentine radars at Port Stanley located Hermes and Invincible. Thus, Argentine aircraft, either land or sea-based, could theoretically hit British carriers even 700 miles from the mainland. Britain understood this vulnerability, ... These radars also provided the only early warning of airborne Harriers to Argentine aircraft attacking around the islands. British V-bombers ... sought to destroy this radar system with missiles homing in on radar signals, but failed."[1071]

"Although 22 free-fall bombs were dropped, only one hit the runway and Air Force support ground crew personnel swiftly repaired the crater, which meant the airstrip was operating again within 24 hours." [1072]

"No intelligence alert was received on the island, not even a warning about the possibility of a Vulcan bomber flying from Ascension Island and attacking BAM Malvinas; hence, neither the surveillance system nor the antiaircraft defense system was prepared to face such an attack. ... The CIC chief on duty, Mayor Kajihara, reported that 10 to 15 minutes before the attack, the radar acquired an echo to the north in an antenna rotation, and that the first real alarm, 30 seconds before the first bomb exploded, came from POA 9 installed 30 km northwest of Puerto Argentino, which heard the passage of a powerful jet engine. There was no time to issue the red alarm. ... At 0440, heading northeast-southwest, the Vulcan made the final run and dropped the bombs. The first one exploded on the runway edge (400 meters from threshold 26) and left it partially out of service. The other twenty bombs fell in a line that ran diagonally across the runway and towards the air station, the bivouac, the Elta 2106 radar antenna and the PCAAa. They exploded randomly for more than three hours, with different delay-action times, in order to instill fear and make rescue and debris removal tasks difficult. ... Amid total darkness, screams were heard from a group of men who moved around in the distance, stunned, disoriented and half-dressed. Gunners led them to their shelters using flashlights. The bomb had exploded near their tent and destroyed it. Marine conscript class of 1962, Ricardo Raúl Romero, died instantly. ... As a result of the attack, the Argentine Air Force suffered its first casualties: conscripts class of 1963 Guillermo Ubaldo García and Héctor Ramón Bordón, belonging to the company of soldiers of the 1st and 9th Brigade, respectively. Both of them served as sentries near one of the Squadron's tents when they were caught by surprise by the bombing and could not seek shelter in time. ... The last of the twenty-one bombs dropped by the Vulcan exploded at 0800." [1073]

Shortly after, at 0830 local time, *Sea Harriers* from HMS *Hermes* attack targets in, and around, Stanley and Goose Green. [1074]

1070 *Vulcan Operations* Sir John Curtiss in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal* 2003 no.30

1071 Ferris 2020

1072 Van der Bijl 2023

1073 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.241-243


1074 48 bombs were dropped on or around Stanley airfield by *Sea Harriers*. One of which suffered minor damage to its tail from a 20mm shell; there were no other casualties although Argentine records reported three *Harriers* shot down. Three more attacked Goose Green where at least one helicopter was destroyed and its pilot killed (Argentine press reports would later laud his death in a gallant, lone attack on HMS *Hermes*). Two, possibly three, *Pucarás* were also damaged. Some dispute over casualty figures. See Middlebrook 2003 and Van de Bijl 2023

"I'm not allowed to say how many planes joined the raid, but I counted them all out and I counted them all back."[1075]

"At 4.37 this morning we were literally thrown out of our beds by the most fearful explosions. The house seemed to lift off its foundations… By the time we had got to the bottom of the stairs, a tremendous barrage of anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire opened up from all over the town."[1076]

"We could hear the reverberations from a series of heavy explosions and the distant rumble of large jet engines. I looked at the clock: it was 4.30am. Then came the rattle of anti-aircraft gunfire. I said to Valerie: 'I think the boys have passed by and dropped a calling card.' She replied 'Oh goodee!'... I went into the kitchen to make a pot of tea" [1077]

"... on 1 May, three Sea Harriers caught the defenders (Goose Green) by surprise at the cost of seven Air Force personnel killed, 14 wounded, one Pucara destroyed, two damaged and ammunition exploding. Pedrozo censured Braghini for the unsatisfactory state of air defence, ..." [1078]


Argentine Air Force asset deployment in Malvinas - 1 May
N
BAM Malvinas (Airport)
• 1 VyCA Squadron (TPS-43)
• 1 AAa Squadron (35-20 mm -ELTA)
• 1 GOE Squadron
• 1 Troop Squad (2 Companies)
• 1 Construction Squadron
• 1 Service Fight Unit
• Air Cargo Terminal (TAC MLV)
• SCAT & ROA
• Communications
• Medical Service
BAM Cóndor (Prado del Ganso)
• 1 Pucará Squadron - 12 aircraft
• 1 Helicopter Squadron:
2 CH-47 Chinook - 2 Bell 212
• 1 AAa Squadron (20 mm - ELTA)
• 1 Defense and Security Company
• R.O.A
• Communications
• Medical Service
Gran Malvina Island
Soledad Island
Darwin
Puerto Argentino
0
50
100 km

"... the Elta radar alert was issued, since it had detected an approaching moving object. The alarm was not transmitted because it was assumed that they were Argentine aircraft; but when they were detected again just 4 km away, Sea Harriers could be seen approaching at a minimum-altitude, dropping conventional and submunition bombs. As combatants ran for shelter, they felt the ground shaking and the deafening explosions. One of the bombs hit the A-527 aircraft which Teniente Daniel Jukic was starting up, surrounded by mechanics and gunners NCOs. The aircraft caught fire and the flames caused the gradual explosion of on-board weapons. The area turned into a deadly trap for those who were helping with the aircraft. Another bomb flew over the Command Post and exploded 60 meters away, leaving a large crater in the peat. The rest of the weapons dropped exploded in different places along the runway, damaging two other aircraft, together with trucks and

1075 BBC News report by Brian Hanrahan
1076 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.112
1077 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1078 Van de Bijl 2023. Another source suggests the loss of life amounted to eight Argentine personnel.

vehicles, and maintenance equipment, and hurting even more people. The devastating attack caused utter chaos. … The fire and blasts continued for more than an hour." [1079]

During the morning, British frigates HMS *Arrow* and HMS *Alacrity,* along with the destroyer HMS *Glamorgan,* bombard Stanley airfield. They are attacked by three Argentine *Dagger* jets; one of which is shot down and another damaged. All three ships sustain minor damage. A *Seacat* operator in *Alacrity* is wounded.

"Upon changing course, the destroyer (Glamorgan) barely diverted from the trajectory of the 250-kg bombs that fell on both sides of the deck. Two enormous explosions took place, which lifted the stern nearly 5 meters out of the water. The tillerflat187 housing rose 4.5 meters. It was later discovered that the steering gear fairing and the propeller guard mount had come loose. The hull plates were crushed, and there were shrapnel holes in the rudders. The tillerflat pillar was bent, and a shaft bearing case was also cracked. … the Arrow (rear vertex) received eight 30 mm hits from Capitán Dimeglio, which wounded one crew member; and shrapnel from a bomb launched by Primer Teniente Román caused a breach in the Alacrity (right vertex) hull, which was later repaired. Argentine combatants, witnesses to the attack at approximately 10 km from the coast, confirmed that there were three vessels … The destroyer was surrounded by dark, dense smoke as it slowly turned to port towards the fleeing frigates. When its stern faced the coast, it was seen listing to starboard, and gray to dark gray smoke with black puffs were coming out, which indicated that it had suffered damage …" [1080]

An Argentine *Canberra* bomber is also shot down whilst within the *exclusion zone*.

> *"The firing stopped after a while, causing someone to suggest it was about time we had a cup of tea, so we all trooped back up to the kitchen. We tuned into the BBC… but all we could get from England was a most interesting but unhelpful programme on birth control for overseas listeners."* [1081]

"The ensuing Argentinian air raids on the task force were an Argentinian response…, but were repulsed by Sea Harriers from Invincible and Hermes, with one Mirage, one Dagger and one Canberra shot down by Sidewinder missiles, whilst a second Mirage was damaged and subsequently shot down over Stanley in error by the Argentines." [1082]

Argentine specialists identify the location of the Task Force; *"On 1 May, after the morning attacks, the Task Force approached the islands. From that moment on, it was possible to observe on the radar that the CAPs were taking off from and returning to a distant point, some 180 kilometers away, which overlapped with cumuliform clouds, in an illusory fashion. After a while, noticing that the points of departure and return coincided with the clouds time and time again, the radar operators suspected that something unusual was hiding behind those static echoes. They expanded the radar screen over the area and, to their surprise, they discovered that the Harriers were coming out of and returning to the central clouds. In this unexpected way, Argentine radar operators confirmed the location of the British fleet."*[1083]

Argentina's Navy Command issues orders.

"On 1 May, the Argentine command gave all warships "freedom of action", and ordered "commencement of offensive operations". Veinticinco de Mayo would "deploy by night to a favourable position in order to launch a daytime air attack on units detected" through its own air reconnaissance. "This movement will be carried out during the night, keeping one's distance from the enemy in order to minimise risks of a night air attack, in

1079 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.247. Image above from this source.
1080 *Ibid.* p.265. *Glamorgan* sustained minor damage under the waterline, which was easily repaired.
1081 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.112
1082 Brown 2021. See also *Rachel remembers* … in Bennett 2021
1083 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.306

order to subsequently initiate an attack at first light". The corvette group would assault "units damaged by the air attack and any other dispersed units". The Belgrano group would hit British warships with missiles. "Attacks should only be made on targets when conditions are favourable, taking into account the threat from the air". Every Argentine warship must launch an early reconnaissance and unleash "a massive attack on the surface units before the withdraw".” [1084]

Following the air attack on Goose Green, 114 settlers from that settlement are interned at the Recreation Club. This wooden building has two toilets, a bar and limited running water, but no food supplies. After the civilians are moved, Argentine soldiers loot the houses and hide helicopters between the buildings to deter attack. [1085]

“I had already decided that, if air attacks came, I would move my defences from around the school, which was separate from the settlement, to new positions around the houses, with the idea that the British would never bomb the settlement area.... also, some of the civilians had seemed hostile and uncooperative.... I thought it was better to concentrate them all in one place...” [1086]

“On 29th April, I saw the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Italo Angel Piaggi with Regiment Infantry-12 (RI-12) by Chinook helicopter. They took over the bunkhouse and our single men moved into other vacant houses. Further restrictions of camp work were enforced, and we all saw the arrival of fourteen Pucarás on the airstrip. A few days later, on 1st May, British Harriers bombed the airstrip. This resulted in the inhabitants of Darwin and Goose Green being incarcerated in the Community Hall. We had had no food until late in the evening. At dark, I barged out past the guards on the door, to stop a Fuerza Aérea Argentina (FAA – Argentine Air Force) aircraft Engineer Officer, passing with a squad of conscripts. I explained my plight and requested permission to get some provisions from the store. His response was, ‘Only you and the Storekeeper and no lights, no tell anybody’. He was risking his neck letting us out against orders. Our diet for the next four days was Rivita and Spam. We had no bedding. It was tough laying on a cold, wooden floor, especially for the three octogenarians and the children. Then and now I admire the quiet fortitude of mothers and fathers caring for their children in such inhumane conditions. I think what kept us all positive was the faith we had in Margaret Thatcher and the despatch of the Task Force.” [1087]

“First-Lieutenant Esteban summoned the civilians to a meeting at the community hall to discuss their safety. However, Eric Goss, the farm manager, refused until threatened by a CH-47 Chinook pilot ... Pedrozo announced that since a British landing was imminent, all 113 residents were to be confined in the hall – for their own safety. Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi gave another reason for protecting the locals from the 'rage of the Air Force men, who had lost so many colleagues'. ... Senior Argentine officers appeared to be unaware of the Fourth (Geneva) Convention. For instance, they breached the principles (by) not supplying the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) with details of internees, their location and markings of the community hall as an internment camp. Officers also appeared to have little interest in the welfare of the internees, which included children, a baby ages four months and three octogenarians. No blankets were supplied, the adequacy of the sanitation was not checked and, on the first day, it had not been until the evening that Goss had persuaded a passing Air Force sergeant and his four conscripts to allow him and Keith Baillie to 'do a shop' at the Farm store. In the darkness, they filled two boxes with Rivita, cream crackers, margarine, spam, tea, coffee, Horlicks, Ovaltine, cocoa, dry powder milk, Marmite and Bovril and when Goss mentioned that it was hardly enough to feed 113 people, the sergeant allowed four more boxes to be filled and then instructed two of his men to help carry the supplies to the community hall. Suspicious that resupply could be

1084 Ferris 2020 citing *3/AA/90057-82 April 30, 1982.* Also *Signint History* pp.99-108
1085 No food was made available for 48 hours. Such detention is illegal under the Geneva Conventions.
1086 First Lt. Esteban quoted by Middlebrook 2003
1087 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 pp.41-42

intermittent, Goss rationed the adults to two Rivitas and a slice of Spam per day. The children and the elderly had their fill. Fortunately, other 'ration runs' were organised." [1088]

"One Islander I interviewed during the referendum had been locked in a hall in Goose Green for twenty-nine days during the 1982 invasion, given daily rations of three spoons of baked beans and crackers." [1089]

In an Argentine blue on blue incident, an A-4B bombs an unidentified ship – *Formosa*. With an unexploded bomb in its hold, the Argentine ship sails for Rio Grande. [1090]

British ships sailing from Ascension Island include *Sir Lancelot*, *Sir Tristram*, *Sir Galahad*, *Sir Percivale*, *Sir Geraint* (all LSLs), RFA *Pearleaf* and a water carrier *Fort Toronto*.

To the south of the Falkland Islands, HM Submarine *Conqueror* sights the *Belgrano* group. Britain's operations room at Northwood receive the information at 1629z; *"The submarine then shadowed the group, remaining between 9,000 and 14,000 yards from it at speeds up to 21 knots."* [1091]

To the north of the archipelago, HM Submarine *Splendid*, searching for the *Veinticinco de Mayo* sees frigates and destroyers, but not the aircraft carrier.

From Madrid, Spain's Government protests the British air attack, alleging that it; *".. constitutes a serious escalation in the conflict. The possible outbreak of a more generalised and massive British action in the archipelago would mean a tragic loss of human lives and would signify great responsibility and a historic error. The Spanish Government ...deplores the fact that in spite of its efforts in the international fora and in bilateral contacts no account has been taken of the fundamental colonial problem which is the origin of the conflict and on which Spain has always supported Argentina's traditional position, ..."* [1092]

In New York, Argentina's mission submits a letter to the UN Security Council.

> *"... two Harrier aircraft were shot down, a third was hit ... In perpetrating this bloody aggression against my country, the United Kingdom is persisting in violating Security Council Resolution 502 (1982). In the light of these facts, not even the most distorted interpretation of that Resolution (which was adopted in the interests of peace) can be used by the United Kingdom in an attempt to legitimise its irresponsible conduct. The increasing aggression by the United Kingdom ... is today threatening to unleash an armed conflict of unknown dimensions and unforeseeable implications for international peace and security; the United Kingdom Government will be solely responsible for the breach of such peace and security. ... The United Kingdom ... cynically invoking the right of self-defence in seeking to justify an open and brazen act of aggression."* [1093]

Britain's Ministry of Defence issue a statement.

> *"... an air engagement took place this evening within the Total Exclusion Zone between British Sea Harriers and Argentine Mirages. One Mirage was shot down. There are no reports of damage to British aircraft."*

1088 Van der Bijl 2023
1089 Blair 2023
1090 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.273
1091 Brown 2021
1092 It is not very clear what 'efforts' Spain had made. Indeed, Spain made little comment throughout the 1982 conflict; possibly because its application to join NATO was pending.
1093 No *Harrier* losses were reported on May 1, 1982.

> *"The news from the Argentines was grim, and, we hope, wishful thinking on their part. They reported HMS Hermes had been badly damaged, with five of her Harriers lost. The BBC reported that there was no damage and that all her aircraft had returned safely."* [1094]

"The Argentine take on the events of 1 May varied considerably from that of the British. Unlike the British they knew that the damage to Stanley airfield was limited. They also believed that their air defences had shot down two Harriers during the dawn raids, and that they had inflicted serious damage on at least one warship." [1095]

"On 1 May, different pieces of information overlapped and thus it was difficult to check the veracity of the shoot downs. The same event was observed by different people from different angles and distances. It was hard to keep track and to record the reports, especially when there was no accuracy regarding the time and place of the event. ... Regardless of the British information, there are still significant doubts as regards the identity and real damage to the sighted destroyer (Glamorgan), since many eyewitnesses saw the bombs explode on the vessel ..." [1096]

In New York, with the President of the Security Council calling for information, Parsons sends a reminder.

> *"In my letter of 28 April concerning the Total Exclusion Zone, I set out the text of an announcement by the Government of the United Kingdom to the effect that from 1100 hrs on 30 April 1982, "Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack" ..."*

From Lima, following a telephone conference with Secretary Haig, President Belaunde of Peru contacts Galtieri in Buenos Aires, with proposals for a diplomatic solution.

"1) An immediate cease fire. 2) Mutual withdrawal of forces. 3) Introduction of third parties to govern the Islands. 4) The two governments acknowledge the existence of conflicting views with respect to the Islands. 5) The two governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views and the interests of the Islanders in the final solution. 6) The third parties – or contact group – would be composed of Brazil, Peru, West Germany, and the United States. 7) A final solution will be reached not later than April 30th, 1983, under the guarantee of the contact group." [1097]

"... I read the paper that has seven points and I tell him (Galtieri) – "Look, General, it seems excellent to me, considering where we are, by the way". "Because"? "Because it's better than Haig's. First, it's better than Haig's because it does not ask for the restitution of British authority, not even shared, but rather a group of four countries. Second, because it simply talks about the aspirations of the islanders, not desires and even less self-determination, that is, their aspirations will be heard." [1098]

"Galtieri objected to the United States because of its recent 'public attitude'. Belaunde said that Canada had been mentioned as an alternative, but it had been suggested that it was even less acceptable, and that anyway the United States was balanced by Peru ('a country that's frankly on Argentina's side'). Brazil was the alternative. ..." [1099]

1094 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.116
1095 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Also asserted that the British had attempted a landing, but abandoned due to superior defences.
1096 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. p.256 & p.265
1097 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/02/1982*. Also presented to Washington, but not transmitted to the UK
1098 Costa Méndez interviewed in 1882 quoted in Yofre 2011
1099 Freedman 2005 vol.2

In the South Atlantic, believing that they have the advantage, Vice-Admiral Lombardo directs Admiral Allara in *Veinticinco de Mayo* to move towards the position of the British fleet. At 2007 local time, Lombardo orders an attack.

> *"I gave the order to attack on 1 May. When the British force set out to land would be the key moment of danger and their whole strategy would be to defend people who disembarked. Then they put all their elements, including submarines, to defend that position. That was the moment when we had to take the opportunity to do something."* [1100]

> *"May 1st, the Argentine High Command told us the British were disembarking on the northern part of the Falklands. That evidently meant most of their ships would be concentrated, for a prolonged period of time, in that area. This, therefore, was a favourable opportunity for the mission of Task Force 79."*[1101]

"It had been a very bad day for the Argentines. The runway at Stanley airfield had been badly damaged (sic), and a Pucará had been destroyed and two more damaged at Goose Green airfield. Positions had been bombarded. Two Argentine ships had been damaged, one by the fire of its own side's aircraft. Three Argentine aircraft had been shot down by Sea Harriers and a fourth destroyed by the fire of its own side after being damaged in air combat. Seventeen Argentines were dead; four air-crew in the air, one pilot and seven technicians at Goose Green and five men killed around Stanley by the Vulcan bombs or by naval shelling. One officer and twenty-seven men were injured. Several observation parties of British troops had been successfully landed. The British casualties consisted only in superficial damage to two ships, a cannon shell hole through the tail fin of a Sea Harrier and one seaman slightly injured." [1102]

In Buenos Aires, in a radio address, President Galtieri informs the Argentine people of the day's events.

> *"Compatriots: the armed forces of the nation have today responded to a fresh act of war by Britain in the South Atlantic. They have used and they are continuing at this time to use fire against us. We have responded and shall respond with fire and that will always be our response if the enemy tries to turn Argentina land into a colony again. Prior to this attack, for day and whole weeks, unbelievable pressures were exerted against our national will. Attempts have been made to portray us as bloody aggressors when the truth, as everyone knows, is that in recovering unredeemed territory we prefer to die than to kill, and so, in an unprecedented military operation, neither the adversary nor the Malvinas population suffered a single casualty.*
>
> *We have been wronged by sanctions which the great powers do not apply to those they regard as their worst enemies, as though our being a young nation made us easy prey. …*
>
> *We have been insulted:*
>
> *We have been slandered: and intimidation has been used against us, along with threats, intrigue and all imaginable manoeuvres to discredit us.*
>
> *We have given our reasons.*
>
> *We have said that for almost a century and a half we have obtained only intemperate refusals or the most cynical silence in response to our persistent claims for our proven rights. …*

1100 Vice-Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo in an interview with *La Nacion* published March 31, 2001
1101 Admiral Gualter Allara interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.216
1102 Middlebrook 2003

Now the British Empire, emboldened by the supposed results of its campaign of pressure, is resorting to the direct and overt use of force. There remains no other recourse but to respond with military action to this violence. ..." [1103]

May 2nd, in Buenos Aires, newspaper Clarin reports:

"The whole country supports its soldiers [...] The events unleashed by the unspeakable British aggression against the Malvinas Islands have moved our people, who are saddened by the fate of their children [...]

These days, the simple people have contributed food or coats, have written to the soldiers, have taught their children the value of the Malvinas [...] has made all the gestures within their power to somehow star in the history of which they are part."

From Stanley, General Menéndez reports; *"... a British landing attempt which had been successfully repelled. Moreover, he noticed that Argentina Air Force's attacks on the Task Force together with the anti-aircraft fire had taken a heavy toll on the enemy. ... Meanwhile, in Puerto Belgrano, COATLANSUR arrived at the conclusion that the information coming from Malvinas was incorrect, that the reported landing attempt had not taken place, and that the British were not engaged in any decisive action. From Argentine positions, however, helicopters had been observed over the Gran Malvina and Soledad Islands from which units of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force special forces had landed, ..."* [1104]

From Washington DC, Secretary Haig telegrams President Belaunde in Lima, Peru.

"If the text is agreeable to President Galtieri and to the other members of the governing Junta, I will be pleased to present it to Foreign Secretary Pym with whom I will meet at 10 o'clock this morning."

In the UK, British intelligence, acting upon intercepted Argentine communications, conclude that Argentina's naval groups are set to deploy a pincer movement. The aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo* is to attack the British fleet from the north, while the *Belgrano* group is to come from the south-west.

"The Belgrano group, TG 79.3, ... was to deploy south to Burdwood Bank, and then close in on the British to deal with any surface units operating to the south of the Falklands, ... Lombardo urged an early reconnaissance followed by by a massive attack on the British fleet before any units had a chance to withdraw. It was the receipt of the detailed offensive plan that caused the most stir. Within a few hours of the order being issued by Allara, this was being relayed to the (British) Task Force..." [1105]

"At 05.18 the commander-in-chief's staff at Northwood instructed Conqueror that Belgrano's group was not to be attacked until allowed by the rules of engagement. ... It was probably during the night of 1/2 May that the fleet commander's staff in Northwood realized that if the Belgrano group chose to make a dash across the shallows (Burwood Bank), Conqueror might not be able to keep track of all three ships, and they might get within Exocet range of Hermes and Invincible before anybody could take action to stop them." [1106]

1103 *PREM19-0646.* Argentine news agency *Telam* claimed that this address was met with a gun salute by its forces on the archipelago. There were no local reports.

1104 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.287. COATLANSUR = Commander South Atlantic Theater of Operations (Admiral Juan Lombardo)

1105 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1106 Brown 2021. Some would argue that the '*rules of engagement*' at this point, already permitted such an attack.

British intelligence reports also conclude that Argentina now has 13,000 troops on the archipelago; supported by 42 105mm guns, 4 x 155mm guns, 23 quick-firing anti-aircraft guns plus surface-to-air missiles. Also 23 armoured cars. [1107]

In Britain, in an article published in the *Observer* newspaper, Professor Rosalyn Higgins considers the situation under international law.

> *"Regardless of the turbulent history of the period 1765-1832, it is clear that Britain, having intervened in 1833 in protest against Argentina's attempts to assert authority in the islands, has established a good title. ...*
>
> *No tribunal could tell her (Argentina) that she has to accept British title because she has acquiesced in it. But what the protests do not do is to defeat the British title, which was built up in other ways than through Argentina's acquiescence. ... South Georgia and the other British dependencies in the South Atlantic have never been settled by Spain or Argentina. Only Britain has settled them to an extent regarded by international law as sufficient in that hostile environment."*[1108]

Spain's Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, speaking at a rally, asserts that Britain has negotiated, *"little and badly,"* and adds that his country has a clearer claim to Gibraltar, than Argentina has to the Falklands. [1109]

In England, at Chequers, Britain's Prime Minister calls a meeting of OD(SA) for 1300z (GMT). Informed that Argentine naval forces are preparing to attack the British Task Force, an agreement is reached.

> *"... that British forces should forthwith be authorised to attack any Argentine naval vessel..."* [1110]

"The decision was taken because this was a military threat. ... I should make it clear that we did not order the submarine to sink the Belgrano. We told all submarines down there that they were now free to attack Argentine warships when they had an opportunity to do so. We did not say, to Conqueror, 'Sink the Belgrano', although we knew that was going to be the effect. We hoped it would be the effect. By the time she got the signal, she might possibly have lost contact." [1111]

"Admiral Fieldhouse told us that one of our submarines, HMS Conqueror, had been shadowing the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire power provided by 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles. We were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive intentions of the Argentine fleet. There had been extensive air attacks on our ships the previous day and Admiral Woodward , in command of the Task Force, had every reason to believe that a full scale attack was developing. ... Admiral Woodward had to come to a judgement about what to do with the Belgrano in the light of these circumstances. From all the information available, he concluded that the carrier and the Belgrano group were engaged in a classic pincer movement against the Task Force..." [1112]

1107 Surprisingly accurate information

1108 In 1982 Rosalyn Higgins was Professor of International Law at the University of London. President of the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 2000.

1109 Spain ceded Gibraltar to the British in the peace treaty of 1713. A legal transfer of territory.

1110 *PREM19/623 f14*

1111 Lord Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff, interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.212

1112 Thatcher 1993

"One of those present, William Whitelaw, later recalled it as 'one of the simplest decisions that I personally found myself involved in' once he understood the risk of losing contact with the Belgrano if Conqueror were not allowed to attack... All were asked for their views before the Prime Minister gave her own, but the issue was not controversial." [1113]

"The War Cabinet, meeting at Chequers, the prime minister's residence, decided at 0800 (1300 London, British Summer Time) on Sunday 2 May that, on the basis that a real threat to the task force existed, the rules of engagement should be changed to permit attacks on all Argentinian naval vessels on the high seas, whether inside or outside the exclusion zone, as had previously been agreed for the Veinticinco de Mayo alone. This change was signalled from Northwood to Conqueror at 08.38 (Falklands Standard Time),..." [1114]

In the South Atlantic, at much the same time, Argentina's Admiral Allara, changes his plan.

> *"As the hours passed, two things made me decide to call (the attack) off. First was confirmation the British were not landing, so not preoccupied with that operation. Second, the weather conditions. There was absolutely no wind. It was, therefore, not possible for our planes to take off from the carrier with the weapons, and fuel, needed. These weather conditions were forecast for the whole day of May 2nd. Therefore we called it off, and pulled the carrier back to shallow waters,.."* [1115]

"The lack of wind, unusual for those dates and in those latitudes, creates a complication in the equilibrium equation. The planes could only take off with two bombs, not four." [1116]

"According to Navy sources, on 2 May at 0050, it was known for certain that the 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier group had been discovered by reconnaissance aircraft from the Invincible. ... Aware of the disadvantageous situation, Vicealmirante Lombardo ordered the Argentine fleet to take up defensive positions closer to the mainland. Starting at 1230 on 2 May, the three task groups began to retreat." [1117]

With Allara's decision confirmed by Vice-Admiral Lombardo, orders to withdraw are circulated to the various elements of Argentina's fleet, including ARA *General* Belgrano to the south of the archipelago. [1118]

"It is quite untrue to say we knew the force had turned back before the Belgrano was sunk, or certainly before the signal changing the rules of engagement was sent. Even if we had known, it would not have changed our minds." [1119]

"... the big issue here was the sinking of the Belgrano. By the time I was appointed Official Historian I had already sought to debunk the core accusation – that the motives behind the sinking were more political than military, designed not so much to torpedo a ship which posed little threat at the time, but instead to torpedo a new Peruvian-led peace initiative. ... I challenged the supposition that any Argentine signals would be intercepted and decoded almost immediately and done so in time to influence Cabinet decisions." [1120]

1113 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1114 Brown 2021. *Conqueror* acknowledged at 12.25 Falklands time.

1115 Admiral Gualter Allara interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.216

1116 *La Armada Argentina en la Guerra de Malvinas. Análisis de las acciones y decisiones del 2 de mayo* Francisco J. Cancio 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

1117 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.287. There is no evidence that Argentina's carrier group had been sighted by any British aircraft and this appears to fly in the face of Allara's later statement in 1989.

1118 The exact time that *Belgrano* received the cancellation, is not known.

1119 Lord Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff, interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.212

1120 Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman interviewed on *Historical Research and Political Accountability: Trident, the Falklands and Iraq* Strand Group 21, Kings College London. March, 2017. At this time the Peruvian proposals were not known to the British government, having only been presented to Argentina and the USA.

"When the members of the War Cabinet took the decision to authorize the attack on it the cruiser group had already reversed course, although this information was not known to them." [1121]

In Washington DC, a note from Foreign Minister Costa Mendez is handed to Secretary Haig protesting the imposition of US sanctions on April 30th.

> *"The gesture on the part of the United States Government is not only very unfriendly but also surprising. In fact, only a few hours before, the United States was acting as a friend to the parties, assisting them in the search for a just and honorable negotiated arrangement. Now, alleging that its efforts have failed, it takes upon itself the unilateral defense of one of the parties and imposes unacceptable sanctions against us, for the ostensible purpose of breaking our determination, of using force to impose upon us solutions that conform to the very particular views that the United States Government maintains on the matter. Your Excellency blames Argentina for the failure of the negotiations, emphasizing its inability to reach a compromise. Nothing is said of the intransigence of the British or of the aggressive posture they have adopted. You disregard the fact that at the time of your statement, a powerful British air and naval force was completing its preparations to attack my country. Quite to the contrary, the Secretary of State finds it just to aid in the aggression by providing the British forces with the material assistance they require, which is a very odd way of cooperating to keep the conflict from becoming worse. … Your Excellency cannot fail to see that the position taken by your Government will have a significant impact on relations be tween our two countries. The Argentine people will never understand or forget that at one of the most critical moments in their history, in contrast to the solidarity that they received from all corners of the hemisphere, the United States preferred to take the side of an extra-hemispheric power, thereby abetting it in its aggressive designs. …"* [1122]

Secretary Haig receives news from Lima.

"In telegram 4510 from Lima, May 2, Ortiz reported that Belaúnde had telephoned at 10 a.m. (11 a.m. Washington time) to inform him that Costa Méndez had asked Belaúnde to convey that the Government of Argentina "in general" found the seven points of the Peruvian plan acceptable with "two changes on which the Argentines were very insistent". The first was a textual change to paragraph 5. The revised formulation read: "The two Governments acknowledge the need to take into account the views concerning the interests of the Islanders in the final solution". The second revision proposed the replacement of the United States with Canada as a member of the contact group, "because the United States was firmly on the side of the UK."…" [1123]

Arriving in Washington DC, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym hosts a press conference at the British Embassy.

> *"Last week I came here to see Mr. Haig in his role as a mediator, today I have come back to consult him as an ally. The British people are very grateful to the United States for coming down in their support. We never had any doubt that they would come down in support of the victim and against the aggressor … but that does not end the search for a diplomatic solution."*

Pym and Haig meet, privately, after which Pym messages London.

> *"President Reagan had spoken to Mr. Haig by telephone today and said that the UK forces were quote 'doing the work of the free world' unquote, which would be strengthened by a British victory …*

1121 Brown 2021
1122 *OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 40/82, May 14, 1982*
1123 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* footnote p.440


Haig went out of his way to explain that we should not take literally a public statement by President Reagan to the effect that US military support for the UK would be within the context of existing agreements, this was simply not so, the Americans were very keen that our military efforts should succeed…

*Haig then explained the outline of a **possible diplomatic solution**, which had originated in a Peruvian initiative, but had been modified by the Americans… Further pressure on Argentina would be needed before they were likely to agree to our basic requirements. Haig agreed that this was essential – we needed another day like yesterday. …"* [1124]

"Pym replied cautiously. The proposals were not even at drafting stage, and while they might be useful at an appropriate time, he doubted that Buenos Aires was yet ready to meet Britain's basic requirements. … Pym also observed that Parliament was unlikely to accept a change in status quo over South Georgia now that it had been recaptured successfully." [1125]

Pym also meets US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, who tells him; *"… that our arms supply effort would intensify, and that we would work as effectively as we could to support the British counterattack."* [1126]

While Francis Pym flies to New York for a meeting at the UN, Secretary Haig and Britain's Ambassador Henderson, discuss the Peruvian proposals. Haig makes it plain that; *"… Argentine compliance required,.. no further British military action in the meantime. Henderson replied that Britain would not agree to anything that inhibited it from maintaining the military pressure. The conversation concluded with Haig promising to get in touch as soon as he had heard again from Argentina."* [1127]



In the South Atlantic, some 30 nautical miles outside the TEZ, Britain's nuclear powered submarine HMS *Conqueror* closes on the cruiser, ARA *General Belgrano*.

"The Argentine leadership thought the British would not fight outside the maritime exclusion zone." [1128]

Having turned towards the south-west, *Belgrano* is now heading west towards the Islas de los Estados.

> *"I spent more than two hours working my way into an attack position on the port beam of the cruiser. It was still daylight. The visibility was variable; it came down to 2,000 yards at one time... They were not using sonar – just gently zigzagging at about 13 knots."* [1129]

1124 *PREM19-0646 UK Mission New York to FCO London May 2, 1982*. My emphasis. A tentative suggestion, nothing more. Since 1982, some commentators have suggested the actions that day, by the British, were specifically aimed at dest5roying the peace proposals put forward by Peru. At this moment on May 2nd, the British had only just heard of the initiative; without any details. There was nothing on the table.

1125 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1126 *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* Casper Weinberger 1990 p.208

1127 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1128 US Admiral Harry Train in Charlton 1989 p.217. Despite the Argentine Government having received the warning of April 23, 1982. See above.

At 1557 local time (1957z), whilst approximately 35 miles south-west of the *'Total Exclusion Zone'*, HMS *Conqueror* fires three torpedoes towards the Argentine cruiser.

"Conqueror fired three torpedoes at the Belgrano. They were the older Mark 8 torpedoes, relatively unsophisticated weapons but with huge warheads. Conqueror's captain chose those weapons because he knew that the Belgrano had a 6-inch-wide band of armour plating along most of the ship's side... the range was very close, only 1400 yards, the recommended optimum for such an attack." [1130]

"*The submarine had closed to within 1,280 yards of Belgrano, on her port side because the two destroyers were on her starboard side. The destroyers did not have their sonars in active mode. Three torpedoes were fired in a slight fan pattern on a track angle of 90°, but one did not hit the cruiser;... The two that did hit General Belgrano did explode, one beneath the after superstructure and the other just aft of the bow. ... The two destroyers had orders to flee if there was an attack... When the first explosion came, Captain Héctor Bonzo knew it was a torpedo. The ship came to a dead halt and all electrical power was lost, plunging everywhere into darkness. "There was a terrifying silence", he said. He opened a door and looked towards the bow, but there was no bow.*" [1131]

Britain's submarine immediately turns away to avoid retaliatory attacks by the escorting destroyers, but not before *Conqueror*'s commander, Captain Christopher Wreford-Brown, manages to send a brief signal to CINCFEET at Northwood. [1132]

> *"Successfully attacked Belgrano. Two hits with Mark Eights. Evaded to East."*



Less than 30 minutes later, the crew of *General Belgrano* are ordered by Capt. Héctor Bonzo, to abandon the stricken ship. However, no distress signal is sent, and the escorting vessels only become aware of the severity of the attack when they observe the *Belgrano's* crew taking to the life boats.[1133]

"The ship was listing at a rate increasing by one degree a minute, and by 15.21 (sic) had reached 30°. Captain Bonzo gave the order to abandon ship." [1134]

"In a graphic account of the dying moments of the cruiser, ... Captain Bonzo said the 44-year-old vessel was steaming slowly at only ten knots away from the war zone towards Argentina when two torpedoes struck. The impact of the explosions tore through four decks killing sailors in their dormitories and in the canteen. She sank with an hour. ... he told of a disciplined evacuation into life rafts to become victims of the Atlantic gales with 75-mile-an-hour winds whipping up waves 25 feet high and temperatures way below freezing." [1135]

1129 Captain Wreford-Brown quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2

1130 Middlebrook 2003

1131 Brown 2021. This author gives a detailed, indeed disturbing, account of events on the *Belgrano* after the two torpedoes struck the ship.

1132 *Conqueror*'s commander, 36-year old Christopher Wreford-Brown, was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

1133 *Bouchard's* commanding officer reported the loss of communications with *Belgrano,* but had not witnessed the explosions. There is some evidence that *Bouchard* had been hit by the third torpedo towards the end of its run; without it exploding.

1134 Brown 2021

1135 Briley 2022, citing a news conference given by Capt. Bonzo on May 7, 1982

Argentina's warship, the ARA *General Belgrano,* sinks. [1136]

"Captain Bonzo denied reports coming out of London that the General Belgrano had posed a threat to British warships in the area. Without going into details of his mission, he said that the World War II vintage, American-built cruiser "was going toward the continent and very slowly." In response to a question from a British journalist, the Argentine Navy officer responded with what appeared to be suppressed anger: "You can have the absolute certainty that my ship never passed at any moment through the zone of exclusion. There did not exist in the area any British surface warship."..." [1137]

"... although, in my country and abroad, many voices condemned the sinking of the Belgrano, I repeat that as a professional, and especially from a military point of view, I do not condemn it. That ship was in the area of operations." [1138]

"A quarter of an hour after Captain Bonzo left the deck, the General Belgrano *rolled over on her port side and her stern rose high into the air as she pitched forward and sank. Packed into the surrounding life rafts, almost nine hundred of her crew, some of whom would not survive this freezing night, sang the Argentine National Anthem as she went. I am always startled by the emotions the Malvinas can stir in the breast of an Argentinian. For us this campaign was a tough and demanding job on behalf of our government. For them it was something close to a holy war."* [1139]

"By no means do I have any feelings of anger. ... I realized from the outset that the 200-mile limit had nothing to do with the mission I had to accomplish. The limit did not exclude danger or risks; it was all the same in or out. I would like to be quite precise that, as far as I was concerned, the 200-mile limit was valid until 1 May, that is while diplomatic negotiations were taking place ..." [1140]

"... Not a war crime, but a combat action. The 323 crew members who gave their lives were not murdered, they died fighting for their country ... The Belgrano and the other ships were a threat and a danger to the British. ... To think that they were poorly killed and not killed in combat is to offend the memory they deserve..." [1141]

"The sinking of the Belgrano had significant diplomatic and military effects... Even though the attack on the Belgrano fell within the terms of (the) British self-defence rider, this was not well understood by either the Argentines or the international community, both of which focused on the MEZ/TEZ." [1142]

"Argentine Rear Admiral Allara, who was in charge of the task force that the Belgrano was part of, said "After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. We, as professionals, said it was just too bad that we lost the Belgrano". The modified rules of engagement permitted the engagement of Belgrano outside the exclusion zone before the sinking." [1143]

1136 321 crew and two civilian lives were lost. The two civilians, brothers, served drinks in a hospitality lounge. They had been given the opportunity of disembarking at Ushuaia, but declined. There seems to have been an inordinate delay before a serious rescue effort began. 770 men were saved between the 3rd and 5th of May.

1137 *Belgrano Captain Recounts Sinking* in *The New York Times* May 8, 1982. After the war, and with the replacement of the junta, Capt. Bonzo changed his account. See below.

1138 Admiral Gualter Allara interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.216

1139 *One Hundred Days* Admiral Sandy Woodward 1992

1140 Capt. Bonzo quoted in Middlebrook 2003

1141 Admiral Enrique Molina Pico, former Chief of the General Staff of the Argentine Navy in *La Nacion*, May 2, 2005.

1142 Bratton & Thies 2011 pp.11-12

1143 Alison 2017 *cf.* August, 1994

"Good Sigint (Signals Intelligence) well used, however, had perverse consequences. Without wider knowledge of this source, the attack seemed fishy – anyone hostile to British policy could claim it stank. … Britain had over emphasised the issue of the Exclusion Zone compared to that of the general threat posed by the Argentine fleet wherever it might be." [1144]

"… 770 crew members (were) rescued alive, but 23 men had perished in the life rafts, and 28 in the water. The total loss of life was 323 from a ship's company of 1,093, the biggest loss of life in any incident in the Falklands conflict." [1145]

In New York, unaware of the *Belgrano* sinking, Pym and Parsons speak to UN Secretary-General de Cuéllar over dinner. Also at the meal is an assistant of the Secretary-General, Rafee Ahmed. Pérez de Cuéllar presents a paper.

> *"In separate meetings on 2 May with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Francis Pym, and with the Permanent Representative of Argentina, I handed over an aide-mémoire in which I expressed my deep concern over the grave situation and emphasized my conviction that the United Nations had a most serious responsibility under the Charter urgently to restore peace and to promote a just and lasting settlement. I stated that the implementation of Resolution 502 (1982) was imperative."* [1146]

The Secretary-General's paper lays out a set of proposals; *"… the two Governments agree to take simultaneously the steps set out below, which are conceived as provisional measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. (a) … both Governments to complete their withdrawal by an agreed date, (b) both Governments commence negotiations to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences by an agreed date, (c) both Governments rescind their respective announcements of blockades and exclusion zones, and cease all hostile acts against each other, (d) both Governments terminate all economic sanctions, (e) transitional arrangements begin to come into effect to supervise implementation of the above steps and to meet interim administrative requirements. The Secretary-General wishes to reiterate his readiness to do all he can to be of assistance … It would be appreciated if written communications in this regard were received in time for the Secretary-General to make a public announcement on 5 May…"*

The discussion that follows is summed up by Anthony Parsons in a *minute* for Pym.

"Pérez de Cuéllar left it to Ahmed to introduce and defend his paper. He seemed to agree with many of your comments on it. Your firmness will, I think, have had a salutary effect on Ahmed who can no longer be under any illusions that his sketchy and ill-thought out ideas have much chance of acceptance. Nevertheless, the fact that the Secretary-General has given you and the Argentines some ideas, which will certainly become known here (I shall be surprised if Pérez de Cuéllar fails to allude to them when he briefs members of the Council), should enable us to gain a little more time here. It would be off-side for anyone to introduce a Resolution into the Security Council when the parties were considering ideas put to them by the Secretary-General."

In Argentina, news of *Conqueror*'s attack reaches Buenos Aires. The US Ambassador reports to Washington DC.

> *"… we have a report from a reliable source in the Presidential Palace that the mood in the top levels of the military has turned very ugly against the U.S. The story is that the cruiser 'Belgrano' was "pulverized" with heavy loss of life.*

1144 Ferris 2020
1145 Brown 2021
1146 See *UN Doc S/PV.2350*

Allegedly, the U.S. located the ship for the British and gave its permission for the use of a "special weapon" against the 'Belgrano' (the implication being a nuclear weapon). The source advised one of our attaches "to get out of town."

We are making appropriate representations to remind the GOA of its responsibility for the security of this mission and its personnel. However, in view of the 'Belgrano' incident and what seems to me the likelihood of new naval engagements in the South Atlantic, I request the Department's authorization to declare ... the relevant emergency levels. I ask for authorization for the departure of dependents of our military personnel, ... I also request authorization to prepare for the reduction in non-essential personnel and their dependents... The dependents of our military will depart by road or ferry for Montevideo once the Department has given its approval. We shall be in touch with the Department on the method and timing for the larger evacuation." [1147]

The news has not yet reached Peru.

"On the dramatic night of Sunday, May 2, the voice of President Belaúnde was heard on the radio announcing that in a few more hours the conflict would be resolved,..." [1148]

May 3rd, from New York, a little after midnight and aware of President Belaúnde's radio announcement, Ambassador Parsons telegrams the British Embassy in Lima.

"... please get in touch immediately with the Foreign Minister and/or President's office to ensure that no announcement is made that implies that we have agreed to these proposals or even had them formally presented to us ... We will be prepared to consider carefully any ideas presented to us which seem likely to ensure what must be the first requirement: a withdrawal of Argentine troops which unlawfully invaded and occupied the Falklands." [1149]

At 0118z, the 7-point Peruvian proposal is formally notified to the British Foreign Office. [1150]

In London, a press statement is issued by the Ministry of Defence.

"... the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged. On Friday 23 April, HMG warned the Argentine Government that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. The cruiser posed a significant threat to the British Task Force maintaining the TEZ. ... The British submarine suffered no damage in the engagement and has resumed her patrol." [1151]

"... a cruiser of a belligerent has no right to consider itself immune from enemy attack because it is on the high seas beyond the range of a proclaimed maritime exclusion zone. Great Britain justified its action by pointing out that the cruiser was a threat to its picket ships, frigates, and destroyers, and that it had previously advised the Argentine government of the establishment of a defensive zone around units of the British fleet which the Belgrano had disregarded." [1152]

1147 *Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (Jan–15 May) 1982*

1148 Bonifacio del Carril quoted in *Cómo se perdió la paz en 1982* in *La Nacion* April 4, 1999

1149 *PREM19/624 Telegram 4 of 3 May 1982.*

1150 *Telegram No. 138 of 3 May*. A note on the bottom states "*Repeated 'flash' to UK Mis New York & Desk by 030730z UK Del NATO*"

1151 *FCO SITREP 0700 3 May 1982.* While the SITREP is timed at 0700, the statement had to have been issued before. Various press reports refer to the British statement being made "*early Monday*".

1152 *The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War* Schmitt & Green (eds) 1998

"The British government declined to justify this act by publishing Sigint – it understood very well the centrality of the source. Indeed, the first official statement on the topic was intended precisely to draw attention away from the role of Sigint in the sinking of Belgrano." [1153]

At 0330, General Galtieri calls President Belaunde in Lima to tell him that Argentina is rejecting his proposals.

> *"We would rather die on our feet than live on our knees."* [1154]
>
> *"... I consider (this) to be a drama for all of Latin America and I understand that our very fervent intentions of finding a quick solution have necessarily to enter a period of paralysis. ... I'm going to call Secretary Haig ... he called me very mortified in the afternoon and announced something about the loss of a ship. ... We can do something to achieve peace. ... It was even announced a little hopefully that an agreement could be reached and some journalists ... they gave the news as fact. They have been rectified, naturally. ...*
>
> *Now I am studying how to make a communication to the President of the United States, reflecting on the need for him to modify the erroneous policy they are following. ... I am going to call Haig now. To tell him that although you were very inclined to study these points, you have been forced to put this aside, in view of the circumstances..."* [1155]

"Belaunde ... had just finished speaking with President Galtieri. He reported that Galtieri stated that the Argentine Government was prepared to study the Peruvian peace proposal with serenity and thoroughness. However, Galtieri said that owing to the quote unspeakable unquote British military actions of today's date, specifically the torpedoing and presumed destruction of the Argentine flagship 'Belgrano' there was nothing left for Argentina to discuss. All that remained was to fight. President Belaunde said that with this message from President Galtieri he considered the Peruvian peace initiative to be terminated. The President said it was very lamentable that the British actions should have occurred when serious negotiations were underway with a high chance for success. He condemned the UK's attacks and said they would enflame the hemisphere." [1156]

"... Brigadier Lami Dozo assured me directly that the attack on the cruise ship radically suspended the Argentine approval of the Peruvian peace proposal to the point of cancelling the preparations for the Learjet aircraft that under his control was waiting on the runways of Jorge Newbery Airport in Buenos Aires to transport the Argentine legation, which at that time, apparently, had the approval of the Junta to sign agreements or at least to advance the negotiations." [1157]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig speaks to Ambassador Henderson; who promptly reports to Thatcher.

"He told me that ... It was being put about that the cruiser had been hit as a result of intelligence passed by US satellites and with the help of a special weapon provided by the Americans ... (Haig said) President Belaunde believed that something real must be done to bring about a ceasefire. He believed that the Argentinians would accept the seven proposals ... No less pressing, in his mind, was the need to do something immediately to stop the fighting. He thought it was desperately urgent for the Prime Minister to propose a ceasefire ... I told him

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1153 Ferris 2020 citing *Interview with Omand, June 21, 2018.*

1154 Galtieri quoted in *Signals of War: The Falklands Crisis of 1982* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.286.

1155 President Belaunde of Peru quoted in Yofre 2011. The time is given as 0030 (?)

1156 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/03/1982*. As the proposals had not been presented to London at that time, the Peruvian President was rather getting ahead of himself.

1157 Cancio 2022

that after waiting three weeks while the Argentinians reinforced the Islands we were not in a mood to rush to an armistice just because the Argentinians were losing…" [1158]

"This began a series of pained conversations with Haig. Henderson was told of the bitter complaints from the Peruvian President, of the high price that may have to be paid in terms of a Soviet advance in Latin America, the possibility of an American veto being needed to prevent anti-British sanctions being adopted by the OAS, of western opinion turning against Britain. Henderson reminded him of the Argentine naval manoeuvrings which formed the immediate background to the sinking, and that the Americans had also concluded that Argentine forces were determined to attack." [1159]

"After the Belgrano was sunk, Alexander Haig said that if any further British attacks occurred, "US opinion, and for that matter Western opinion more generally, might become less favourable towards [the UK]. People might say we were overreacting". Nicholas Henderson, the British ambassador, retorted that, "according to the information he [Haig] would have seen, the Argentineans had ordered three frigates to attack the Hermes and the carrier had been given instructions to attack British ships. It could not therefore be said that the Argentineans were behaving peacefully…"." [1160]

In New York, Anthony Parsons is informed of the Ministry of Defence statement; *"We have just heard that the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano has been hit by two torpedoes from the submarine HMS Conqueror. … Although the incident took place outside the TEZ it was in accordance with the rules of engagement agreed on 2 May. …"*

From Lima, Britain's Ambassador responds to Parsons earlier message; *"The Foreign Minister … communicated to me a formal note .. about the sinking of the Belgrano. .. In the ensuing conversation Dr. Arias said he wished me to be in no doubt about the profound shock and consternation felt by the Peruvian Government on learning of the attack on the cruiser after President Belaunde had announced his peace initiative. Dr. Arias said that Costa Méndez had told him on the telephone that the 7 point plan was being considered by the military Junta in Buenos Aires when the news of the attack brought further consideration, and the meeting, to a conclusion …"*[1161]

In London, *The Guardian* newspaper publishes an editorial discussing the need for a formal inquiry into the causes of Argentina's invasion and the associated intelligence failures; questioning whether the Government will allow a truly independent investigation.

From Buenos Aires, the junta issues a short statement.

> *"… as a result of the attack suffered at a point located at 55 degrees 24 minutes south and 61 degrees 32 minutes west by the cruiser General Belgrano, .., indications exist that it must be presumed to have sunk."*

"On Monday, May 3, I interviewed Costa Méndez, who introduced me to the text of the Belaúnde proposal. They were practically the ideas that we had been discussing since day one, during the conversations with Haig. The word 'wishes' of the inhabitants could easily be changed to 'aspirations', as Costa Méndez himself had already noted. I insisted with the greatest effort before Costa Méndez to do everything possible so that the proposal was accepted. … I told him that the opportunity might not present itself again and that everything

1158 *PREM19/624 Telegram No.1575 3 May 1982*
1159 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1160 Ferris 2020 citing *Telegram No.1574, British Embassy Washington to FCO, May 3, 1982 PREM 19/624*
1161 *PREM19/624 f114*. Peru's announcement, such as it was, had been rather premature.

depended on the form and time with which it was announced. He was very worried about the opinion of the street. He agreed to do what he could. He told me that Belaúnde was a peacock and that in any case he would resume the negotiations through some other country, Venezuela, for example." [1162]

Argentina recalls its surface fleet to shallow waters.

"The attack on the Belgrano was controversial in Britain and elsewhere, but it also proved to be a coercive success. After the sinking of the Belgrano, the Argentine Navy refused to take action against the British task force and remained close to port for the remainder of the conflict." [1163]

In New York, due to leave for London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym has a short meeting with the new President of the Security Council, China's Ling Quing and the Secretary-General, before speaking to the press.

> *"I … had talks with the Secretary-General. We explored various ideas as to how the United Nations might be able to help in one way or another … our strategy all along has been to maintain pressure on the Argentines, diplomatic, economic and military, and we declared several days ago the Total Exclusion Zone which we are now going to protect. Yesterday there was a very real threat to that zone posed by a cruiser. There was also an attack on a helicopter from two ships which were immediately counter-attacked by British forces. I want to make it clear that the British are not undertaking these military engagements by choice. We are there to defend British soil..."*

From Washington, Haig sends Pym a message.

> *"We are concerned that your military successes have not had the desired effect of making the Argentines more reasonable. Our assessment is that the fatalistic mentality characteristic of the Argentines is becoming stronger with each setback. Paradoxically – and tragically – the Argentines may well be waiting, and trying, for a military success of their own before making a serious move toward a settlement. Such a strategy would be consistent with everything we know about the Argentines. … We suggest that the United States and Peru make a further peace proposal to the parties, stipulating that they have forty-eight hours in which to accept or reject it, with it understood that no response constitutes rejection. This period could begin at noon Washington time Wednesday.*
>
> *To maximize the pressure on the Argentines to accept a fair proposal, and to deal with the political problems I outlined above, we suggest that Her Majesty's Government announce, at the time of presentation of the proposal by the United States and Peru, that British forces will take no offensive action during the forty-eight hour period, provided the Argentines show corresponding restraint. …*
>
> *Unless there is an arrangement for suspending military action for a brief, fixed period of intensive diplomatic effort, I am afraid that the Argentines and others will succeed in blaming failure to achieve a political settlement on your military actions...."* [1164]

From New York, US Representative Kirkpatrick informs Haig that the Secretary-General is intent on pursuing his own peace initiative; believing the Peruvian initiative to have failed. The US Secretary of State, however, makes it plain that he wishes to continue acting on the basis of the Peruvian proposals as these seem to have had some acceptance by Buenos Aires. Despite the change in rhetoric following Argentina's loss of the ARA *General Belgrano*.

1162 Bonifacio del Carril quoted in *Cómo se perdió la paz en 1982 (How the Peace was Lost in 1982)* in *La Nacion* April 4, 1999

1163 Bratton P. & Thies W. 2011 p.12

1164 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982*

In the South Atlantic, *Alferez Sobral*, an Argentine ocean-going tug armed with 20mm cannon, attacks a *Sea King* helicopter inside the exclusion zone. *Lynx* helicopters from HMS *Coventry* counter-attack with *Sea Skua* missiles, killing eight of the vessel's crew, and damaging the tug.

"One of the helicopters attacked the Alférez Sobral dispatch boat with two Sea Skua missiles. The first one damaged the starboard side and injured three 20 mm twin machine gun operators, while the second missile hit and completely destroyed the bridge and the radio room. The captain and seven crew members were killed. Damaged as it was, the Alférez Sobral started sailing towards the mainland with difficulty and without communications." [1165]

In official statements, Brazil *"disagrees"* with attacks by Britain which it describes as a violation of *SCR 502;* Cuba condemns the UK and calls for *"solidarity"* from all Latin American countries while Venezuela talks of *"British aggression."* The USSR condemns attempts to *"restore the Falklands colonial status by force"* and China deplores military attacks against the – *"Malvinas Islands."* Rather more mildly, Mexico "*regrets*" the outbreak of hostilities.

In Argentina, propaganda reports falsely claim that its air force has attacked HMS *Exeter,* and sunk it; and that eleven *Harriers* and one helicopter have been shot down. Another report claims that Argentine forces have severely damaged four frigates, one aircraft carrier and one destroyer during raids on the British fleet. All resulting in – *"serious casualties."* Britain's Ministry of Defence responds to press enquiries that only one aircraft has suffered damage – described as "*minimal*" – and that one frigate has suffered some minor splinter damage. The spokesman denies that *Exeter* has been involved in any fighting and that, contrary to claims of serious British casualties, only one seaman has been wounded. This casualty is described as, *"safe and comfortable."*

In Chile, the newspaper *Tercera* also comments on Argentine propaganda; *"Question: What news from Buenos Aires? Answer: The British sent three planes to the islands and the Argentines shot down seven of them."*

May 4th. at 0530, Operation Black Buck II drops twenty-one 1,000lb bombs on the runway near Stanley.

"*Assuming that the antiaircraft defenses would be on alert, the bombing was executed from a higher altitude than on the 1 May attack, thus losing accuracy. The bombs impacted at 45° to the longitudinal extent, about 60 meters away from threshold 08 without affecting the runway, but causing minor injuries to two Army soldiers. ... The Malvinas radar had not detected the Vulcan air raid because it was out of service."* [1166]

Britain's morning newspapers report the attack on the ARA *Belgrano*. [1167]

"... although this was later used as an example of callousness and jingoism, it did reflect widespread popular reaction." [1168]

From Buenos Aires, the US embassy telegrams Washington DC.


THE Sun

QE2 IS SET TO SAIL FOR WAR

We told you first

GOTCHA

Our lads sink gunboat and hole cruiser

SUNK

CRIPPLED

UNION BOYCOTTS WAR

BATTLE FOR THE ISLANDS

£50,000 BINGO! Today's lucky numbers are on Page 20.

1165 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.296

1166 *Ibid.* p.310

1167 *The Sun*'s famous (infamous) headline only appeared on some 100,000 copies of the newspaper distributed in Scotland and the north of England. The date on the image above is May 4, 1982. Not May 3, as often reported.

"We continue to make no headway in our efforts to put at rest the story that the US provided satellite intelligence which permitted the British to locate and sink the "Belgrano". Army Chief of Staff Vaquero sent me word this morning that the Argentines have "concrete proof" that such was the case. ...

Telam, the government wire service here, is carrying a story quoting an unnamed informant in the Pentagon to the effect that the US has "at least one spy satellite" in the South Atlantic and that a great part of the information which it obtains is transmitted to the UK. Another of our problems is created by the NOAA satellite photographs of the weather over the Falklands which are appearing in the local press.

The distinction between weather satellites and those used to obtain military information is not likely to be grasped very easily by the Argentine public. The press here has also picked up a purported statement by Secretary Weinberger that we would provide the UK with every kind of support, including logistical, material and information. This last is taken as confirmation of the allegation" [1169]

In Israel, reports in the *Jerusalem Post* newspaper reveal Israeli arms sales to Argentina. [1170]

In London, responding to the *Jerusalem Post* reports, Michael Palliser of the Cabinet Office writes to the FCO.

"Lord Sieff spoke to me about this at the weekend. He said that his Israeli contacts had told him that there was much concern in Jerusalem about allegations here, and particularly in the British press, that Israel was continuing to supply military equipment to Argentina. He understood that the official Israeli position as conveyed to us was that existing contracts would be fulfilled but that there would be no new supplies of military equipment pending the end of the Falklands crisis. He had also been assured in confidence that, on Mr Begin's instructions, the Israelis were doing all they could by administrative means to hinder supplies of such equipment, even if they were being made in fulfilment of an existing contract. But this was being done in confidence and the Israeli Government were concerned that it should not be publicly known. In short, the message which he had been asked to convey to us was that the Israeli Government were doing and would continue to do everything they could to prevent the supply of military equipment from Israel to the Argentine; and the less that was said about that here in public the easier it would be for them to do it in practice." [1171]

"In public, Israeli officials continued to deflect the accusations that they were arming Britain's adversary. Argov reported that 'not a single military item had been supplied to Argentina since a decision taken by the Israeli Government early in the crisis' and that the Argentineans were pressuring them to reverse this decision." [1172]

1168 *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography* Charles Moore 2013 p.714

1169 *Department of State, Secret cable, "Sinking of the Belgrano—Alleged US Role", 4 May 1982, National Security Archive. S*ee - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21348-19820504-sinking-belgrano-alleged-us-role

1170 See April 27, above.

1171 *Palliser to Acland May 4, 1982* in *PREM19/624 f104.* Thatcher would later learn that Israel had supplied arms to Argentina throughout the war, the assurances given to Palliser notwithstanding. It seems clear that Israel supplied weapons to Argentina before, during and after the conflict in 1982. British diplomacy was trying, and failing, to pressure Israel into ceasing its supplies well into 1983.


1172 Bermant 2017. On June 3, 1982 Ambassador Argov was shot during an attempted assassination by a Palestinian. He survived but the absence of an Israeli Ambassador confused the situation further as Argov had been lobbying his government to cease sales. A lone voice, however, and one now muted.

Passenger ship *Queen Elizabeth II* (*QEII*) is requisitioned by the British Government as a troop carrier; *"... just nineteen hours before she was set to sail to the Mediterranean with a full compliment of cruise passengers."* [1173]

From London, Britain's Prime Minister sends a message to President Reagan.

> *"Francis Pym has told me about the very useful talks he had with Al Haig about the Falkland Islands during his visit to Washington on Sunday. ... We should continue to build up the diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Argentina to put an end to its unlawful military occupation and, thereafter, to negotiate with us in good faith about the long term future of the islands.*
>
> *On the diplomatic front, I can assure you that we remain committed to the search for a negotiated solution which accords with the principles which our two countries have defended for so long. We are looking urgently today at Al Haig's latest ideas. In the military field, let me emphasise how much we appreciate your generous offer of material support for our forces. ...*
>
> *I am sure that, without effective military pressure, the Argentine leaders will not be brought to implement Security Council Resolution 502. But, with so many young lives at risk – British and Argentine – I feel that we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. That is why I attach so much importance also to the economic pressure which we and other friendly countries are bringing to bear. ..."* [1174]

In the South Atlantic, at 1100 local time, HMS *Sheffield,* a British Type 42 destroyer, is hit by an *AM39 Exocet* missile, fired from a *Super Etendard* of the Argentine Navy. It fails to explode, but causes an uncontrollable fire.



"... three Type 42 destroyers were occupying air defence stations some 18nm west (nautical miles) in front of the main body of the force. Glasgow was in the middle with Sheffield on its left and Coventry on its right... two Super Etendards approached the Sheffield group. ... The two Exocets were released. One passed by into the sea; and the other hit the destroyer. After a quick look to confirm a hit they veered back to the mainland and returned safely... the single Exocet hit Sheffield at the starboard side, leaving a large hole and causing widespread minor shock damage and an immediate loss of fighting capability. Fortunately the warhead did not detonate. Nonetheless large fires still broke out..." [1175]

" ... the Argentine response came through aircraft equipped with French Exocet missiles from the Navy and aircraft from the Argentine Air Force, which sank the destroyer HMS Sheffield. How it occurred and who sank it is still a topic of debate and competition between the Navy and the Air Force." [1176]

1173 Privratsky 2014

1174 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Special Handling Restrictions Memos 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive May 1–5 1982*

1175 *Ibid*. There is some dispute about whether or not the *Exocet* missile exploded. See Brown 2021.

1176 Yofre 2011

"*On 4 May Sheffield and other ships received from the task group commanders information that five Super Es were operating from the Argentinian mainland base at Rio Grande. … However, Sheffield rated the Exocet danger lower, and the submarine threat higher, than did the carrier group. … Sam Salt rated the submarine threat to be as great as the air threat… When the attack came, on the afternoon of 4 May, Sheffield was the southerly of three British Type 42 destroyers that formed an air defence arc … the other two destroyers being Glasgow and Coventry. … The starboard defence watch came on duty at 12.00 and shortly afterwards the AAWC in Invincible broadcast a situation report confirming Air Warning Yellow, with no known hostile air activity within 200 miles of the task group. The captain (Sheffield) visited the operations room at about 12.45 to update himself and then returned to his cabin … The anti-air warfare officer (AAWO), lieutenant Commander Nick Batho, left the ops room at about 13.40 to go to the bridge … and then went to the wardroom and had a cup of coffee. His assistant, Able Seaman Burns, also left to 'visit the heads' (relieve himself), as had one of the target indication operators, whilst the air picture reporter was still in the ops room but not at his desk. Thus, the AAWO and three of his air team of eight were out of the ops room or out of position, … Glasgow reported the raid from the south-west on AAWC radio at 10.00 00 sec (which was received in Sheffield), went to action stations 23 seconds later and fired chaff at 10.02 7 sec. … In Sheffield at 10.01 45 sec the order to 'stand to' was given to the crews of the Sea Dart, 4.5 inch and light guns. Ten seconds later the approach of the aircraft was indicated to Sheffield's forward Type 909 radar but not to the aft 909, which had clear arcs to the aircraft and to the missile throughout. A further seven seconds later the first Exocet missile was fired … The second missile was fired at 10.02 10 sec, just eight seconds after the first. … The AAWO was still out of the ops room as were two important members of the air team, … At 10.02 15 sec missile smoke (from the Exocet boosts) was sighted visually from the bridge and reported to the ops room. However, officers on the bridge were mesmerized by the sight and did not broadcast a warning to the ship's company. … at 10.03 00 sec the missile struck the ship at 2 deck on the starboard side between the galley and the forward auxiliary machinery room and forward engine room."* [1177]

"After refueling, the Super Étendards continued flying at a low altitude, achieved a lock-on to the largest target, launched the Exocet missiles at 1104, and then returned to Río Grande. The TC-70 landed in Río Grande at 1345. The operation was planned and executed with absolute skill, although it was impossible to know for certain the target characteristics or the extent of the damage inflicted, because of the procedure used —the Exocet standoff firing system did not require visual contact with the target. The fire-control radar allowed the pilot to select the target at 50 km and store the coordinates into the missile's memory. At 35 km, the pilot would launch the missile and then abandon the area. Therefore, the only piece of information available about the identity of the attacked target was that the pilot had selected the largest radar echo. … the Argentine naval aviators fired two Exocets against two radar echoes located at different ranges, according to the geographical coordinates provided by the SP-2H Neptune aircraft. The closest target was the destroyer, while the most distant one was the aircraft carrier Hermes which was out of the missile's effective range, according to the British." [1178]

At 1200, with 20 dead and 26 injured, Captain Sam Salt, gives the order to abandon ship. [1179]

"Some, including Sam Salt and the warfare officers who had been on watch, were flown by Sheffield's Lynx helicopter to Hermes, where the Admiral's staff were keen to learn what had actually happened … Salt received

1177 Brown 2021. This author gives a very detailed account of what followed.

1178 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 20233 p.307

1179 A Board of Inquiry subsequently reported a number of errors leading to the loss of the ship; noting that the ship had been '*unprepared*' for an attack and did not immediately go to '*action stations*' when warned by HMS *Glasgow* that Argentine aircraft were approaching. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/12/board-of-inquiry-hms-sheffield-may-1982.pdf

a rather frosty reception from Admiral Woodward, who said 'Sounds as though you've been pretty careless, Sam', ..." [1180]

From the Pentagon, US Secretary of State for the Navy, John Lehman, contacts Peter Blaker, Britain's Minister for the Armed Forces. The message is that the US Navy stands ready to supply intelligence, logistical support and the procurement of weapons. Lehman is also prepared to step in personally if channels operated too slowly.

"In addition, he said he would not rule out the possibility of moving US forces, for example one of the two Carrier Battle Groups currently in the Caribbean, to the South Atlantic as an indication of support. It appears to be at this point that the possible transfer of a US aircraft carrier was discussed... Lehman also made it clear that after the war the Americans would be looking to more support from Britain for their Central American policies and also a review of the naval cuts proposed in the 1981 defence review." [1181]

From Dublin, in the Republic of Ireland, the Government issue a statement.

> *"... appalled by the outbreak of what amounts to open war between Argentina and Great Britain in the South Atlantic and at reports that hundreds of lives have already been lost. ... see the present situation as a serious threat to world peace ... (and) regard the application of economic sanctions as no longer appropriate and will, therefore, be seeking the withdrawal of these sanctions by the Community"* [1182]

Ireland's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Noel Dorr, is instructed to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council; calling for: 1. An immediate cessation of hostilities by both British and Argentinian forces, and 2. The negotiation of a diplomatic settlement under the auspices of the United Nations.

"In reply to these escalating events the Irish Cabinet again hurriedly convened on the afternoon of May 4. Ministers agreed that the Republic would immediately take up a "neutral" stance on the Falklands issue and seek the withdrawal of EEC sanctions against Argentina. Haughey's decision to no longer support sanctions against Argentina stunned civil servants within the DFA (Dept. of Foreign Affairs). Dorr admitted subsequently that Haughey's new stance on the Falklands crisis took him by "complete surprise."..." [1183]

In Washington, Britain's Ambassador Henderson receives a message from Secretary Haig, concerned about the Irish call for a Security Council meeting; *"Haig's main emphasis this morning is on the real urgency, in his view ... for London to take an initiative. ... he regards the Irish decision as "totally irresponsible" and as, "likely to prolong the war"... He was convinced that London must come up with something to try and head off the inevitable emergence of opposition."*

From New York, Parsons reports an encounter with Ireland's Permanent Representative to the UN.

> *"I disembowelled him. When I had drawn breath, I summed up as follows: he could tell his Government following his conversation with me that ... such a debate at this stage would kill the current confidential initiative taken by the Secretary-General. Dorr was obviously shaken. He kept on saying that it was too late. .. However he could ask for an immediate meeting without insisting that the meeting should take place during the next day or so, i.e. he could give us and the Argentines a chance to respond to the Secretary-General's ideas.*

1180 Brown 2021

1181 *Ibid.* Unrealistic as the aircraft carrier would have arrived without a crew. With no time to train up a British crew, this was one of those "*what if*" conversations that neither of the parties subsequently recalled initiating.

1182 *Irish Times* May 5, 1982

1183 *How Charles Haughey launched an Exocet at Anglo-Irish relations during 1982 war* Stephen Kelly in *Belfast Telegraph* October 31, 2016

I said that he knew as well as I did that this idea would not fly … As soon as he asked for an immediate meeting the nasties would press things to a head as quickly as possible." [1184]

Stepping in, the UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, asks Noel Dorr not to press the matter until there is an answer to the peace *'ideas'* put forward by himself on the 2nd. Dorr agrees. However, Chinese President of the Security Council, Ling Qing, having received a similar request from the Soviet representative, schedules an *'informal'* discussion for the evening of the 5th.

"Parsons was content with this. … a confidential venture by Pérez de Cuéllar was preferable to a formal council meeting at which Britain might find itself vetoing an apparently mild resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. Given the alternatives, it was becoming in Britain's interest to boost the status of the Secretary-Generals efforts." [1185]

Following Haig's call for an initiative from the British, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym submits a proposal based largely upon the basic plan suggested by the President of Peru.

"Subject to your very early comments I would like out of courtesy to give these ideas direct to the Peruvian President –

(1) An immediate cease-fire, concurrent with:

(2) Mutual withdrawal of forces: (a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any forces into that area. (b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison to the mainland. (c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain outside that area.

(3) The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being: (a) to verify withdrawal; (b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim agreement.

(4) Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.

(5) The two governments acknowledge that the views and interests of the Islanders must be determined, and be taken into account in the definitive settlement of the problem.

(6) The two governments will make every possible effort in good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983. The countries represented in the contact group will give every assistance in this."

If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon Argentina and Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in the terms I am enclosing, the British government would immediately announce that our naval forces in the South Atlantic had been given orders not to fire within or outside the TEZ unless directly threatened by Argentine ships or aircraft…" [1186]

1184 *PREM19/624 Telegram 645 of 4 May 1982*
1185 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1186 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2.

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig is not impressed.

"Almost as soon as he got the British draft, Haig rushed round to see Henderson, having cancelled a meeting in New York. There was 'no doubt about his great anxiety'. ... Haig expressed his view that it was 'now or never' if the fighting was to be stopped. The British draft would not work. There was not the slightest chance of Peru forwarding to Argentina anything that contained references to the former administration, the need for the wishes of the islanders to be respected, and doubt that a definitive agreement could be reached." [1187]

From the UN, Parsons telegrams Pym.

> *"You should be aware that the fact that the Secretary-General put specific ideas to you and my Argentine colleague over the weekend is now widely known here. This ... is, I suspect, largely accountable to Rafee Ahmed. It also results from speculation arising out of his and Ling Qing's consultations with members of the Council yesterday. ...*
>
> *At today's briefing the spokesman said that "peace plan" was not the term the UN was using, but the Secretary-General had put forward "various ideas" to you and the Argentines ... and both had agreed to consider them."*

From Malaga, Spain, three Argentines – Allessandro Nicoletti, Pedro Lattore and Guillermo Rojas - are quietly flown to Madrid to catch an onward flight to the Canary Islands from where they will be deported to Buenos Aires. [1188]

"... was a victory for the Argentine armed forces viable within the framework of the Cold War and against one of NATO's main allies? Clearly, it is unimaginable that a leader of Margaret Thatcher's profile and personality would have agreed to lay down her arms in 1982. Rather, it would have been more likely that she would have decided to extend hostilities to mainland Argentina, to force the Military Junta to accept a ceasefire under the conditions imposed by the United Kingdom. ... it is worth asking whether, had Operation Algeciras been successful in sabotaging ships anchored at the British base on the Rock of Gibraltar, it would not have been an argument in favor of direct intervention in mainland Argentina, that is, with results counterproductive to the intended objective." [1189]

In the Falkland Islands, Argentine positions around Stanley are shelled.

"After Royal Navy warships had begun shelling Argentine positions on Stanley Common on 4 May, Civil Affairs formed a committee to survey houses suitable for air raid shelters. Civilians sheltered in a warehouse."[1190]

1187 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1188 Operation *Algeciras* was a plan to attack a British warship in Gibraltar harbour. Approved by Admiral Anaya in early April, the three men, all ex-Montoneros and experienced scuba-divers, flew out initially to Paris from where they drove to Spain. There they remained around the Malaga/Algeciras area awaiting a suitable target. Argentina's Embassy had received explosives from Buenos Aires in diplomatic bags. These included limpet mines. Despite identifying a number of targets, Anaya declined to order an attack. On May 4, 1982, following the sinking of ARA Belgrano, the three men believed that permission would be forthcoming and commenced preparations. However, their movements around various hotels and tendency to pay everything in cash had aroused suspicion among some locals who reported their concerns to the local Malaga police. The Spanish police arrested the three on May 4th, believing they were dealing with a gang of criminals, however Nicoletti almost immediately confessed their purpose. Spain's Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo ordered their immediate, and secret, deportation. It was not until 2003 that details became known when the men were interviewed for a Spanish documentary.

1189 *Hacia una mirada diferente sobre la Guerra de Malvinas* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

1190 Van der Bijl 2023

Over Goose Green, a British *Sea Harrier* is shot down.

"Three Sea Harriers from HMS Hermes were dispatched to carry out a bombing attack on the airfield at Goose Green, but an Argentine radar controller at Stanley detected the raid coming in and warned Goose Green. The anti-aircraft detachment at Goose Green was alerted, and its Skyguard radar picked up the Seas Harriers ten miles out at sea over the Choiseul Sound. Two of the Sea Harriers came straight in from that south-east direction … one of the first two was hit by cannon shells fired by a 35-mm Oerlikon." [1191]

"On 4th May, I was escorted to pump fresh water up to the high-level tank. At 1.15pm, I witnessed Lieutenant Taylor's Sea Harrier shot down by the 35mm Anti-Aircraft guns. The Argentines buried him on Friday 6th May, with television coverage to show the world the respect they have for their fallen enemy. Civilians were kept away from the burial, all shut in the hall. Brook arranged for men to go to the killing house to fetch unwashed sheep skins for us to lay on. I negotiated use of the Farm Galley to cook a substantial midday meal by the volunteer women. Permission was also granted to bring in sheep to kill for mutton and dog food. The conscripts couldn't understand our concern for dog welfare. On the same day, Bob McLeod and Ray Robson made up a radio from broken sets found under the floorboards, we listened to the World Service." [1192]

"To defend BAM Cóndor, small light weapons fire was added to the antiaircraft artillery. Argentine Air Force soldier of class 1963 René Agustín Loaiza, born in Santiago del Estero and belonging to the Defense Company, did not abandon his position and shot his FAL rifle until the hit Sea Harrier crashed —despite the fact that the aircraft was falling in the exact direction of the foxhole he was in. The heatwave of the explosion went beyond Loiaza's position, causing minor burns to his face." [1193]

Conditions deteriorate in the Goose Green Community Hall.

"Sanitation in the community hall had become distinctly uncomfortable because running water had failed on the third day, the toilets were blocked and consequently there was some dysentery among the internees. The Argentines agreed to bring sea-water in barrels for the toilets; and Mike Robson did sterling work keeping them going. Two young men, Bob McLeod and Ray Robson, both radio hams, found an old broken radio in a junk cupboard. Once they had repaired it, some of the internees listened to the BBC World Service every evening while others made a noise at the windows to cover the crackling of the broadcast." [1194]

From the UK's Mission at the UN, Parsons telegrams the FCO.

"I think there is a reasonable chance that I will be able to keep the Council in informal consultations,... My insistence on ... not cutting across the Secretary-General's efforts will of course be only a pretext. I do not believe that the Secretary-General's ideas provide the basis for a negotiated settlement, and given the involvement of Rafee Ahmed, it is probably desirable to keep the United Nations out of the game, at this stage at any rate. My real purpose in delaying a formal Council meeting will be to gain time for the Haig/Belaunde proposals to mature and, of course, to put off as long as possible a possible UK veto of a seemingly mild Resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. Such a veto would seriously undermine our position here and transfer the diplomatic advantage to the Argentines."

From the White House, President Reagan writes to Prime Minister Thatcher's.

1191 Middlebrook 2003. The pilot, Lieut. Nicolas Taylor was buried in a nearby paddock with full military honours; filmed and televised world-wide.
1192 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.42
1193 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.312
1194 Van der Bijl 2023

"Al Haig has sent to Francis Pym new formulations which might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos Aires. I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis. Equally important, you will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect.

I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by US and Peru as soon as possible, recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope." [1195]

May 5th, from Washington DC, Ambassador Henderson telegrams Pym; *"Haig does not consider that there is the slightest chance of the Peruvians being prepared to agree to our points or of being ready to transmit them to the Argentines. ... I asked him what, in the circumstances, he thought could be done and this led to a prolonged analysis of texts, the outcome of which was a new set of points ... that he hoped met some of our requirements, without involving language that would be rejected out of hand... Haig implores you to have another look at this ..."* [1196]

Alexander Haig sends a message to Francis Pym in London.

"I appreciate the efforts your government has made to react quickly to the suggestion we made. But I must tell you with a candour possible only between closest allies that the ideas you have conveyed can lead to only one outcome: Argentine rejection and therefore resumption of hostilities after the forty-eight-hour period, with the prospects for eventual settlement having been damaged in the process. Beyond that, we have no reason to believe that the Peruvian Government would associate itself with your proposal. Indeed, our assessment is that even presenting it to them would drive Peru to a more pro-Argentine posture. Tragic as recent events have been, I believe we now have an opportunity to achieve an agreement which is consistent with our shared principles and impossible to construe as a success for the aggressor. ...

We may not have another such chance before many more lives have been lost – if then. I am sending you a revised version of the seven points which attempts to take more of your concerns into account. .., it includes our best effort to meet your concerns about a security guarantee. I will not deny that it is closer to the ideas we sent you than to those you sent us. ...

Recognizing the burden it places on you, may I ask that you give me an indication as quickly as possible as to whether you would like us to proceed." [1197]

In London, the Cabinet meet to consider Haig's latest peace plan: 1) An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with: 2) Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces, according to a schedule to be established by the Contact Group; 3) The immediate introduction of a Contact group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands, on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement. The Contact Group will assume responsibility for (a) Verification of the withdrawal, (b) Ensuring that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the local administration, which would contravene this interim agreement; and (c) Ensuring that all other provisions of the agreement are respected; 4) Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands; 5) The two Governments acknowledge that the aspirations and interests of the Islanders will be included

1195 *Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982)*
1196 *PREM19/624 Telegram 1598 of 5 May 1982*
1197 *Reagan Library, Executive Sec., NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Falklands War (04/22/1982–05/17/1982)*

in the definitive settlement of the status of the Islands; 6) The Contact Group will have responsibility for ensuring that the two Governments reach a definitive agreement prior to April 30, 1983.

"The position was difficult, with American pressure and wavering in the EC following the Belgrano and then the loss of the Sheffield denting national confidence in Britain's military position... There was general unhappiness about Haig's ideas, .., but it was judged that some response was needed." [1198]

After four hours of debate, Pym telegrams Haig to say that the British Government are prepared to accept his proposals as a basis for proceeding. However, the Dependencies are to be excluded and all Argentine forces must leave the Falklands. Also that during the extended negotiations the Islands must be administered according to the wishes of the elected representatives of the population.

> *"I hope very much that Peru and Argentina will accept the proposals on the basis I have set out. Because of the danger that the Argentine response may be equivocal, like last time, the Cabinet feel strongly that (once you have got the Peruvians on board) Buenos Aires should be asked to signify acceptance by a precise and early deadline. If they fail to do so, or give any reply other than unqualified acceptance, they would be taken to have rejected the proposals and there would be no ceasefire."* [1199]

"They would, however, also want a side letter confirming that the draft agreement incorporated a guarantee on the part of the US of the non-reintroduction of Argentine forces into the Falkland Islands pending a definitive settlement... Buenos Aires should be asked to give an answer by a precise deadline." [1200]

Thatcher answers Reagan's message of the 4th, explaining the need to amend the Peruvian/American peace plan.

> *"... Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, ... We asked earlier that it should be included explicitly. Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposal a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives.*
>
> *It is not much to ask ... I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. ... That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposal. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders..."* [1201]

Pym telegrams Parsons in New York; *"I am giving priority to the Peruvian/American initiative. We should not say anything to Pérez de Cuéllar that might encourage Argentine to look to his ideas rather than Haig's ... I should also wish you to make it clear that I am not in any way turning down his own ideas. ... we shall need his help in making it clear to Security Council members that diplomatic activity is continuing, that his own ideas are still under study and that the Council should do nothing that might cut across these efforts..."* [1202]

1198 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1199 Pym quoted in *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Files of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 1981–1982, Lot 82D370*
1200 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1201 *PREM19/624 f47 (T97/82)*
1202 This was not passed onto the Secretary-General by Parsons, who recognised that it would merely cause annoyance.

Spain's *El Pais* newspaper reports:

> *"If one considers that by now almost as many Argentine soldiers may have died as half the population of the Malvinas Islands, there are more than enough reasons to doubt the honesty that informs the decisions of the London government. Killing hundreds of people to guarantee the rights of self-determination of a few hundred more does not seem the most civilized of paths, and effortlessly recalls the practices of Nazism. Defending democracy with bombs, even if democracy has been violently attacked, is a dangerous experience that requires an ethical foundation that is not found today in the public statements of the Foreign Office. Everything indicates that the United Kingdom has inflicted disproportionate and unnecessary punishment on its opponents, and war crimes are not only committed in concentration camps."*

Spain's *ABC Sevilla* newspaper reports:

> *"The Economic Community is backtracking on its support for Mrs. Thatcher, and some countries have made it known that they do not wish to be involved in a war, even politically."*

From London, the BBC continue to broadcast family messages to the Islanders.

> *"Good reception, or at least better than usual, for 'Calling the Falklands.' ... If only they could see us listening, huddled around the wireless on the kitchen table, with the windows blacked out with blankets;.. When the need arises we can all get into the bunker with remarkable speed in the darkness..."* [1203]

In New York, the United Nations Security Council meet in informal session. The Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, reports that Argentina's Foreign Minister has agreed to accept his '*good offices*.' Spain's Permanent Representative demands that hostilities should be '*frozen*' pending a response to the Secretary-General's initiative. Dorr (Ireland) asked the Council to consider how to achieve a ceasefire, without giving either side any '*advantage*.' Responding for the UK, Parsons makes it clear that, *"... there was no question of our suspending military operations, ..."* Council members rejects Parsons' attempt to insert a reference to SCR 502 in the final statement. Adjourning, the Security Council express their, *"deep concern at the deterioration of the situation,"* but also their strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General.

> *"We were almost entirely isolated, no-one expressed support or understanding for the military action we are taking. Apart from me, only Guyana mentioned withdrawal. I was alone in resisting pressure to include in the statement a call for 'cessation of hostilities' or 'restraint'. I received no support from Mrs. Kirkpatrick (US) and De Nanteuil (France) was actively unhelpful. The Council is to meet again tomorrow (6 May) in informal consultations. ...*
>
> *So far, so good. With luck, and assuming there are no major military developments overnight, we should avoid a formal Council meeting until 7 May at the earliest. But it was a disturbing meeting, which revealed how completely support for our position has been eroded since SCR 502 was adopted. The hostilities have caused most Members of the Council to lose their nerve and think of us and the Argentines as equally to blame for loss of life. ... no-one is prepared to speak out in support of our right to take action under Article 51. ... I think we were lucky to get away with tonight's harmless mouse (sic) without our isolation having the effect of turning the whole Council against us."* [1204]

1203 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.121
1204 *UKMIS to FCO May 6, 1982 Telegram No. 658*

"Writing late from New York on 5 May, Parsons urged London to take note of the mood at the UN and find a more positive response to Pérez de Cuéllar, lest Britain was 'dangerously isolated here..' He wanted a substantive reply the next day that would affirm Britain's position but not cause embarrassment if published. It should give time for Peruvian ideas to succeed or fail, look positive and keep the ball in play 'but would contain conundrums which would give the Secretariat plenty to work on.' ..." [1205]

From Lima, Peru's President Belaunde has a telephone conversation with Galtieri in Buenos Aires.

"(Belaunde) said he advised Galtieri of the constructive UK response to the peace proposals. He told Galtieri the UK in essence accepted them with some changes. However, before he could elaborate Galtieri told him that Argentina had just communicated its agreement to the UN Sec-Gen to a mediating role for the UN. Galtieri did not reveal to Belaunde the conditions under which the UN mediation would be carried out. Belaunde told Galtieri that the British position on the Peruvian peace proposals would give the Argentines some idea of what would be acceptable to the UK. Galtieri expressed his gratitude for Peru's efforts." [1206]

In Washington DC, Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Lewin, meets with General David Jones, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, to hand over a list of military supplies that the UK is in need of.

In the South Pacific, a series of British reconnaissance flights commence, using San Felix Island, off the Chilean coast, where Chile's Navy maintains a runway. [1207]

"The problem was the long distance to the area of operations, which was on the southern end of the South American continent, meaning the aircraft had to refuel somewhere. It was decided to use Concepcion, refuelling during the night on the way out or on the return from a mission. That airfield is about 1,300km to the south-east of San Felix. Nimrod XW664, supported by a Vickers VC10, was deployed there in early May and on the 5th performed the ACME One mission, with a crew of 30, taking off at 1025hrs and landing at 1920 ." [1208]

"The Chilean airport on San Félix Island, 892 kilometers west of Chañaral, where Chile had opened a landing strip for large aircraft in late 1979 in anticipation of a possible conflict with Peru was used by British aircraft camouflaged with Chilean identification markings. An RAF Hawker Siddeley Nimrod R1 was flown to Chile to conduct electronic intelligence and communications missions for mutual benefit. As it strictly flew over Chilean territory, it was deemed not to violate the territorial regulations established by Pinochet against launching British operations against Argentina from Chilean territory." [1209]

From London, a request is sent to Washington for assistance in repatriating the 151 Argentine prisoners-of-war captured at South Georgia; currently held on board HMS *Antelope*.

> *"As you know the 151 POWs taken on South Georgia, together with 39 civilians (these include two Chileans, two Uruguayans and one Spaniard), are now on their way by ship to Ascension Island. They are likely to arrive around 11 May. Onward travel from Ascension to Argentina presents us with a number of practical problems.*

1205 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1206 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/06/1982*
1207 Known as the ACME missions, the aircraft (*Nimrod R.Mk.1s*) flew up and down the length of Chile picking up intelligence from Argentina. There were six flights, the last on May 17, 1982.
1208 *Black Buck 6 and ACME Missions: a quick look at British operations on Latin American soil during the Falklands War* Dario leone 2019
1209 Sznajder 2022

We have looked at the various possibilities and have concluded that the best answer would be to seek US assistance in the shape of a civilian aircraft to transport the party either to Brazil (as the protecting power) or Uruguay. … One of the major considerations is the problem of security on Ascension Island." [1210]

"10 May. 1200Z 21° 07'S; 21° 17'W we have made an Argie flag in case we have to bury any at sea. Antelope passed us escorting back a ship with the Argie POWs from South Georgia. Outgoing mail transferred." [1211]

Argentine newspapers continue the task of bolstering support for the war.

"In a photo montage, a weekly newspaper showed an English soldier heading to the islands in disguise, facing an Argentine conscript in combat uniform and holding an artillery shell. At the foot of the British it reads "on board the Hermes. Lots of beer, antics, and little discipline. English sailors do not care about the war their rulers sought". The Argentine, on his part, is "willing to defend the land from him. Here everything is discipline and they know that a country is behind them." …" [1212]

Secretary Haig informs the British Ambassador that Argentina no longer wishes to pursue the US/Peru initiative.

"Haig telephoned Henderson at 2300 saying that Argentina was no longer interested in the US/Peruvian plan but was now committed to the UN route.... The sinking of the Sheffield had greatly emboldened them, with the result that they were now convinced that they would triumph militarily and politically." [1213]

May 6th, acting on Parson's advice, Pym sends a message to be passed on to Pérez de Cuéllar at the UN.

"Britain is willing to accept and immediately implement an interim agreement which would prepare the way for a definitive settlement. Such an interim agreement could provide for a cease-fire … But such a cease-fire cannot simply leave Argentina in illegal occupation of the Islands, in contravention of Resolution 502 and with the ability to continue to build up the occupation forces.

Implementation of the cease-fire must therefore be unambiguously linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal... Withdrawal would be completed within a fixed number of days. The British forces would stand off at a reasonable distance [1214]*... After mutual withdrawal, the two sides would lift the exclusions zones ... (and)... economic sanctions... the United Kingdom would be prepared to accept an interim administration ... to be undertaken by a Contact Group ... which would act in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands ... Britain would be ready with Argentina to acknowledge the existence of different and conflicting views regarding the status of the Islands. We would be willing to engage in negotiations, without prejudice, for a definitive agreement and to accept a target date … for conclusion of an agreement which would accord with the wishes of the Islanders. We should be willing to accept that the Contact Group ... should have a role in relation to these negotiations..."*

From Ascension Island, the *Argonaut Group*, sails.[1215]

1210 *FCO to UK Embassy Washington 051600Z May 1982*. The POWs were eventually repatriated by the Red Cross to Montevideo on May 13, 1982.

1211 Southby-Tailyour 1990

1212 *Testigos de la derrota Malvinas: los soldados y la guerra durante la transición democrática argentina, 1982-1987* Federico G. Lorenze 2006 citing *Siete Dias* May 5, 1982 pp.778-79

1213 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1214 Standing off is nowhere near as easy as it might sound, particularly with the onset of winter in the South Atlantic.

1215 HMS *Argonaut* and *Ardent* escorting *Canberra*, *Elk* and *Tidepool*

Out at sea, two British *Sea Harriers* take off from HMS *Invincible* for a reconnaissance flight. In fog., they collide and crash into the sea. Both pilots are lost.

In the Falkland Islands, at Goose Green, Argentine army discipline begins to break down as supplies are rationed and soldiers forage for food.

"Piaggi initiated an investigation and found that a window had been broken in the settlement supply store, and established that some sweets, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages were missing, so imposed close surveillance to avoid repetitions of the event. When Sub-Lieutenant Gómez Centurión demanded provisions from the farm store at gunpoint, Goss insisted he sign for the supplies.... Centurión replied, 'No cheek, Goss!'." [1216]

In London, Foreign Secretary Pym speaks to the press.

> "*I am deeply disappointed that Argentine intransigence has once again frustrated a constructive initiative. Had they genuinely wanted peace, ... we could have had a ceasefire by 5pm tomorrow."*

A Peruvian cargo aircraft, arrives at El Palomar airport, with a cargo of 120 Soviet-made SA-7 ground-to-air missiles from Peruvian stocks. [1217]

In New York, UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, issues a statement. He says that he has received positive comments regarding his own initiative from Buenos Aires, and hopes to receive approval from London. Sir Anthony Parsons telegrams Britain's Foreign Office.

> *"I recommend that I should be authorised to deliver our reply to the Secretary-General immediately. This will upstage the Argentinians whose reply consisted only of an acceptance of the Secretary-General's demarche, a call for a ceasefire, and an expression of willingness to discuss details. I should also get our reply in before Costa Méndez arrives here .... we must protect ourselves against the mounting pressure on us to accept calls for unqualified cease-fires, cessation of hostilities, maximum restraint, etc. These will undoubtedly be renewed at this afternoon's Security Council consultations and I intend to stand as firm as I did yesterday. Obviously we cannot accept calls for a cease-fire unless they are clearly linked to unequivocal Argentinian agreement to withdraw ..."*

At 1230, New York time, Parsons has a meeting with the Secretary-General. Pérez de Cuéllar is said to be *"pleased"* with Francis Pym's message. The Secretary-General agrees that there is no need for a formal session of the Security Council to be called, and tells Parsons that he will seek a response from Argentina.

"Pérez de Cuéllar immediately issued a statement, describing the British response as substantive rather than procedural. Ahmed's attitude in the meeting had, however, been 'unremittingly critical and hostile,' as he demanded to know whether the new British proposals were, in effect, the Haig/Belaunde proposals already put to the Argentines and rejected by them. Ahmed, he described as a 'sinister and malevolent influence." [1218]

In Washington DC, Haig tells Henderson that he is not convinced that Argentina is *"serious"* about negotiating.

In New York, Parsons is interviewed for Britain's *World at One* television programme. He is asked to make a statement about the Secretary-General's claim of a *"positive reaction"* from the *Junta*.

1216 Van der Bijl 2023

1217 *Infobae* June 18, 2019.

1218 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Rafeeuddin Ahmed was a member of the Secretariat from Pakistan. What is clear from this conversation is that the Secretary-General had very little idea of what the Belaunde plan had consisted of; probably as a result of Haig trying to keep the UN out of the loop.

"I think there is a certain amount of exaggeration, at least there was last night, and I think it has been corrected in the American media this morning. ... I don't believe they've accepted all the propositions, all the range of ideas that he's put forward, in fact I am perfectly sure they have not. ... we are still ... at a very preliminary stage."

Mexico's President tells the press that Galtieri has offered to hold a face-to-face meeting with Margaret Thatcher, but that in no circumstances is Argentina willing to agree to any proposals put forward by, or otherwise associated with, the USA. He believes that the Peruvian proposals had been broadly acceptable.[1219]

In the UK, a planning paper considers the remaining options; including an approach to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

"... the plan followed what was now a rather familiar model: cease-fire linked to mutual withdrawal; immediate negotiations at the UN about interim administration (rather than trusteeship); negotiations on the future of the Falklands or a reference to the ICJ, resulting in a negotiated agreement on a binding ICJ ruling; negotiations without prejudice to outcome. They were looking for some way to get the ICJ to consider self-determination as well as legal title, so that Argentina would probably reject referral and was more likely to lose the case if it did not." [1220]

In Buenos Aires, *GENTE* magazine announces on its front page *Estamos Ganando – "We are winning"*. [1221] Above the legend:



"Tuesday. 4.10pm. Puerto Darwin, Malvinas Islands. Argentine soldiers await possible landing. However, only one air attack is reported. Two English planes are shot down."

Argentina's Defence Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, tells reporters that Argentina is not an aggressor country. That the aggression is being perpetrated by Great Britain and that his country will respond to that aggression with every means – at the right place and in due time.

NATO's '*Eurogroup*' [1222] issue a *communique*.

"Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Island and the dependencies as well as the failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties..."

In the *Le Monde* journal, Cuba's Vice-President states that his country is prepared to aid Argentina by all means, including military support.

Chile confirms its neutral status.

"Foreign Minister Rojas has publicly reaffirmed Chile's neutrality in the dispute. ... Press reports quoted Chile's Ambassador to Argentina as reassuring the Argentine people that Argentina "had its back guarded by a firm and loyal Chilean attitude". He also reportedly assured that Chile would not seek to take advantage of the crisis

1219 *PREM19/625 Telegram No. 366 of 6 May 1982*
1220 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Parsons was opposed, and the plan was dropped.
1221 See May 27 below.
1222 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey

in any other area. In private conversations here (Washington) and in Santiago, the Chileans have sought to promote understanding on our part of their own frustration over years on inconclusive talks with Argentina over the Beagle Channel, and of exasperation with Argentine "intransigence". They say they sympathize with the UK, worry over what a victorious Argentina might attempt as well as over what defeat would imply for future Argentine-Chilean relations." [1223]

May 7th, from London, PM Thatcher sends a message to the EEC heads of Government.

> *"The collapse of the US/Peruvian initiative means that the focus of diplomatic activity moves to New York. In approaching this new phase of the crisis there is one point which I should like to put to you urgently, personally and with all the emphasis at my command. I want you to know that Britain will not acquiesce in the retention of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. The military means to terminate the military occupation are being assembled. They will be used, unless a diplomatic solution can be found. If events take this course there will be, I fear, the likelihood of destruction and casualties on a scale far exceeding what we have seen already. I am prepared for this and so is my government, and so is my country. You should be in no doubt about that..."*

In Paris, French President François Mitterrand, speaks to his doctor.

> *"What an impossible woman, that Thatcher! With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic, she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians. ....*
>
> *I have been forced to yield. She has them now, the codes. If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell, it's not going to reflect well on our exports."* [1224]

In Geneva, Switzerland, Argentina registers a complaint with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

> *"(The UK).. in carrying out its acts of aggression against the civilian and military personnel in the region, has carried out continuous violations of the most elementary principle of humanitarian law. For example ... lack of information on the fate of the civilians captured in South Georgia; Lack of information on the situation of military personnel captured in South Georgia.*
>
> *In addition the UK has carried out acts repugnant to the consciences of civilised peoples such as – the incorporation in the Royal Navy Task Force of British military personnel captured by Argentine forces in the Falklands and South Georgia and then repatriated to the United Kingdom; sinking by submarine attack of the cruiser General Belgrano, sailing outside the zone defined by the UK as the maritime exclusion zone and not engaged in hostilities at the moment of sinking; attacks on similar vessels going to pick up people shipwrecked in another incident, the attack on ARA Sobral, one such vessel, was even more blameworthy since it was unarmed."*

1223 *Latin American Reaction to South Atlantic Crisis – US Dept of State Confidential Cable May 7, 1982.* See below.

1224 Quoted in *Rendez-vous: La psychanalyse de Francois Mitterrand* Ali Magoudi 2005. When originally published, this story was not given any credibility. However, in 2022, it was revealed that the French missiles were, apparently, fitted with a 'kill switch', designed to prevent the weapons being used against their makers. That information had not immediately been provided to the UK by France, causing some annoyance within the UK. However, it now appears that, in 1982, British scientists took an *AM39 Exocet* missile to pieces and successfully identified the means by which the missile could be confounded. Arising from that research, a number of countermeasures were devised including the use of chaff. There is no suggestion that this 'kill switch', for want of a better term, was in any way electronic.

The ICRC respond by noting that the British Government had provided information about captured Argentine troops within 5 days which; *"contrasted favourably with Argentine behaviour."* Also that the ARA *General Belgrano*, though outside the exclusion zone, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations. [1225]

In New York, at the United Nations building, Parsons speaks to Pérez de Cuéllar.

> *"I wanted to explain exactly why the previous negotiations had collapsed. Essentially this was because the Argentines had insisted that the transitional arrangements and the diplomatic negotiations for a final settlement must be pre-judged from the outset by acceptance of Argentine sovereignty. This had in turn become a precondition for withdrawal. ... Pérez de Cuéllar took notes and said that he fully understood the position. He was alive to the possibility that the Argentines might simply be using him in order to get either a cease-fire and endless negotiations without commitment to withdrawal, or a British veto of a call for a cease-fire combined with negotiations. This putting them in a better diplomatic position..."* [1226]

In London, the Ministry of Defence announce;

> *"Her Majesty's Government has consistently made clear that the United Kingdom has the right to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Her Majesty's Government will take all necessary measures in the South Atlantic in the self defence of British ships and aircraft engaged in operations and in re-supplying and reinforcing British forces in the South Atlantic.*
>
> *Because of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hostile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, Her Majesty's Government warns that any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more than **12 nautical miles** from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly."* [1227]

Responding, Argentina claims that the extension of the zone demonstrates; *"... the British insistence on a military solution and desire to obstruct the diplomatic option then under consideration with the Secretary-General."*

HM Ships *Fearless*, *Stromness*, *Norland*, *Europic Ferry* and *Atlantic Conveyor* sail from Ascension Island. [1228]

"At 0700 on the morning of 7 May 2 Para had arrived in Norland and Europic Ferry to be plunged immediately into their one rehearsal with LCUs ... At 2200 that day the bulk of the Amphibious Task Group weighed and under cover of a tropical night with ships darkened for the South Atlantic while Bob McQueen ashore on Ascension Island continued to transmit on his radio circuits as though we were still at anchor, even to the point of simulating my ships' replies." [1229]

In New York, Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Ernesto Ros, arrives. Ros immediately calls on Pérez de Cuéllar to give him *"amplifications"* of the Argentine reply to the Secretary-General's proposals. He then complains to the Security Council about Britain's most recent announcement; *"This unlawful measure constitutes a further act of aggression ... which endangers the security of the Argentine Republic..."*

1225 *PREM19/625 Telegram No.224 of 7 May 1982*
1226 *PREM19/625 Telegram No.672 of 7 May 1982*
1227 My emphasis.
1228 *Atlantic Conveyor* was carrying fourteen Sea Harriers and ten helicopters. See May 18, 1982, below.
1229 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012

From the UN, Parsons contacts Britain's Foreign Office with regard to the effective extension of the exclusion zone to within 12 miles of the Argentine coast.

> *"The MOD statement ... has already caused a stir here. It has provoked a letter from Roca to the President of the Security Council, has worried Pérez de Cuéllar and is being presented dramatically in the New York media . ... I have reassured Pérez de Cuéllar that the MOD statement should not be seen as a dramatic escalation of the conflict but rather as a clarification of earlier announcements..."*

"Although the new warning was seen as extending the Exclusion Zone right up to the Latin American coastline, this was not quite what was intended as, unlike the TEZ it only referred to Argentine warships and military aircraft. Nonetheless, the announcement immediately prompted queries from Chile and Uruguay as to how it might apply to them." [1230]

US representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts the Secretary-General to complain that his peace initiative is likely to *"cut across"* other proposals that Secretary Haig is involved with.

From Washington DC, Haig sends out a review of Latin-American attitudes to all US diplomats throughout the Americas.

> *"The Anglo-Argentine conflict has divided Spanish speaking countries from the English speaking Caribbean, jeopardized the Inter-American system, provided Cuba the opportunity to repair relations with Argentina and adopt the mantle of Latin American solidarity, ignited nationalist feelings throughout the hemisphere, and revived latent anti-Americanism, which has yet to erupt widely in public but is simmering beneath the surface. ...Privately Brazilian Government officials have voiced their disappointment and concern with the degree and extent of the US tilt toward Great Britain. While maintaining official neutrality, Brazil itself has tilted toward Argentina and has responded favourably to an Argentine request to purchase patrol aircraft."* [1231]

May 8th, from Lima, Peru's government issue a statement concerning Britain's extension of the exclusion zone.

> *"The Peruvian Government considers of the utmost gravity this extension of the area of conflict as far as the waters which, according to Argentine legislation, correspond to its sovereignty ... Faced with this new announcement of belligerent action on the part of the British forces, after the unjustified sinking of the cruiser 'General Belgrano', the Peruvian Government repeats its firmest protest ..."*

HMS *Intrepid* sails from Ascension Island.

"... once the Task Force sailed south from Ascension Island, the only way of delivering urgent/vital supplies would be through my Hercules flying down to it and dropping them by parachute into the sea, having provided sufficient flotation packaging to permit the stores to float until picked up by the ships." [1232]

Argentina announces that they have converted a survey vessel, the *Bahia Paraiso*, into a hospital ship.[1233]

From New York, Anthony Parsons reports two meetings with the Secretary-General. Regarding the first:

1230 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1231 *Latin American Reaction to South Atlantic Crisis – US Dept of State Confidential Cable May 7, 1982.* See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21349-19820507-latin-american-reaction-south

1232 Evans 2003

1233 In effect, removing its status as a potential 'target' under the Geneva Conventions. See below.

"I saw the Secretary-General for an hour at 1530... Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides agreed with the concept that his proposals were "provisional measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties." I confirmed that we agreed with this, but said that we must have 100% precision from the Argentines on the point. Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had indicated that the Argentines envisaged a written agreement: their signature would give us the precision we needed. I said that it would depend whose signature was on the agreement. All previous negotiations had foundered at the last minute on Argentine insistence that their claim on sovereignty should be accepted. ...

On the terminal date for the negotiations for a diplomatic solution, Argentina had proposed 31 December 1982 and you (Pym) had suggested "perhaps one year." Pérez de Cuéllar would value your reaction to the Argentine proposals. On transitional arrangements ... Pérez de Cuéllar went on to say that Argentina favoured "an exclusive UN role" whereas you had proposed a contact group of States acceptable to both parties. I repeated that we needed to define what we meant... what did an "exclusive UN role" mean? ... for us this would be a crucial question. ...

On the format and venue of the substantive negotiations, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines wanted them to be conducted either by the Secretary-General or a representative appointed by him and that they should be held in New York. ..." [1234]

Parson then reports on the second meeting.

"I saw the Secretary-General and his team again at 2130 today. Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had asked Ros for an initial reaction to my request for clarification of what the Argentines meant by "an exclusive UN role" in the interim administration. Ros had replied that Argentina felt that since the interim period was likely to be fairly short it should be possible to adopt arrangements which, while not affecting individual rights, should necessarily come under the authority of the interim administrator, ie. the UN. ...

She (Argentina) felt strongly that, in order to avoid confusion and so as to ensure that the transitional period was truly transitional, it should be under a clear cut administration, with a presence from both the interested parties. Pérez de Cuéllar commented that this seemed to be a repetition of the position the Argentines had maintained all along on the transitional arrangements. I questioned this: ...

Their reference to "individual rights" presumably meant existing law on property, family matters, etc. What in effect they were proposing was direct UN administration without any local political structures. This was a very different concept from ours and I did not believe that it would be acceptable....

Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had repeated very clearly this afternoon that it was not the purpose of Argentina to prejudge the question of sovereignty, although de Soto added that for the Argentines this depended on agreement on appropriate terms of reference for the negotiations ... we shall have to watch this..." [1235]

Parson sums up the day's meetings with the Secretary-General.

1234 *PREM19/625 Telegram No.679 of 8 May 1982*
1235 *PREM19/626 Telegram No.686 of 8 May 1982.* Álvaro de Soto was a Peruvian member of the UN's Secretariat.

"After today's rounds, it is clear that the Argentines have organised their negotiating position very thoroughly. Perez de Cuellar told me in the strictest confidence that Ros has a prepared statement on every topic from which he reads verbatim as appropriate. I think that there are three possibilities.

The first, and least likely, is that the Argentines have decided to negotiate in good faith and play it straight … Pérez de Cuéllar is as sceptical about this as I am. I hope we are wrong. The second possibility is that the Argentines have realised that if the search for a diplomatic solution fails because of their insistence on prejudging the sovereignty question, it will be diplomatic game set and match to us... The third possibility is that they have decided that they cannot get what they want now, and that they should prepare the ground to get it the day after the interim period expires. This would mean that they would genuinely negotiate an agreement with us now ... But would refuse to accept anything in the agreement which envisaged prolongation of the interim period if agreement had not been reached. …

My suggestion is that I take the following line tomorrow (9 May). We are prepared to look more closely at the possibility of UN administration, but we could not accept the total exclusion of the Islanders, as proposed in the latest Argentine formulation: this is a great deal more rigid than the ideas they discussed with Haig where the problem was the disproportionate number of which they required on the two Councils. …

I could take this line as an exploratory move without conceding our position on the Contact Group for the time being... I realise that I have not tackled the answer to the third and perhaps most sinister (third) possibility.. It is extremely hard to see a way out of this dilemma. …" [1236]

From Buenos Aires, at 8.30pm local time, a 24-hour TV marathon starts to broadcast across nine South American countries; hosted by Lidia 'Pinky' Satragno and Jorge Fontana. Its purpose is to lift the nation's spirits and to raise funds for the Argentine troops stationed in the Falkland Islands. Footballer, Diego Maradona, sends a cheque for 100,000,000 pesos (US$7,117).[1237]



"In those twenty-four hours, in good faith, people crowded onto Figueroa Alcorta and Tagle avenues to donate cash, cheques, gold of all kinds to be melted, works of art, historical pieces, jewellery and even a golden Mercedes Benz … At the same rime, a hundred telephone operators received calls from the interior with donations. At one point a military band played the National Anthem and one could say that the entire country stopped for a few minutes. … the chancellor made a triumphant entry into the main studio of ATC, supported by some diplomats, as if the Argentine troops were close to victory: the general public did not know what was happening in the Malvinas." [1238]

1236 *PREM19/626 Telegram No.686 of 8 May 1982*

1237 In June, 1982, the newspaper *La Nacion*, reported that more than 75,000 contributions had been made. In all, some 22,874,769,000 pesos (US$1,628,097) was raised for what was to be known as the *Malvinas Argentinas Patriotic Fund*. Quite what happened to the gifts and monies raised is still much debated, even today. Little, if anything, appears to have reached Argentina's troops in the archipelago.

1238 Yofre 2011

May 9th, at 1300 local time, four Argentine A-4cs depart San Julian. On mid-air refuelling, two of the aircraft encounter problems and return to San Julian. The other two aircraft press on. Near the Falkland islands, both aircraft disappear. [1239]

From London, Francis Pym relays instructions to Parsons.

> *"We agree that Britain should demonstrate full willingness to cooperate in the Secretary-General's negotiations. … You should convey the following British position to the Secretary-General:*
>
> *(a) … We can agree that time 'T' should be set as soon after signature of an agreement as both parties can guarantee compliance by their forces to a cease-fire. For us, 24 hours after signature is acceptable …*
>
> *(b) …We can accept a period of 14 days for withdrawal of all Argentine military personnel from the Islands; half of them should be withdrawn within 7 days.*
>
> *(c) … The arrangements for British withdrawal must be equal and parallel with those for Argentine withdrawal, thus involving no disadvantage to Britain. We can agree to withdraw all of or naval forces within 14 days, and half of them within 7 days, to outside a zone of 200 nautical miles from the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *(d) … It is unreal to set an absolute terminal date for negotiations when everyone knows that the parties, with the best will in the world, may not be able to conclude an agreement within a specified time. For this reason we hope that the Secretary-General will return to the expression "target date" which appeared in his original proposal of 3 May. On that basis we could accept that the named date be 31 December 1982. In order however to take account of reality, without stating directly that negotiations might go on beyond the target date, the agreement would have to say that the interim arrangements will continue until an agreement on the future of the Islands is implemented …*
>
> *(e) … negotiations should take place under his (Secretary-General's) auspices … perhaps Geneva or Ottawa... we must also insist most firmly that the new Argentine suggestions to the Secretary-General about the interim administration are unacceptable. …*
>
> *What Argentina is now suggesting is unprecedented and unreasonable. We can accept UN interim administration, but on the clear understanding that the Executive and Legislative Councils continue to function…"*

Pym adds; *"… any agreement must be about the Falkland Islands, thus keeping the dependencies out of it."*

"… to help Pérez de Cuéllar, the Ambassador (Parsons) was permitted to hand over previous draft agreements. As the original Haig proposals contained many elements that Britain would not wish now to revive, it was best to stick with the draft that emerged out of the Peruvian effort." [1240]

Interviewed on US television, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, says that Argentina is not asking the UK to recognise Argentine sovereignty at the beginning of negotiations; provided that those negotiations conclude with confirmation of Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

In New York, Parsons sees the Secretary-General to set out the British position.

1239 Lt. Farias's A-4C was never found. Lt. Casco's aircraft was eventually discovered on South Jason Island. His identity was not confirmed until 2008.

1240 Freedman 2005 vol.2

"... this brought me on to the all important question of Argentine acceptance that the interim arrangements would be without prejudice to the question of sovereignty. I had been seriously disturbed by Costa Méndez's television interview today.

He seemed to me to have been saying that Argentina was not insisting that the UK should actually cede sovereignty before the negotiations started but that she insisted that those negotiations must conclude with confirmation of Argentine sovereignty and that they would therefore be concerned not with sovereignty itself but with how the interests of the Islanders might be protected under Argentine sovereignty. If my reading of Costa Méndez's remarks was right, there had been a major change in the Argentine position as Pérez de Cuéllar had described it yesterday.... I next stated that I wished it to be quite clear that we were talking about the Falkland Islands alone, not about the Dependencies...." [1241]

"... Ahmed referred several times to a joint communique issued in London and Buenos Aires on 27 April 1977 and conveyed to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 9 June 1977 for transmission to the special committee on decolonization. It dealt with negotiations about 'future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.' Similar letters and communiques were circulated thereafter... Parsons took the line that the Argentine invasion of the Islands 'created a new situation and that the precedent of earlier negotiations was no longer relevant.'..." [1242]

Pérez de Cuéllar agrees to seek clarification from Ros.

Off the Falklands, an Argentine spy trawler, *Narwal*, is attacked by *Sea Harriers* before being boarded by special forces (SBS). Thirteen of the crew are found to be injured; one dead. The survivors surrender. [1243]



"It had an Argentine naval officer on board and had been in the Exclusion Zone for a week on surveillance. The Argentine reports of the trawler incident seem to differ considerably from the BBC ones." [1244]

"The presence of an Argentine naval officer and of certain documents confirmed the ship's intelligence gathering activity." [1245]

1241 *PREM19/626 Telegram No.691 of 9 May 1982*

1242 Freedman 2005 vol.2. On April 26, 1977 Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen made a statement to Parliament which started - *"The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed to hold negotiations from June or July 1977 which will concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories, in particular, and the South West Atlantic, in general."* His inclusion of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands was never explained; causing some confusion following a change of government in May, 1979. *cf.* 1977

1243 Some sources spell the vessel's name as *Narwhal*

1244 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.134. The Argentine naval officer was Capt. Juan Carlos Gonzalez Llanos of the Navy Information Service. He was transferred to HMS *Invincible*.

1245 Middlebrook 2003

An Argentine *Puma* helicopter is shot down by HMS *Coventry* with a *Sea Dart* missile.

"General Menéndez requested Brigadier Castellano to send a helicopter to the area in order to rescue the shipwreck victims who were on life rafts. After analyzing the request with the Staff, and being informed by the radar that an enemy CAP was overflying the area near the vessel, it was concluded that they were on the alert to attack should rescue arrive. The Brigadier was adamant: as long as enemy fighter aircraft remained in the area, he would not deploy any helicopter there. On the face of this decision, and after a heated argument, Menéndez ordered an Army Puma to answer the request for assistance immediately; then, the General was warned to brace himself for the worst. Brigadier Castellano ordered the CIC to follow the Puma, registration mark AE-505. Forty minutes after takeoff, a missile impacted on the helicopter, near Los Leones Island. It was later known that the missile was fired by the Coventry destroyer and that the victims from the Narwal shipwreck were rescued by the enemy and taken as prisoners of war until the end of the conflict. Three Army men were killed: Teniente Primero Roberto M. Fiorito, Teniente Primero Juan C. Buschiazzo, and Suboficial Raúl H. Dimotta. The Narwal sank the following day." [1246]

HMS *Coventry* fires two *Sea Dart* missiles at an Argentine *Hercules* approaching Stanley airfield. The missiles miss, but in the attempt to get out of the way, the two escorting *Skyhawk* aircraft collide and crash.

From New York, Parsons reports on reactions to the military exchanges to London.

> *"Today's military engagements have predictably fluttered the dovecotes here. Roca complained to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council … the Argentines are putting it about that at the Security Council's informal consultations on 5 and 6 May tacit agreement was established that there should be no hostilities while the Secretary-General pursued his initiative. … I telephoned Pérez de Cuéllar and Ling Qing to remind them that I had made it absolutely clear at the informal consultations that there was no question of our suspending military operations…"*


Pérez de Cuéllar and Parsons meet again in the UN building.

> *"… he had told Ros that we did not consider that the Dependencies were included in the present exercise. Ros had objected strongly, saying that it would be impossible for the Argentine authorities to explain to their public opinion that Argentina would withdraw from the Falklands but that there would be no British military withdrawal from South Georgia. … Ros had refused to accept our position… they wanted the lifting of the exclusion zones and of economic sanctions "to be effective as of time T", otherwise the impression might be given that their withdrawal was taking place under pressure…*
>
> *On the interim administration, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines continued to object strongly to any role for the Islanders, even of an advisory character, because this would prejudge the outcome of the negotiations. … Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had had a very difficult discussion with Ros about the terms of reference of the negotiations and the linked question of Costa Méndez's television interview.*
>
> *The kind of language the Argentines had in mind for the terms of reference was: "the negotiations would have to solve the disputes between the parties, taking into account relevant General Assembly Resolutions." I said that this would not do. Costa Méndez's remarks today had been very close to Argentine statements which had caused the collapse of previous negotiations. We must have proper clarification. … In order to remove any shadow of doubt, we would also have to insist that all three members of the Junta signed the agreement…"*

1246 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.348-349.

Parsons telegrams London.

> *"This ball is now firmly in the Argentine Court and Buenos Aires will have to give Ros instructions on the sovereignty question before we come under further pressure. If they come up with the wrong answer, ie an answer unsatisfactory to us, the stage will be set either for a break down of the negotiations or for a final dramatic effort by Pérez de Cuéllar to persude the Junta to think again."*


EL PORTEÑO
EL NORTE CONTRA EL SUR
Pérez Esquivel: La soberanía y la paz
Reportaje: Augusto Fernandes
Los rebeldes que insultan a la Reina
Historia de una mapuche que murió de tristeza
TV: La caja idiota no se rinde

In Argentina, at the Ciudad de Mar del Plata Stadium, 50,000 people swear their allegiance to the Argentine flag; *"... under the martial sounds of the band of the 601st Defence Artillery Group."* [1247]

Argentina's newspapers describe the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as; *"unscrupulous, resentful, warmongering, crazy and a witch."*[1248] *El Porteño* pictures the British Prime Minister as a pirate.

From Lima, President Belaunde announces that he is sending a minister to Europe to argue for the lifting of sanctions against Argentina.

Mexico's President, Lopez Portillo, asks the British Ambassador when he can expect a reply to his suggestion that General Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher have a face to face meeting.

From the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar's office issues a statement.

> *"The Secretary-General's discussions with the parties continued today and he met twice on separate occasions with the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Secretary-General has also informed the President of the Security Council of his talks. Substantial progress has been made on several points but clarifications are still needed on others. The talks will continue tomorrow."*

May 10th, in the Falkland Islands, between 0230 and 0330 British ships bombard Argentine positions near Moody Brook. [1249]

In New York, Parsons hears from Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym.

> *"I endorse in particular your insistence on smoking the Argentines out on the question of sovereignty and the terms of reference for negotiations about the future of the Islands.*
>
> *If the Secretary-General's efforts were to collapse because Argentina insisted on a transfer of sovereignty or would not agree to a sensible provision about what would happen if negotiations had not succeeded by a target date, Argentina would clearly have been unreasonable and we think we could defend our position satisfactorily in Parliament and internationally. ...*
>
> *The question of the dependencies and of the traditional administration may, as you say, be the ones where the crunch will come. ... Meanwhile, the following comments ... are provided as general guidance for your meetings with the Secretary-General today.*

1247 Yofre 2011
1248 *Ibid.*
1249 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.352

Dependencies:... you should argue that the status quo in the Dependencies is as it was before the unlawful occupation and that our purpose in the present negotiations is to deal with the new situation created by the continued unlawful occupation by Argentina of the Falkland Islands themselves...

Sovereignty: You should continue to insist on two major points of substance; (a) that the text of the interim agreement must not prejudice the outcome of negotiations about the future and (b) that the Argentines must state clearly to the Secretary-General that they accept this and will desist from declaring the opposite in public.

Interim Administration: ... you should contest the unsupported and erroneous Argentine assertion that the involvement of the islanders in the interim administration would prejudge the outcome of negotiations...

Target Date for Conclusion of Future Negotiations: We see no reason why an interim agreement should not say that: (a) negotiations will start immediately, to produce an agreement by the target date of 31 December 1982; (b) the interim agreements will remain in force until implementation of a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands..."

In the South Atlantic, at approximately 0730z, HMS *Sheffield* sinks in poor weather conditions while being towed by HMS *Yarmouth.*

Argentina's news agency, *Telam,* reports on *Narwal*'s capture by British special forces.

"British forces attacked and sunk the Argentine fishing boat Narwal which was in the area carrying out specific tasks that did not pose any threat to the British Fleet. The Narwal was sunk by a Sea Harrier which later did not hesitate to machine-gun the rafts that were hurled to the sea by the survivors, and even a raft that was filled with sick and wounded. This is an outrageous attack that violates the most elemental human feelings .. an inhuman deed, a hideous barbarian act that goes against all those values of the free world which the British Government has claimed to defend and uphold."

From New York, Parsons sends a message to London.

"I asked my old Commonwealth colleagues, who have more time than I have recently, to circulate amongst UN delegations whether they felt that the overall attitude towards us was changing for the worse. They said it was not. There was still much sympathy for our position." [1250]

In London, Francis Pym is asked by the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee about the Government's long term objectives. Pym responds that while British territory, the Government had never taken a view that the Falklands were under British sovereignty, *"for ever and a day."* Other forms of governance were available to ensure their future, including independence, associate status, condominium, UN trusteeship and others. Problems with media coverage are also raised.

"At a meeting of the Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee, Pym condemned the BBC for its coverage of the war and urged constituents to write to the BBC to complain. Pym's remarks were given wide publicity in Britain and provoked headlines such as, 'PYM ATTACKS BBC', and 'ANGRY PYM IN BLAST AT THE BEEB'." [1251]

1250 *PREM19/626 Telegram No.700 of 10 May 1982*
1251 Thornton 2015 p.106

The Bristol Group of reinforcements sail from the UK for the South Atlantic. Destroyers *Bristol* and *Cardiff*; frigates *Active*, *Andromeda*, *Avenger*, *Minerva*, *Penelope*. Also fleet auxiliaries, RFA *Bayleaf* and RFA *Olna*.

From Buenos Aires, the junta, in *Communique No. 40*, declares the whole of the South Atlantic a *'war zone'*.

In New York, Argentina submits its own amendments to the Secretary-General's proposals.

> *"(1) This agreement is concluded within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and taking into account Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly.*
>
> *(2) The agreement to which the parties commit themselves shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties.*
>
> *(3) The geographical scope of this agreement shall comprise the* ***three archipelagos*** *considered by the United Nations.* [1252]
>
> *(4) The Government and the Administration shall be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations. The observers of the parties may fly their respective flags.*
>
> *(5)* ***There shall be freedom of transit and residence for citizens of the parties, who shall enjoy the right to acquire and dispose of real estate****.* [1253]
>
> *(6) The withdrawal of forces shall be effected under the supervision of the United Nations.*
>
> *(7) The parties commit themselves to undertake in good faith negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General with a view to the peaceful settlement of the dispute and, with a sense of urgency, to complete these negotiations by 31 December 1982."*

Pérez de Cuéllar meets with Anthony Parsons.

> *"I had nearly two hours with the Secretary-General and his team this evening. It was a very discouraging meeting. Pérez de Cuéllar said that ... Ros had given him a paper... the paper had not originated in Buenos Aires but had been drafted in the course of the discussions here. It was therefore "negotiable." Ros had told him that the Argentines saw the paper as a "package" and thought it better to discuss all these points at the same time.*
>
> *Pérez de Cuéllar had said that the paper would be unacceptable to us but said he would convey it to me. I said that I was puzzled and disappointed ... it went back to general headlines (and, in its paragraph 5, added a major new point), without the detail on which I thought that Pérez de Cuéllar and I had been making progress...*
>
> *At the end of the meeting de Soto said that as the Dependencies had been included in our earlier negotiations with the Argentines they could not be excluded from the next round. Did he understand that I wanted to exclude them from the interim arrangements? Surely, withdrawal from South Georgia, where we had few troops, would be a "painless gesture."*
>
> *I denied this firmly ... as far as we were concerned, the agreement under discussion related to the Falkland Islands alone...*

1252 My emphasis. Only the Falklands archipelago was listed at the UN as a non-self-governing territory for the purposes of decolonization. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands had not been listed in 1946. Nor were they mentioned in any UN resolution.

1253 My emphasis. Presumably all the soldiers would have been back a week later in the guise of civilians seeking to purchase land.

Withdrawal: A major new problem arose here. Ahmed said that the Argentines had said today that the proposals discussed with Haig had been based on the complete withdrawal of the British Task Force to its bases in the UK. I said … since then, the situation had changed enormously and there was no question of us accepting such an arrangement. It was totally irrelevant to the real situation…" [1254]

Parsons opines on the day, in a telegram to London.

"Today's experience brings me very close to believing that they are still not interested in reaching a negotiated settlement on terms which would be acceptable to us, and that it is rapidly becoming a question of who wrong-foots whom when the negotiations break down…"

Cuba's Fidel Castro, current Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement at the UN, calls upon the other members to take whatever steps they can to delay further British action against Argentina.

From Washington DC, America's roving envoy, US Ambassador Walters, travels to Buenos Aires to; *".. probe the possibilities of an alternative government there; to emphasis to Galtieri the danger of Soviet penetration, and to indicate US economic help would be forthcoming in the event of a UK/Argentine agreement."* [1255]

Argentina's Air Force issues a *communique* listing the names of 10 dead and 4 missing in action over the Falkland islands. 18 more are shown as wounded.

Panama's President, in a telegram to the Secretary-General, condemns; *"… the United Kingdom's escalating aggression against Argentina as a collective affront to Latin America …"*

Near the Falkland Islands, HMS *Alacrity* is ordered to conduct a reconnaissance through Falklands Sound which divides the two main islands; from the south. [1256]

A 100-mile control area is imposed around Ascension Island. Entry into the area by shipping or aircraft requires prior notification. [1257]

May 11th, at 0240, traversing Falklands Sound and near the half-way point, a radar contact is detected by HMS *Alacrity*. High-explosive 4.5 inch shells are fired at the unknown target before the British frigate moves on.

"Thus occurred the only surface action between British and Argentine ships of the entire 1982 war." [1258]

"The whole engagement was carried out by radar on a dark night with heavy rain falling. At least three hits were seen through the rain. … The ship attacked was the Argentine naval transport Isla de los Estados. … The ship sank." [1259]

"The transport ship Isla de los Estados, together with the transport ship ELMA Río Carcarañá, had remained moored in Groussac Bay, in front of the airport, as valuable defense materiel was unloaded with lighters. On 29 April, when the British attack was imminent, the Naval Component Command ordered that the ships slipped their moorings and take shelter in the coves southeast of Soledad Island. …, while navigating near Port

1254 *PREM19/626 Telegram No.703 of 10 May 1982*
1255 *FCO Sitrep 0730 11 May 1982*
1256 Admiral Woodward (1992) described *Alacrity*'s mission as being to discover whether the Argentine's had mined the Sound - the hard way.
1257 Privatsky 1986
1258 Woodward 1992. The Argentine ship was carrying 325,000 litres of aviation fuel, which eventually ignited from the fires caused by *Alacrity*'s shells.
1259 Middlebrook 2003. Unaware of *Alacrity*'s passage, the Argentines were confused as to what had happened and did not mount a search until two days later.

Mitre, the frigate Alacrity took the Isla de los Estados by surprise and fired its broadside that hit the ship directly and reached her cargo of fuel. The ship blew up and started sinking quickly. Eighteen crewmembers died; Cabo Héctor Hugo Varas, belonging to the Tandil 6th Air Brigade, was among them." [1260]

At around 0300 local time, *Alacrity* exits Falklands Sound at high speed, towing a decoy. Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis* sights the British ship and fires a torpedo, before diving to avoid any counter-attack. [1261]

Life in Stanley, continues.

> *"The troops in the town are trigger happy. A youngster had let loose with a heavy-calibre machine-gun and sprayed a house opposite the Senior School. No one was hurt, only because the person in the room which was hit badly had just put out the light and laid down. … Valerie was very chirpy; she had delivered a baby. A daughter for Jackie and Taff Davis. … There was talk of a ship being sunk in the Falklands Sound. The Argies said it was carrying supplies for the locals on West Falkland."* [1262]

At Goose Green, some families are allowed to return to their homes. [1263]

In the UK, the BBC is criticised for its *"biased"* reporting of the war. Anthony Grant MP complains to the Director-General; *"I do not expect the BBC to be biased in Britain's favour but, in the interests of 'balance' if nothing else, need they be so obviously on the side of the enemy?"*

From Paris, the French Government informs London that they had delivered five *AM39 Exocet* missiles to Argentina before the start of the conflict; part of an order for ten missiles. They also confirm that they have an outstanding order for four *Exocets* from Peru.

From London, Margaret Thatcher writes to the other EC Heads of Government asking them to support a renewal of the embargo on Argentina; due for review on the 17th; *"… anything less than this could only encourage the Argentines to believe that our resolve is weakening, and that if they maintain their intransigence their aggression will eventually attain its objectives."*

In a message to Mexico, Thatcher also politely declines President Portillo's suggestion of a face to face meeting with Galtieri, as it may; *"… cut across what is happening in New York."*

In Argentina, the junta hold a meeting with the Military Committee (COMIL); *"The three commanders decided to carry out a census or survey of companies, financial entities, and establishments under British (ownership) to structure a system that would make it possible to block funds, titles and other assets … in the event of national need."* [1264]

"… the Chancellor also pointed out that the negotiations (in the United Nations) had little pace because Great Britain continued to maintain those schemes based on the validity of local committees (self-determination) and separated the cases of the Malvinas and South Georgia. The Chancellor stated that Great Britain would attempt a significant military offensive." [1265]

From the Foreign Office in London, Francis Pym responds to Parsons.

1260 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.353
1261 Unconfirmed. Information from a mixture of sources; only some of which were there at the time. If true, it appears that the torpedo may have hit the ship's towed decoy, detaching it without exploding.
1262 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1263 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.43. 79 people remained in the community hall.
1264 Yofre 2011
1265 *Ibid.*

"I agree that your talks yesterday with the Secretary-General were very discouraging... The Argentine paper ... having been drafted by Ros in New York, must incorporate negotiating fat. Moreover, it might be disowned by the Junta and, for this and other reasons, we should be careful not to get into the position of accepting it as the basis of further discussions. ...

When you see the Secretary-General today, you may use the following ... (a) Dependencies: continue to insist on their exclusion. (b) Sovereignty: the formula is clear and easily explainable. You should continue to work for as much of it as possible. (c) ... the suggestion that we should retire 2000 nautical miles is completely unreal. (d) Withdrawal:... the State which would be best placed geographically and in terms of equipment to verify naval withdrawal effectively would be the US. (e) Interim Administration: you should suggest that the UN administration should be described as functioning "in consultation with the Executive and Legislative Councils in the Islands"... (f) Point 5 in the Argentine text about freedom of transit and residence is obviously designed by Argentina to flood the Islands and thus change the demographic facts during the interim period ... wholly unacceptable ..." [1266]

From Washington, Ambassador Henderson informs London; *"State Department have now advised us, with some embarrassment, that Landsat photography of the Falklands area has taken place during the period 7 – 12 May and that the Argentines have obtained the pictures."*

From Buenos Aires, Argentina's junta issues a statement.

"In view of the United Kingdom's persistence in its aggressive attitude, which is reflected inter alia in the restrictions it has attempted to impose on Argentine marine traffic in the South Atlantic, and in exercise of the right of self-defence established by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is decided that any vessel flying the United Kingdom flag which is navigating in the aforementioned zone towards the area of operations and/or which may be presumed to constitute a threat to national security shall be considered hostile, and action will be taken accordingly."

At the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar meets again with Parsons.

"... on reflection, he had decided not to give me the "rough draft" until he had had a reply from Ros on the question of non-prejudgement... There was one point he wished to raise following his conversation with Ros this morning. ... Pérez de Cuéllar wondered whether we could find other ways to meet our concern about a vacuum occurring if agreement had not been reached by 31 December. ... It was left that the Secretary-General's team would think further on this..."

Later, Parsons is asked to return.

"Pérez de Cuéllar said that at last he had good news for me. The Argentines had accepted that 31 December should be a target date and that the agreement should state that the outcome of the negotiations would not be prejudged. He then handed me the following text:

"The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982, taking into account the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgement of the outcome."

1266 *PREM19/627 Telegram No.383 of 11 May 1982*

Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had put this text (which is a variant on the language I gave him on 9 May) to Ros as his own proposal. Ros had told him this evening that, "after consultation with everybody" Costa Méndez had instructed him to accept it. I said that this was an extremely encouraging development ... assuming that Ros was acting with full authority... There still remained a question about what would happen if no agreement had been reached by 31 December. Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines had made a "tremendous concession." They had also told him, on the interim administration, that they could accept that individual members of the Legislative Council, in their personal capacity, could be used by the administrator for advisory purposes, so long as the administration was also empowered to call on an equal number of other individuals from the Argentine population … they hoped serious consideration could be given to the need to have as few restrictions as possible on communications, the transit of persons and the acquisition of property. ... Finally on zones of withdrawal, the Argentines had expressed the hope that agreement could be worked out on withdrawal distances for the Task Force which would dispel any impression that Argentines were withdrawing under pressure ... I said that, welcome as tonight's news was, there were still major difficulties ahead. One was the Argentines' proposals on representation of the Islanders. I did not believe that you would be able to accept that 1,820 Islanders should have the same representation as 30 Argentines. ...” [1267]

“In his memoir Pérez de Cuéllar records Ros describing this as 'an extremely difficult decision which had not easily been reached' and his own belief that a 'crucial breakthrough had been achieved.'... Pérez de Cuéllar was now keen to consolidate the progress but Parsons urged him not to do more until he had heard from his Government. One explanation for the Argentine concession was that it reflected concern that another attempt at a British landing was imminent and this represented an attempt to create the most difficult context for the British... The increase in military activity noted from 9 May had led to an Argentine expectation of a major operation on 12 May... The British were therefore taken by surprise, and had to assume that there could be some substance to the concession... Argentina was either sincere or trying to put Britain in the position of breaking negotiations and being put on the wrong foot.” [1268]

Parsons seeks instructions from London.

“I realise only too well that the pressure is now on us (This was inevitable if the Argentines gave way on the fundamental question) and that you face very difficult decisions.”

In Washington, Argentina's Ambassador to the USA, Estaban Takacs, approaches William Middendorf, the US representative to the Organisation of American States (OAS).

“... he wanted to emphasize that there had been a definite Argentine change – Argentina has deliberately de-linked the sovereignty issue from the negotiating process and he asked that I pass this message on.

He said this de-linkage was a major concession since the Argentine public feels strongly that "nobody should take us out of our islands." Takacs added that he feels with this display of Argentine flexibility the ball is now in the British court...

He also said that continued British shelling could be a disaster, provoking an escalation, in hostilities. He said thus far ten Islanders had been killed; many more were in peril if the British did not stop. ...

1267 *PREM19/627 Telegram No. 728 of 11 May 1982*

1268 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Argentine commanders were still convinced that they had successfully repulsed a British landing on May 1, 1982. As no landing was planned for the 12th, the British negotiating team were confused as to why Argentina had taken the step of making a concession.

He said that if negotiations go on over the next week or longer and the British at the same time show no sign of halting, he would hope the US would weigh in and ask the UK to stop." [1269]

May 12th, in the South Atlantic, Argentina's Air Force commanders order reconnaissance flights when the weather improves (low cloud, fog and drizzle).

"While waiting for weather conditions to improve and processing radar information as well as the data gathered by air exploration, the FAS planned an attack with eight A-4Bs from BAM Río Gallegos and four M-5s from Río Grande, all of them carrying an MK-17 bomb set to explode with a 25-30 second delay. These flight units, supported by the two air tankers, were to attack at 5-minute intervals the naval targets detected to the east and southeast of Puerto Argentino." [1270]

From Rio Gallegos, as 12.20pm local time, four A-4B aircraft carrying 1,000lb MK-17 bombs, fly to the Falkland Islands. HMS *Glasgow* and HMS *Brilliant* are attacked, defending themselves in a *42-22* deployment. [1271]

"Girls and I watched two Argentine planes shot down about lunchtime. Sunny spells in afternoon – usual walk around town." [1272]

"When they arrived at Fitz Roy, the OCAT gave them the order to set heading 182º. Approximately 20 km away, they located the targets: a Type 22 frigate, HMS Brilliant, and a Type 42 destroyer, HMS Glasgow. There were fog banks, and the windshields were covered by a salt film that prevented them from seeing ahead; they could only see through the oblique lateral windows. When the attack began from the east on the vessels navigating at full speed and 200 to 300 meters apart from each other, the aircraft underwent antiaircraft fire from the Brilliant frigate. The A-4Bs were flying 500 meters away from each other when a Sea Wolf missile hit Primer Teniente Nívoli's aircraft. Another one reached Teniente Ibarlucea's after he had launched his bomb. Meanwhile, Primer Teniente Bustos, who was flying on an escape route after having called for a rendezvous, saw a missile coming towards him and tried to take avoiding action, but as he was flying at a minimum altitude, he touched the water surface and crashed into the sea. Although he was the only one that remained, Alférez Vázquez dropped the bomb, overflew the vessel, and descended even more to escape from the missiles..." [1273]

Near Goose Green, in a blue on blue incident, an Argentine Skyhawk is shot down.

"On 12th May, the Argentines shot down a plane in Goat Rincon. Ten minutes before this HMS Glasgow had been bombed. Among the conscript there was a considerable amount of jubilation with them shouting 'Harrier, Harrier'. I interrupted the cheering and shouting and said, 'own goal it was a Skyhawk'. I was soon loaded into a Puma by Vicecomodoro Oscar Verra to go to the crash site. The officer confirmed I was right: it was a Skyhawk. ... We were loaded in the Puma with the twelve other soldiers and flew the two miles back to the settlement. By the facial expression of the others, I was the only content person in the helicopter." [1274]

1269 *PREM19/628 Telegram No. 1756 of 14 May 1982.* There were no Islander casualties at this time.
1270 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.365
1271 *42-22*, so called because the Type 42's missiles could deal with enemy aircraft at medium range, whilst the Type 22's were better at close range.
1272 *Valerie's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1273 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.367. The sole surviving aircraft returned to Rio Gallegos at 2.20pm.
1274 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.43

At 12.30pm, a second flight of four A4Bs heads to the Falkland Islands to complete the attack on *Glasgow* and *Brilliant*. A little after 2pm, *Glasgow* is hit by a 1,000lb bomb which fails to explode, but causes extensive damage. [1275]

Falkland Islanders note harsh discipline being exercised on the conscripts.

> *"There have been a number of reports recently of cruelty and brutality to the Argentine soldiers by their officers and NCOs. A couple of days ago one soldier came in from the mountains to get more rations for his men. For this action he was stripped to the waist and made to stand all day in the freezing rain at the back of the town hall.*
>
> *Several people saw a young soldier at Government House being beaten with a fence batten, then kicked along the ground until he was almost senseless. There are also often disturbing incidents such as a single shot followed by a scream. It is impossible to prove what has actually happened, but does not leave a great deal to the imagination."* [1276]

"Morale dived further among the Argentines on 12 May when the Military Garrison Joint Command instructed that prepared meals were to be restricted to one a day. ... the shortage of adequate winter clothing led to complaints and ill-discipline. Punishments included soldiers being staked out and others being buried. At least three conscripts died." [1277]

British photographic reconnaissance of Stanley airfield suggests, that while its width had been reduced as a result of British bombing, Argentina's *Hercules* aircraft can still operate there.

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri addresses his cabinet.

> *"We are reaching the moment of greatest confrontation of the wills of both countries. ... This will end with a warlike confrontation and, at the termination of that confrontation, a negotiated settlement will come. Argentina has advantages: we are in our own territory and we defend a cause that we consider fair ... On the other hand, we have the disadvantage of having inferior military power... The anticipated violent confrontation has to occur. There is a firm decision to face this ..."* [1278]

From Southampton, England, passenger cruiser QEII sails with 5 Infantry Brigade (right), comprising 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and 700 soldiers of the 1st/7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles.[1279] Ahead of the QE2 are *Nordic Ferry* and *Baltic Ferry* (STUFT) carrying the Brigade's supplies.



"The requisition-conversion time of STUFT became one of the most impressive achievements of the war, the average time to convert merchants being 72 hrs. for 95%of the work required. In all, about fifty STUFT entered the Task Force to augment Royal Fleet Auxiliary and other support vessels, providing a total of seventy

1275 The Argentine bomb passed through the aft engine room and exited the ship on the far side. Fired by a Lt. Gavazzi, whose Skyhawk C-248 was brought down by friendly fire over Goose Green shortly afterwards. The pilot was killed.
1276 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.140
1277 Van de Bijl 2023
1278 Quoted in Yofre 2011
1279 Also on board was official war artist Linda Kitson. Commissioned by the Imperial War Museum. Many of her 400 drawings are now part of the Museum's art collection. *The Falklands War: A Visual Diary* Linda Kitson 1982

support vessels to sustain approximately forty warships, on-board aircraft, and a land force of 10,000 men. … Hidden within the hulls of many Task Force vessels, however, was a nightmare that would haunt operational sustainment for the duration of the campaign. In their rush to get forces in motion, the British had sacrificed logical loading plans and inventories. At the bottom of some vessels, hidden beneath tons of less important supplies, were items that would be sorely missed after commandos and parachute infantrymen landed on East Falkland. Restowage enroute could solve part of the problem, but not all of it. Too much had been loaded too fast--and too little attention given to what supplies would be needed first. " [1280]

"On 12 May No 63 Sqn embarked on RMS Queen Elizabeth II at Southampton and sailed for Ascension and South Georgia that afternoon. The squadron's heavy equipment – fire units, radars, missiles, stores and spares – together with its forty-eight prime movers and forty-four trailers had already been loaded on Atlantic Causeway at Devonport and had sailed the previous day with only five squadron airmen on board. On board QE II No 63 Sqn became responsible for co-ordinating the air defence of the ship by the embarked Army and RAF Regiment units, using 7.62mm and .50" machine guns and Blowpipe missile systems. During the voyage No 63 Sqn was unexpectedly declared to be a 'Forces Asset' and was transferred from the command of HQ 5 Infantry Brigade to the direct control of Commander Land Forces Falkland Islands (CLFFI). A solitary Regiment officer was transhipped from QE II to HMS Fearless to act as the Rapier liaison officer at HQ CLFFI where, being without communications and support, he was unable to exercise any influence on the Rapier defence of the Harrier FOB." [1281]

"The Brigade was hardly stowed for war, with artillery gunners separated from their guns and infantrymen from their mortars. On QE2, ammunition packed the bottom levels. If she were to be torpedoed, she would likely sink quickly after a very loud explosion. It would be difficult shifting any of the large loads now within or between ships, except in a secure anchorage area." [1282]

In Buenos Aires, a Government advertisement in the journal *Siete Dias* picture a thumbs up sign. [1283]

> *"Argentines: to win! For our flag and for our destiny […] Because justice and law are on our side. Because we have faith in ourselves. For our children. Because the enemy is fighting for his past and we for our future."*

In London, orders are prepared for *Operation SUTTON*; *"This instructed the forces in theatre to repossess the Falklands as quickly as possible. It outlined a six-phase operation beginning with the establishment of a Total Exclusion Zone and reconnaissance, both of which had started and continuing with the amphibious landing, initial land operations, the arrival of 5 Infantry Brigade and finally the repossession of the islands. It specified that the amphibious landing would not be initiated until Woodward had achieved sea and air superiority."* [1284]

San Carlos is identified as the preferred landing site.

*"This was very much the Brigadier's briefing … The Brigade was to conduct a silent night approach by landing craft in the San Carlos area. The surrounding ground would be seized on foot, before first light, in order to secure a beachhead into which stores and munitions would be unloaded prior to subsequent operations … the Brigadier stood once more in front of the silent assembly. "Gentlemen," he said, "**The operation we are***

1280 Privatsky 1986

1281 *RAF Regiment Participation in Operation Corporate* Kingsley Oliver in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal* 2003 no.30

1282 Privratsky 2014

1283 *Siete Dias* May 12, 1982 p.67

1284 Privratsky 2014. At the same time Major General Moore was confirmed as Commander Land Forces Falkland Islands (CLFFI)

about to embark on will be no picnic*". He had no need to add that it would not be a walkover. The plan for the initial landing was simple. The amphibious ships would anchor or orbit on a 'race track' to the west of Chancho Point (the southern entrance to San Carlos). Landing craft from Fearless and Intrepid would collect 40 Commando from Canberra and 45 Commando from Stromness. ... Off Little Rincon we would split into two groups, form line abreast and at maximum speed land 40 Commando below the settlement of San Carlos. ... Simultaneously 45's landing craft would turn to starboard to land them in Ajax Bay. ... The second wave, for whom the landing craft would return, would bring 2 Para into the beach south of San Carlos, ... while 3 Para would be landed to the west of Port San Carlos... A troop of Blues and Royals would be landed with 40 Commando and 3 Para. ... It was simple..."* [1285]

In New York, instructions from Foreign Secretary Pym arrive for Ambassador Parsons.

> *"Ministers remain of the view the inclusion of South Georgia in the interim arrangements presents us with very serious difficulties. Quite apart from our title and the fact that we are in possession, there are practical considerations. ... we may need to use South Georgia during the period of withdrawal. Its anchorages will enable us to conduct this operation much more satisfactorily than if they were not available. ... Much the best course is to concentrate on the Falklands only... For your own information, if we were ever to come to contemplate withdrawal from South Georgia in the interim, we should have to insist upon total Argentine withdrawal from Southern Thule."*

In addition, Parsons is to maintain that the British Government has reservations about references to General Assembly resolutions that do not mention *'self-determination'*; and remain concerned about the target date of 31 December. Further questions are to focus on the arrangements for verifying withdrawal of the two forces, and the role of the UN administrator. Argentine demands about rights of residence and the acquisition of property are to be rejected outright, although a vague reference to the *Communications Agreement* of 1971 is acceptable. [1286]

"On Tuesday, the war cabinet had been content with Parson's general approach,.. Now on Wednesday, perhaps not appreciating just how much might be assumed in New York to have changed following the Argentine concession, they discussed whether there need be any movement in Britain's position....This was not the positive set of instructions for which Parsons had been hoping,.." [1287]

At the United Nations, Parsons informs Pérez de Cuéllar of his instructions, before contacting Pym.

> *"It was a grim meeting. ... The Secretary-General and his staff were clearly stunned ... The Argentines were coming to see him ... I had given him nothing to pass on to them in return for what they saw as yesterday's major concessions. ... He could not exclude the possibility that they would break off the talks immediately. ... I urged him to look at the problem from the London end. It was not we who had committed the aggression, we had nevertheless already made a number of major concessions ... Any arrangement which appeared to reward Argentine aggression would simply not be accepted in Britain... Bringing the meeting to a close, Pérez de Cuéllar said that he felt obliged to ask me formally*

1285 Southby-Tailyour 1990. My emphasis. The Brigadier was Julian Thompson, commanding 3 Commando Brigade "*No Picnic*" would become the title of Thompson's 1986 book on the conflict. The phrase is still much quoted by Argentines to suggest how close the fight in the Islands had been, despite Thompson using the words long before he ever saw the Falklands.

1286 The Communications Agreement of August 1971, had permitted Argentines to travel to the Falklands without having to produce a passport. In its place was a 'temporary or white card' which acted as an identity document. The misuse of this white card by Davidoff's scrap metal employees in South Georgia in 1981 was one of the triggers for the Falklands War. South Georgia had not been included within the Communications Agreement, although this was denied by Argentina. *cf.* 1971 & 1981

1287 Freedman 2005 vol.2

to tell you that in his view his whole effort might now collapse if we could not moderate our position."[1288]

"I explained ... that the basic British view was as follows. The only just outcome was that the aggressor should withdraw, the status quo ante be restored and the negotiations which had so rudely been broken off resumed. ... the plain if regrettable fact is that everyone here sees the situation quite differently. The majority of the Membership sympathise with our reaction to Argentine use of force, but they believe (this includes a number of western delegations) that the Falklands should belong to Argentina provided that the interests of the Islanders are safeguarded. The dominant view here is that the Argentine position is becoming more moderate and that we should respond... if we do not moderate our position ... we will be regarded as the culprits." [1289]

From New York, Pérez de Cuéllar asks Secretary Haig to persuade London to make a *"comparable concession"* to that made by Argentina. However, speaking afterwards to Ambassador Henderson, Haig says that he; *".. fully understands the absurdity of this line of argument when Argentina up to now has made no movement whatsoever, but on the contrary has stepped up its demands."* He adds that Britain should not give way on South Georgia. At the end of the conversation, Haig reassures the British Ambassador; *"... there was widespread support for us over resistance to aggression. Most Latin American countries understood how impossible the Argentinians were. Their machismo made them intolerable to deal with, but Britain would put itself in the wrong, and as a result inflame the whole American hemisphere, if it attacked the Argentine mainland..."*

In New York, Secretary-General de Cuéllar decides not to inform the Argentine representatives of the British position. At least, not in any great detail.

"Pérez de Cuéllar decided on reflection that the best way to avoid a breakdown was not to describe Britain's position to Ros 'bluntly.'... Pérez de Cuéllar had only a fairly brief meeting with Ros... told Ros that Britain... already had fresh misgivings because of a recent statement by Costa Méndez." [1290]

Parsons reports once again to London.

"In the event Pérez de Cuéllar decided not to call me back for a further meeting ... He told me on the telephone that the following points had emerged from his fairly brief meeting with Ros:

(1) a private appeal to us ... for military restraint while serious negotiations were continuing,

(2) Pérez de Cuéllar told Ros that we were generally satisfied ... with the Argentine statement on non-prejudgement.

(3) Ros had nothing further to offer on the nature of the interim Administration,

(4) Ros re-opened the question of freedom for Argentines to acquire property in the Falklands and the point about their being able to buy shares in the Falklands Islands Company...

You and your colleagues are now faced with an immediate strategic decision. If tomorrow I stick to the positions set out to Pérez de Cuéllar today and he puts them to the Argentines, as he will feel compelled to do, I agree with his assessment that the negotiations will terminate there and then. We can only keep the talks going if we are prepared to make fairly substantial concessions on the nature of the interim administration and on our military withdrawal from South Georgia..." [1291]

1288 *PREM19/627 Telegram No. 731 of 12 May 1982*
1289 *Parsons to Pym* in *PREM19/627 Telegram No.733 of 12 May 1982*
1290 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1291 *PREM19/627 Telegram No. 733 of 12 May 1982*

May 13th, on Ascension Island, all but one of the Argentine prisoners captured on South Georgia are handed over to the Red Cross, and flown to Montevideo. Lieutenant-Colonel Astiz remains while a decision is made regarding French and Swedish requests to interview him; in connection with murder inquiries concerning their nationals.

British intelligence suggests that Argentina has only three *AM39 Exocet* (aircraft launched) missiles left. [1292]

In the Falklands, an Argentine *Hercules C-130* successfully lands at Stanley airfield, with supplies for the garrison together with a 155-mm cannon for the army. [1293]

"This level of activity was still not enough to meet Argentine needs: many requests for supplies were left unmet. The estimate now was that by stretching rations and using local resources the Army could survive beyond 18 may to 26/27 may but if the force was to be fed even on reduced rations for ten days beyond that the some 75 tons of resupply would be necessary." [1294]

> *"(Lt. Vinelli (Navy)) … told me that there were 15,000 men in the islands now; … There seemed to be a lot of digging happening in Malvina House paddock too. A small mechanical digger was being employed, perhaps they are going to put an AA gun there. That'll rattle our windows."* [1295]

In Chile, Punta Arenas journal *La Prensa Austral*, carries a headline – *Argentina thinking of repeating its Invasion of the Beagle Channel*. [1296]

In London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym addresses the House of Commons.

> *"I shall not recall now the long and strenuous efforts that we made in co-operation with Mr. Haig, ending in failure because of Argentina's intransigence. … But it is interesting that, in spite of Argentina's rejection then, the elements of an agreement about which I first spoke to the House as long ago as 21 April have remained as elements in subsequent negotiations. In that statement I told the House that they were the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal, the nature of any interim administration of the islands and the framework for the negotiation for a long-term solution. That is still the case today. …*
>
> *The negotiations are now going on under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Senor Pérez de Cuéllar has shown great determination and diplomatic ability in his lengthy and frequent talks in recent days with the British representative, Sir Anthony Parsons. They have met at least once every day and sometimes more often. On Tuesday, those talks seemed to make a little progress. Yesterday, things went less well. Hopes have been raised before, only to be dashed, and many very serious difficulties remain. It would be quite wrong for me not to indicate that to the House.*

1292 France had confirmed that only five had been delivered, with a further five held back. Four ordered by Peru had been due for delivery on the 12th, but with information that these would be passed on to Argentina, the French Government managed to find sufficient reasons to ensure that they were not delivered while the conflict continued. See May 17, 1982 below. France had sold over 2,000 *Exocets* to twenty-six countries, but Argentine attempts to obtain more of them on the open/black market were unsuccessful. Defence Secretary Nott would later indicate that there had been a world-wide effort by MI6 to ensure that either the Argentines were outbid, or that the missiles were rendered inoperable. Unsurprisingly, few details have been made available.

1293 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.377

1294 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1295 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

1296 *Argentina pensaba repetir invasion en Canal Beagle* in *La Prensa Austral* May 13, 1982. Cited in *International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict* Alex Danchev (ed) 1992. Also Roushanzamir 2000. Confirmed in an interview with Brigadier Brasilio Lami Dozo in *Perfil* November 22, 2009. Chile's General Pinochet had been well aware of Argentina's plans since before the invasion of the Falklands.

... It is not, of course, easy to negotiate with the Argentine authorities. While their representative in New York has appeared to be prepared to recognise many of the realities of the situation, there have been – even within the last two days – a number of unhelpful statements by other Argentine public figures, made in public....

On different occasions the Foreign Minister, one of his senior officials, a general and a junior Minister in another department have all referred to the process of negotiation as if this was designed solely to lead up to a handover of sovereignty to Argentina. That attitude is, I repeat, quite unacceptable to us and we must be absolutely sure that Argentina does not adhere to it, privately or publicly, if a negotiated settlement is to be possible.... the outcome of long-term negotiations about the future of the Islands must not be prejudged in advance in any way. ...

Present negotiations in New York are at an important point. Our resolve has not wavered. There have been some indications – actually the first since the crisis began – of genuine Argentine willingness to negotiate on some of the important points. There will have to be more if we are to succeed....” [1297]

Following concerns expressed by Brazil's President, that the UK was considering attacks against Argentine mainland air bases, Ronald Reagan telephones the Prime Minister.

“(Reagan) ... we've been on the phone with the Secretary General, and he now suggests that the two sides are quite close. Is this the way it looks to you?

(Thatcher) Wouldn't have said the two sides were quite close because there are two very big outstanding things, one, the interim administration. And of course they want an administration that is much, much more Argentinian than would suit us or our people. And also want to have movement of Argentinian people in constantly and possibly, and so on, and, and that just, just would not suit the Islanders at all. And, also, there's a question of South Georgia, which of course the title is totally different from that of the Falklands. ... there is the other thing as well, that you don't know quite who you're negotiating with and that what Ros says, we're ready to negotiate without any preconditions about sovereignty, we don't know whether it's true. But the other thing is, if they're saying that, what their ploy obviously is, is to try to arrange an interim administration and conditions to that administration, which would lead inevitably to sovereignty at the end of the period. And the third thing is, there's absolutely no guarantee that at the end of the period, if they haven't got what they want, they won't just invade again. ... They attacked our ships yesterday, so they're not holding off on military action. But even if they were, it's easy for them to hold off knowing that I with a task force bobbing around on the sea have not got the length of endurance on the sea which they have on the mainland.

(Reagan) Yes, that's right.

(Thatcher) It makes sense for them to say, look, don't have any military action while you're negotiating. And all they've got to do then is to go on and on and on. And we'd be able to get nowhere and have our capacity to take military action steadily whittled away. ... So I've said, continuously said, and still say, that the negotiations have not stopped military action nor can they, because the fact is, Ron, we're only getting anywhere as the military pressure builds up. ... the title of the Falklands, you know, is not necessarily by a long chalk the Argentinians, they've always refused to take it to the International Court of Justice. And knowing the title, I can see why. But as they say, because an island four hundred

1297 *HC Deb 13 May 1982 vol.23 cc952-1034*

miles, is four hundred miles off the coast, there are a lot of islands, including Trinidad and Tobago, who would shake in their shoes, because they're much, much nearer South American continent.

(Reagan) Yes. ... Well, Margaret, I agree with you that one thing that has been neglected, particularly on the part of the Argentinians, in this whole thing, is consideration for the people on the island who live there. And when I talked to him that first night, trying to get him to turn his task force, his invasion fleet around, when we knew it was on its way, oh, he swore to me up and down that the culture and the lifestyle and the rights of the people on the island would go on just the same as they had always been. Well, we know that isn't true and we know they've made great changes already under this occupation.

(Thatcher) There you are, anyone in the government of Argentina who says that! But, you see, some of our people have been in the Falkland Islands for far more generations than some of the people in Argentina. I had some one in my room just a few days ago – seventh generation in the Falklands." [1298]

"The Prime Minister was not in a receptive mood. While in public she had been cautious, in private she was becoming more anxious about the diplomatic trend... So this conversation with Reagan became for Thatcher yet another exercise in dispelling misapprehensions." [1299]

In New York, Parsons and de Cuéllar meet again, after which Parson reports:

"I judged that to make the points about South Georgia and the interim Administration ... would almost certainly precipitate an immediate breakdown. I therefore took the line that, because of the emergency debate in the House of Commons, you had not yet had time to send me substantive instructions on these two points ... (Pérez de Cuéllar said that he always preferred delays to bad news.)...

I did, however, have an answer of substance on the risk of a vacuum after 31 December 1982 if no agreement had been reached... It was unrealistic to think that sufficient confidence could be generated between us and the Argentines for it to be safely left in the air. It seemed to me that it was an equally important point to the UN, the UK and Argentina. ... Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides were pressing him for ideas on it. The Argentines were prepared to let him ask for an extra month or two if no agreement was in sight at the end of the year. But they wanted to guard against the risk that the UN interim administration would last for ever.

I said that we could trust the Secretary-General but not the Security Council. Might it be possible to devise some formula under which, if the Secretary-General decided that further time was needed ... the interim administration would remain in being unless the Security Council decided otherwise?

Ahmed and de Soto said that the Argentines also felt uncomfortable about involving the Security Council (because of our veto) and that the Secretariat were working on language which would contain no reference to the Security Council ... The trouble was that this formula would not meet Argentine concerns, unless it specified that only one extension would be possible.

I indicated that the latter condition would not be acceptable to us. I was then subjected to a burst of rhetoric from Ahmed to the effect that we could not expect the Argentines to make another concession. I dealt very firmly with this ...

Pérez de Cuéllar was obviously afraid that Ros would break off because of my failure to make any move on either the Dependencies or on the interim Administration. He said that he now felt that by

1298 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation; President Reagan (May 82)*

1299 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Sunday (16 May) at the latest he would have to present some UN ideas to both of us. He recognised that one or both of us might reject his ideas, but he felt obliged to try." [1300]

Parsons telegrams London.

"My theatrical performance this morning has helped us get through another day. The price of course was expectations that we will come up with something on the difficult subjects tomorrow. I am working on the assumption that we are on two tracks – genuine search for agreement and, if no agreement is possible, for the negotiations to collapse with us in the least disadvantageous position. I am also conscious of the need to buy as much time as we can."

From the Foreign Office, Francis Pym responds.

"I realise that the negotiations have reached a very difficult position. ... our immediate purpose should be to keep the negotiations going, at least for some time yet. ... I see the scope for further discussion of certain of the problems with the Secretary-General before Ministers attempt to take a decision about a package covering all the outstanding questions. In particular, please pursue the following matters: (a) you should make full play with the continued statements ... that Argentina insists on having sovereignty... (b) you should say that the risk of a vacuum after an interim period is for us, one of the most important matters, and that more clarity must be achieved as soon as possible... I realise that you also need to say something about South Georgia and about interim administration. ... on South Georgia you may say that we should be willing to refer title over South Georgia to the ICJ, does the Secretary-General think that would help?.."

Ling Qing, President of the Security Council, calls for an informal discussion in Council on the 14th.

Pérez de Cuéllar warns Parsons that he considers Ling Qing, *"biased and dangerous."* [1301]

May 14th, the US delivers two anti-missile gun systems for HMS *Illustrious,* and further *AIM-9L Sidewinder* missiles for the *Sea Harriers*. The US Government also embargoes arms supplies to Argentina. [1302]

"During May, Britain procured some $120m of US material made available at very short notice (often 24 hours) and frequently from stocks normally earmarked for US operational requirements. This equipment had included the sidewinder missiles, Vulcan/Phalanx, 4,700 tons of airstrip matting for Stanley airport once it had been recaptured, conversion of the SS Stena Inspector for use as a repair ship... Shrike missiles for use by the Vulcans, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for use by the Sea King helicopters, temporary accommodation on a large scale on Ascension Island for British forces, Stinger ground-to-air missiles, as well as ammunition." [1303]

In London, the War Cabinet meet.

"The FCO's assessment was that it was still not clear whether Argentina's objectives were to negotiate seriously or gain time while the weather worsened in the South Atlantic, but it was certainly getting itself into a good presentational position in order to blame Britain if the talks collapsed... The real sticking point was not the Dependencies, where future concessions might be offered... but the interim administration... The debate in parliament the previous day convinced ministers that the Government's supporters would not welcome more concessions." [1304]

1300 *PREM19/627 f125*
1301 *PREM19/627 Telegram No.748 of 13 May 1982*
1302 See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21350-19820514-us-actions-south-atlantic-crisis
1303 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1304 *Ibid.*

Intelligence is received that the *Bahia Paraiso*, newly converted into a hospital ship, is loading large quantities of food and weapons at the port of Ushuaia. A decision is taken to request that the Red Cross inspect the vessel, but that if it has already left and is found within the exclusion zone, it should be stopped and searched. Buenos Aires is to be informed via the Swiss Embassy. With regard to future operations, consideration is given to a plan to attack Argentina's mainland air-bases, and in particular the Rio Grande in Patagonia. [1305]

"Before ordering special forces into Argentina on such a risky sabotage mission, the Prime Minister's South Atlantic 'war cabinet', known as OD(SA), sought advice on its legality. They were told that an attack on the Argentine mainland would be legal under the terms of Article 51 of the United Nations treaty, provided the attack was 'very, very specifically' limited to military aircraft or stores which 'had been used to attack British forces'. ..." [1306]

The meeting is also presented with further plans for retaking the Falklands – Operation SUTTON. [1307] A decision is made to recall both Parsons (from New York) and Henderson (from Washington) for consultations.

In the South Atlantic, three Argentine *Skyhawk* aircraft are shot down by *Sea Harriers*. Stanley airfield is bombed.

"The British continued with the high-altitude air raids and, the pilots were apparently improving their launch technique accuracy. They were hitting very near the antiaircraft artillery cannons, especially in the area 300 meters to the east of runway threshold 26, where the 3rd Battery was placed together with the Antiaircraft Artillery Command Post located in the 3rd Battery's shelter." [1308]

On East Falkland Island, Lieut.-Colonel Piaggi, commanding at Goose Green, orders First-Lieut. Carlos Esteban to set up an observation post at Fanning Head overlooking San Carlos Bay and the northern entrance to Falklands Sound. [1309]

In New York, at the UN, Belgium's Permanent Representative informs Parsons that members of the Argentine Mission have been visiting all the EEC Ambassadors; with a message.

> *"(a) Argentina was negotiating in good faith, (b) sanctions had not helped the British: their effect had simply been to consolidate Latin American and Third World support for Argentina; their renewal would extend the confrontation and heighten north/south conflict, (c) the sovereignty question had been resolved as a result of an Argentine concession, (d) there remained three main issues, (e) the most important of these was the nature of the interim administration, where Argentina wanted purely UN administration, but the British were insisting on retention of "the colonial structures," (f) the other two were withdrawal, where the Argentines had accepted the Secretary-General's concept of simultaneous or parallel withdrawal, but the British had not: and the substantive negotiations where the British were refusing to accept a deadline ..."* [1310]

From Caracas, Venezuela, information is received to the effect that the Venezuelan Government is also sending out a mission to Europe at President Galtieri's request. Their itinerary includes Spain, the Vatican, West Germany, Belgium, Holland and France. The purpose being to show *"solidarity"* with Argentina by seeking the lifting of sanctions.

1305 See May 17, May 24 and May 26, 1982, below.
1306 *Falklands: The Chilean Connection* Duncan Campbell in *New Statesman* January 1985
1307 The FCO were not informed; at the insistence of Admiral Lewin.
1308 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.383
1309 Van der Bijl 2023. Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.391, dates the transfer of Esteban's section to May 15, 1982.
1310 *PREM19/627 Telegram No.755 of 14 May 1982*

In the USA, on his return from Buenos Aires, US General Walters telephones Britain's Ambassador Henderson.

"Walters went on to outline his visit to Buenos Aires, the main purpose of which he claimed was to limit the damage to American relations with Latin America which had been brought about by US support for the UK. He had found the Argentine Junta the most difficult people he had had to deal with since his encounters many years ago with MOSSAD. ... Galtieri told Walters that recent US statements, particularly by Weinberger, had raised strong anti-American feelings in Buenos Aires ... he felt that the Americans could have adopted a less partial course.... Galtieri was unyielding on access to the Islands for Argentine nationals. ... No mention was made of the Dependencies. ... Galtieri had also proposed that the dispute should be resolved by means of a summit meeting under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and comprising himself, Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan." [1311]

From the State Department, US Secretary Haig sends his *"latest thoughts"* to Ambassador Henderson.

> *"(1) We should do everything possible to ensure that it was not we who were responsible, or held responsible, for any breakdown in the Secretary-General's efforts ... (2) withdrawal from the Islands should be based on parity of time in terms of the ability of both sides to reinsert their forces... (3) the focus of the discussions should be on the Falkland Islands and not the Dependencies. This had also been the view of President Figueiredo of Brazil."*

At a fundraising event in Philadelphia, President Reagan speaks to the Press.

> *"The tragedy of the Falkland Islands the quarrel that's going on there – I'm worried as perhaps and I hope only temporarily slowed what we intend to be a real relationship and an accord with our neighbors to the south. We've done our best and are continuing to do everything we can to, again, broker a peace down there. At the same time, we can't ignore the fact that the aggressor was our neighbor here in these continents, Argentina, who, with military force, invaded the Falklands and took over. And if we – we must establish that that cannot happen in the world that the rule of law prevails, not the rule of force. Where would we draw the line if we say, "Well, it's all right there"? Then how many other places are there in the world where there are boundary disputes? And do we literally say, "Well, it's all right for the one that thinks they're strong enough to do it, to go grab the territory"? And we've been trying, as I say, and it's been very frustrating. We sometimes come where it seems as if we're almost to agreement, and then there still seems to be one hitching point. But we're going to keep on trying to bring that peace."*

In New York, Anthony Parsons seeks out de Cuéllar to inform the Secretary-General of his recall to London. Also to request a delay in the presentation of formal proposals until his return after the weekend. Believing that Parsons hoped to return with the UK's last ditch proposal, de Cuéllar readily agrees.

"He also told Parsons that he had given Ros a hard time on the question of islander participation in the interim administration, arguing that it was inconceivable for any democratic country to accept that people should be robbed of democratic rights let alone accept parity between 2000 and 30... This provided some confirmation that the Americans had been putting pressure on Buenos Aires for a concession on the interim administration." [1312]

1311 *PREM19/628 Telegram No.1773 of 14 May 1982*
1312 Freedman 2005 vol.2

At the informal meeting of the Security Council called by Ling Quing, the Secretary-General outlines the progress he has made with his peace proposals; *"A broad framework of agreement was taking shape, covering ceasefire, mutual withdrawal, an interim Administration and negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General. There would be an important role for the UN, subject to the approval of the Security Council."*

Spain's Ambassador calls for a cease-fire while negotiations continue. The suggestion is not taken up.

> *"Thanks to Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts, we have thus cleared another hurdle in the Council, but there was no mistaking the members' nervousness about hostilities if and when the Secretary-General's efforts should fail. The Council is all set to support a simple ceasefire plus a negotiations Resolution in that event."*

Ambassador Henderson and Sir Anthony Parsons fly to London.

To the north of West Falkland, British Special Forces approach Pebble Island.

"Preceded by a party from D Squadron's Boat Troop, who carried out a three-day reconnaissance of the air strip, the remainder of D Squadron, including one 81mm mortar team, was landed by Sea King helicopter into a landing Zone marked out by Boat Troop... The Squadron was landed late, touching down at midnight..." [1313]

"Very little was known of the target aside from air photography and some information from our Royal Navy Liaison Officer. Each troop had a specific role in the raid: 17 (Boat) Troop were tasked to carry out the recce; 16 (Air) Troop were tasked to enter the settlement and deal with the enemy including pilots, ground crew and support elements; 18 (Mobility) Troop were tasked to destroy the aircraft on the airstrip; and 19 (Mountain) Troop were tasked to remain at the rally point/mortar location as a quick reaction force. The main priority of the mission was to disable the suspected radar and then disable the aircraft." [1314]

May 15th, 0245 local time, British Special Forces attack the Argentine naval air base on Pebble Island.

> *"The commandos touched down several miles from the target and took several hours to reach it across rugged country in the dark. In the dead of night, the battle exploded in front of me... From the sea the ships threw out orange flame and covering fire ... salvo after salvo of high explosives, whining away into the darkness to land on the defenders, twenty at a time, one shell every two seconds, a tempo designed to terrify as much to destroy... The commandos moved in, blew up an ammunition dump and destroyed eleven aircraft, six of them Pucaras used for ground attack against troops."* [1315]

A large ammunition dump is destroyed together with the fuel stores, while a number of aircraft are put permanently out of action. HMS *Glamorgan* shells the base as British forces withdraw.



> *"The Argentine version is that only three aircraft were damaged and the attack was repelled. It seems that Chile has offered the research vessel Piloto Pardo to evacuate the*

1313 *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic:1 1982* Julian Thompson 1992. First edition was 1983 with another in 1986. This would seem to be the third edition.

1314 Interview with Mark 'Splash' Aston in *1982 Uncovered: The Falklands War Mapping Project* Clack T. & Pollard T. 2022 pp.12-16.

1315 BBC *News Despatch* from Brian Hanrahan quoted in Briley 2022

Argentine dead and wounded from Stanley, which the (BBC) put as forty-one dead and thirty-eight wounded." [1316]

"The Argentine garrison was kept pinned down by naval gunfire from HMS Glamorgan and by the GPMGs of the covering party... while the 81mm mortar team fired illuminating bombs. The assault party, led by Captain Hamilton, then destroyed all eleven aircraft on the strip, using prepared charges, and started withdrawing at 3.30 am. While the Squadron was withdrawing, a half-hearted counter-attack was put in by the Argentine garrison. The officer leading the attack was shot by D Squadron and the remaining Argentines fled."[1317]

"A small Argentine naval air base had been established on the grass airfield here (Pebble Island). This was officially know as Base Aérea Naval Calderón,... there was only a small guard in a hut on the edge of the airfield on this wet and windy night when the SAS men and the shell fire both arrived without warning. ... There was an exchange of fire between the Argentine marines and the SAS; some men were wounded on both sides, but there were no deaths." [1318]

"All plans had to change once we got to the rally point at Big Pond. The troop meant to deal with the radar and aircraft did not arrive at the rally point in time. 19 (Mountain) Troop were then ordered to attack the aircraft. For various reasons outside of our control, we were well behind schedule, so 16 (Air) Troop were ordered to refrain from entering the settlement and instead form a screen between the airstrip and the settlement. The aircraft destruction went well. As we were ordered to withdraw, the enemy blew some cratering charges which injured a couple of the guys. Then, as we withdrew past the settlement, the Argentines attempted a counter attack, but were easily beaten off. All troops arrived safely back at the rally point and were met by our returning helicopters to be flown back HMS Hermes." [1319]

"At about 2.15am on the 15th, flares burst over the island and Lieutenant Marega ordered stand-to and everyone sheltered in the trenches. Marine Javier Ramos recalled, 'There was a heavy bombardment which was probably the softening up for a major amphibious assault on the airfield. Fires were seen burning at the far end of the runway. A patrol then reported that fuel had caught fire and two aircraft were on fire'. ... Of the six Pucaras, one had serious damage to its engine and wing roots, three suffered minor engine and wing damage, another had shrapnel and blast damage and the sixth could still fly. ... One Mentor was destroyed, another was badly damaged, the third had minor damage to its engine and the fourth was pitted with small arms fire. The Coastguard Skyvan was totally destroyed..." [1320]

"Pucará pilots and mechanics, who did not have the appropriate weapons for their ground defense, relied on the security provided by Argentine Navy infantry. ... the attack took the Argentine garrison by surprise. The Pucará Squadron crew could only be mere spectators of the operation. ... The Argentine defense, assuming the enemy was trying to take control of the aerodrome, detonated a high-explosive charge which had been previously buried, to leave the runway unserviceable. After the explosion, the attackers left. At the blasting site, traces of blood and abandoned materiel were later found. The helicopters left at 0540. Plastic explosive bombs were used to destroy five Pucará aircraft (registration marks A-502, A-520, A-529, A-552 and A-556), four Turbo Mentor from the Argentine Navy (registration marks I-A-401, I-A-408, I-A-411 and I-A-412) and a

1316 Diary entry from Smith 1984 p.153
1317 Thompson 1992
1318 Middlebrook 2003. Only one British casualty was recorded as wounded.
1319 Interview with Mark 'Splash' Aston in Clack & Pollard 2022 pp.12-16.
1320 Van der Bijl 2023. According to this author, citing an account by Lt. Marega, it was only after a patrol went out and found empty shell cases that Marega realised that the airfield had been attacked by ground forces.

Skyvan from the Argentine Coast Guard (registration mark PA-50). Besides, the aircraft had countless 7.62-mm impacts. The IA-58 Pucará, registration mark A-523, which had suffered irreparable damage during the 4 May landing, was considered destroyed by the British due to explosives and fragmentation grenades." [1321]

Despite the Exclusion Zone, Argentina successfully airlifts 40 tons of cargo, 88 passengers and two 155mm *L33* artillery field guns into Stanley. [1322]

> *"The big gun on Davis Street is a 155-mm field gun, now positioned between Rag's House and 94 Davis Street under thick camouflage. Very heavily guarded so unable to get too close. It's a formidable-looking affair and will be very difficult to hit without blowing up the nearby houses. There is another one along towards Ross Road West just past the monument between Sulivan House and the doctor's old house."* [1323]



From both Chile and Ascension Island, British *Nimrod* aircraft explore an area of Argentine coast 740km wide by 1,800km long. [1324]

Stanley airfield is bombed together with two other targets nearby.

> *"A cheeky Harrier had flown up the Sapper Hill road beside the power station and fired some rockets and things at a missile site by the oil tanks..."* [1325]

May 16th, 0510, *Sea Harriers* attack fuel depots in the Fox Bay area.

1215, *Sea Harriers* again bomb Stanley airfield. [1326]

> *"The Harriers have really had a field day, bombing mainly in the airport area, but occasionally dropping one somewhere else, so that the Argentine would not become too complacent about things. An unusually large number of folk turned out for Glory Hour in the pubs at lunch time, taking advantage of the sunshine plus the entertainment – not only the British bombing but the Argentine confusion."* [1327]

"Two Sea Harriers attacked antiaircraft artillery positions in BAM Malvinas, from an altitude above 6,000 meters. The attack was repelled. Two bombs exploded near the Antiaircraft Artillery Command Post (PCAAa), where the 3rd Battery was also located. For several days, it seemed that target had been chosen to be neutralized." [1328]

In Falkland Sound, at 1355, two *Sea Harriers* bomb an Argentine merchant ship, *Rio Carcarana,* which is set on fire and abandoned. [1329]

1321 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.386 citing an account supplied by Suboficial Auxiliar VGM Alfred R. Claria.
1322 *Ibid.* p.389
1323 Diary entry from Smith 1984 p.150. It is a clear breach of the Geneva Conventions to place military hardware within civilian areas.
1324 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.384
1325 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1326 Further attacks took place at 1430 and 1630
1327 Diary entry from Smith 1984 p.153. *Glory Hour* was so-called because of a local licensing law that only allowed the public houses to be open for one hour on a Sunday lunchtime.
1328 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.393
1329 Reported as on fire, she eventually sank.

At 1415, *Bahia Buen Suceso* is observed at anchor in Fox Bay.

> *"We were lucky. … Only three of us were still aboard, getting our sleeping equipment together, when we heard the planes and the sound of the cannon shells. There were several hits, some near me – too many! … by the grace of God no one was killed. The ship was badly damaged…"* [1330]

"Two Sea Harriers attacked ARA Bahía Buen Suceso moored in Fox Bay. It did not suffer serious damage. One of the aircraft, the ZA-191, was reached by artillery fire on its tail, but it could return to Hermes where it was repaired." [1331]

In London, members of the Cabinet and the Foreign Office (FCO), including Ambassadors Parsons and Henderson, meet at Chequers to decide *"the absolute minimum acceptable"* in any potential agreement.

> *"We went over every point in detail, working as usual around the oblong table in the Great Parlour upstairs, remodelling the draft clause by clause. At hand were voluminous reference sources on the UN…"* [1332]

"The PM veered the whole time towards being uncompromising, so that the rest of us, and in particular the FCO participants, constantly found themselves under attack from her for being wet, ready to sell out, unsupportive of British interests etc. … Did not people realise that it was the Argentineans who had committed aggression? Did the Foreign Office have no principles? She said that while we were content to be dishonest and consult with dishonest people she was honest. Were the FCO prepared to hand over people who believed in democracy to a dictatorship? She would never abandon the Falkland Islands any more than she would fail to uphold the principle of self-determination which must, indeed, be written into the draft agreement, not just once but several times – though we told her that to do so would make everyone think that we were not serious because the Argentineans would reject it out of hand." [1333]

"Other recollections suggest a less than harmonious day, with the Prime Minister in one of her more combative moods. … All agreed that the aim was not to draft a document that reached out to Argentina." [1334]

After 6 hours, the meeting draws up the minimum conditions that the UK can accept - (1) no prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute, (2) no acts or activities taking place while the interim agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty, or create any rights of sovereignty, (3) 24 hours after signature (time 'T') each party undertakes to cease and thereafter refrain from all hostile actions, (4) both countries undertake – (a) to commence withdrawal at time 'T', (b) to withdraw half of their forces 150 nautical miles within 7 days, (c) to complete withdrawal within 14 days, (5) exclusion zones to be lifted from time 'T', (6) following completion of the withdrawal each party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces within 150 nautical from the Islands, (7) economic measures to be lifted at time 'T', (8) both parties to jointly sponsor a Security Council Resolution to recognise the agreement and the Secretary-General's role, (9) the Secretary-General to appoint an Administrator acceptable to both parties, (10) the Administrator to ensure the continuing administration of the Islands in consultation with the representative institutions of the Islands in accordance with Article 73 of the UN Charter, with the exception that one representative from the Argentine population be appointed to each of the two institutions, (11) the UN Administrator to verify withdrawal, (12) each party to have no more than three observers on the Islands, (12) Negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General, for the

1330 Capt. Niella quoted in Middlebrook 2003
1331 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.393 citing *Falklands: The Air War* Rodney Burden et al, 1986 p.214
1332 Thatcher 1993
1333 *The Diaries of an Ambassador* N. Henderson 1994
1334 Freedman 2005 vol.2

peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of negotiations by 31 December 1982 and without prejudgement, (13) this agreement shall remain in force until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands has been reached and implemented by the parties. The Dependencies are not included.

Anthony Parsons is told that there can be no amendments.

> *"... although the right course would have been for the Argentines to implement SC Resolution 502, we have been negotiating in good faith for more than five weeks through various intermediaries. We are very grateful for the Secretary-General's latest efforts but we cannot allow matters to drag on much longer. Midday New York time on Wednesday 19 May is therefore an absolute deadline for the Argentines' reply. If not received by then we shall have to assume rejection..."* [1335]

"On 16 May, the government of London again offered that of Buenos Aires a final series of proposals for the suspension of hostilities, and the start of a pathway toward consensual solution to the dispute over the Falklands. Although with much reluctance, the Prime Minister had to bow down to pressure, and soften her position. She eventually accepted the impossibility of a full return to the status quo, the commitment to debating the sovereignty over the islands, and some form of provisional administration that foresaw a role, however limited, for the Argentines. At the same time, Margaret Thatcher deemed irrevocable the guarantee that the reaching of an accord with Buenos Aires would sanction the respect of two other principles: the reaffirmation of international legality, and the right of self-determination for the inhabitants of the islands. The withdrawal of the Argentines would be required, before the beginning of any negotiation. In addition, it had to be clear that the result of the negotiations would not necessarily be the handing over of the Falklands to Argentina. Finally, the Prime Minister was resolute in regard to the need for setting a time limit on the holding of negotiations, to avoid remaining enmeshed by the predictable dilatory tactics of the Argentines. On this point, Mrs. Thatcher succeeded in imposing her own viewpoint, despite the different approach of the FCO..." [1336]

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym leaves for EEC and NATO meetings in Luxembourg.

In the South Atlantic, a C-130 *Hercules* aircraft, with modified fuel tanks, in a flight lasting more than 24 hours and covering some 6,300 miles, drops 1,000lb of supplies to HMS *Antelope*. [1337]

"I will highlight just two notable incidents. The first was the first long range flight into the combat zone which took place on 16 May when Flt Lt Harry Burgoyne dropped 1000 lbs of vital stores and eight SAS troopers into the sea alongside HMS Antelope." [1338]

"By 1 June, 47 Air Dispatch had flown on 47 similar sorties, dropping 163 tons of supplies to the Task Force. The ability of the British to airdrop supplies into the war zone permitted them to reduce order-receipt time for high priority items to less than two days. By the war's end high priority cargo out of Ascension, ranging from critical electronic components to missiles, was being dropped off East Falkland within forty-eight hours of request." [1339]

1335 Thatcher 1993
1336 Bruni 2018
1337 See Privratsky 2014
1338 Evans 2003.
1339 Privratsky 2014 citing *Combat Logistics: The South Atlantic* Capt. (RN) Whittaker 1984 in *Air Force Journal of Logistics* Autumn 1984 p.6. C-130 *Hercules* aircraft flights were exceeding 28 hours, with two crews and two in-flight refuellings. It took five *Victor* refuelling aircraft to get one C-130 near the Falklands. The C-130 was prop driven, creating huge differences in flight speed between the *Victors* and the *Hercules*. Just one more problem to be overcome.

"The special troops were to verify the presence of the Super Étendards and the Exocet missiles, as well as to assess the defense capability and level of readiness of the Río Grande Naval Air Base.The special troops were to verify the presence of the Super Étendards and the Exocet missiles, as well as to assess the defense capability and level of readiness of the Río Grande Naval Air Base." [1340]

In Hamburg, Germany, Chancellor Schmidt, and French President Mitterrand, meet; *"There was clear agreement on the need for solidarity with Britain on the basis of SCR 502. Sanctions involved sacrifices for both France and Germany, but it was clear that they would be renewed.."*

In Europe for the NATO meeting, Alexander Haig speaks to Italy's Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, of the need for European unity in support of the UK.

"... he recognized the importance of what the Secretary was saying but that in present circumstances he was not permitted to join an EC consensus favoring renewal of economic sanctions. This fact was very disagreeable for him, but if he said yes, there would be a major political crisis in Italy. It is the military escalation in the South Atlantic which has caused great problems in his country from psychological point of view; the reactions of the Argentine population to the sinking of the Belgrano had had a major impact on Italian public opinion, given the fact that millions of Argentines were of Italian origin and that many of these even held dual citizenship. Colombo added that the issues were very clear in his mind and that the points which the Secretary had made about the need to support the UK were correct but that unfortunately irrational situations sometimes prevailed ..." [1341]

In Luxembourg, Secretaries Haig and Pym meet. Pym shows the US Secretary a draft of that mornings' conclusions by the British Cabinet.

> *"Haig seemed more confident than in earlier meetings of our ability to do the job militarily, and assumed that we would not be able to wait much longer. He argued strongly against action against the mainland, but seemed otherwise undisturbed about the military prospects ..."*

Haig informs Pym that the Argentines in New York are *"bragging"* that their concession on the pre-judgment of sovereignty has thrown British negotiators into disarray.

May 17th, in the Falkland Islands, an SBS observation team conceals itself south of the San Carlos settlement; *"well beyond earshot and out of sight"*. [1342]

From Luxembourg, Secretary Haig telegrams President Reagan.

> *"British Foreign Secretary Pym has just shown me the UK negotiating position approved today by Mrs. Thatcher's War Cabinet. It is to be delivered to the UN Secretary General tonight as a final UK position which the Argentines have forty-eight hours to accept or not. The British have made a serious effort. But the position is less forthcoming than the proposal we put to the two sides at the end of April. In that the Argentines rejected that earlier US proposal, the British must realize that their current position is unlikely to be accepted. The forty-eight hour deadline may well coincide with a British landing on the Falklands. ...*

1340 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.404. The authors behind this official (?) record of the Argentine Air Force's war in the Falklands in 1982, believe that the arrival of this SAS team, which they date to May 15, 1982, was one of the first steps in an operation that would become known as *Plum Duff*. Their sources unstated, they believe that the 8-man team was tasked with reconnaissance; to be followed by a larger 60-man team (Operation Mikado) should the attack be deemed feasible. See below.

1341 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/18/1982*. Some 1.3 million Italians living in Argentina were eligible to vote in Italian elections.

1342 Thompson 1992

Pym did assure me that London is not now contemplating strikes against the mainland. There is of course the possibility that the Argentines will respond with relatively modest changes to the British text, which could give Mrs. Thatcher pause before ordering a landing. ... However, I doubt that the Argentines will come far enough to avert a British assault. Odds are that the battle for the Falklands will begin as early as this Wednesday or Thursday." [1343]

The US Embassy in Luxembourg, reports to the White House on events in the city; *"Despite some opening-ceremony pep talk earlier this morning by the .. Luxembourg hosts, the mood here is sombre and dominated by the South Atlantic issue. Though NATO is the nominal headliner, most eyes are on the following EC meeting scheduled later today and the uncertain status of the sanctions renewal. Leaving Ireland aside, the key to continued support for the UK may hinge on Italy. ... Al's talks with Pym last night were one on one, ... but two nuggets did filter down: 1) the Brits are reportedly incensed at what they see as less than wholehearted U.S. support for their position; and 2) the negotiating process still has some time, but not much."* [1344]

At the EEC meeting, Margaret Thatcher raises British concerns with France regarding Peru's order for four *AM39 Exocet* missiles. The French President assures her that completion of the order will be delayed; *"... as long as is necessary."* Although opposed by both Italy and Ireland, EEC trade sanctions are renewed until the 24th.

"The test of a friend is that he stands by you when you need him the most. That applies to countries as well as people. How does the Republic of Ireland match up to the test? ... She is now our partner in the Common Market. Britain has been the victim of unprovoked aggression in the Falklands. All the justice, all the right in the affair is on our side. When we look to the Common Market for help, the French and the Germans rally round. But, as we stand at the brink of a shooting war, the Irish stab us in the back." [1345]

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Shlaudeman opines to Washington.

"I scarcely need to say that a bloody battle on the Islands leading to Argentine defeat would produce grave consequences for US interests here and elsewhere in Latin America." [1346]

A letter from the British Community Council in Buenos Aires, calls upon PM Thatcher to accept a cease-fire while the children of the Falklands are evacuated to Anglo-Argentine homes in Argentina. [1347]

"... the idiots, wouldn't even entrust their children to the care of Anglo-Argentine families who offered to take them while the fighting went on." [1348]

"This plan seemed altruistic to the Anglo-Argentines but was spurned by Falkland Islanders. While there is no evidence of any official response from London, some London-based Falkland Islanders spoke out against it, stressing the level of mistrust for the Anglo-Argentines and asking them, instead, to persuade "the Argentines to remove themselves from the islands," while in the Falklands the proposal was not even considered." [1349]

1343 *Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, May 17, 1982*
1344 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/17/1982*
1345 *The Sun* May 19, 1982.
1346 Quoted in Freedman 2005 vol.2
1347 There was no acknowledgement or response, although the letter appears to have been passed on to journalists.
1348 Quoted in Mercau 2016 citing *Nell Shakespear to Deborah L. Jakubs, July 1982* in *Straddling the Fence No More: The Falkland/Malvinas War and Its Impact on the Anglo-Argentine Identity* Deborah L. Jakubs 1987
1349 Mercau 2016 citing *G. T. Murchison (BCC) to Thatcher May 17, 1982*. Also *Truce Call to Take Children Away* Nicholas Timmins in *The Times* May 19, 1982

In New York, Anthony Parsons arrives back at the United Nations. He carries two documents for Secretary-General de Cuéllar. The first, setting out the British proposals, is the draft worked out in London. Parsons emphasises that this is as far as Britain is prepared to go.

> *"... these were major concessions. We could make no more. All that Argentina had offered ... was a matching undertaking (if it could be believed) to put sovereignty on one side, and conditional agreement to withdraw, which could hardly be regarded as a concession when Argentina was the aggressor; withdrawal, for an aggressor, was an obligation not a concession. ... This represented the bottom line for HM Government. We could not accept any amendments to it. ... Negotiations could not be allowed to drag on ... we required a reply from the Argentines by 12 noon on 19 May. Any appeals for further time, or any proposals for substantive amendment, would be interpreted as a rejection of our proposals."*

"Parsons suggested that he (de Cuéllar) should present it as a British draft, but one that was based on the negotiations that he had led and thus quite different to what would have appeared if he had not been involved. There were real concessions. He could say that he had imposed the deadline to stop the negotiations going on indefinitely." [1350]

Pérez de Cuéllar speaks to Parsons privately. Britain's representative hands over the second document: a letter making it clear that the Dependencies are not a part of the Interim Agreement. Parson reports:

> *"Pérez de Cuéllar then went on to say that, between ourselves, he thought that our paper was perfectly reasonable and he appreciated the effort we had made... He also had some indications that the Argentines were beginning to get a bit desperate, and might genuinely want to get an agreement with us. His feeling was that they thought that we could recapture the Islands without much difficulty and that the only way to save themselves from this ultimate humiliation would be to get an agreement before it happened..."* [1351]

Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Ros, is handed the proposal by the Secretary-General.[1352]

Pérez de Cuéllar issues a statement to the press.

> *"As you know, Sir Anthony Parsons returned from London this morning and immediately informed me of the British position as defined during the intense consultations he had with his Government over the weekend. This afternoon I conveyed to Vice Minister Ros the information I had received.*
>
> *You will understand that until I hear from the parties I have nothing to add except that I am more than ever convinced that time is not on the side of peace. Therefore efforts to find a peaceful solution will be pursued with vigour. The next few days will be decisive."*

In Luxembourg, at a *"super-restricted"* session of NATO, all speakers, including the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy and Norway, express their solidarity with the UK on the question of the Falklands. [1353]

1350 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1351 *PREM19/629 Telegram No.765 of 17 May 1982*
1352 Pérez de Cuéllar later told Parsons that Ros had looked, "*disappointed*."
1353 *FCO Sitrep 0700 18 May 1982*



May 18th, in Rio Grande, at 0428 local time, a TPS-4 radar operator reports an unauthorised flight.

"Teniente Jorge Oberkersch, … immediately reported the finding to the CIC and entered it on the radar log book, which time and position data agree with the subsequent account of the British pilots. Time: 0428. Radial: 260º. Distance: 21 miles. Level: 035. Speed: 60 knots. Time: 0429. Radial: 260º. Distance: 23 miles. Level: 035. Speed: 60 knots. Time: 0430. Radial: 268º. Distance: 26 miles. Level: 035. Speed: 60 knots. Time: 0432. Radial: 270º. Distance: 31 miles. Level: 035. Speed: 60 knots. Likewise, the Piedrabuena and the Bouchard commanders asserted to have followed the intruder's path over the mainland, even though the British pilot, Hutchings, stated that, during the whole mission, the helicopter's radar warning system (RWS) only detected the TPS-43." [1354]

Also tracking the Sea King helicopter are the Argentine destroyers, *Piedra Buena* and *Hipólito Bouchard.*

"There were two Argentine destroyers – Piedra Buena and Hipólito Bouchard – on radar watch off the coast and both reported the passage of the helicopter, but a considerable land search discovered nothing. … a considerable effort by all three Argentine services would continue to be devoted to airfield and coastal protection on the mainland." [1355]

".., Lieutenant Richard Hutchings RM and his crew and eight SAS had lifted from HMS Invincible in a Sea King helicopter and were near the Argentine coast when Hutchings noted that his on-board radar had been 'pinged'. He later learnt that it was 'pinged' by the destroyer ARA Bouchard acting as early warning and defensive screen off Rio Grande." [1356]

With poor visibility and deteriorating weather conditions, the Sea King pilot drops off his SAS passengers and flies in the direction of Punta Arenas.

"When a flare suggested the Argentines were alert, Hutchins landed on low ground dead to radar sweeps, but when a second flare was fired, the (crew) and the (SAS) split, with Hutchings and his crew evading to Chile."[1357]

1354 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.406 citing an email sent by Richard Hutchings to retired Comodoro VGM Jorge Oberkersch on July 14, 2012.
1355 Middlebrook 2003
1356 Van der Bijl 2023.
1357 *Ibid.*

"As they were flying towards the border, the thick fog continued hindering the operation. They were not able to land at the pre-planned location, but on the coast of Bay Inútil (Useless Bay), near the town of Cameron, 83 km from the Argentine border and 143 km from the target. At that point they separated, and the commandos began the ground crossing towards the border under terrible weather conditions. … Some days later the crew surrendered to Chilean authorities." [1358]

In Chile, during the morning a British *Sea King* helicopter is reported as having been discovered burnt-out.

"(A) secret SAS operation was nearly exposed when, on 18 May, a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter was forced to land at Agua Fresca, between Punta Arenas and Dawson Island. Dawson Island, … was also rumoured to be a secret British military base; according to reports from Chile intercepted by the BBC Monitoring Service." [1359]

"We had no knowledge of this operation, and as this violated one of the principles we had laid out, we had a very strong argument with Wing Commander Edwards, who promised it would never happen again. As the wreck of the helicopter burned, everybody in Punta Arenas, and later in Argentina, got wind of the mysterious helicopter. I informed General Pinochet immediately. He then gave the pertinent instructions to deny all Chilean knowledge of this to our own Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I was given a free hand to help the crew out of Chile." [1360]

"For the first time since I had arrived in Chile, I felt that there was a serious danger that the incredible mutual trust that the Chileans and I had rapidly established was in serious jeopardy. … I immediately drafted an urgent signal … I did not have to wait very long … I was to describe this as a routine reconnaissance mission that experienced a serious failure in its navigation equipment and a complete loss of communication. This caused the crew to become lost in extremely bad weather. When they were running out of fuel they had no alternative but to land at the first suitable spot. Believing that they were probably in Argentina, they carried out standard procedure in such circumstances, which was to destroy their helicopter and attempt to escape."[1361]

In London, a meeting of the War Cabinet considers Operation SUTTON.

"It was for the Chiefs of Staff to advise on the military feasibility of the operation. Their advice, presented first by CDS (Lewin), was that this was about the only option left that was feasible. There was no satisfactory settlement available to be negotiated nor was a long blockade viable. The recommendation was therefore that the landing should go ahead as soon as practicable… Individually the Chiefs made their own submissions, all pointing to the same conclusion… The War Cabinet accepted the advice: the landing and repossession operations would go ahead unless it was clear that an acceptable diplomatic settlement was available by the afternoon of 20 May… The decision was made…" [1362]

In Parliament, PM Thatcher makes a statement to the House of Commons.

> *"Our representative at the United Nations has had a further meeting with Senor Perez de Cuellar. The negotiations are continuing and we are doing all that we can to reach a peaceful settlement, although there are principles on which we cannot compromise. There remain substantial difficulties. I believe that we shall know within the next day or two whether an agreement is attainable. We cannot have endless Argentine prevarication. We have been negotiating in good faith for six weeks and there*

1358 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.406. See May 24, 1982, below.
1359 *Falklands: The Chilean Connection* Duncan Campbell in *New Statesman* January 1985.
1360 General Fernando Matthei in *The Matthei Memorandum to Margaret Thatcher* March 25, 1999. See - http://www.josepinera.org/RevChilena/chile_democracia_memomatthei_en.htm
1361 Edwards 2014. This arrived before the helicopter crew members had been found. Assuming they were actually lost. See May 27, 1982, below.
1362 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Final timing would be determined by the weather.

has still been no sign of Argentine willingness to implement the Security Council's mandatory resolution. Our determination to ensure that all Argentine forces are withdrawn from the islands remains absolute. We have throughout made it clear that we shall take whatever steps are necessary to bring this about. We are meanwhile increasing the military pressures on the Argentine Government.... I believe that any military action or option cannot and must not be delayed by people who are extending negotiations."[1363]

In the Falkland Islands, a *Hercules C-130* arrives with supplies for the garrison. [1364]

At 1025, two *Sea Harriers* drop bombs on the airfield.

"The team in charge of repositioning the 35-mm cannon 303 was caught out in the open and suffered the effects of the high-altitude bomb explosions: they were reached by the shock wave and a large amount of scattered shrapnel. Despite this, and refusing to be overcome by adversity, they continued the transfer. The Sea Harriers repeated the attack at 1225 and at 1432 over the same objective, probably because it had been marked as the Headquarters." [1365]

In Washington, Deputy Secretary of State, Walter Stoessel, reports to President Reagan.

"I had a long talk with UK Ambassador Henderson today. He expects the Argentinians will not accept the latest UK proposals, but will come back tomorrow with suggested changes. Henderson anticipates that these in turn will be unacceptable to the British and that the UN Secretary General will thereupon declare his mediation mission at an end.

Henderson intimated that a major UK assault on the main island would ensue on the heels of the SG's declaration; he predicted with confidence that the operation would be successful and that the battle – while possibly involving high casualties on both sides – would be over "sooner rather than later." Henderson thought that when the assault takes place there will be pressure in the UN Security Council for a simple ceasefire without withdrawal (which would be unacceptable to the UK) and that – in his "personal view" – the time would then be appropriate for the US again to come forward as the only power capable of bringing about a settlement."

In New York, at the UN building, Parsons speaks privately to the Secretary-General; before reporting back.

"Pérez de Cuéllar was already regretting that British tactics had made it difficult for him to produce a paper of his own, as he had expected to do by this stage of the process. ... The end game was still going to be tricky, Parsons warned London. He could now see that Pérez de Cuéllar would probably want to put some proposals to both sides, just to say that he had done so, but without any expectation of success." [1366]

Late in the evening, Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister Ros submits a paper to the Secretary-General's office; *"... a mixture of requests for clarification, re-statement of known Argentine positions and introduction of new points. ... (a) The Argentines said that they were not clear what we meant by "in consultation with".. Did it mean that the opinion of the Councils would be binding on the Administrator or not? .. (b) they did not like the references to Article 73 of the Charter, (c) they were prepared to change the date to 30 June 1983, but required a provision that if no agreement had been reached by then the General Assembly would intervene ... They needed a mechanism to ensure that the negotiations did not continue for ever, (d) they wanted the Dependencies included, (e) they wanted a reference to the relevant GA Resolutions in the preamble if possible,*

1363 *HC Deb 18 May 1982 vol.24 cc189-90*
1364 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.409
1365 *Ibid.* p.410
1366 Freedman 2005 vol.2

and in any case in the terms of reference, (f) they suggested that in the negotiations the Secretary-General should "resort to" a four State Contact Group, two States being nominated by each party, with each party having the right to veto one of the two States proposed by the other, (g) on withdrawal, they proposed a very general clause which would provide for complete withdrawal and return to normal areas of operations within 30 days, (h) there was also a point about communications and access to the Islands for the nationals of both parties during the interim period."

"On Tuesday, May 18, 1982, Argentina presented a draft agreement to the Secretary General of the United Nations. The document insisted once again that "the three paragraphs of Resolution 502 are indivisible in their treatment and therefore the withdrawal of troops is part of the negotiations and not a prior condition to negotiate. "Immediately afterwards, it considered that "the geographical area within which the withdrawal of troops must be carried out covers the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands." The third point of the preamble was: "The withdrawal of the forces of both parties should be gradual and simultaneous. Within a maximum period of thirty days, all the armed forces must be in their bases and normal areas of operation." [1367]

After Ros has left, Pérez de Cuéllar summons Parsons. Following a discussion, Parsons contacts the Foreign Office in London.

> *"He said that Ros had given him a document containing Argentine "ideas and views" to bridge the differences between us. De Soto then described these. ... I said that I would transmit all this to you ... but I could say right away that you would consider this Argentine response as completely unsatisfactory. It did not constitute a clear reply ... You would only be able to draw the conclusion that the Argentines were playing for time. ... I had made clear yesterday that such a response would be interpreted by HMG as rejection."*

Informed, the USA's Permanent Representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick, speaks to Ros and Eduardo Roca.

> *"I attempted without success to persuade them that the British proposal is not so bad; that Argentina could, if she chose, accept it and declare she had won by the establishment of a UN authority responsible for the government..."* [1368]

The New York Times reports:

> *"Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said today that the United States had little choice but to support Britain in its dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands even though that support disrupted United States policies in Latin America. "There are some problems in international affairs that are inherently insoluble in the sense that whatever you do you can suffer serious damages and the U.S. found itself in this position," he said at a press conference. "Once the Argentines had seized the islands it was almost impossible for the U.S. to escape the dilemma that Great Britain was its oldest ally." Mr. Kissinger, ... said he supported United States and United Nations efforts to solve the problem and believed a negotiated settlement would eventually be reached. "The only question is whether this will come before or after the use of military force," he said."*

1367 *Malvinas: el audio inédito de Galtieri con el secretario de la ONU, que lo acusó de no estar "sobrio"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* December 11, 2022

1368 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/19/1982*

In Luxembourg, the North Atlantic Council (NATO) issue a final statement.

> *"In view of the fundamental importance which they attach to the principle that the use of force to resolve international disputes should be resolutely opposed by the international community, the Allies condemn Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and deplore the fact that after more than six weeks she has still not withdrawn her forces in compliance with Mandatory Resolution 502 of the Security Council.*
>
> *They call for a continuation of the efforts to achieve a satisfactory negotiated settlement in accordance with this Resolution in its entirety."* [1369]



Near the Falklands' exclusion zone, two elements of Britain's naval force, the carrier group (TG317.8) and the amphibious group (TG317.0), rendezvous to facilitate a redistribution of men and supplies via ship-to-ship transfers. From *Atlantic Conveyor*, four *Sea Harriers* are transferred to *Invincible* and ten to *Hermes* (right). Over 4,000 troops are present.

The assault plans are changed again. [1370]

"... signal from CINC Fleet saying that only one major unit may be in any one ship. Thus 40 Cdo are joining us in HMS Fearless tomorrow and 3 Para will go to Intrepid." [1371]

May 19th, in the US, the *National Intelligence Daily* publishes a piece by Henry Rowan, Chairman of the American National Intelligence Council – *Solution to the Falklands Crisis*. [1372]

> *"1. Cessation of hostilities, and prevention of imminent hostilities;*
>
> *2. Some appropriate penalty upon the Argentinians for having used armed force to seek to settle an international dispute;*
>
> *3. An ultimate turnover of the Islands to Argentinian sovereignty, as the British are said to be prepared, and to have been prepared for some time, to do; and*
>
> *4. Adequate protection of the cultural and political preferences of the British residents of the Falkland Islands in a humane and indeed generous fashion.*
>
> *Main Elements of the Solution*
>
> *1. All Argentine armed forces are to withdraw immediately from the Falkland Islands. The British fleet is to turn around and return to its normal stations.*

1369 *American Foreign Policy Current Document 1982* Document 176 p.477 -: *NATO Response to Continuing Threats to International Security*

1370 By the time everyone had arrived, the vessels in a relatively small area of the South Atlantic included *Fearless, Intrepid, Antrim, Argonaut, Ardent, Plymouth, Canberra, Elk, Norland, Europic Ferry, Atlantic Conveyor, Stromness, Tidepool, Pearleaf* and *Fort Toronto*; joined by *Hermes* and *Brilliant*. Redistribution of men and supplies was necessary for the proposed landing, but also because of fears about keeping too many men aboard *Canberra*.

1371 Southby-Tailyour 1990

1372 Elgood 2025. See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83t00966r000100030008-0 Intriguingly, the source document is dated January 1, 1982. That said, this may be a default date to indicate year of completion. According to the xAI: "*... the January 1st date convention appears to be a procedural practice for certain CIA documents, particularly internal memos, proposals, and non-daily reports. It's likely used as a default or placeholder in metadata to indicate the year of origin, especially for documents not intended for daily publication like the NID. Examples from historical collections, propaganda guidance, and intelligence estimates support this pattern.*

2. An enclave in the nature of a large compound on the Falkland Islands is to be created, which will house an Argentinian Resident (not "Governor" or "Ambassador") and an office staff, to provide information and any other governmental liaison with the residents of the Falkland Islands. That enclave/compound will be an area of Argentinian sovereignty, and the Argentinian flag will fly in it. In that enclave/compound, the Argentinian law only will apply, and no British administrative powers will be applicable. The Argentinian Resident will have diplomatic immunity.

3. British administration of the Islands with the exception of the enclave/compound mentioned above, will. immediately resume, for three years.

4. For a period of three years the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands will be given a chance to consider whether they wish to remain on the Falkland Islands or whether they wish to relocate to an area of British jurisdiction, either in the UK or elsewhere under British sovereignty, with a relocation grant of $100,000 per person. (It is likely that many residents will find this a sufficient inducement to relocate to some other area, perhaps in Scotland or elsewhere where conditions may be similar to the Falkland Islands.) Any residents who do not wish to relocate will be free to remain and become Argentinian citizens at the end of three years. The cost of the relocation grants to be paid to any residents of the Falkland Islands wishing to relocate elsewhere will be borne fifty/ fifty by the Argentinian and British governments. It should be noted that the expense of the relocation grants, if every one of the 1800 residents of the Falkland Islands took up the offer (it would have to be residents alive now or within the next six months, to avoid a population increase not intended by the offer) would be less than $200,000,000, which would be one- half of the cost of published estimates of the dispatch of the British fleet alone.

5. After three years, the Islands will become Argentinian.

6. Argentina will pay a suitable indemnification to the UK for all damage done by its invading forces, including the period of occupation of the Islands by those forces. Furthermore, Argentina will pay compensation to the UK for the property of British citizens or of the British government in the Falkland Islands, including any investment in land and structures, sheep, et cetera, which will remain in the Falkland Islands after the three years. Both amounts will be determined by an arbitral panel consisting of three countries, for example, Malta, Austria, and Finland; or Malta, Switzerland, and Austria; or the like. The amount of the arbitral award for compensation and indemnification will be paid by Argentina to Great Britain over ten years in equal installments. .

7. In the event of off-shore oil deposits being found in the exclusive economic zone of 200 miles around the Islands, the exploitation thereof will be a joint venture between the UK and Argentina, with costs and profits shared fifty/fifty. The UK will undertake to make available its technological know-how for such exploitation on normal commercial terms to the joint venture.

The administration of this disengagement and settlement agreement, as well as its interpretation, will be carried out by the arbitral panel of three countries, who will each dispatch a resident officer to the Falklands forthwith to implement this agreement. The arbitral panel will have binding and definitive authority in all matters respecting the interpretation and implementation of this agreement, and its decision shall not be appealable. At the conclusion of its work it shall render a report to Argentina and the UK and to the United Nations Secretary General, but the panel shall not be in any respect under the authority of the United Nations or to take any instruction from the United Nations or to be considered subject to its authority in the performance of its work. It shall have the authority to engage any expert assistance it may desire from any source, and its expenses shall be borne fifty/fifty by the UK and Argentina."

From the United Nations building in New York, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, reports to Reagan.

> *"This morning I spoke with SG Perez de Cuellar. He described the Argentine response as "terrible" for this stage of the negotiations, and the British proposal as rigid but fundamentally "not so bad," saying the Argentines must accept the fact that however justified their position may be, juridically they were wrong. ... He said he would present some proposals to the Argentines this morning and if they "can live with them" he will ask the British for 24 hours more."* [1373]

Parsons records his thoughts.

> *"The Secretariat gave us their translation of last night's Argentine paper. This is even worse that Pérez de Cuéllar and de Soto led me to believe ... in particular, (a) the previously agreed language on pre-judgement has been omitted, (b) there is no reference to Councils as such, but only to "persons who are members of the population of British origin" who are to be appointed as advisors in equal numbers with Argentine residents in the Islands, (c) the provisions on freedom of movement are much worse... in short, the Argentines have reverted to the negotiating position they occupied at the very beginning of Pérez de Cuéllar's initiative."*

Argentina's proposals are summarised:- (1) withdrawal from the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, (2) withdrawal to *"normal bases of operation"* within 30 days, (3) economic measures to be lifted from the date the agreement is signed, (4) supervision of withdrawal to be carried out by the UN, (5) the interim administration – (a) to be the responsibility of the UN, (b) the administration to perform all functions (executive, legislative, judicial and security), (c) local judicial functions may be exercised in accordance with the legislation in effect on 1 April 1982, (d) the administration to appoint advisers, persons who are members of the population of British origin and Argentine residents in equal numbers, (d) the flags of the parties shall fly together with that of the UN, (e) during the interim administration communications to be kept open, including freedom of movement and equality of access with respect to residence, work and property, (f) freedom of access for Argentina's airline (LADE) and Argentine television, (g) the way of life of the locals to be respected. (6) negotiations to be completed by 31 December 1982 with a single option to extend to 30 June 1983 – and if the period expires without agreement, the General Assembly of the UN to determine the final agreement.

In receipt of a copy from New York, Britain's Ambassador Henderson forwards it to Secretary Haig.

> *"... the Argentines have reverted to the negotiating position they adopted at the beginning of the UN Secretary General's initiative."*

The UN Secretary-General proposes a meeting over lunch. In private, before the meal, Pérez de Cuéllar tells Parsons that Costa Méndez had suggested that the Secretary-General talk directly to General Galtieri. Costa Méndez had also suggested that the UN Secretariat send envoys to both London and Buenos Aires. Parsons dismisses this last suggestion as merely a tactic to prolong talks. Pérez de Cuéllar indicates that he is unable to refuse a direct call to Argentina's President, but that after he would wish to make a similar call to Margaret Thatcher. Parsons sends a report to London.

> *"Pérez de Cuéllar proposed a working lunch.. At my private meeting with Pérez de Cuéllar before the lunch I asked him to formally convey to Ros that HM Government found the Argentine response totally unacceptable. The Argentine position had not changed in substance since the beginning of the negotiations. It was clear that there was no hope of reaching an agreement ...*

1373 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/19/1982*

We therefore had to draw a line… I told Pérez de Cuéllar that we recognised that this would enable Ros to wrong-foot us by blaming us for the breakdown of negotiations but this was something that we would have to accept." [1374]

Parsons notes; *"I do not feel uncomfortable about our own position. First, …, Pérez de Cuéllar will not consider that we have acted in bad faith in announcing to the House of Commons tomorrow that we regard the present round as having ended with the Argentine rejection of our proposals. Secondly, he will not accuse me of bad faith if HM forces land on the Falklands in the next few days. I made the deadline clear to him … We are going to need all the support we can get from our friends and allies in the days to come – I even took the exceptional step of brain-washing Mrs. Kirkpatrick this evening on the flexibility we had shown in the negotiations, as opposed to Argentine obduracy. Some of my Community partners are so untrustworthy that I will not brief them until Friday …"*

From the UN, the Secretary-General telephones President Galtieri.

"Mr. President, I allowed myself to call you so that perhaps I could exchange some impressions with you as I see you now and naturally with a mixture of anguish at the time that passes with a dangerous speed for the cause of peace and on the other hand with a bit of hope that perhaps in these remaining hours I can obtain a solution to this problem that not only moves your country and Great Britain but indeed the whole world." After the prologue, the United Nations secretary explained: "I know that the British consider that the negotiation is finished for them but it is not finished for me, because I, as Secretary General of the United Nations, I do not have the interest of any of the parties in my sights, but the interest of peace…" [1375]

"When Pérez de Cuéllar rang Galtieri he did not make much progress. The Argentine President 'seemed somewhat confused, as if he had been drinking, and was being prompted by others on what to say.'… Galtieri complained about British deadlines, unreasonableness, and an imminent military offensive." [1376]

After speaking to the Argentine President, Pérez de Cuéllar telephones Margaret Thatcher. The Secretary-General tells the PM that he has urged Galtieri to make further concessions, and will inform Parsons of any further ideas coming out of Buenos Aires. Thatcher tells Pérez de Cuéllar that while Britain would always look at new proposals, the country had gone as far as it could with regard to peace proposals.

"Javier Pérez de Cuéllar spoke by telephone with Margaret Thatcher and Galtieri. Privately, he commented that when he spoke with the Argentine president he perceived, from his tone of voice, that he was not "sober"; an absolutely false fact. … During the same telephone contact, Pérez de Cuellar proposed to Galtieri that he send a man he trusted (undersecretary Cordovés) to Buenos Aires to deal with the most sensitive issues of his proposal. In particular when talking about the application of article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations and the self-determination of the kelpers. For Foreign Minister Costa Méndez, accepting this point was equivalent to returning the islands to the British." [1377]

At the United Nations, Ling Qing, President of the Security Council, calls for an informal meeting in the afternoon to update the Council of any progress. After the event, Parsons reports on the discussion to London.

1374 *PREM19/629 Telegram No.786 of 19 May 1982 Sir Anthony Parsons to FCO*

1375 *Malvinas: el audio inédito de Galtieri con el secretario de la ONU, que lo acusó de no estar "sobrio"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* December 11, 2022, citing a recording of the conversation.

1376 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1377 *Malvinas: el audio inédito de Galtieri con el secretario de la ONU, que lo acusó de no estar "sobrio"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* December 11, 2022

"There was no disposition to move into a formal meeting nor any proposals for Presidential statements which would have caused us difficulty. The Secretary-General and I reported briefly on the stage reached. … In order to avoid provoking a wider debate, with the possible risk of a formal session tonight, I thought it better not to say explicitly that as far as we were concerned, the present round of negotiations had ended … I gave no-one any grounds to claim that we had accepted the various calls for restraint and moderation."

In London, from studios in Mayfair, *Radio Atlantico del Sur* makes its first broadcast, bouncing off a requisitioned BBC transmitter on Ascension Island. [1378]

"The aim will be military and designed to maximise the use of radio to demoralise Argentine troops (particularly conscripted troops) currently occupying the Falklands, reinforcing (their) sense of isolation, and so reducing the willingness of the Argentine garrison to resist any landing. Responsibility would rest with the Ministry of Defence." [1379]

In the Falklands, three *C-130 Hercules* aircraft deliver supplies to the garrison.

"… took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 1315 transporting 14,200 kg of cargo and eight passengers to BAM Malvinas. There was a woman among them, Cabo Principal Liliana Colino, who was the only Argentine Air Force nurse to cross to the islands in order to care for the evacuated wounded. The TC-63 landed at Malvinas at 1615 and took off again ten minutes later carrying 5 wounded onboard. The CIC immediately ordered a swift left turn and to fly as close to the ground as possible. It landed at Comodoro Rivadavia at 1855." [1380]

During a period of unusually calm weather in the South Atlantic, ship-to-ship redistribution of men and supplies continues apace. During one transfer from *Canberra*, a *Sea King* helicopter crashes as it attempts to land on HMS *Intrepid*.

"The helicopter cross-decking went without a hitch until the very last Sea King transferring men of D and G Squadrons 22 SAS from Hermes to Intrepid ditched, killing twenty-two Warrant Officers, NCOs and troopers, including the air crewmen … the heaviest loss in one day since the Second World War." [1381]

"The weather, fortunately, made matters much easier. For the first time in days, the South Atlantic calmed, permitting LPDs to dock down safely and release their landing craft from dock wells. The LCUs then went alongside Canberra and shuttled 40 Commando and 3 Para into the dock wells of the LPDs, from where the men climbed up ramps to crowded spaces for the final transit. Troops carefully followed each other down narrow pasageways before exiting Canberra through her large side doors on to LCUs bobbing in the swells. During the transfer, one man from 40 Commando fell into the sea between the troop ship and a landing craft; others pulled him out shaken but without injury." [1382]

Delays affect the timing of the operation.

"The timings for the landings had been backwards and forwards a bit with 'H' hour now at 0230 GMT to allow us the maximum darkness on the approach … we now had more to do in less time. … I intended to lead the

1378 Project Moonshine was opposed by both the FCO and the BBC. However, the Ministry of Defence took the project direct to the War Cabinet on May 18, 1982 where it was approved. The station made 47 broadcasts between May 19 and June 15, 1982.

1379 MOD submission May 13, 1982

1380 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.413-414

1381 Thompson 1992. Ten were rescued. The helicopter appears to have been significantly overloaded.

1382 Privratsky 2014.

long snake of craft until off Ajax Bay where 40 Commando's craft under ... Bob Edwards would have an agonizing 10-minute wait while I took 2 Para into Bonners Bay at full speed. Without any signal, 40 Commando would then form into line abreast and steam into Pony's Valley Bay. We would meet again off Ajax Bay and return.I would take my craft to Intrepid for 3 Para and Bob would take his Intrepid craft to Stromness for 45 Commando. There were other restrictions. The whole operation would be conducted in radio silence and without visual signalling." [1383]

May 20th, just after midnight New York time, Parsons sends an urgent telegram to London.

> *"... the Secretary-General has dropped an embarrassing bombshell ... he has now launched his own paper... When we remonstrated with his staff that this move was inconsistent with the British position as I had described it as recently as lunchtime today... they said he had been encouraged to make it by the Prime Minister's concluding remarks ...*
>
> *It looks therefore as though Pérez de Cuéllar, in his desperate desire not to sign off, has chosen to ignore the clarification of the Prime Minister's remarks which I gave him this evening. The paper is very cleverly drafted and is undoubtedly more favourable to us than to Argentina, but I fully realise that it has come too late ..."* [1384]

UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar's paper identifies four areas where he believes that agreement can be reached – (a) certain aspects of the interim-Administration, (b) provision for the extension of the time for completion of negotiations and related duration of the interim-Administration, (c) certain aspects of mutual withdrawal of forces, and (d) the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the Interim Agreement. His proposal also includes: (1) addition of the Dependencies within the Interim Agreement, (2) references to UN General Assembly resolutions, (3) the flags of the parties and the UN to fly over the Islands, (4) arrangements (undefined) to extend the UN administration if the target date is not met, (5) consideration of a relaxation of restrictions on residence and the acquisition of property.

America's representative at the UN, Kirkpatrick, speaks to Estaban Takacs, Argentine Ambassador to the USA; who reports to Buenos Aires.

"In the early hours of that day, cable 'S' No. 1,517 entered the Palacio San Martín, from Washington, which summarized the last conversation that Esteban Takacs had had with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The text, "for the exclusive and immediate knowledge" of Costa Méndez, had five points, in which the US ambassador asked for "one last effort (in diplomatic negotiations) after having participated in a special meeting at the White House". She requested an "affirmative" Argentine response to the proposal of the Secretary General of the United Nations. In point #3, Takacs relates that he asked Kirpatrick if she believed that Argentine public opinion could accept the British conditions. "If you say yes, you are still the net winners in this conflict. The English will never return to the islands. Pérez de Cuellar is doing a great job and can bring this to a successful conclusion for you in the framework of the United Nations," she replied. Point #4 was important on that day and recorded the following dialogue: Takacs asked if she "had any doubts about our military ability to respond to a larger-scale British attack." Kirkpatrick replied that she "didn't rule out that we could respond successfully, but she saw that even so, and despite the cost of lives, the conditions would improve because the subsequent escalation of British military actions could be very serious". Takacs, in the same text, clarified that

1383 Southby-Tailyour 1990

1384 The Secretary-General appeared to have taken Thatcher's comment about being prepared to look at fresh proposals to heart, despite Parsons having clarified that this phase of negotiation was over.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick requested that her opinion be transmitted to President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri."[1385]

In London, Britain's War Cabinet meet to discuss the unexpected turn of events; *"This idea did not get very far, although there was reluctance to reject it out of hand.... it was apparent that there could be no question of holding up the landing because of these ideas... Parsons was instructed to make it clear that the search for a negotiated settlement would not interfere with military preparations..."* [1386]

In the Falklands, a little after midday, three RAF Harrier GR.3s attack fuel depots at Fox Bay. An Argentine *C-130 Hercules* arrives at Stanley to evacuate five wounded soldiers. In the afternoon, another C-130 makes a delivery drop to Fox Bay. [1387]

"Primer Teniente Rodolfo Yuse and Primer Teniente Horacio Alzamora, had arrived the day before by helicopter and joined the 8th Infantry Regiment (8 RI), tasked with the defense of Fox Bay . Yuse informed the Regiment Chief about the aerial delivery dropping mission details. While searching for the most appropriate zone for cargo dropping, two Pucará aircraft were overflying but had to fly away since they received friendly fire. Given the situation, the Company Leader was asked to inform the personnel that a C-130H was approaching to drop supplies and they were given details for recognition. Considering what happened with the previous dropping, a drop zone was marked for the aircraft to see it regardless of its approach heading. At 1600, the ten containers were uneventfully dropped. Three of them fell into the water due to the strong wind, but they were recovered. Despite the warnings, when the aircraft flew over 8 RI positions, Argentine troops opened fire against the Hercules. The 8 RI Headquarters contacted Primer Teniente Yuse to offer their apologies and to inform that the person responsible, a Subteniente who had given the order to open fire, had been sanctioned and relieved from this post." [1388]

From the UK, Francis Pym telegrams Parsons to tell him that the Secretary-General's ideas represent *"significant downwards from what was our absolute bottom line."*

With regard to military plans, Parsons should; *".. emphasize, as has been constantly stated in Parliament, that our search for a negotiated settlement has not affected and cannot affect the pressures, including military, which we have been bringing to bear on the Argentines."*

In New York, Parsons speaks to de Cuéllar; *"I said that we appreciated the positive aspects of the aide memoire, but it differed in important respects from out bottom line. ... Even if acceptable to both sides as a basis for negotiations it would take days if not weeks to know whether success could be achieved. I had emphasised the importance of our deadline. ..."*

In London, Margaret Thatcher presents Britain's rejected draft-agreement to the House of Commons.

> *"On Monday of this week our ambassador to the United Nations handed to the Secretary-General our proposals for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These proposals represented the limit to which the Government believe it was right to go. We made it clear to Senor Pérez de Cuéllar that we expected the Argentine Government to give us a very rapid response to them. By yesterday morning we had had a first indication of the Argentine reaction. It was not encouraging. By the evening we received their full response in writing. It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals.*

1385 *The beginning of the end of the war: the erosion of the peace proposals of the United Nations and the British landing in the Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* May 20, 2022.
1386 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1387 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.420-421
1388 *Ibid.*

It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals. Indeed, in many respects the Argentine reply went back to their position when they rejected Mr. Haig's second set of proposals on 29 April. It retracted virtually all the movement that their representative had shown during the Secretary-General's efforts to find a negotiated settlement. ... We have reached this very serious situation because the Argentines clearly decided at the outset of the negotiations that they would cling to the spoils of invasion and occupation by thwarting at every turn all the attempts that have been made to solve the conflict by peaceful means. Ever since 2 April they have responded to the efforts to find a negotiated solution with obduracy and delay, deception and bad faith. ... Argentina began the crisis. Argentina has rejected proposal after proposal. One is bound to ask whether the junta has ever intended to seek a peaceful settlement or whether it has sought merely to confuse and prolong the negotiations while remaining in illegal possession of the Islands. I believe that if we had a dozen more negotiations the tactics and results would be the same. From the course of these negotiations and Argentina's persistent refusal to accept resolution 502 we are bound to conclude that its objective is procrastination and continuing occupation, leading eventually to sovereignty. ... The Secretary-General, to whose efforts I pay tribute, has a duty to continue to seek agreement. But, as our representative is telling him in New York, his paper differs in certain important respects from our position as presented to him on 17 May and which we then described as the furthest that we could go. Moreover, it differs fundamentally from the present Argentine position as communicated to us yesterday. ... This is the seventh set of proposals that we have considered. We have considered them carefully. Each time we have met with tactics the object of which is procrastination leading to continued occupation of the islands. Because of the record on this matter we thought it best to put up our own specific draft interim agreement in writing so that our position was clear for the world to see and so that it was clear that we were not compromising fundamental principles, but that we were prepared to make some reasonable, practical suggestions if we could secure the prize of no further loss of life. The proposals have been rejected. They are no longer on the table…" [1389]

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, speaks towards the end of the Commons' debate.

"... I remind the House of the basic requirements that we have set ourselves throughout these long weeks. Our first requirement has been to secure the withdrawal of Argentina forces, which was demanded as a matter of mandatory obligation by Security Council resolution 502. The second has been to establish a ceasefire to avoid further loss of life as soon as withdrawal could be agreed. The third has been to make satisfactory provision for the democratic administration of the islands in any interim arrangements that prove necessary. The fourth has been to ensure that the negotiations with Argentina over the future of the islands should be such as to conform with the principles so strongly supported in this House. We have made it clear in this connection that we remain prepared to negotiate with Argentina about the long-term future of the islands, as we and previous Governments were so prepared before the invasion, that we shall be ready to discuss anything which either side might wish to put forward, and that we insist only that the terms of reference of these negotiations should not be such as to predetermine or prejudge the outcome, whether on sovereignty or on other matters. The Leader of the Opposition said that he understood that there had been some movement by Argentina towards the position of non-prejudgement. That was right, but the position changed yesterday and on Monday, as it has before, and the Argentines withdrew that position and the reply that we received yesterday did not contain it...." [1390]

1389 *HC Deb 20 May 1982 vol.24 cc477-561.* Thatcher's use of the term, "*off the table*" caused a good deal of inquiry as to why. Particularly from opposition MPs who were unaware of Operation Sutton.

1390 *HC Deb 20 May 1982 vol.24 cc477-561*

The prospect of an independent inquiry into the intelligence failures leading to Argentina's invasion is also raised during the course of the debate.

"The inquiry is thus emerging as a classic battle of establishment cultures: between a parliament out to expose what it sees as an overweening bureaucracy finally caught with its pants down, and a civil service equally convinced it was the cowardice and short-sightedness of politicians which brought the debacle to pass." [1391]

Following the end of the Commons debate, the Foreign Office issue a document to the press – *'Negotiations for a Peaceful Settlement'* – laying out, in great detail the negotiations that have taken place. [1392] There is no mention of Operation Sutton.

"MoD were desperate that not only should there be no hint of what was to come but that, even if it succeeded, news should not be released until well after the event. It was conceivable that British forces could establish a beachhead without the Argentines being aware of British intent." [1393]

"... on May 20, 1982, the Military Attaché in Washington, General Miguel Mallea Gil, communicated with Colonel Mario Zambonini (Undersecretary for Institutional Affairs of the Presidency of the Nation) through a code telephone (conversation that was recorded) and brought him up to date on the latest news circulating in the capital of the United States. He reported that Margaret Thatcher accused Argentina of rejecting all peace proposals and that Britain had withdrawn her proposals as a result. That Great Britain does not currently have any peace proposals on the table and that Admiral John Woodward has been ordered to carry out a series of landings and hit-and-run attacks." [1394]

From Lima, Peru's President Belaunde announces a new peace initiative of his own. Belaunde asserts that he has been encouraged by a telephone call from Costa Méndez, to the effect that the Argentine Government are urgently re-examining Peruvian ideas.

> *"(1) Each Nation subscribes unilaterally to the latest proposal for an agreement presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (2) The Secretary-General fulfils the clauses in which there are points of agreement, such as – (a) ceasefire; (b) mutual withdrawal of forces; (c) Administration of the Government of the Islands by the UN or by a contact group, formed of various countries, within a period which is agreed in the two proposals; (3) The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar, or the contact group acceptable to both parties, which he will propose, will be responsible for organising and presiding over negotiations in pursuit of a permanent solution and for supervising the immediate withdrawal from the zone of conflict of the forces of both countries."* [1395]

From New York, Parsons reports.

> *"The Secretary-General has spent the whole day waiting for an Argentine reaction to his aide mémoire of 19 May. At 2345z this evening he had still not had one."*

1391 *The Economist* June 19, 1982

1392 Far too large a document for this work. Published in full in the *New York Times* May 21, 1982. See - https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/21/world/text-of-british-government-document-on-the-falkland-islands-negotiations.html For Argentina's response - see May 26, 1982 below

1393 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1394 *The beginning of the end of the war: the erosion of the peace proposals of the United Nations and the British landing in the Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* May 20, 2022.

1395 *PREM19/629 Telegram No.187 of 20 May.* Peru's big idea was that, as there was no one document both sides were prepared to sign; then each would sign their own. *"Unacceptable" was* written across the Prime Minister's copy.

Pérez de Cuéllar tells Ros that, as he has not received a reply from Argentina, he has no choice but to inform the President of the Security Council that he cannot continue his efforts. Ros replies that he has been unable to get any response from Buenos Aires. [1396]

"It appeared that with the military pressure reaching a climax the Argentine Government simply could not organise a sensible response." [1397]

"While the diplomatic dalliances were taking place, Ambassador Kirkpatrick would comment to an Argentine negotiator: "London has already given the order for the final attack."." [1398]

Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar writes to the President of the Security Council.

> *"I felt the time for reaching agreement through negotiations .. was extremely short. It remains my view that substantial progress was achieved in the past two weeks towards a diplomatic solution, but I must now state that the necessary accommodations which were still needed to end the conflict have not been forthcoming. ... I feel it my duty to inform you that, in my judgement, the efforts in which I have been engaged, with the support of the Council, do not offer the present prospect of bringing about an end to the crisis nor, indeed, of preventing the intensification of the conflict."* [1399]

From London, Britain's Embassies and Missions throughout the world receive instructions.

> *"If asked about the UN Secretary-General's last-minute proposals, you should say that we have throughout warmly appreciated Sr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts. However, given the hardening of the Argentine position in their latest text, it was clear that further negotiations would be fruitless."* [1400]

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Glamorgan* bombards targets on the Falkland Islands south coast to give the impression that a '*softening-up*' is taking place ahead of a landing south of Stanley. [1401]


"2220Z. Packing kit. Loaded pistol. Time for a beer and a quiet think about the job in hand, and home." [1402]

"It had become clear in recent days, ... that the Carrier Battle group had not achieved control of the skies around the islands as some had anticipated. Now, intelligence warned that air attacks were likely following the landings, but that it would probably take Argentina half a day to sort out the confusion caused by diversions and to counter with fighters from the mainland." [1403]

To the north of West Falkland, *Antrim*, *Ardent*, *Fearless*, *Intrepid* and *Yarmouth* sail towards San Carlos.

> *"The assault force approached the Falklands in ideal conditions. Thick cloud, driving rain and a gale."*[1404]

1396 *PREM19/629 Telegram No.809 of 20 May.*
1397 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1398 *Malvinas: el audio inédito de Galtieri con el secretario de la ONU, que lo acusó de no estar "sobrio"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* December 11, 2022
1399 *Survey of Article 98: The Secretariat*, *United Nations Sup.6 Vol.6 (1979 – 1984)*
1400 *PREM19/629 Telegram No.90 of 20 May.*
1401 *Operation Tornado*
1402 Southby-Tailyour 1990
1403 Privratsky 2014
1404 BBC Correspondent Robert Fox's despatch quoted in Briley 2022


S E C R E T
SIC 19F
OPERATION SUTTON
1. THE EYES AND EARS OF THE WORLD ARE UPON US.
BE STEADY IN RESOLVE, STRONG IN BATLE AND MERCIFUL IN VICTORY
BT

3 Special Boat Service are landed east of Fanning Head.

"As Ardent positioned herself in the Sound to provide gunfire support to the Special Air Service diversionary raid near Darwin, Wessex helicopters from Antrim would insert marines from the Special Boat Squadron and naval gunfire observers to help eliminate an Argentine observation post at Fanning Head... As this was happening, the second group consisting of Norland with 2 Para, Stromness with the bulk of 45 Commando and Canberra with 42 Commando, escorted by the frigates Brilliant and Plymouth and the auxiliary Fort Austin, would be entering the Sound;... The overall plan hinged on ships arriving and men disembarking on time." [1405]

From Ascension Island, an RAF *Nimrod XV232*, sets out on a reconnaissance flight. [1406]

At midnight, Britain's forces are in position.

"H-hour, the time when the first LCUs would drop their bow ramps on Blue Beach Two, was timed for 2.30am local time on Friday 21 may. To meet this H-hour the LPDs must enter Falkland Sound from the north at 11pm local time on 20 may and anchor outside the entrance to San Carlos Water, west of Wreck Point. ... Few people got much sleep between the onset of darkness on 20 May and just before midnight when they started to move down to their craft. ... The slowly moving files of marines with blackened faces snaked seemingly endlessly into the (landing) craft." [1407]


"The enemy fleet preparatory manoeuvrers —who were trying to isolate the sector chosen for landing, to block Argentine cantonments closest to Fox Bay and Prado del Ganso, and to prevent Argentine troops from reaching the area by land— went unnoticed by the Malvinas Garrison Command. The invasion was already underway." [1408]

1405 Privratsky 2014. A third group was scheduled to enter the Sound some four hours after the second – *Argonaut*, *Broadsword* and the *Europic Ferry* carrying *Rapier* air defences and artillery. Also embarked were the Commando Logistic Regiment with supplies for the first few days.

1406 Covering some 8,453 miles of the South Atlantic in 18 hours 50 minutes, the crew broke the previous record set on May 15, 1982.

1407 Thompson 1992

1408 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas & Dirección de Estudios Históricos - FAA 2023 p.421



May 21st, on East Falkland Island, 25 men from 3 Special Boat Service (SBS) attack Argentine positions on high ground to the north of San Carlos Water (Fanning Head), supported by covering fire from HMS *Antrim*.[1409] Units of the Special Air Service (SAS) attack positions to the south of the landing beaches, supported by HMS *Ardent*.

"3 SBS had been landed by helicopter east of Fanning Head … and, before moving off, had detached a small party which was to move down to Green Beach One as quickly as possible to check that it was clear of enemy before 3 Para landed. It was. On their way to the beach they quickly scouted through Port San Carlos, but saw no enemy, who were, as it turned out, all asleep in the houses. … D Sqn 22 SAS, supported by HMS Ardent, were attacking Darwin to keep the strategic reserve pinned down and provide a diversion from the main landings." [1410]

"The Darwin isthmus would undoubtedly be the first materiel target to be conquered by the troops landing in San Carlos. On the night of 20 May, the special forces carried out a commando attack and opened fire from the coast; they attacked the Darwin facilities and the Argentine Air Force positions at Prado del Ganso. It was "something small in order to test the defenses' reaction, establish positions or minefields in the area"323. The only purpose may have been to conduct an exploration because they immediately retreated aboard a helicopter. During that night and in the early morning of 21 May, the "Hiena" POA, located on the Alberdi Hill and under the command of Alférez Jorge Blázquez and together with conscript class of 63 Sergio Bustos, was attacked by a Special Air Service (SAS) patrol to cover up the onset of the landing. Fortunately, Blázquez and

1409 Accompanying the SBS squad was a naval gunfire specialist, from 148 Commando Forward Observation Battery.
After several hours of fighting at Fanning Head, the Argentine force fled, leaving 11 dead, 3 wounded and 6 captured.
1410 Thompson 1992

his soldier discovered the enemy patrol; they left the post and marched among the rocks taking shelter in a nearby stream. From that point, they observed the commandos firing at the shelter and searching for them; they also saw that, from another nearby place, they were fired back. During the dark night, standing motionless and under cover, the Argentine men witnessed the fierce combat between two fractions of the British troops. As soon as they could, they reported to the BAM Cóndor Command Post not only the fighting they had witnessed but also the helicopters flights over the area. All observation posts were up to date with the recent events in real time as they shared the same frequency for operations." [1411]

Off San Carlos, men start to move towards the boats.

"I struggled towards the dock against a tide of camouflaged and fully-kitted Marines. Men for the smaller LCVPs had an uphill climb to the upper decks (of Fearless); men for the LCUs had a descent to the vehicle decks and 'beach'. There was an unreal animation amongst the crews and yet everyone was carrying out pre-sailing checks as though we were off Portland naval Base. I felt immensely proud of them ... Inshore, and recognizable by the whiteness of their wakes rather than by their indistinct shapes, Intrepid's landing craft made their way towards Norland and 2 Para. They too, were late, ... Exactly sixty-five minutes after we should have begun our passage to the beaches we crossed the start line at full speed." [1412]

Later than planned, British forces commence their landings on East Falkland Island.

> *"I embarked with a parachute battalion in four landing craft, exactly the D-Day model.... It appeared that surprise was complete. Then the dramatic moment of the ramp going down and the dash up the beach... It is a very quiet night, a silent night and now we are ashore... Only one of the units, another paratroop battalion, encountered resistance ashore. They had a brisk firefight and there were Argentine casualties and prisoners..."* [1413]
>
> *"The landing was carried out by stealth rather than by force. The ships moved into the main channel between the Falklands and dropped anchor safe from the sight of an Argentine garrison only by the dark moonless night. For the next few hours, the troops clambered down scrambling nets lashed alongside into the landing craft that shuffled back and forth to the shore.. It was an agonisingly long operation, nearly four hours from start to finish. All carried out in total silence, both real silence and radio silence."* [1414]

"At the appointed place, off Ajax Bay, the formation of craft split, 40 Commando's craft stopping, while 2 Para's craft were led towards Blue Beach Two by Southerby-Tailyour. Our craft touched bottom about five metres offshore and the ramps dropped. 2 Para waded ashore. Their feet would remain wet until after the capture of Goose Green and Darwin nine days later. ... The only enemy encountered by the Brigade on or near their beaches was in Port San Carlos, west of 3 Para's Green Beach One. This enemy, about forty strong, and the other half of the Company providing the Fanning Head Mob, had woken from their slumbers in the houses and settlement building to find a British parachute battalion landing two kilometres away and wisely decided to withdraw." [1415]

"Everything started out as planned. As naval gunfire and diversionary attacks fixed Argentine attention on Stanley and Darwin, marines of the Special Boat Squadron were landing ... while this was happening, though, the mist that obscured the Amphibious Task Force from observation posts on Fanning Head created directional

1411 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.433-434. This suggests a blue-on-blue incident, for which I have no British record.
1412 Southby-Tailyour 1990
1413 BBC Correspondent Robert Fox's despatch quoted in Briley 2022
1414 Brian Hanrahan's despatch quoted in Briley 2022
1415 Thompson 1992

problems for some captains navigating ships through the Sound. Norland, which was carrying 2 Para for the first wave, had even more difficulties. Her crew forgot to place marking lights on her bow and stern to guide landing craft next to the troopship. … Now, in the early morning darkness of San Carlos, the lack of training was revealed. … The end result was that the disembarkation of 2 Para delayed the first wave getting to the beach. … The first wave did not land until 0430 hrs, about two hours later than scheduled." [1416]

"The bay chosen to set foot on the Islands not only lacked enemy ground forces; surrounded by hills, it also was a one-entrance amphitheater which facilitated antiaircraft defense. This was due to the fact that the shadow of Soledad Island's central mountain range placed it below the CIC Puerto Argentino radars' detection horizon. It was not possible to provide Argentine aircraft with radar warning support since that area was below 1,500 meters." [1417]

In London, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is considered; *"… Externally, the most immediate impact has been the concern of international banking circles about Argentina's credit-worthiness. Argentina's total debt is US$34 billion, of which US$10 billion is short-term. Short-term credits are being rolled over, but longer term loans are not being replaced as they mature, and Argentina has not been able to raise any new loans since the invasion. The authorities have been obliged to introduce severe restrictions to prevent foreign currency outflows. There are now limits on imports and extensive controls on all foreign payments. … Foreign currency reserves, which had fallen by US$400 million in March, fell a further US$500 million in April. Within Argentina, there has been a steady run on the banking system, as large number of people withdrew their deposits. At least 7 financial institutions have collapsed. Interest rates have risen sharply … The economy was already in recession before the invasion: this has got worse…"*

In New York, unaware of events in the South Atlantic, the UN Security Council decides that a formal meeting of the council should take place at 2.30pm local time. However, before the UN SC can meet, Britain's Ministry of Defence make an announcement.

> *"The Task Force has landed a number of **raiding parties** on the Falkland Islands during the night. These raids are still in progress. Early indications are that they are achieving their objectives. Bombardment from ships in the Task Force continued in the vicinity of Port Stanley and other areas in East Falklands. Harriers from the Task Force have mounted attacks in the Fox Bay area. All these activities have been directed against Argentine military targets including fuel and ammunition dumps and military stores."* [1418]

On East Falkland, 2 Para move inland to secure the bridgehead.

"After a pause to shake out, the Battalion began its eight-kilometre approach march to its objective on Sussex Mountain. Four hours had been allocated for the move, … It took twice that by men heavily laden with rucksacks…" [1419]

A bombardment from HMS *Ardent* destroys Argentine aircraft stationed at Goose Green. However, one *Pucara* manages to get airborne and reports the activity at San Carlos; before being hit by a *Stinger*.

1416 Privratsky 2014
1417 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.432
1418 My emphasis.
1419 Thompson 1992

"The British plan had taken Menendez by surprise. In fact, his forces near Goose Green, distracted by the diversionary raid and naval gunfire, reported that they were being attacked by at least a battalion. … They nevertheless responded far quicker to the landings than the Task Force expected." [1420]

"… the frigate started an intense bombardment against the most vulnerable targets of the BAM Cóndor. The flashes were seen from the POA; hence, the Alférez warned the personnel using a coded message to protect themselves: "Lead coming your way!" The frigate bombarded the ELTA radar and the airport facilities. Under fire, among bursts, the Argentine gunners moved the radar to the south of the runway. The Ardent carried out the harassment in order to prevent the Pucará aircraft from taking off and attacking the beachhead at San Carlos. The bombardment lasted four hours; …" [1421]

Argentina's command at Stanley send out reconnaissance aircraft, to reconnoitre San Carlos.

"… upon receiving the information of the landing and the attacks against Argentine positions, the Air Component command alerted the Cóndor Military Air Base and ordered a Pucará flight unit to explore the landing zone and to shoot down all targets encountered. Nevertheless, about 0800, still before dawn, the "Roca" POA, located at Punta Cantera on the San Carlos Sound, and commanded by Alférez Mario E. Egurza and soldier class of 63 Andrés Coronel, observed a vessel entering Brenton Cove amid the fog. That was the Type 21 Ardent frigate. Egurza radioed a message to the BAM Cóndor: "Matchbox entering through Roca heading for Nido"." [1422]

At 0800 local time, a *Sea King* helicopter with a reconnaissance party, escorted by two *Gazelle* helicopters, is fired on east of San Carlos. Both *Gazelles* are hit; *"One managed to get back to the LSL on which the flight was based, but one bullet hit the pilot of the other Gazelle, Sergeant Evans, Royal Marines. By a brilliant piece of flying, although dying of his wounds, he managed to put his aircraft down in the water. His air crewman, Sergeant Candlish, was the first to surface from the sinking helicopter, followed after a few seconds by Sergeant Evans, conscious but helpless. Sergeant Candlish pulled Evans to him and inflated his lifejacket before realising that they were still being shot at, although helpless in the water. The Argentine soldiers retreating from 3 Para along the northern back of the San Carlos River were responsible for this fire."* [1423]

A third *Gazelle* is hit by fire from the retreating Argentine forces, crashing with the loss of both aircrew.

On Mount Kent, an air attack from *Hermes* destroys a Chinook helicopter and a Puma helicopter.

"The British forces were surprised to confirm that the defense of the bay —which offered deep waters, safe anchorage sites and ideal characteristics for a big-scale landing— was only protected by an Army combat team commanded by Teniente Primero Carlos D. Esteban. On the other hand, a section under the command of Subteniente Gustavo Vásquez, positioned on the elevations at the mouth of the Sound, started firing mortar projectiles against the British soldiers, but once they were sighted, their position immediately suffered a naval bombardment. Esteban and Vásquez abandoned their positions and began to retreat when they realized the massive size of the troops they were facing. From an elevation, Esteban warned the Puerto Argentino Command of the landing of an assault force and started a daring defense which destroyed two enemy Gazelle helicopters (XX-411 and XX-402) and damaged a third one (XX-412) belonging to the Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade Air Squadron. Afterwards, Teniente Primero Esteban and his soldiers managed to escape, crossed half the island, and were rescued by Argentine Army's helicopters." [1424]

1420 Privratsky 2014
1421 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p. 434
1422 *Ibid*. p.434
1423 Thompson 1992. Sergeant Evans received a posthumous *Mention in Despatches*.
1424 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.432

Over the Atlantic, at 1116 the crew of an Argentine Boeing 707 (TC-92) sight a British Oberon-class submarine 2,250km east of Montevideo – HMS *Onyx*. [1425]

From Stanley airfield, the Argentine Air Force manage to get aircraft into the air, despite the bombardment.

"The pilots waited in a shelter at the threshold. When the mechanics got an aircraft ready, the pilots would run to the machine and take off between bursts. The first to depart was the Flight Commander, Capitán Benítez; he flew alone, since the wingman, Teniente Brest, did not take off due to technical failures. In the landing zone, he confirmed that there were assault vessels, and he observed that the troops were advancing from the beach towards the hills. While searching for an appropriate target, within the Flat Shanty area (a plain located between the San Carlos settlement and Alberdi Hill) the right engine of his aircraft was hit by a FIM-92A Stinger missile that had been launched by a forward patrol from the SAS 22nd Squadron. Benítez lost control of the aircraft. The Pucará climbed and then dived; it crashed to the ground. The pilot managed to eject at approximately 100 meters and landed uninjured on the ground. After avoiding the British patrols and walking for twelve hours, Benítez returned to the BAM Cóndor. Meanwhile, once their aircraft were ready, Mayor Tomba (no. 4) and Teniente Brest (no. 2) took off and attacked enemy ground positions in the vicinity of Darwin. The rocket launchers of no. 2 failed, and he was ordered to head towards the BAM Malvinas. Tomba returned to the base and orbited in the vicinity until the section leader, Primer Teniente Micheloud, was able to take off. They both rendezvous and headed for the target: helicopters on Bombilla Hill, 18 km east of Port San Carlos. When they arrived, they did not find them. A Sea Harrier flew over them but was unable to see them. Immediately afterwards, they headed for the beachhead and were repelled with machine gun fire and ground antiaircraft missiles, which they believed were Blowpipe or Stingerlike. When they tried to determine where the attack was coming from, they were ordered to head to Puerto Argentino because BAM Cóndor was under heavy naval gunfire. They orbited over the sea, observed the lighthouse, and tried to communicate via VHF with the BAM Malvinas. As they failed to do so since they selected the wrong frequency, they returned to the BAM Cóndor." [1426]

At Port Howard, an Argentine *Blowpipe* hits a *Sea* Harrier of 1 Squadron RAF. Flt. Lieut. Jeffrey Glover ejects.

"After the aircraft had gone through 320 degrees, I looked down and saw my right hand pull the ejection seat handle. I then heard a metallic bang and I lost consciousness. I woke up about four feet under water, sunny-side up and flapped to the surface and saw the sun again. … So I was in the water in my protective immersion suit and, after what seemed like five minutes of being in shock, I started to think about getting into my self-inflating dinghy which was attached to me by two quick-release clips. At some point, I realised that I couldn't see out of my left eye – this was because my helmet had flown off during the ejection, which shouldn't have happened. The end of the oxygen hose, which got separated from my oxygen mask as the helmet flew off, had bashed into my mouth causing some damage. My left side was also completely incapacitated from various injuries. I then heard voices and looked around. There was a little rowing boat with some Argentinian troops in it, holding rifles. In my stupidity, I reached for my RAF-issue pistol but, thankfully, I had mistakenly left it on the Hermes and did not have it with me. The soldiers pulled me out of the water and I was from then on, and for the next fifty days, a PoW.'" [1427]

1425 *Ibid.* p.431

1426 *Ibid.* p.435

1427 Glover quoted in *AirMail Magazine* April 2022. As a result of the ejection, Flt.-Lieut Glover sustained facial injuries and a broken collar bone and shoulder blade. Initially detained at Port Howard, Glover volunteered to give blood to save an Argentine conscript who had severed a femoral artery. Glover was transferred to the Argentine mainland on May 25, 1982 where he was held until July 8, 1982. See - https://www.lordashcroft.com/2022/04/i-felt-and-heard-bang-bang-bang/

"The remaining aircraft flew over the Argentine positions, without locating any targets. He was ordered to carry out a low-level photo-reconnaissance run. During the second run, it was shot down by the Army's light weapons. Glover ejected, he was rescued from the water and taken prisoner. He was treated for a collarbone fracture and other bruises. Two other Harrier GR.3s piloted by Sqdn. Ldr. Jerry Pook and Flt. Lt. Mark Hare (XZ-988 and XZ-963) attacked the Army's helicopter base on Mount Kent. They destroyed a CH-47 Chinook (AE-521) and a Puma (AE-501) and caused rotor damage to a Bell UH-1H (AE-417) that was later repaired."[1428]

Falklands based Argentine aircraft are ordered to strike targets which may contain "spotters" for the British guns.

"... they were assigned a new target: a house, located on the hill near the base, which was believed to be used by SAS troops to adjust the naval fire of the Ardent frigate. They destroyed the house by launching rockets. As they were leaving, BAM Cóndor Operations ordered them to attack another target, further north in the area of Brenton Cove (10 km northwest of Prado del Ganso), in order to update the information about the landing. While flying towards that heading, they were intercepted by three Sea Harriers piloted by Lt. Cdr. Nigel Ward (XZ-451), Lt. Cdr. Alistair Craig (XZ-495), and Lt. Steve Thomas (XZ-456). Primer Teniente Micheloud managed to evade the CAP by flying at a low altitude through the mountain valleys, made a wide turn and landed about 1000 at the base. Simultaneously, Ward chased Mayor Tomba firing with cannons at his Pucará. In a first attack, he hit the Pucará's left aileron, but, taking advantage of the Sea Harrier's higher speed, the British lowered the flaps and made a tight left turn. When it was again behind the tail of the A-511, he damaged the right engine and, during the third attack, he damaged the upper part of the fuselage. Tomba lost control of his aircraft and ejected at a very low altitude; he fell a few meters away from the wreckage of the IA-58, in the area known as Drone Hill (10 km southwest of Prado del Ganso). The time was around 1000. He waited for the enemy aircraft to fly away and, after all of the Pucará's ammunition had exploded, he returned on foot to the Argentine lines. At dusk, he would be rescued by the Bell 212 H-85, call sign TORDO, crewed by Teniente Luis Longar and Teniente Gustavo Brea, which had been sent to look for him." [1429]

Argentina's mainland bases are alerted; *"At the BAM San Julián, Capitán Raúl A. Díaz, Operations Officer of the M-5 2nd Squadron .., early that morning received the information of the landing that was taking place in the San Carlos area. Shortly afterwards fragmentary orders were received: the M-5s were to neutralize the landing operation by attacking vessels and ground targets. ... During the flight, the weather improved, clouds and fog disappeared. When they were near the Gran Malvina Island, they descended and began a low-altitude flight towards the San Carlos Sound."* [1430]

Argentine aircraft arrive over San Carlos. [1431]

"The British realised a strike was coming and the ships were on full alert. The first wave of nine Daggers was detected visually coming in low as they entered the Sound near Swan Island... They went for the two most accessible targets, Antrim and Broadsword. Antrim was damaged and temporarily out of action, with eight wounded and an unexploded 1000lb bomb lodged in the after heads, Broadsword received cannon fire, wounding eight men and damaging its ... Lynx helicopter. Another raid came in, with aircraft going straight for Antrim ... while another went for Fort Austin.. There was then relief for two hours..." [1432]

1428 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.433
1429 *Ibid.* p.435
1430 *Ibid.* p.438
1431 According to Thompson (1992), the first air attack came from a *Pucara* which attacked *Canberra* at 0855 local time. Two more *Pucarras* then arrived at 0938, attacking 2 Para on Sussex Mountain. One appears to have been shot down. *Daggers* arrived at 0945.
1432 Freedman 2005 vol.2. The unexploded bomb was removed during the night, allowing *Antrim* to move away.

"The attack was a total surprise. The British assumed that weather conditions would affect FAS operations, though they kept three CAPs airborne to provide coverage for the landing forces. When they arrived at the Sound, a few meters from the surrounding elevations, the scene exceeded what they had expected. They confirmed the defensive system. The warships covered the landing zone in a semicircle-like arrangement. The M-5s headed at approximately 980 km/h towards the closest frigate. Flying very close to the water, the three aircraft advanced lined up. From a 1,000-meter distance, they began firing cannons against a Type 22 frigate, probably the Brilliant. This was taped by the aircraft's gunsight recorder. In the footage, it is possible to see impacts in the waterline. When they reached the appropriate distance to release the bombs, the launching system failed. As the attack was quick, the frigate did not fire back and only attempted to move out of the line of sight by attaining maximum speed without changing the course. Neither Sea Wolf short-range missiles nor antiaircraft guns were fired. Another vessel, which was positioned to the right, started an intense antiaircraft firing against the flight unit; fortunately, it turned out to be ineffective. As Díaz's M-5 passed over the frigate, fragments detached from the structure and hit his external fuel tanks, without perforating them. The flight unit's aircraft were also hit by several light weapons. On their escape route, the M-5s performed defensive maneuvers to avoid the antiaircraft missiles. The situation was difficult. British gunners tried to form fire curtains since they wanted to shoot them down directly with impacts from barrage fire. It was quite a spectacle: columns of water, trails of missiles, antiaircraft munition explosions, lights of tracer ammunition, all together performing a singular dance. The aircraft climbed. They managed to jettison the bombs in emergency mode and arrived at the mainland without incidents. They landed in San Julián at 1040." [1433]



A second wave of Argentine aircraft arrive at the Falkland Islands.

"When they arrived in the San Carlos Sound, they saw about ten warships. The leader headed towards a Type 21 frigate. He saw the projectile traces fired by the antiaircraft batteries and two missiles launched from the vessel, one passed on his left and the other one on his right. When the vessel was in sight, at about 1,000 km/h, he launched the bomb prematurely and fired all of his 30-mm projectiles against the deck, the radar, and the command booth. He saw flying pieces of metal sheets as he passed over the frigate. … The attack was carried out at 1031 against the frigates Broadsword and Argonaut. Teniente Bean's aircraft was shot down by a Sea Wolf missile launched from the first vessel. … After the escape and having flown at minimum altitude during almost 80 km, Rohde and Janett climbed to 11,200 meters and landed in Río Grande at 1145." [1434]

A third wave of Argentine aircraft arrive over San Carlos.

"They reached the Sound at 1040 and, once again, attacked the destroyer Antrim. The latter defended itself with columns of water in front of the aircraft created as a result of the artillery fire. The M-5s advanced, almost touching the waves, firing cannons as they observed the impacts against the deck and the radar antenna. Capitán Dimeglio hit the target with one of his bombs. They flew away and landed in San Julián at 1230. … Thus, the first (attacks) ended with eleven attack sorties and four coverage sorties, and only one aircraft shot down. The results turned out harsher for the enemy: two frigates were damaged —the Broadsword and the Antrim—, and the Brilliant suffered minor damage." [1435]

1433 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.438-439
1434 *Ibid.* p.440. There are some discrepancies in reconciling the Argentine and British accounts.
1435 *Ibid.* pp.442-443

In the early afternoon, more Argentine fighters arrive over San Carlos.

"They flew away from the air tanker at 1254. They flew over the Gran Malvina Island and, near Chartres Settlement (38 km to the southwest of Port Mitre), they were intercepted by the Sea Harriers commanded by Lt. Cdr. Neil Thomas (XZ-492) and Mike Blisset (XZ-496) from the 800th Squadron (Hermes). As they were not properly equipped to defend themselves, the A-4Cs pilots jettisoned the external loads and tried to escape at full throttle. The faster Sea Harriers, guided by the CIC aboard the frigate Brilliant, reached them and shot down Primer Teniente Manzotti and Teniente López using Sidewinder missiles. During the debriefing, fellow flight unit officers stated they had seen two ejections. Although Teniente López flight unit's fellow officers had observed his aircraft explode in the air, he managed to eject and fell alive, though both his legs were broken. He could not walk, seek help or shelter to protect himself from the intense cold weather. His lifeless body was found with a letter on his lap, which he had started to write to his family. He was buried in the Chartres Settlement cemetery, and, afterwards, when British authorities gathered the Argentines' remains, he was transferred to the Darwin War Cemetery. Manzotti managed to eject from the aircraft in better conditions in spite of the high speed, but fell into the water in the Bay Navidad, west of the Soledad Island. He did not survive; his body was found on 24 May by Islanders who informed the Argentine forces. On that day, they recovered his body and transported it to the Cóndor Base. Nowadays, he is buried in the Darwin War Cemetery. On the other hand, the Sea Harrier pilot, who had shot down Manzotti, fired cannons at Capitán Almoño's aircraft who managed to escape together with Capitán García. PATO 1 and PATO 3 arrived in San Julián at 1420." [1436]

HMS *Ardent*, near the northern entrance to Grantham Sound, is attacked by a single *A4* Skyhawk. Two bombs straddle the ship but do not explode.

"Carballo was alone now and continued northward, along the east coast of the San Carlos Sound. In the Ruiz Puente Bay, he found the frigate Ardent, fired his bomb at it, and escaped, as he was followed by the artillery. Due to the thick smoke belching out of the vessel and the fragments of flying debris, it was assumed that the impact had been on the deck. ... Thus, the second (attack) ended, in which the A-4 Skyhawks participated. It resulted in serious damage to the Type 21 frigate Ardent, two A-4Cs shot down and their pilots killed. " [1437]

In Buenos Aires, President Galtieri responds to an initiative sent by President Turbay of Colombia.

> *"I value and appreciate every effort directed towards a peaceful solution of the conflict ... Our Government has employed its maximum effort to help the steps being taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We have shown that we are flexible and reasonable. We have abstained from using force and we have only done so in reply to Great Britain's military aggression. We are witnessing today a new and serious phase of this armed aggression.*
>
> *The intransigent attitude of the Government of Great Britain which, to restore a colonial, anachronistic and illegal situation, resorts to violent means, shows itself once again as an immovable obstacle to all diplomatic solutions, ... to negotiate and attack at the same time thus creating a serious risk for world peace. ..."*

At around 1530 Falklands' time, more Argentine aircraft arrive over Falklands Sound. HMS *Argonaut* is hit by two bombs which immobilise her, but fail to explode. Two of the ship's crew are killed by the impact.

1436 *Ibid.* p.443
1437 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.444. *Ardent* was undamaged in this attack.

"Two bombs had hit Argonaut, but neither exploded because the Skyhawks were flying too low and this did not give the bomb fuses time to arm themselves after leaving the aircraft. But one of the bombs set off an explosion in the Sea Cat magazine,.. Two seamen were killed in the ship." [1438]

"They headed directly to Malvinas without refueling in flight; if necessary, they would do so on their return. They reached the Sound. As they were low flying towards Port San Carlos, they saw the frigate Argonaut that was trying to take shelter behind a cliff. The five pilots flew in open transition formation (20/30 meters), three aircraft to the right of the leader and one to the left. They attacked the vessel using cannons and bombs, at minimum intervals. Even though it did not explode, the first bomb made a hole above the waterline leaving the engines and the rudder system out of service. The second bomb hit under the waterline and caused the explosion of a boiler, two Sea Cat missiles and killed two crewmembers. Primer Teniente Filippini's aircraft grazed and bent one of the frigate antennas and lost the back cone of his external fuel tank upon impact. " [1439]

An Argentine *Dagger M5* is shot down by a *Sea Harrier*.

"Before beginning the descent towards the Islands, the CUECA flight unit had been detected by the frigate Brilliant. The latter, acting as air control, guided two 800 Squadron Sea Harriers to intercept them before they reached the vessels that, from the San Carlos Sound, were attacking Argentine ground positions. ... The CAP made up of Lt. Cdr. Rob Frederiksen (XZ-455) and S/Lt. Andy George (ZA-176)346 managed to position itself behind Primer Teniente Luna's M-5, CUECA flight unit's wingman number 4. Luna saw the Harriers behind him and tried to warn the flight unit, but his communications system failed so nobody knew the danger they were in. Seconds later, a Sidewinder launched by the leader of the Harriers hit directly on Luna's M-5; he lost control of the aircraft and managed to eject at an extremely low altitude and high speed." [1440]

Unaware that one of their number has been shot down, the remainder of the unit fly on.

"When the Daggers reached the Sound at the Ruiz Puente Bay, they found a Type 21 frigate in front of them, about 2,000 meters. It was the Ardent heading towards the north of the Sound to join the rest of the British vessels already in the landing zone; the frigate had been harassing Argentine positions in Darwin and Prado del Ganso with its cannon that morning and the night before." [1441]

Ardent is hit by three 500lb bombs; two of which explode inside the hanger area damaging the *Lynx* helicopter and killing the aircrew. The third penetrates the ship. It does not explode but fires break out. *Ardent* moves to the north-west but is seen by three Argentina *A-4Q Skyhawk* fighters. More bombs hit, aft of the already damaged hanger. Some bombs explode, others, whilst penetrating the vessel, do not. Steering is lost. Two of the attacking Argentine aircraft are shot down by *Sea Harriers*. A third, damaged by machine gun fire from the ship, crashes into the sea after its pilot ejects. [1442]

With 22 men dead and a further 37 wounded, HMS *Ardent* is abandoned. [1443]

1438 Middlebrook 2003. *Argonaut* had to live with the unexploded bombs for a further six days before removal.
1439 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.445
1440 *Ibid.* p.448. The pilot survived.
1441 *Ibid.* p.448
1442 Two of the Argentine pilots ejected, and survived.
1443 Detailed account in Brown 2021. Commander Alan West's order to abandon the vessel appears to have been based upon confused and misleading information provided by his senior officers, and a subsequent board of inquiry concluded that it had not been necessary to abandon the ship at that time. It seems likely that the ship could have been saved had the fires been fought. *Ardent* remained afloat for some 12 hours after the abandonment, and its fate was only sealed after the fires reached the ship's magazines. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2024/03/board-of-inquiry-into-the-loss-of-hms-ardent.pdf

"Without the air superiority originally anticipated, the operational sustainment plan providing for a close-in, floating supply base was put to shambles. Clapp concluded that to keep LSLs in the narrow waters of Falkland Sound without air superiority was too risky. Accordingly, he issued orders that LSLs were to unload as much stocks as possible into the Ajax beachhead, depart those waters, apparently for the TRALA, then return at night when more stocks could be moved ashore under cover of darkness.... Thus, ship-to-shore "movement of stores was agonizingly slow," frustrating all intentions of an early breakout toward Stanley." [1444]

Three Argentine M-5 Daggers are shor down by Sea Harriers. [1445]

Argentine *M-5 Dagger* cannon fire hits *Broadsword* and *Brilliant*. [1446]

> *"...many cannon impacts on the starboard side, five wounded by a shrapnel-like explosion, the operations command post covered with pieces of shrapnel, the radar and the forward Sea Wolf launcher unserviceable for any operation mode and the rear one with minor damage, damage in the power distribution center, in the sonar and in the Exocet launchers. Every hole has been temporarily sealed, and the rear Sea Wolf launcher and radar can be repaired tonight, and the rest of the repairs are to take several days."* [1447]

From London, Foreign Secretary Pym sends a message to the British Ambassador in Lima.

> *"Belaunde's new formula is very simplistic and offers no apparent means of bridging the very wide gap between our and the Argentine position. ... The essential first step is, as it has always been, an unequivocal Argentine commitment to withdraw its forces ... If President Belaunde were able to exert his considerable influence with President Galtieri in order to bring this about, the prospect for a peaceful and negotiated settlement would be immediately transformed."*

In New York, at a formal (public) session of the Security Council, Pérez de Cuéllar gives an account of his activities since the adoption of SC resolution *502*. [1448]

> *"Mr. President, I felt it my duty to inform you yesterday evening that my efforts to facilitate an agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom in respect of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), initiated in pursuance of my responsibilities as Secretary-General, did not offer the present prospect of bringing an end to the crisis. The armed conflict persists and threatens to grow worse. ...*
>
> *It remains my belief that an agreement along the lines developed in the exchanges over the past 2 weeks, incorporating the approaches suggested in my aide mémoire of 19 May, could restore peace in the South Atlantic and open the way for an enduring solution of the long-standing dispute be tween two Member States. By yesterday evening, however, the necessary accommodations had not been made."* [1449]

"He concluded that, towards the end of the previous week, essential agreement had been reached on many points, leaving four crucial differences: namely, certain aspects of the interim administration of the territory; provisions for the extension of the time frame for completion of the diplomatic negotiations and the related

1444 Privatsky 1986
1445 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.451-452. The three pilots survived.
1446 Despite suffering damage, both ships remained on station.
1447 Log of HMS *Brilliant* quoted in Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.452
1448 This session would go on for 5 days. See https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/question-concerning-the-situation-in-the-region-of-falkland-islands-may-21-1982-decision-of-may-26-1982.pdf
1449 *UN Doc S/PV.2350*

duration of the interim administration; certain aspects of the mutual withdrawal of forces; and the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the interim agreement. The Secretary-General described how he had spoken by telephone to President Galtieri and Mrs Thatcher and drew attention to the subsequent aide-memoire which he had presented to both parties. He finished his summary by stating that, by the previous evening, the necessary accommodations had not been made: he had therefore concluded that he must inform the President of the Council of his appraisal…" [1450]

Argentina accuses the British of *"rigidity,"* while Japan calls for a resumption of negotiations. Australia says that as Argentina began the crisis, it is responsible for the consequences of its own recklessness. Before adjournment, Brazil calls for implementation of SC resolution *502*.

The British Government issue a statement.

> *"1. It is now almost seven weeks since Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. This unlawful use of force in unprovoked aggression threatened not only to destroy the democratic way of life freely chosen by the Falkland Islanders but also the basis on which international order rests. The invasion was also a singular act of bad faith: it took place when Britain and Argentina were engaged in negotiations in accordance with requests from the United Nations.*
>
> *2. On 1 April the President of the United Nations Security Council had formally appealed to Argentina not to invade the Falkland Islands. Yet on 2 April Argentina invaded. On 3 April the United Nations Security Council passed its mandatory Resolution 502, demanding a cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands. The same day, Argentina took South Georgia. In the ensuing weeks she has shown no sign of complying with the Security Council Resolution: on the contrary, she has continued a massive build up of the occupying forces on the Falkland Islands. There could hardly be a clearer demonstration of disregard for international law and for the United Nations itself. …*
>
> *3. The present crisis was brought about by Argentina's unlawful act of aggression. In their subsequent attitude the Argentine Government showed that they had no respect either for democratic principles or for the rule of law. Britain stands firmly for both."* [1451]

Argentina submits a document explaining its position to the Organisation of American States (OAS).

> *"Throughout this whole negotiation process conducted by the Secretary-General, Argentina has really acted in all good faith, and with discretion and moderation, and with the firm purpose of reaching a just and lasting settlement to a crisis which affects its territorial integrity and its dignity as a nation. The Argentine Government is persuaded that the international community, most of whose members have acknowledged Argentina's rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, and Sandwich del Sur Islands, will concur in this just position because history does not turn back, and restoration of colonialism by force is no longer countenanced by either the conscience or the morality of civilized nations."*[1452]

In Washington, Britain's Ambassador Henderson speaks to Senator Biden.

"… support for our position reflects the closeness of Anglo/US relations rather than a feeling that important principles were at stake. … We should not therefore assume that the Senate would support greater US involvement – or even maintain its present level of support for us indefinitely. … Against this background,

1450 Parsons 1983
1451 Dept. of State Bulletin, October 1982 pp.87-90
1452 *OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 62/82, May 22, 1982*

Biden said we should not be surprised that so many Senators had taken the view that the US could not afford to impair its interests for the rights of self-determination of 1800 sheep farmers. If, in any renewed negotiations, self-determination for the Islanders were to become the one issue on our side standing in the way of a settlement, US support for us would evaporate. I said that I was astonished that self-determination could count for so little in the country that had invented it … Biden said he agreed and would continue to be our strongest supporter but we should not delude ourselves that Congressional opinion was altogether solid. …" [1453]

At Ascension Island, detained on a British ship, prisoner-of-war Lieut.-Colonel Alfredo Astiz is asked whether he is prepared to be interviewed by Swedish and French officials with regard to their investigations about missing nationals in Argentina. The Red Cross (ICRC) refuse to be involved. [1454]

> *"On the 23rd, I was interrogated by the island's commander, Captain McQueen, in the presence of the civil governor about whether I had anything to declare regarding the French nuns or in the case of Dagmar Hagelin. I replied that as a prisoner of war of the British government, I refused to answer any questions posed by the French or Swedish government. That I was only prepared to answer questions from the British or Argentine governments, and in the case of the former, only those stipulated by the Geneva Convention."* [1455]

"Unsurprisingly, neither the Argentine Government nor Astiz was prepared to agree to any sort of interrogation. Stockholm and Paris were both unhappy with this failure to move the issue forward and still demanded an opportunity to question him. The Swedish Foreign Minister appealed directly to Pym and offered his own interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. British legal advice still pointed to early repatriation." [1456]

In the South Atlantic, by the end of the day, 2,400 British troops have landed and are dug in.[1457]

> *"The Battle for Malvinas started. This morning a fierce fight was waged against the British landing forces, which had managed, with heavy losses, to establish a beach head in the San Carlos area. 70% of Britain's naval units would have been knocked out, and 3 Sea Harrier planes and 2 attacking helicopters were destroyed. The Argentine air counterattack destroyed 4 frigates and damaged 4 ships. It was reported that 6 Argentine planes and 3 helicopters were lost."* [1458]

> *"The battle of the Falklands began only a few hours after the collapse of diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. Royal Marine commandos and troopers of the Parachute Regiment stormed ashore in a half-dozen or more small-scale raids and landings, military sources reported. These were designed to destroy fuel and ammunition dumps and to divert attention from the simultaneous main invasion at Port San Carlos on East Falkland island. Dispatches from the scene said the landing took four hours. … In Washington, the United States offered to help arrange a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but, with the breakdown of United Nations negotiations on the dispute, there was no diplomatic initiative under way. …*

1453 *PREM19/630 Telegram No.1856 of 22 May.* In 1982, Biden was a leading Democrat and member of the US Senate's *Foreign Relations Committee.*

1454 There is no formal record of this interview, which may simply have been to see if Astiz was willing to co-operate. Capt. Robert McQueen was Commander British Forces on Ascension. The "civil governor" may be a reference to the Administrator on Ascension, Richard Ralph. See June, 5, 1982, below.

1455 Astiz quoted in *Recuperar Malvinas: Las disputas por los significados de la guerra y su tardía inclusión en el campo de los derechos humanos* Alejo Ramos Padilla 2025 citing a letter dated in Buenos Aires on June 23, 1982 by Astiz. *cf.* April 26, 1982, above.

1456 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1457 1,000 tons of stores had also been offloaded.

1458 Argentine newspaper *Clarin* May 22, 1982. Pure fiction.

At first, military sources said, the amphibious assault at Port San Carlos was unopposed, but at dawn the Argentines hit back, and both sides took heavy casualties. Above the battlefield, the sources continued, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Harriers, launched from the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible, flew into the waves of Argentine planes, breaking up their formations. But a significant number got through, British officials conceded, and hit the five ships, which found it hard to maneuver in the narrow sound. One of the five was said by unofficial sources to be gravely damaged and in danger of sinking. ... Late tonight, The Press Association, Britain's national news agency, reported that a reliable military source said 2,500 British commandos were ashore on East Falkland, which represents almost all of the marines with the task force. They were said to have landed on four beaches. Casualties were reported to be "very light" so far. ... Officials gave little importance to a new Peruvian peace proposal, one of them describing it as "a nonstarter that would simply give the Argentines a new excuse for procrastinating." .." [1459]

"The day had been testing for both sides.... By no means all the (Argentine) sorties even got to the Falklands, but some 45 did. Of these ten were lost (five Daggers, three A4Q's and two A4Cs), and a number of others were caught by small arms fire and out of action until they could be repaired. Two Pucaras had also been lost. While conserving itself for this battle, the Argentine Air Force did not appear to have planned for it. In particular they had come without their own escorts and had not identified the most important targets, that is the amphibious ships, but instead attacked escorts as they came across them. In addition, although they were well aware of the problem they had not addressed the more technical issue of bomb fusing." [1460]

"By the day's end ... Argentine pilots had flown over fifty sorties against warships in the Sound; and although Harrier patrols and ship defences stopped one out of five planes, the British simply could not down them all. When the air attacks were over, damage to the fleet was serious. Plymouth and Yarmouth were the only warships to make it through the day unscathed. Brilliant and Broadsword had sustained minor damage; Antrim and Argonaut would be out of action until unexploded bombs lodged in their structures could be disarmed and removed; and Ardent was sinking. ... Attacks on D-Day proved costly for both sides. The British lost twenty-five men, one ship, and two Gazelle helicopters. Over forty men were wounded and three other ships damaged significantly. But Clapp's defence had worked overall. Ships and Harriers had downed nine Mirages, five Skyhawks and three Pucaras." [1461]

"When the British landed on the Islands, three weeks into the conflict, they were not met with significant ground resistance, yet they suffered the attack of the Argentine aircraft. The British would acknowledge one sunk frigate, three other frigates damaged to different extents, and a severely damaged destroyer. The Argentine Air Force lost two Pucarás, five Daggers and (three) A-4Cs; five pilots would be rescued. ... The Argentine Air Force carried out 104 sorties: • 95 departed from the mainland, 59 of which were combat sorties. • 9 departed from the Malvinas bases, 6 of which were combat sorties." [1462]

With a fear of further attacks, *Canberra*, *Norland* and *Stromness* are ordered to depart. [1463]

1459 *New York Times* May 22, 1982

1460 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1461 Privratsky 2014. This author notes that the 1,000lb bombs used by the Argentine aircraft were British made *Mk17*s. Also that the other, American-made bombs, could have been easily adapted to explode on contact but the US embargo had prevented the Argentines from obtaining the manuals that explained this.

1462 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.458 & 460.

1463 Taking much needed supplies with them. *Canberra* was also the designated front-line hospital facility.

"... a complete dressing station and surgical su8pport team was unintentionally left on board Canberra, not to be seen again until Canberra brought 5 brigade from South Georgia to East Falkland on 1 June." [1464]

Those vessels remaining are ordered to unload as quickly as possible.

"With some of the highly vulnerable and visible targets now safely at sea, Clapp's ships continued their cordon defence of the anchorage as Harrier pilots flew combat air patrols." [1465]



May 22nd, in Italy, from the Vatican City, Pope John Paul II, expresses his anguish and appeals for; *"... an immediate ceasefire that will open the way to a peaceful settlement of the dispute."*

In the Falkland Islands, during the night, HMS *Ardent* sinks.

"On Saturday, May 22, La Nacion headlined "Heavy Enemy Losses in the fighting yesterday". Clarin: "Argentine troops face the invading force". Popular: "Victory! The new English invasion attempt failed: eight of their frigates were out of action, 2 presumably sunk and another 2 with severe damage". The Reason: "The invasion was contained". And Conviccion: "The marines immobilized in San Carlos, await their Dunkirk". In London it was reported that five thousand British soldiers had landed. They encountered no resistance and the beachhead in San Carlos was consolidated. At the same time they acknowledged the sinking of the frigate Argent," [1466]

1464 Privatsky 1986
1465 Privratsky 2014
1466 Yofre 2011

Near the San Carlos beachhead, a field hospital is established at Ajax Bay. [1467]

"Strangely enough, operational planners did not see the importance of the field hospital. Reports indicate that the decision was made to establish the field hospital only after terse arguments by a tactical-level medical commander. Supposedly he risked court-martial in the process, but in so doing, he insured the British could adequately care for their casualties." [1468]

Rapier air defence systems are set up ashore to offer protection for the amphibious vessels which continue to unload weapons, ammunition, stores and equipment. Argentine aircraft return.



> *"The air attack started an hour after dawn and continued right through the day. First came the small Pucara bombers ground attack, low and surprising. One of them got right into the bay to drop its bombs but without success. For a few moments the air was full of missiles as the defending ships fired back.... That set the pattern for the rest of the day. Wave after wave of air attacks came against the fleet. ..."* [1469]

In Choiseul Sound, two British aircraft attack an Argentine patrol boat, *Rio Iguazú*.

"... the Rio Iguazú was at sea when daylight came, still 13 miles from its destination. In an example of sheer bad luck for the Argentines, the first two Sea Harriers of the day to take off from Hermes passed right over the ship, and one of them came down and seriously damaged it with cannon fire." [1470]

"*At 0823, a Sea Harrier section piloted by Lt. Cdr. Rod Frederiksen (XZ-460) and Lt. Martin Hale (XZ-499) from the Hermes attacked the GC-82 Río Iguazú patrol ship, belonging to the Argentine Coast Guard, transporting two 105-mm pack howitzers to Darwin. As Cabo Julio Benítez was repelling the attack with a machine gun, a projectile hit his chest and he died. Ayudante de Tercera Roberto Vaccaro and Cabo Segundo Carlos Bengoechea were injured, while Army troops suffered minor wounds."* [1471]

Two Argentine *Puma* helicopters and their escorting *Agusta A109* are fired on by *Sea Harriers*. One helicopter is shot down, while the other two land. One *Agusta A109* is set alight by gunfire.

In London, a Ministry of Defence spokesman amends the previous day's statement.

> *"Further reports on yesterday's operations in the Falklands up-date Argentine aircraft losses as follows: 9 Mirages, 5 Skyhawks, 2 Pucaras and 4 helicopters. We have not received final casualty reports for yesterday's operations. Initial reports indicate British casualties of 27 wounded, 2 missing and 3 dead. The two ships reported yesterday as being seriously damaged were hit by bombs in the series of air attack launched against our forces. The other three ships remain operational."*

1467 A sign soon appeared outside the hospital – '*The Red and Green Life Machine*'. Named for the colours of the commando and paratrooper berets. Commanded by Surgeon-Captain Richard 'Rick' Jolly, the hospital treated casualties from both sides. For his work in assisting Argentine wounded, Jolly was appointed an Officer in the Orden de Mayo by Argentina's government in 1998. With an OBE from the British, Jolly was the only person to be decorated by both sides. One of the founders of the South Atlantic Medal Association (SAMA).

1468 Privatsky 1986

1469 Brian Hanrahan despatch May 22, 1982 quoted in Briley 2022.

1470 Middlebrook 2003. Two of the crew were injured; one later dying of his wounds. The vessel was beached.

1471 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.461

A little after midday, Britain's Defence Secretary, John Nott, makes a statement.

> *"This morning the Union Jack is once again flying on the Falkland Islands... A major bridgehead has been established in the area of San Carlos on East Falkland. The major amphibious landing yesterday was a complete success. Tactical surprise was achieved and our troops landed safely with almost no interference from Argentine forces. We are now ashore on British sovereign territory in considerable force and have three Royal Marine Commandos and two Battalions of the Parachute Regiment firmly in place with their supporting arms including artillery and rapier and other air defence weapons. ...*
>
> *To compliment the landings there were raids yesterday in other parts of East and West Falklands. In one of these, Royal Marines captured an Argentine position on Fanning Head overlooking Falkland Sound. In another the airfield at Goose Green, and Argentine positions close by, were raided by our forces. Carrier based RAF Harriers launched attacks in the course of the morning against Argentine installations at Port Stanley airfield and the helicopters on the ground nearby, as well as military installations at Fox Bay. During these operations we lost two Gazelle helicopters, and one RAF Harrier is missing. The Argentine navy has so far made no attempt to intervene.. The Argentine force has, as expected, launched heavy raids on our ships... We are back on the Falkland Islands, and back in strength. We intend to ensure that aggression does not pay."* [1472]

From Lima, Peruvian President Belaunde announces that the Argentines have accepted *"in principle"* his latest proposals – albeit with certain reservations.

"... which President Belaunde thought might not be insuperable. In particular, President Belaunde said that Galtieri had shown himself to be receptive to the idea of an "equidistant" withdrawal of forces. The Argentines feel that 150 miles is too near because their own bases are further away. ... The president also said that the Argentines are not opposed to a UN Group governing the Islands for six months or even one year during which negotiations could take place. If at the end of this period there was no agreement, the Argentines would propose to return the problem to the United Nations. ..." [1473]

In the Falklands, at 1600 local time, two *Dagger* aircraft and three *A4B*s attack British ships at San Carlos. No vessels are hit or damaged. One *Sea Harrier* explodes shortly after take-off. Bad weather prevents further Argentine air attacks.

Uruguay agrees that casualties may be repatriated via Montevideo.

In New York, Parsons reviews his strategy.

> *"We have already got Canada and New Zealand on board, they will probably speak today, thus to some extent offsetting the torrent of Latin American rhetoric which is in store for us (... it will bore the Council to death). We are working on the Caribbeans, Americans and members of the Community... Abdulah (Trinidad) is on our side but gutless. ... The new Barbadian Ambassador is a man of sterner stuff and I have some hopes of him. Our African friends – Zambia, Botswana, Kenya etc. are cheering us vigorously from the pavilion but are reluctant to go to the wicket. ... The US and France are bound to make substantive comments at some stage but, given the personal qualities of Mrs Kirkpatrick and de Nanteuil, I suspect that the Guyanian statement will be more helpful. From the point of view of getting out Third World Commonwealth speakers, it might be worth your seeing if Ramphal would help."* [1474]

1472 *United Press International Archives*
1473 *PREM19/630 Telegram No. 192 of 22 May*
1474 Shridath Surendranath 'Sonny' Ramphal was a Guyanese politician and Commonwealth Secretary-General.

When the Security Council reconvenes, Argentina's representative makes a statement.

> *"… this dispute… was not begun by the Argentine Republic but precisely by this British fleet which, in a full upsurge of British imperialism, came to our coasts, expelled our authorities, imprisoned our inhabitants and expelled them to Montevideo. This was the act of force which gave rise to this problem. It is not a problem of today, it is a problem which goes back a long way. My country never signed a treaty, never accepted any declaration. On the contrary, it constantly protested against this usurpation of its territory, of a piece of our territory on which a colonial regime was imposed, and today it is claimed that we should accept it as if it were a fact which all Argentine generations have constantly rejected."* [1475]



Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama, Canada, Guatemala and the United States, contribute views before the meeting is again adjourned.

> *"Of the Latins, the Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign ministers were abusive; the others made reasonably moderate statements, notably Guatemala. The Soviet Union was hostile but not abusive. Canada was excellent. The US statement was a little too even-handed. Mrs Kirkpatrick made small but important changes to the advance text."* [1476]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig sees Ambassador Henderson privately to say that the US Government is increasingly concerned at the consequences for US interests.

May 23rd, Argentina's press reports on the previous day's action.

> *"The British nucleus in San Carlos is encircled. Argentine forces control the situation in the area. They are isolated while the ships of the fleet took refuge on the high seas. Intense fighting is fought north of the San Carlos Strait in the north of Soledad Island, where members of the Argentine Army maintain a siege on the several hundred landed British soldiers who have been there for 36 hours and who are isolated without supplies and scarce food. …*
>
> *The situation in the region where the vegetation is nonexistent, the rugged terrain, with some elevations not exceeding 250 meters, is fully controlled, and the objective of the archipelago's defense forces is to prevent the raiders from penetrating the island. …*
>
> *It is estimated that the landed marines have a serious problem, since they cannot be supplied either by sea or by air, because they are abandoned by the fleet units that were on the high seas."* [1477]

Britain's *Sunday Times* newspaper reports that the Argentines are taking "*elaborate precautions*" by "*deploying units of 100 men or more to watch over every conceivable landing site on East Falkand*." The report includes quotes from messages between the Argentine forces in the Islands, and the Argentine mainland.

"Reporting of this nature is totally irresponsible and displays a complete disregard of D notice No.6 by the Editor of the Sunday Times. He cannot plead ignorance on this matter, as the new D notices have only recently been issued. … The revelations in the Insight articles contain references to and extracts from Category III Comint, the unauthorised disclosure of which risks exceptionally grave damage to national interests. In this

1475 *UN Document S/PV.2362 cf.* 1833, 1849 & 1850. Again, limited in its accuracy. Argentina registered no protest regarding the Falkland Islands from 1850 until 1945. Although there were a few complaints to third parties.
1476 *FCO Sitrep 0700 23 May 1982*
1477 *La Razon May 23, 1982*. Information and translation from Fabian Turcato

case the national interests include not only Sigint activities but also military operations by the British Task Force and British lives, both of which could be jeopardised if the revelations resulted in an increased COMSEC awareness by the Argentinians and a consequent denial to us of vital intelligence. ... It is inconceivable that the Editor of the Sunday Times would be completely unaware of the serious effect that the publication of such material might have. It is a case, therefore, of putting good copy before the national interest, which is irresponsible at best and treasonable at worst." [1478]

In the South Atlantic, clearing weather allows Argentina's Air Force to return.

"... Antelope's role was to replace the lost Ardent in gunfire support and carry out air defence of the amphibious landings, positioned at the entrance to Port San Carlos, south of Fanning Island and Rabbit Island. Her station was at the junction of two valleys, which exposed her to attack from most directions;..." [1479]

At around midday, local time, HMS *Antelope* is attacked by four *A4B Skyhawks* from the south. One of the attacking aircraft is damaged by a *Sea Cat* missile.

"The aircraft ... approached the ship about 50ft above the water and at about 400 knots, along the southern shore of Port San Carlos River." [1480]

Hit by two 1,000lb bombs which fail to explode, *Antelope* is also damaged by cannon fire. In an attack by the second pair of *A4B Skyhawks*, one of the Argentine aircraft collides with *Antelope's* mainmast and crashes.

"Right after the section leader, Primer Teniente Guadagnini, dropped the bomb, fire from the Antelope damaged his right wing. The aircraft seemed to be about to crash into the water but the pilot leveled off the machine with paramount effort, but crashed into the flagpole of the frigate. Guadagnini died due to the impact. The vessel was still bobbing when the bomb dropped just seconds before entered the hull without exploding. Wingman number 4 dodged the missile and, while escaping, overflew a vessel that, he reckoned, might be ocean liner Canberra operating as troop transport. He also sighted eight vessels in the bay." [1481]



1478 File reference *R/6666/8002/10/1 The Falklands: Sunday Times Insight Articles 23 May 1982* released by the National Archives at Kew in a bundle of *HW92* files on May 13, 2023. All of these having been viewed by Prof. John Ferris for *Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ*. This file is marked *Top Secret* and the author's name redacted. Apparently the information was passed to the Ministry of Defence via the GCHQ Liaison Officer and put to the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting of May 24, 1982. All of which suggests that this file originated at GCHQ.

1479 Brown 2021.

1480 *Ibid.*

1481 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.474

A Falklands' coaster, *Monsunen*, requisitioned by Argentine forces, is attacked by two British *Lynx* helicopters and abandoned.[1482] A second wave of *A4Q*s fails to hit any of British ships. The MOD report:

> *"Five Mirage and one Skyhawk are known to have been shot down; a further one Mirage and two Skyhawks were probably shot down. During these attacks one of our frigates sustained some damage. No reports on the extent of the damage have been received, nor have we any indication of casualties. We have had no reports of other damage to British ships or aircraft. In a separate incident earlier, Sea Harriers from the Task Force on routine patrol saw two Argentine Puma helicopters and one Bell helicopter in Falkland Sound ... The Harriers attacked and one Puma exploded; the Bell helicopter landed but was seen to be on fire and the second Puma may have been damaged."*

"... the British thought that they were doing better than was in fact the case. Two Argentine aircraft had been shot down that day, but British assessments were between four and seven." [1483]

"1030 –Two Sea Harriers attacked four Army helicopters as they were flying over the water, in the vicinity of Port Fox. Three of them were destroyed: one Agusta (AE-337) and two Puma (AE-500 and AE-503)." [1484]

From Buenos Aires, President Galtieri responds to the Pope's '*anguish*' of the previous day, by asserting that Argentina is prepared to accept a cease-fire and negotiate. [1485]

> *"The Argentine radio says that the British are ready to surrender, having now been surrounded by Argentine soldiers, but then says their planes find them difficult to locate. All very confusing and conflicting."* [1486]

Libya's Colonel Gaddafi agrees to supply Argentina with Russian-made weapons. [1487]

In New York, the Security Council reconvenes; hearing thirteen speakers before adjourning again until the 24th. Parsons reports that support for the UK is *"stretching very thin"* and that a view is developing of the crisis bringing about a, *"... kind of cultural confrontation between Latin America and Western Europe/North America."* [1488]

In the Falklands, HMS *Antelope* moves to a sheltered position while a Royal Engineer bomb disposal team attempt to defuse the unexploded ordinance. After three failed attempts, a fourth denotes the second bomb causing extensive damage.[1489] *Antelope* is abandoned.[1490]

1482 *Monsumen* had been carrying two dismantled 105-mm cannons. These were subsequently retrieved from the vessel. See Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.485

1483 Freedman 2005 vol.2.

1484 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.483

1485 With a visit to the UK already planned, the Vatican announced that the Pope would also visit Argentina in June, 1982

1486 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.172-173

1487 *Clarin* February 19 & March 31, 2012. Also, *Malvinas. Los vuelos secretos* Gonzalo Sánchez 2012. The armaments were offered for free, with Soviet Russia's approval. Included were air-to-air missiles, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, .50 calibre machine guns, star shells, mines and ammunition. Reports suggest that Argentina's President Galtieri gifted Gaddafi with two horses in return. Details as regards flights are difficult to pin down, although at least one of the Boeing 707s used to obtain munitions from Israel would appear to have been used in early June, 1982. According to *ABC:International* December 28, 2012, the UK became aware around May 31, 1982, after a British air attache became suspicious of Argentine aircraft refuelling at Recife airport in Brazil. Pressure was then applied to the Brazilian government, which may not have been aware, to halt the flights. There has long been a suggestion that elements of the Brazilian armed forces favoured Argentina, and acted independently.

1488 *FCO Sitrep 24 May 1982*

1489 Staff Sgt. James Prescott was killed.

1490 *Antelope* sank the next day. For the subsequent Board of Inquiry report see - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2024/03/hms-antelope-board-of-inquiry-1982.pdf

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig is interviewed on CBS TV's *Face the Nation*. [1491]

"Q. Now that the British flag has been hoisted in the Falklands, why not support the growing pressure in the United Nations for an immediate cease-fire?

A. I think the answer to that question is very clear. The United Nations has passed a resolution, 502, which has three components. Those three components constitute a very strong endorsement of rule of law in international affairs, and that is that aggression must not be rewarded. The three components involve a cease-fire, as you suggest; the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the islands; and a political solution. I think those three essential elements are as important today as they were at the outset of the crisis. ...

Q. There have been reports that the Soviet Union has been giving at least intelligence information to the Argentines through Soviet satellites. Could you clarify that?

A. We've been exposed to the same assurances that the world community has from Argentina that they are not accepting assistance, so I prefer to accept their word on face value. ..." [1492]

May 24th, in London, Defence Secretary Nott makes a statement to Parliament.

"On the night of Thursday 20 May, Her Majesty's forces re-established a secure base on the Falkland Islands and the Union Flag is today flying over the settlement of San Carlos in East Falkland – where it will remain. The whole House will have been delighted to see the expressions of delight on the faces of the islanders and their children – published widely yesterday.

The amphibious landing was the culmination of a long period of planning by the force commander and of preparation by the Royal Marine commandos, members of the Parachute Regiment and supporting arms during their six weeks voyage into the South Atlantic. Whilst they sailed south, the Government worked unremittingly to persuade Argentina to withdraw peacefully and honourably from the Falkland Islands. But the Government met only with Argentine intransigence.

Last week it became clear that the only possible course left open to us was the repossession of the Falkland Islands by military means. In this the Government have been encouraged – as I think has the country as a whole – that Her Majesty's Opposition and the other main political parties in the House have supported us. Certainly I believe that our Service men have been greatly encouraged by the support that they have received from right hon. and hon. Members of this House...

We all feel deeply too for the constant concern and worry of the families and friends of our Service men. They are showing great patience and understanding in very difficult circumstances. Names of casualties will not be released until the next of kin have been informed, although to counter the false propaganda coming out of Argentina we have had to give some general information on the progress of military action as soon as it is confirmed.

Our forces are now established on the Falkland Islands with all the necessary supplies, together with their heavy equipment and air defence missiles. They have mobility with a large number of helicopters at their disposal – and their spirits are high. But I must emphasise that our men still face formidable problems in difficult terrain with a hostile climate. We must expect fresh attacks upon them, and there can be no question of pressing the force commander to move forward prematurely – the judgement about the next tactical moves must be his – and his alone. But, one thing is certain: the days of the

1491 Interviewers came from CBS and *The New York Times*.
1492 *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.52

occupying Argentine garrison are numbered and it will not be long before the Falkland Islanders once again have their democratic rights restored." [1493]

Britain's Ministry of Defence announces that *Antelope* has sunk.



> *"On Monday afternoon Antelope broke her back and as the sea rushed in a white cloud erupted, the hot metal was finally cooled. The bows and the stern rose from the surface then slowly sank."*[1494]

"D+3, Monday, 24 May, was not a good day and was to get worse before it got better. It had started with Antelope blowing up and sinking. I now had two ships sunk, twelve ships at anchor (three with unexploded bombs in them – Argonaut, Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot)." [1495]

In Europe, the EEC extend economic sanctions against Argentina for an unspecified period.

"We reject with righteous indignation the decision taken by the European Economic Community, with the honourable exception of Ireland and Italy, extending indefinitely the economic aggression which, under the pretext of "sanctions", has been imposed on Argentina."[1496]

In the Falklands, British aircraft attack Stanley airfield shortly after dawn; damaging a helicopter and a *Pucara*. Some minor damage is caused to the runway.

"At 0935, aircraft belonging to the aircraft carrier Hermes 800 Squadron tried to neutralize BAM Malvinas antiaircraft defenses. Two Sea Harriers, piloted by Lt. Cdr. Neil Thomas (XZ-496) and Lt. Cdr. Mike Blisset (ZA-191), appeared from the northeast and, from a great distance and out of the antiaircraft artillery range, they launched a toss bombing attack dropping fragmentation bombs with airburst fuzes. Immediately afterwards, flying at a minimum altitude, two RAF Harrier GR.3s commanded by Sqdn. Ldr. Robert Iveson (XZ-997) and Flt. Lt. Tony Harper (XZ-989) entered from the northeast –each of them dropped three 1,000-pound parachute-retarded bombs. One of them damaged the runway. At first, antiaircraft defenses did not respond to the attack. Twenty seconds later, amid the explosions and showing perfect coordination, another two GR.3s piloted by Wg. Cdr. Peter Squire (XZ-988) and Fl. Lt. Mark Hare (XZ-789) penetrated from the west and dropped retarded bombs. On that occasion, the batteries achieved a lock-on to the targets: there was evidence that one Harrier was damaged and, possibly, shot down. These and other similar attacks, performed at 1250 and 1455 (from a great altitude), neutralized the runway for six hours and their shrapnel damaged a Pucará (A-509) and a MB-339 which were on the ground." [1497]

Five Argentine *A4 Skyhawks* fly in over San Carlos Water. HMS *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Lancelot* are hit in the attack. Although the bombs fail to explode, fires break out on *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Lancelot*.

1493 *HC Deb 24 May 1982 vol.24 cc647-55*
1494 Brian Hanrahan despatch May 24, 1982 quoted in Briley 2022.
1495 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012
1496 *UN Doc S/15111 Note Verbale dated 24 May 1982 from the permanent missions of Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*
1497 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.487-488. No British aircraft were reported as lost from this mission.

In a second attack, HMS *Sir Lancelot* is hit again but the bomb bounces off. Cannon fire hits *Fearless* and *Sir Galahad,* which is beached to extinguish the fires.[1498]

"Fused to provide enough time for the airplane to get clear before they exploded, the bombs had no time to arm at the low altitudes where the Argentines were flying. To arm and explode, they needed to be dropped from a greater height – at least 200 feet – and at that altitude, the aircraft became vulnerable to missiles. BBC World Service would reveal that little secret, but not until late May." [1499]

"Considerable damage nevertheless resulted as 500lb or 1000lb bombs passed through or lodged in logistics ships. When it was all over, Galahad was beached and on fire, and Lancelot was still anchored but likewise on fire. Both had been hit twice by bombs that cause significant damage even though they failed to detonate." [1500]

At San Carlos inlet, *Sir Bedivere* is hit by bombs dropped from Argentine *Dagger M-5*s. One bomb passes through the ship. A search finds an unexploded 1000lb bomb "*rolling around in the battery store*".[1501]

British forces at the San Carlos beachhead receive a signal to say that there is concern at Northwood regarding the lack of movement; and that they should consider getting off the beachhead. [1502]

British *Sea Harriers* shoot down three *Daggers* with *Sidewinder* missiles.

"The British approached from behind. Auld fired the first missile. Puga saw Castillo's aircraft explode and notified Díaz: "A missile shot wingman number 3 down". Díaz thought he was making reference to the flight unit ahead. Puga repeated the information and added: "ORO 3 is down". Díaz turned his head towards Puga and saw that a light was zigzagging 200 meters behind the C-410 and closing in. It was a missile. With no reaction time, he just managed to shout for him to eject. The IR missile hit the engine and it was such a spectacular explosion that fire and black smoke enveloped the whole aircraft but its nose and cabin. The rest of the C-410 no longer existed. Díaz jettisoned the external charges and performed a close-in turn to the south while he insisted on ordering Puga to abandon the aircraft. From a distance of 1,400 meters, Smith fired a Sidewinder at the C-430. Half turn, Díaz felt the impact, lost control and the emergency lights and sound alarms were immediately activated. While trying to eject, he flew by very close to Puga's aircraft, still airborne and burning. At that moment, the out-of-control C-430 shaking violently started a low-level erratic trajectory. Díaz and Puga managed to eject at very high speed over Gran Malvina" [1503]

In Chile, *Sea King* pilot Lieut. Hutchings and his crew hand themselves in to the local police. [1504]

"The Royal Navy crew 'disappeared' for several days and were then 'discovered' walking into Punta Arenas."[1505]

1498 Returning from the attack, one of the *Skyhawks* crashed into the sea. See Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.490

1499 *Air War in the Falklands: Grand miscalculations, unknown odds miserable weather, vast distances – and unlikely adversaries* Carl A. Posey in *Smithsonian Magazine* September 2002.

1500 Privratsky 2014. HMS *Galahad* was refloated that same day. The unexploded bomb on *Galahad* was eventually craned out, deposited in an inflatable full of cornflake packets for cushioning, and dumped at sea. *Galahad* was out of action for a week. *Lancelot* for nearly three weeks. Both ships carried important supplies.

1501 Brown 2021.

1502 The military facility at Northwood in London acted as the headquarters of the Royal Navy's Commander in Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET). With staff from all three services, it oversaw operations in the Falklands.

1503 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.491-491. Two of the pilots survived.

1504 See May 18, 1982, above, also May 26 & 27, 1982, below

1505 *Falklands: The Chilean Connection* Duncan Campbell in *New Statesman* January 1985.

*"The crew were ordered **through their own radio links** to give themselves up at a clearly specified Chilean Air Force facility."* [1506]

*"They were **apparently very cold and hungry** but otherwise safe and well. Apart from admitting that they were the missing crew of the Sea King helicopter, they were saying nothing about their mission, what had happened to them or why they were in Chile. … There followed a short period of intense discussion about how and when we would fly our unexpected guests out of Chile."* [1507]

In Argentina, journal *Conviccion*, keeps its readers informed.

> *"The marines, immobilized at San Carlos, await their Dunkirk. As Argentine troops concentrate to throw them into the sea, the British continue in the little beachhead without resupply."*

From Buenos Aires, the US Embassy informs Washington DC that it is in a position to evacuate all the dependents of its remaining non-essential personnel. A further message to the US Secretary of State notes; *"Expectation that British military pressure, or even British military victory in the Falklands, will produce an Argentine disposition to settle the dispute on terms consonant with UNSC resolution 502 could prove unfounded. Whether or not the junta survives, it seems to us entirely possible that the Argentines will coalesce around the military in an attitude of defiance. The conflict could thus be considerably protracted. … it is still generally assumed here, even within the GOA, that the conflict will ultimately end with some sort of negotiated agreement. I think that is now open to question."* [1508]

In Panama, the Foreign Minister is reported as describing Margaret Thatcher as; *"Hitler with skirts."*

In the USA, the *Washington Post* provides another perspective.

> *"Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggests that Britain's successful landings on the Falklands – plus the sacrifices sustained by both sides – may make enough of a difference to permit negotiations to resume. Surely he is right. In its bridgehead and in its evident capacity to sustain operations ashore, Britain has something real to convert into political coin. Argentina may hope to raise the cost to the British and limit their military gains, but it cannot expect to boot them off the Islands again. The 40 isolated marines it swept up on April 2 are one thing, the 5,000 troops ashore, with their fleet protection, are quite another."*

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) circulates its assessment of how the British intend to press forward. [1509]

> *"London is aiming at a rapid military victory in the Falklands, and its forces are likely to spend only a short time consolidating the beachhead. The British probably intend a direct assault against Argentine forces at Stanley even though their forces are substantially outnumbered … The British apparently envision a campaign lasting less than two weeks. They probably expect to consolidate their position at San Carlos in short order and are then likely to move against Darwin/Goose Green, less than 32 kilometers away."*

From Buenos Aires, Argentina calls for an emergency meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS).

1506 Chilean General Fernando Matthei in *The Matthei Memorandum to Margaret Thatcher* March 25, 1999. My emphasis. Intriguing. See - http://www.josepinera.org/RevChilena/chile_democracia_memomatthei_en.htm

1507 Edwards 2014. My emphasis. Average daytime temperature in Tierra del Fuego in May are 40°F (4°C). See May 26, 1982 below.

1508 *AMEmbassy Buenos Aires to SecState WashDC 05/24/82* GOA = Government of Argentina

1509 See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21351-19820524-uk-argentina-probable-british-strategy

In New York, the UN Security Council debate continues.

> *"Maina (Kenya) made an admirably robust statement which was an effective antidote to all the Latins have been saying about a cultural confrontation between the West and Latin America. He said that the Breach of the Peace had started with Argentina's aggression on 2 April. That was a separate question from the rights and wrongs of Argentina's claims to sovereignty. Some of those who "felt obliged" to support Argentina's case on sovereignty had tried to treat the two problems as one. ... The Decolonisation argument was irrelevant. All of North and South America had been colonised in the 18th and 19th centuries. ... That was a fact of the world's unfortunate past. This was not a colonial issue: Argentina was engaged in the purely territorial claim, in total disregard of the inhabitants of the Islands. The Argentine claim could not be settled at their expense: their interests were paramount. If the principle of decolonisation was distorted to redistribute peoples, the United Nations would be in real trouble. ...*
>
> *Ling Qing (China) speaking in his national capacity, said that the failure of the Secretary-General's efforts and the arrival of British forces had brought about an escalation which China deeply deplored. ... There should be an immediate ceasefire and resumption of negotiations. The substantive problem was a legacy of colonialism."* [1510]

In Washington, Secretary Haig expresses his fears to Britain's Ambassador Henderson.

> *"... Haig said that the US Government, by coming down on the British side, had already greatly jeopardised US interests in Latin America. What was at stake in the future was enormous. It was not simply a question of the economic sacrifices involved but of the enormous increase in Soviet and communist influence. Haig's problem therefore was somehow to avoid a resolution under the Rio Treaty later this week that would isolate the USA still further from the rest of the American hemisphere. ... Haig then suggested the sort of plan which I have already hinted to you might be on his mind: ceasefire and withdrawal, US/Brazilian interim administration and discussions without prejudice regarding the future – ideas that I told Haig have gone down in London like a lead balloon. ..."*

Henderson informs London of Haig's wavering and, on receiving the telegram, Pym notes; *"It is disconcerting that Haig should be so volatile. Haig was urging us only a few days ago to take military action..."*

In New York, at the Security Council meeting, Brazil's delegate puts forward a draft-resolution.

> "*.. the Security Council of the United Nations can no longer delay taking firm and decisive action to restore international peace and security. ... there is no alternative but that the Security Council must take a decision to put an immediate end to the military confrontation and to establish the bases for a permanent settlement of the problem. The Brazilian Government wish to submit ... the following points which ... can be the basis for a Council Resolution that will ensure a just and honourable peace without winners or losers."*

Brazil proposes:- (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) simultaneous withdrawal to equal distances, (3) withdrawal to be complete within 21 days, (4) a UN administration which will consult the *"representatives of the inhabitants,"* (5) a Committee made up of both Britain and Argentina plus four other States with a mandate to conduct negotiations. Reporting, Parsons comments to Britain's Foreign Office; *"We have told the Brazilians*

1510 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.836 of 24 May*

here that the time for such arrangements is now past and that there could be no question of our allowing a Resolution on these lines to be adopted." [1511]

Ireland's Ambassador Dorr, also tables a further draft-resolution which, *inter alia*, calls for a suspension of hostilities for 72 hours.

"... the Non-Aligned members (excluding Panama) were annoyed with Dorr for going ahead and tabling a draft which he and everyone else knew that we would veto. The three Africans, Jordan and Guyana were desperately anxious to avoid a deadlock in the Security Council which could be followed by a major row generated by the Latin Americans in an emergency session of the General Assembly. This would only polarise relations between the regions, benefit the radicals and damage any prospect there might be of a peaceful outcome to the present crisis..." [1512]

Representatives from Panama and Japan also prepare draft texts. The *Non-Aligned Movement* submits a proposal for an amended version of the Irish draft before the Council meeting is adjourned until the 25th.

Parsons seeks instructions from London.

In New York, interviewed by the BBC's *'Panorama'* current affairs team, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, asserts that Argentina would defend the Falklands as long as there is *"one Argentine alive in either the continent or in the Islands."* He tells his interviewers that Argentina had been seeking a peaceful solution for 17 years and that he considers the invasion to be part of that search for a settlement.

In Santiago, Chile, Argentina seeks support for an OAS condemnation of British aggression; calls for a cessation of hostilities with a return to *'natural'* bases; a resumption of UN negotiations and the adoption by OAS States of measures to discourage the UK and assist Argentina. Chile's Foreign Ministry assures the British Embassy that they will vote against each point, except that calling for a resumption of negotiations. [1513]

In London, intelligence is received from Caracas to the effect that the Venezuelan Government is attempting to persuade all Latin American countries to withdraw their Ambassadors from the UK, breaking off diplomatic relations.

May 25th, in the Falklands, during the night, an SAS reconnaissance team arrive on Mount Kent; finding it, unexpectedly, deserted. [1514]

> *"There had been some small arms fire during the night. Someone in the drill hall had got a little nervous and put a few shots into St. Mary's house. No one was injured but some of Monsignors books had rather large holes in them."* [1515]

Portugal grants permission for British *Nimrods* to refuel at its Lajes air base in the Azores. New Zealand's offer of a frigate, HMNZS *Canterbury*, to take over some of the UK's NATO obligations, is gratefully accepted by PM Thatcher. An additional *Blowpipe* battery is deployed to the South Atlantic, from British forces in Germany.

In Buenos Aires, morning newspapers report the sinking of *Canberra*. *Cronica* reports; *"We destroyed the Canberra! The Canberra is sinking."* [1516]

1511 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.839 of 24 May*
1512 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.844 of 24 May*
1513 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.259 of 25 May*
1514 The 140 Argentine troops, plus artillery, stationed on Mount Kent had been ordered to Goose Green to reinforce the garrison there.
1515 *Neville's Diary* in Bennet 2021
1516 A complete fabrication.

From London, Margaret Thatcher responds to President Turbay's initiative of the 21st.

> *"If you, Mr. President, can bring home to the Argentine Government not only the extent of our determination to achieve a just solution to this crisis, but also the imperative need to withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, you would be making a contribution to the peace of South America and of the World which it would be hard to exaggerate."* [1517]

In the South Atlantic, an Argentine *A4B Skyhawk* is shot down by a *Sea Dart* missile fired from HMS *Coventry*; sailing outside Falklands Sound with HMS *Broadsword* in a 42/22 defensive combination.

"The planned route was to approach from the southern part of the Islands, then turn left and make the final approach from east to west up to San Carlos Inlet. With poor visibility, Palaver and Gálvez flew over Prado del Ganso at maximum speed and unnoticed. BAM Cóndor's antiaircraft defense observed the swift passage of the A-4s without identifying them, as they continued towards the San Carlos Sound. As they "jumped" over the eastern hill of the Sound, the pilots saw a very large white vessel. Just as they were about to drop their bombs, Capitán Palaver saw the red cross on the side of the Uganda, and immediately ordered "abort, don't drop," and initiated a low-level re-attack maneuver to find another vessel to attack. In the distance, they spotted a green vessel with a black hull (probably the Norland), and during the turn, they flew over Port Darwin, mistaking it for Port San Carlos. Capitán Palaver attacked a vessel that turned out to be the Monsunen, and the bombs fell slightly behind the target. Teniente Gálvez attacked a group of houses, but the bomb failed to detonate. Already alerted, the antiaircraft artillery received them with intense fire. Capitán Palaver's aircraft was hit several times, resulting in significant fuel and hydraulic fluid leaks under the fuselage; this situation was noticed by Teniente Gálvez. The leader escaped to the right while his wingman escaped to the left. After seven or eight minutes, Palaver informed Gálvez that his fuel gage was reading zero and that he would attempt to eject over Elefante Bay, on Borbón Island. After that communication, Gálvez lost radio contact with his leader, who was hit by two missiles from the Coventry destroyer right before ejecting." [1518]

Early afternoon, two *A4Cs* are brought down by fire from *Yarmouth* and *Coventry.*[1519]

"They entered the Sound and, upon reaching the San Carlos Inlet at 1225, they attacked the vessels stationed there, which responded with heavy antiaircraft fire. Teniente Lucero was shot down by a Rapier missile launched from the ground. … During their escape, Capitán García informed he was okay but experiencing some hydraulic issues. While climbing, he was shot down by a Sea Dart missile fired from the destroyer Coventry,…" [1520]

The action is seen by Argentine Naval observers on West Falkland Island.

"Near Borbón Island, the destroyer Coventry and the frigate Broadsword were acting as radar picket vessels and had shot down two aircraft. Naval observers deployed at Mount First —at the center of the Island, west of Elefante Marino Bay— determined that the vessels kept a steady position between 300° and 350° from that elevation. Considering they were at a shorter distance from the mainland, the FAS Command planned to attack them supported by a Learjet as tactical air control (OCAT) and employing an in-flight refueling on the outbound leg." [1521]

1517 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.108 of 25 May*
1518 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.499-500
1519 One A4C pilot, Ricardo Lucero, was rescued and taken aboard HMS *Fearless*. At the time there was confusion as to his nationality and some believed that he was Peruvian. This was not the case.
1520 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.501. The second pilot ejected but he did not survive.
1521 *Ibid.* p.502

Around 1400 Falklands time, *Coventry* and *Broadsword* are attacked by two pairs of Argentine *Skyhawks* armed with cannon and 1000lb bombs. *Broadsword* is hit first through the starboard side, but the bomb fails to explode. A second wave attacks *Coventry* which is hit by 30mm cannon fire and three bombs, two of which explode. The first bomb pierces *Coventry*'s hull near the computer room and, exploding, puts all weapon, sensor and communication systems out of action. [1522] The second bomb to explode does so aft of the port side causing the forward engine room to flood. The ship lists to port.



"By mid-afternoon Coventry was in flames. Helicopter pilots struggled to retrieve survivors. By the day's end, the destroyer had capsized, and pilots had flown 263 of the survivors to San Carlos for boarding Fort Austin, sixteen minor casualties to Ajax for treatment and four serious burn cases to Uganda. Nineteen men lost their lives." [1523]

"At 1520, the pilots of the VULCANO section (Carballo and Rinke) spotted two vessels spaced 200 meters apart in a west–east column formation, 36 km north of Elefante Marino Bay. The A-4s targeted the rear ship, which they identified as a Type 22 frigate with a helicopter parked on the stern. It was the Broadsword. Unbeknown to them, the VULCANO pilots were being pursued by an air patrol led by 800 Squadron Lt. Cdr. Neil Thomas, but before he could reach effective range, Thomas was directed away from the vessels' missile zone. The frigate tried to repel them with Sea Wolf missiles, but the fire-control system computer misinterpreted the data since the surveillance radar managed to distinguish that there were two intruders instead of just one only when they were already very close. The Coventry destroyer could not fire its Sea Dart missiles either because the A-4s masked themselves against the fixed radar echoes of the hills of Borbón Island in the background. They could only engage with antiaircraft cannons. The pilots dropped their bombs. Capitán Carballo fired blindly, as his armored windscreen was covered in sea salt and his gunsight was out of order. Neither Carballo nor Rinke were able to see the results. It would later be known that one bomb missed, but the other one fell short, bounced off the sea to strike her aft. It passed upwards through the flight deck, destroyed the nose and cockpit of a Lynx helicopter (registration mark XZ-729), and continued until falling into the sea on the other side, without exploding. The vessel's electrical, hydraulic, and communications systems were damaged. The ZEUS section came behind the VULCANO. … A minute and a half later, guided by Carballo's instructions, the ZEUS section crew (Velasco and Barrionuevo) found the same vessels, now sailing in parallel. They targeted the nearest one, which they identified as a Type 42 destroyer —it was the HMS Coventry. The Broadsword was about to fire a Sea Wolf missile at them, but the Coventry crossed the trajectory and broke the lock-on while maneuvering to face the attack, firing its 4.5-inch guns. This action sealed its fate since it shielded the A-4Bs from the Sea Wolf missiles. … Velasco and Barrionuevo strafed and dropped their bombs on the destroyer. The wingman confirmed that the leader's bombs hit the bow, while his own bomb release system had failed403. He also observed thick black smoke coming out from the Broadsword's stern." [1524]

1522 In detail in Brown 2021.

1523 Privratsky 2014. Another died from his injuries in March, 1983 (Brown 2021). For the subsequent Board of Inquiry report see - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/05/board-of-inquiry-report-hms-coventry.pdf

1524 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 pp.502-504

Further away, two Argentine Navy *Super Etendards* armed with *AM39 Exocet* missiles attack the carrier group.[1525]

"The two missiles veered towards the chaff pattern laid by Ambuscade. Having flown through or under chaff and not been triggered, the homing head on Exocet tends to look to its left for another target and that is where both missiles found Atlantic Conveyor. The ship had no defences and was caught in the starboard quarter." [1526]

"At 15.36, half an hour before sunset, the first indication of an impending attack came as the frigate Ambuscade, ... detected the Agave radar emissions of Super Étendard jets on a bearing of 312° and fired chaff. Exeter also detected the radar emissions. Two aircraft were detected almost immediately by Ambuscade, some 28 miles to the north-west. One minute later, at 15.37, Brilliant detected the aircraft at 26 miles and at 15.38 Ambuscade detected that the Agave radar had locked on to a target. The missile release was detected by both Brilliant and Ambuscade at 15.39. Ambuscade fired a full pattern of chaff again, and an Air Raid Warning Red was broadcast ... to all ships. ... At 15.40 the force was ordered to make an immediate downwind turn to port to 040°, which would have placed the ships broadside on to the missiles. Soon afterwards an immediate torn to starboard to 110°, was ordered ... but this was not received by Atlantic Conveyor, which was still turning to port. ... The second turn would have presented the sterns of the ships to the missiles, the preferred orientation. ... Having launched their missiles, the enemy aircraft broke to port and retired. The two missiles were tracked towards the task group by radar in Brilliant and visually by Hermes and Ambuscade. ... The missiles appeared to be aimed at Ambuscade, but when 6-7 miles from her they veered left... The missile impact occurred at 15.42..." [1527]



With *Atlantic Conveyor* full of hazardous cargo, suffering an uncontrollable fire and with three lives lost, the decision is made to abandon her.

"Lost were three Chinook and two Lynx helicopters, tents for 4,000 men, emergency fuel handling equipment, and desalination equipment, among other items." [1528]

Nine more men die after entering the water. [1529]

"... the successes of 25 May would prove to be the high watermark of the Argentine air effort. ... Unfortunately the Argentine propaganda service sullied the efforts of the air units by publishing outrageous claims on their behalf."[1530]

1525 Quite which vessel the Argentine pilots had targeted is moot. Almost certainly not *Atlantic Conveyor.* Brown (2021) suggests HMS *Ambuscade*, although another possibility was RFA *Regent,* which was unloading ammunition from *Atlantic Conveyor* via helicopter. There is an assertion that *Regent* was, on the 25th, carrying a live nuclear weapon described as a *Bomb Aircraft HE [High Explosive] 600lb MC,* together with two inactive surveillance rounds and a training round. Unconfirmed by any reliable source. This engagement took place outside the Amphibious Operations Area. See *Malvinas, archivos desclasificados: el estudio inglés que afirma que dos misiles apuntaron contra un buque con armas nucleares* Alejandro Amendolara y Mariano Sciaroni in *Infobae* January 14, 2022

1526 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1527 Brown 2021

1528 Privatsky 1986

1529 As a ship taken up from trade (STUFT), many of the crew were civilian and unfit although all had volunteered. The first merchant ship lost since WWII. See May 28, 1982 below.

1530 Middlebrook 2003

"While the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor complicated British plans, it was not quite the result Argentina had intended. They had been after the carriers and had now used up two Exocets in failing to do so. Moreover only one AM39 Exocet remained and efforts to obtain more from abroad had so far been unavailing... That evening the Argentine commanders accepted that their battle must now move on to the next phase." [1531]

"The crew had been working throughout the day to prepare for offloading in the San Carlos anchorage that night. One of the four heavy-lift CH47 Chinook helicopters she was carrying, and which were needed ashore so badly, was on an aerial test flight when the Exocet struck. Harriers being transported had flown away to Hermes as well. But everything else on the converted container ship was lost." [1532]

"When a ship is lost, it is usually the result of a combination of factors, although one of these might be the most critical. In the case of Atlantic Conveyor, the loss resulted from a poor tactical decision and an unfortunate operational error. The decision to use unarmed auxiliaries as a screen for the two aircraft carriers was perhaps reasonable, but the inclusion of Atlantic Conveyor was a tactical mistake. She was carrying four Chinook and seven Wessex helicopters that were vital for the land assault on Stanley, and as such was a strategic asset that should not have been risked..." [1533]

In New York, at the reconvened Security Council meeting, Foreign Ministers representing Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela circulate a '*Declaration.*'

> *"We confirm the rejection by Latin America of the United Kingdom's military offensive against the South American continent ... We strongly protest against the British decision, officially communicated to the Government of Uruguay, to the effect that the United Kingdom has decided to extend its naval and air military action to the River Plate. This deplorable decision, in addition to violating general international law and the River Plate Treaty, carries the British aggression into the very heart of the continent.. This directly affects the integrity and security of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, while at the same time aggravating and spreading the conflict which has resulted from the United Kingdom's military adventure ... We reject with righteous indignation the decision taken by the European Economic Community, with the honorable exception of Ireland and Italy, extending indefinitely the economic aggression which, under the pretext of 'sanctions,' has been imposed on Argentina. This act, which is offensive to the whole of Latin America, constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and presages the generalization of a conflict which, day by day, is assuming the character of an intercontinental confrontation. We note with alarm that, although a number of weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the British fleet's armed attack on the Argentine Republic, the Security Council has taken no action ... This concern is seriously increased by the fact that, after four days of debate in the Council, during which both the fighting and the loss of life have intensified, it has not proved possible to respond to the outcry of mankind, which demands an unconditional ceasefire ..."* [1534]

On addressing the Security Council, Argentina's Foreign Minister Costa Méndez attacks the UK for, *"unleashing war"* in the South Atlantic. He rejects an accusation that it had been Argentina which had first used force.

1531 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1532 Privratsky 2014.

1533 Brown 2021. For the Board of Inquiry report see - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2024/03/ss-atlantic-conveyor-board-of-inquiry-report.pdf

1534 *PREM19/631 Telegram No. 852 of 25 May.* Reference to River Plate appears to have been based on rumours concerning a British blockade of the Rio de la Plata. Seeking clarification, Uruguay had asked the UK only for London to deny that it had any such plans. The declaration's sponsors chose to believe the rumour, for the political capital that it offered.

"It was the UK which had used force to occupy the Islands in 1833. Colonialism was an act of force, permanent aggression and a crime: that was the true explanation of current events. It was not for the United Kingdom, the colonial power par-excellence, to give lectures on self-determination. The UK had abstained when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514, the Magna Carta of decolonisation. ... Self-determination for the Malvinas was a joke..." [1535]

Exercising a right of reply, Anthony Parsons responds to the verbal assault.

"The Foreign Minister referred at length to self-determination... It is true that we took the position in the 1960's that self-determination was a principle and not a right.[1536]

However, in 1966 the two international Covenants on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political rights were adopted.[1537] *...*

The United Kingdom has ratified both these Covenants, which have entered into force. Furthermore, in 1970, the General Assembly adopted by consensus – that is, with the United Kingdom joining in the consensus – the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.[1538] *...*

Not only has my country endorsed the right to self-determination in the sense of the Charter, the Covenants and the Friendly Relations Declaration, but we have gone a great deal further to disprove the allegation that we are the colonial power par-excellence. Since General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) was adopted ... we have brought to sovereign independence and membership of this organisation no less that 28 States. We are proud of our record..."

From London, Francis Pym telegrams Parsons.

"... our position now is that while we remain willing to agree to a ceasefire if Argentina clearly and irrevocably commits herself to very early and total withdrawal of her forces, we are not prepared to accept any other conditions. ... You should vote against the Irish draft Resolution if it is put to the vote as it stands ..." [1539]

From Washington DC, Ambassador Henderson informs London; *"I went over the ground with Eagleburger this morning. He assured me that instructions had been sent to Mrs Kirkpatrick that if the Irish Resolution came to a vote in its present form the United States should veto it."*

From New York, Parsons responds to Pym.

"*Through the morning and at the Security Council lunch, I have negotiated firmly on the Irish draft as revised by the Non-Aligned Movement, ... we have carried almost all our points... We have a clear reaffirmation of 502... I am under very strong pressure to agree this evening so that we can get out of the Council before this fragile near-agreement breaks down. ...*

1535 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.854 of 25 May*

1536 For UN resolution 1514 (XV) see 1960. This interpretation changed as a result of UN resolution 2625 (XXV) in 1970.

1537 Both International Covenants were adopted on December 16, 1966, with UN resolution 2200A. Both covenants commenced their first articles with the words "*All peoples have the right to self determination."* The covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights came into force on January 3, 1976. The covenant on Civil & Political Rights came into force on March 23, 1976.

1538 For UN resolution 2625 (XXV), see October, 1970

1539 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.480 of 25 May*

I therefore recommend that I should be instructed to accept this with a suitable explanation of vote, after the vote. …Guyana was first class, as was Chile given its circumstances. The other Non-Aligned were not at all bad. Netherlands was as unhelpful as the other Europeans (except Belgium) have been, but Italy was a bit more robust. …

The Argentines had the better of the first two days, with a flood of Latin rhetoric, but by the end the general feeling, I think, was that we had won quite handsomely on points. For this we should be especially grateful to Kenya, Guyana and Belgium – the old Commonwealth support for us was taken for granted."

Parsons informs the Security Council that Britain is ready to vote in favour of the draft, initially proposed by Ireland; as amended by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He emphasises that; *"… an Argentine withdrawal must now be totally unconditional and not linked to any parallel British withdrawal."*

Argentina's Costa Méndez asks for time to consider the measure. A vote is deferred until the 26th.

From Washington DC, Alexander Haig expresses his thoughts to Francis Pym; *"I see major advantages in an effort by you to put forward terms of a just and reasonable settlement as soon as you are sure that you can and will succeed militarily."*

In the US, *NBC* television, *Reuters* and *Associated Press* all carry news reports that Secretary Haig has called on the British Government not to *"crush"* the Argentines in the Falklands; but to *"think carefully."* The reports suggest that Argentina would seek a scapegoat, and that scapegoat would be the United States. Haig is said to be *"upset"* by the leak and to consider it, *"damaging."* From London, the Foreign Office instruct all Ambassadors and Missions in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries to speak to their counterparts and ensure that in the NAM meeting scheduled for the 31st, emphasis is laid upon the original aggression by Argentina. Also on their failure to comply with *SCR 502*. In Europe, a meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers agrees an indefinite extension of European sanctions against Argentina in exchange for a reduced budget rebate of $875 million for the UK.


"Ireland and Italy remained 'neutral' on the sanctions decision and agreed not to circumvent the embargo. By conceding on the budget and CAP issues, Britain achieved a firm commitment to continued sanctions from the other EEC members." [1540]

First elements of the Bristol Group of reinforcements arrive off the Falkland Islands.[1541]

"It's Argentine National Day. …We could hear the sound of low flying aircraft, not the roar of jets, but a slightly softer note of the Pucara. … There were several men … watching the five planes. … the five planes chased around the harbour and out through the narrows and back in over the ridge came four... Round they went again … and back came three... I looked up and there he was, the dear little Harrier dropping some sort of bombs on the Pucaras as they flew at water level." [1542]

1540 Martin 1992
1541 See May 10, 1982 above.
1542 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

May 26th, in Stanley, Argentine authorities announce that they are to issue ID cards to every citizen. In accordance with Argentine law. [1543]


REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Documento de Identidad
provisorio

IDENTIFICATION CARD

GOBERNACION MILITAR
MALVINAS

> *"The cards were to be issued to all persons aged between 16 and 65. This seemed to be an anti-infiltration scheme, but one which failed at the onset. George had a nice machine gun and the captain had a nice pistol, but they didn't have a camera"* [1544]

HMS *Glamorgan* bombards targets around Stanley, while a pair of *Harriers* attack Goose Green. One is shot down. The pilot, Squadron Leader Iveson, ejects safely. [1545]

From Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government presents to the US Department of State, a response to the British press release of May 20th detailing the negotiations.

> "*... The Argentine Government, in the light of the position stated in the aforementioned proposed agreement, which reflects the reasonableness which has continuously inspired its negotiating behaviour, deeply regrets that the peace efforts carried out the U.N. Secretary General, in which pursuance and final success the Argentine Republic trusted, have been frustrated as a result of the unilateral decision of the British Government announced on May 20th.*
>
> *The real possibilities of reaching a peaceful settlement to the conflict and of avoiding, with the responsibility that the situation demanded, further bloodshed and an imminent breaking of peace and security in the hemisphere, finally proved to be disregarded by the intransigence and stubbornness with which the Government of the United Kingdom has tried to make the use of force prevail over reason and peace.*
>
> *The Government of the Argentine Republic, therefore, formally holds the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland responsible for the serious consequences which in the future may stem from its denial to exhaust the available means-towards a peaceful settlement, and expressly reserves its rights to a legitimate defense recognized by the United Nations Charter."* [1546]

From the UN, US Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick messages the State Department in Washington DC, with regard to a meeting with Argentine Air Force General Jose Miret.

> *"According to Gen. Miret the military situation was developing favorably for Argentina. Just that morning 21 Argentinian warplanes had attacked British ships and had inflicted severe damage to the Canberra troop carrier. Yesterday they had sunk a frigate. (The) British were not accurately portraying their losses and he was sceptical that their San Carlos beachhead was as well established as they claimed.*
>
> *Although presently the military situation favored Argentina, Argentina was aware that ultimately Britain would prevail because Argentina could not expect to defeat a world power. Argentina naturally did not want to lose but neither did it find comfort in the thought of winning in a manner that would humiliate Britain. ...*

1543 Signed on the second page by Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve as '*Secretario General Gobernacion*'.
1544 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1545 Thompson 1992
1546 *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library: Latin America Affairs Directorate, NSC Records: Falklands/Malvinas NSC and State memos, 1982 (RAC Box Sub 4).*

Britain's expansion of the war zone to include the River Plate estuary necessarily dragged Uruguay and probably Brazil into the conflict. Uruguayan Foreign Minister was coming to New York to raise the issue. As the conflict expands and its intensity increases, it will become increasingly difficult to foresee its consequences or to find an acceptable solution. Without an American restraining influence, Britain will insist on pursuing its military objectives until the bitter end." [1547]

In Bonn, Germany, the *Rheinishe Post* asserts that its country's support for the UK is, *"grudging and full of reservations stemming from incomprehension at many aspects of Mrs. Thatcher's Falklands strategy."* Also that Germany will not go, *"through thick and thin,"* with Britain.

Spain's *ABC Sevilla* newspaper reports:

"The explosion of the British frigate Antelope, ... is a symbol of the tragedy of the Malvinas, a war that barely has an explanation and whose victims are already counted in the hundreds, with no immediate possibility of peace in sight."

In London, Defence Secretary John Nott makes a statement to Parliament.

"During the past seven weeks the Royal Navy has assembled, organised and despatched over 100 ships, involving over 25,000 men and women, 8,000 miles away to the other end of the world. The Task Force has recaptured South Georgia and successfully accomplished a hazardous amphibious landing of around 5,000 men without a single fatal land casualty. The morale of our forces is high. ...

Our forces on the ground are now poised to begin their thrust upon Port Stanley; behind them are another 3,000 men of 5 Brigade, whilst reinforcements and resupply are virtually denied to the Argentine garrison on the island. Generally the military objective to repossess the Falkland Islands has gone forward exactly as we planned it." [1548]

In Mexico, Britain's Ambassador Tickell updates President Portillo; before reporting to London.

"(Portillo) asked me to convey his warm thanks to the Prime Minister. He deplored the loss of life and waste of resources involved in the conflict. He did not doubt our capacity to recover the Islands and indicated that he hoped we would not be too long about it..." [1549]

In the Falkland Islands, C Company, 2 Para, set up a forward base at Camilla Creek House.

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig updates President Reagan. [1550]

"Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands.

After my conversation with you on Monday, I put to them the idea of a US-Brazilian peacekeeping force as a way of enabling them to contemplate withdrawal of British forces as part of an interim agreement. The reply I just received from my British counterpart, Pym, states that the ideas of mutual withdrawal and interim administration are "no longer realistic," given the major change in British mood resulting from their successful landing.

In the meantime, the UN Secretary General has asked the two parties for their positions on a ceasefire within 24 hours. The Argentines have replied that they could accept a ceasefire first, followed by

1547 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/26/1982*. Pure propaganda.
1548 *HC Deb 26 May 1982 vol.24 cc921-31*
1549 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.441 of 26 May*
1550 *Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, Country Files, Falklands Crisis 1982*

discussions of mutual withdrawal. The British position, which has not yet been given officially to the Secretary General, is that a ceasefire is acceptable only if there is a simultaneous Argentine withdrawal. The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their position. It would be a major error for us to pressure the British at all at this point. Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; we should conserve our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher until it can be used to produce results, i.e., when the islands are effectively in British hands." [1551]

In New York, at much the same time, the Security Council's debate continues.

"Spain and Togo listed the cessation of hostilities, negotiation and peace as the priorities of the Council's action, as did several other speakers who urged the Council to call for an immediate ceasefire. Jordan asserted that the Council should not resign itself to the role of onlooker while blood was being shed, and Brazil said the Council was duty bound to prevent a worsening of the situation. Greece said the Council's prestige would be enhanced if it unequivocally condemned all invasions and breaches of the Charter provisions. Colombia asserted that the United Nations would emerge greatly weakened if it failed to enforce international law and maintenance of international peace and security, while the United States considered that the Organization had functioned in the crisis in the manner foreseen by its founders and its Charter. ...

Several countries, among them Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, held the United Kingdom responsible for blocking the negotiating efforts. China said the negotiations had broken down due to a tough stand taken by the party with superior military strength.

Bolivia asserted that any peace effort would be doomed to failure as long as the United Kingdom persisted in its equivocal stand. Panama and the USSR said the United Kingdom had resorted to the language of ultimatums and virtually broken off negotiations by resorting to the use of force. Antigua and Barbuda believed the United Kingdom had made genuine attempts to reach a negotiated settlement.

The United States said the United Kingdom had indicated its willingness to consider, but Argentina had rejected or chosen not to consider, first the United States proposal and subsequently the Peruvian peace plan, both based on the Council's 3 April resolution. New Zealand said it was Argentina's obduracy and rigidity that had frustrated and blocked the Secretary-General's efforts just when it looked as if an agreement was within reach. ... Germany, Guyana, Jordan, Uganda and Zaire believed the mandate should be based on the Council's 3 April resolution. ...

Australia said Argentina's invocation of paragraph 1 of the 3 April resolution in accusing the United Kingdom of hostile action was a perverted reading of that text, as that paragraph, it said, was directed to the state of armed conflict caused by the Argentine seizure of the Falklands.

... the majority of Latin American countries, along with China, Equatorial Guinea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Poland, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Zaire, supported Argentina's territorial claim, while endorsing efforts to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. El Salvador asserted that Argentina's occupation of the Islands was in accordance with its lawful title to them, which led Panama to state that there had been no breach of peace on 3 April, when Argentina recovered the Islands.

1551 *Memorandum for the President May 26, 1982* in Reagan Library

Belgium and Kenya said territorial claims should not be allowed to override the interests of peoples in choosing democratically their own destinies. Australia considered that Argentina had been insistent on loaded arrangements in the Falklands which, if accepted, would lead to conceding its demand of sovereignty and ignoring the rights of the Falklanders; if Argentina's aggression was allowed to persist, it would itself amount to colonialism. In a similar vein, Kenya said Argentina could not claim any right to impose its own form of colonialism on the Islands' inhabitants. New Zealand added that the two aggrieved parties in the crisis were the United Kingdom and the people of the Falklands.

In contrast, Panama called it illogical to talk of the right to self-determination - the right of the oppressed - in the Malvinas case, when the inhabitants of the Islands were dependents of a British colonial company; ...

Colombia, noting that the United Kingdom's policy of decolonization had allowed the independence of many countries by means of negotiations, believed it reasonable to expect that the Malvinas case could also be solved in that manner. Zaire also noted the United Kingdom's past record of decolonization, ...

The Netherlands felt that Argentina's resort to force could not be justified in terms of international law. Antigua and Barbuda said that, as a small island State dependent for its security on the United Nations, it had to deplore Argentina's illegal use of force in seizing the Falklands in defiance of the Council. In a similar vein, Guyana rejected the attitude of those which held aloft the action of 2 April as an example to be emulated, and said aggression should not be rewarded." [1552]

Argentina's Costa Méndez indicates that Buenos Aires can accept the draft-resolution, as amended. Put to a vote, the Security Council adopts the amended resolution.

Security Council Resolution 505 –

Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982),

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General at its 2360th meeting, on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements made in the debate by the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Concerned to achieve, as a matter of the greatest urgency, a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and the United Kingdom,

1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts that he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

1552 *UN Yearbook 1982*

4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution."

"... the new mission was undertaken without enthusiasm by the Secretary-General. He told the Council: You've asked me to do this. I will try, but you should understand that what you are asking is practically impossible. A war is now underway, and it is simply not realistic to think in terms of achieving a cease fire." [1553]

"The resolution was not decisive because Great Britain refused to accept a ceasefire, as well as to order its troops from the Falklands. ... At the end of the day, the Argentine Foreign Minister described the resolution as "tolerable"." [1554]

In exercise of a right of reply, Britain's Representative, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Security Council.

"My delegation voted in favour of the Resolution just adopted ...

We did so because it contains a clear reaffirmation of SCR 502. It registers beyond doubt that the Secretary-General's efforts have been, and will be, concentrated on ensuring the implementation of SCR 502. This is the key to the return of peace to the region... In particular, this key lies in the second operative paragraph of SCR 502, namely the unconditional demand for the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.

I must make clear, so that there is no misunderstanding, that for our part the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked to an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal. The history of the last two months has done nothing to create British confidence in the Government of Argentina ...

Hence a simple verbal agreement by Argentina to withdraw its forces would not be sufficient for a ceasefire. Mr. President the Council should also be quite clear on another point. The situation has changed ... we are talking about Argentine withdrawal. We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in any way to parallel British withdrawal." [1555]

In a telegram to London, Parsons sums up the day's proceedings.

"We owe a lot to the old Commonwealth, Kenya, Guyana and Belgium for their robust support, slightly less to the FRG (Germany), little or nothing to the rest of our partners who spoke, including France: the US statement was too even handed for our liking. However, to a greater or lesser extent, all these statements offset the Latin American barrage ... The fact that we emerged without having to veto, which seemed most unlikely at the outset, was due to a number of factors – the firmness with which we stated our own positions both privately and publicly: the reluctance of the Non-Aligned members of the Council to allow a veto situation to develop both because of basic sympathy for us and because they realised that a deadlock would effectively deal the UN out of any further useful role in the crisis: the Irish tactics which the Non-Aligned found both irritating and unacceptable: and the Latin American desire to get out of the Council in order to leave their hands free for the OAS meeting in Washington on

1553 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.348
1554 Yofre 2011
1555 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.858 of 26 May*

the 27th... It is ironic ... that our best support should have come from Africans, Asians and Caribbeans, with our partners and allies either useless or actively unhelpful."

With only seven days available before he has to report back to the Security Council, Pérez de Cuéllar requests that Argentina and Britain provide, within 24 hours, the terms each consider acceptable for a cease-fire.

"In the afternoon of 26 May, I met separately with the parties and requested that each provide within 24 hours a statement of the terms it considered acceptable for a cease-fire. It was my hope, as I explained to the parties, that, on the basis of their replies, terms could be developed which would be mutually acceptable. I indicated that arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of a cease-fire, as mentioned in resolution 505 (1982), could be made on short notice, with the approval of the Security Council." [1556]

Parsons reports; *"Pérez de Cuéllar asked to see me privately ... Was it really the case that we could no longer contemplate any parallel British withdrawal? I confirmed that it was. ... He did not think that he would have any alternative but to report to the Security Council that mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire were unobtainable. ... I urged him nevertheless to try to find some change in the Argentine position."*

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Central Bank announces that payments for imported goods can only be made 180 days after shipment; *".. aimed at saving foreign currency to meet needs arising from the Falklands conflict. ..."*

In Chile's capital city of Santiago, *Sea King* pilot Lieut. Hutchings is the central figure at a press conference.[1557]

"The press conference took place in the ground floor reception area of the British Embassy. Lt. Hutchings and his crew were sitting behind a desk and the remainder of the room was crowded with reporters and camera crews. ... Lt Hutchings spoke in English, reading from a prepared statement. He said that he had been on a routine reconnaissance mission when his aircraft suffered a serious equipment failure in very bad weather conditions. ... Hutchings added that they apologised for illegally entering the country, had been treated very well by the Chilean authorities and were most grateful for the help they had been given." [1558]

"The failure of Operation Plum Duff prevented executing Operation Mikado. Previously warned of the enemy's incursions in the vicinity of Río Grande, Argentine armed forces high-ranking leaders became aware of the need to take advantage, promptly and in the best possible way, of the last Exocet missiles." [1559]

May 27th, on East Falkland, a little before dawn, 45 Commando move towards Douglas. [1560]

In Chile, following Lieut. Hutchings' press conference, Wing Commander Edwards speaks to General Rodriguez.

"General Rodriguez said it was a pity because, had he known about it in advance, the crew would not have needed to destroy their helicopter. He said we could have hushed the whole thing up and refuelled the helicopter so that the crew could have flown it back to the Task Force at night. ... I explained that the (SAS) patrol was now in hiding on the Chilean side of the border and we would like to move them up to the Santiago area in complete secrecy and hide them where they could recover from their mission. ... The SAS patrol was soon extracted from its position in southern Chile to be flown back at night to a Chilean Air Force base near

1556 Interim Report by the U.N. Secretary General, Submitted to to the U.N. Security Council, June 2, 1982. UK responded on May 27, 1982. Argentina on May 27 & May 28, 1982. See below.

1557 Operation *Plum Duff*. See May 16, May 18 & May 26, 1982, above.

1558 Edwards 2014. Lieut. Hutchings and his two man crew were flown out of Chile the following day (May 27, 1982). All crew members subsequently received gallantry medals for, apparently, getting lost. See May 27, 1982, below.

1559 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.407

1560 Moving over difficult terrain, it took some 36 hours for 45 Commando to reach its objective.

Santiago. ... General Rodriguez kindly chartered a civilian registered 707 aircraft on my behalf. ... The patrol was thus spirited out of Chile (June 8, 1982) with no leaks to the media." [1561]

In London, Margaret Thatcher addresses the House of Commons.

> *"Yesterday the United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously a resolution on the Falkland Islands. It reaffirms resolution 502 and requests the Secretary-General to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, to enter into contact with Britain and Argentina with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable conditions for a ceasefire and to report again to the Security Council within seven days.*
>
> *We shall, of course, co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in that. In voting for the resolution our representative at the United Nations made it clear that, in view of Argentina's continued refusal to implement resolution 502, the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked with a firm and unconditional Argentine commitment immediately to commence withdrawal of its forces from the islands. ...*
>
> *In the published proposals that we debated last Thursday there was a linked withdrawal of British forces and Argentine forces. Those proposals have been withdrawn and as our ambassador to the United Nations made clear when he voted for the resolution, there can now be no question of a British withdrawal. He said: We are talking about Argentine withdrawal. We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in any way to parallel British withdrawal. ...*
>
> *The talks with the Secretary-General will be about unequivocal withdrawal of Argentine forces in accordance with resolution 502 as a condition for a ceasefire. After that, we shall be in repossession of the islands. We then wish to restore British administration. Administration has to continue under existing British law and under existing democratic institutions. There will be a great deal of reconstruction work to do, and also talk about development of further resources.*
>
> *It will take some time for the islanders to crystallise their views, but then we must have discussions with them about the longer-term interests. It will be most unwise for us to give away any of that in advance."* [1562]

Francis Pym responds to Secretary-General de Cuéllar's urgent question.


> *"You have asked about the British Government's definition of acceptable terms for a ceasefire. In our view a ceasefire that was not linked inseparably to Argentine withdrawal would give Argentina another opportunity for procrastination through intransigence. The British answer to your question is therefore that a ceasefire is highly desirable and would be acceptable if it was inseparably linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal and the completion of that withdrawal within a fixed period. ... A change of position by Argentina involving willingness to implement Resolution 502 could transform the situation.*
>
> *It would be most encouraging if in your resumed efforts for peace under the mandate of Security Council Resolution 505 you could obtain from Argentine convincing evidence of such a change.*

1561 Edwards 2014. In 1985, Duncan Campbell, of the *New Statesman,* put forward another theory; that the *Sea King* had operated from a base in Chile (see April 14, 1982, above). Campbell also asserted that there was some evidence that the SAS team had successfully raided the Argentine air base and destroyed five aircraft. Argentina has never admitted to any raid on the mainland. As of 2025, all details remain ... unconfirmed. For Campbell, see - https://www.duncancampbell.org/PDF/the chilean connection.pdf

1562 *HC Deb 27 May 1982 vol.24 cc1049-52*

Argentina's immediate response to your question yesterday may not do this, in which case I hope you would go back to them on the point." [1563]

In Buenos Aires, *Gente* magazine announces; "*We keep winning, 8 ships sunk, 16 damaged. 21 planes and 16 helicopters shot down. We are destroying the British fleet."*



In Dublin, Britain's Ambassador informs Taoiseach Charles Haughey that, as Ireland tabled a draft-resolution unacceptable to the UK, relations had taken a, *"considerable turn for the worse."*

From London, a BBC World Service broadcast reports that 2 Para have moved towards the Darwin area.

> *"A parachute battalion is poised and ready to assault Darwin and Goose Green."* [1564]

> *"The radio announcer from the BBC said that the troops were preparing to move off from the northwest to attack an important strategic target. The only place they could go was Goose Green. Nice of them to warn the enemy – unless the attack had already begun "* [1565]

Picked up by Argentina's command, the report is dismissed as propaganda. [1566]

"... I have had the allegations thoroughly investigated. The reports from the correspondents who were with 2 Para before their attack on Darwin and Goose Green probably originated from the BBC World Service broadcasts which they heard a few days before the attack. These broadcasts reflected the prevailing newspaper speculation that an attack on Darwin and Goose Green was imminent. Indeed the Daily Express announced on its front page the capture of Goose Green two days before the attack. It is quite understandable that someone on the spot might have felt that official circles in London had been indiscreet. There is no evidence of MOD indiscretion and it was unfortunately all too easy for the armchair strategists to work out for themselves that Darwin and Goose Green were likely to be our first objectives." [1567]

"At about midday someone in the Battalion tuned into the BBC's World Service and heard the announcement that 2 Para were advancing on Darwin, while 45 Commando and 3 Para were advancing on Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet Settlement respectively. Jones was furious and ordered the Battalion to disperse and dig in to face the attack that must surely follow this gross breach of security. However, no attack came..." [1568]

1563 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.475 of 27 May*

1564 Quoted in Van der Bijl 2023

1565 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

1566 The source of this entirely accurate report is unknown. An inquiry at the MOD, found no leak or indiscretion. BBC reporters on the ground also denied revealing any information. The conclusion, ultimately, was that the report had been founded upon speculation by "*armchair strategists*" who had come to the same conclusion as the military planners; that Darwin and Goose Green had to come before any attack on Stanley. America's CIA had come to the same conclusion on May 24, 1982 (see above). See also Lord Trenchard's answers in the House of Lords, June 10, 1982.

1567 *Nott to Thatcher June 11, 1982*. See - https://c59574e9047e61130f13-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/EB110E5E858A4D4CA384C358C7EFC297.pdf

1568 Thompson 1992

"... it ought to be recorded, perhaps, that the commanding officer of 2 Para, Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, also wanted to sue John Nott, the prime Minister, the Defence Ministry, the BBC and many others, charging them with manslaughter. Colonel Jones was killed leading his men towards Goose Green shortly after telling reporters that he wished to undertake legal proceedings himself, after the BBC broadcast the fact that an attack on Goose Green was imminent – that 2 Para was within five miles of Darwin." [1569]

"The broadcast was heard by the men of 2 Para – who were furious at what they saw was a stupid and dangerous disclosure – and also by the Argentines both at Stanley and at Goose Green. Contrary to British beliefs, however, no reinforcements of any kind were sent to Goose Green as a result of that radio broadcast. Most Argentine believed it was a bluff. Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi's reaction was: 'I did not take it too seriously; I thought it was more a psychological action... I made no changes because of that broadcast.'..." [1570]

In the Falklands, an observation team near Camilla Creek House is seen by Argentine forces and fired upon. A *Harrier* is shot down covering the unit's withdrawal.

"On 27th May, three ground attack Harriers attempted to destroy the 35mm Anti-Aircraft guns at Garden Point. One made a third pass and was hit by 20mm shells. I saw the pilot eject and remember hoping that if caught he would be well cared for. The pilot was Squadron Leader Bob Iveson, who was shot down over Darwin Ridge. He deployed his parachute close to Paragon House and took shelter there. He watched the entire Battle for Goose Green from the upstairs window whilst tucking into a tin of Heinz Baked Beans. After the War, he came to my house and offered to pay for the beans. I said on a balance scale, with a tin of beans on one side and a ground attack Harrier on the other, that I'm sure we owed him." [1571]

An Argentina reconnaissance team consisting of Lt. Carlos Morales and three men is sent by Lt.-Col. Piaggi to investigate, only for them to be captured. Following an interrogation, it becomes apparent to British forces that the Argentines at Goose Green are well entrenched.

"... (Jones) had brought only two 81mm mortars and a limited amount of ammunition for a quick action. The improving intelligence and the World Service report led 2 Para to signal back that: 'the task is a lot harder and amount of goods given are not sufficient, could 8Bty bring some more.' ..." [1572]

"... A Company and a Scout Platoon section had developed a strong defensive position across the isthmus south of Low Pass and east of Burntside House..." [1573]

In Washington DC, addressing the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Treaty (OAS), Secretary Haig makes a *"detailed and determined"* speech. He focuses on the fact that, since it was Argentina which had committed the original act of aggression, it would be wrong to invoke the Rio Treaty.

> *"This festering dispute has suddenly become a violent conflict that poses dangers to the very institutions and principles which bring us here and that have made this hemisphere, in many ways, the envy of the world. The war puts the inter – American system under stress. Some say that this is an "anti-colonial war" because the islands were formally administered as a British colony. Some say that since this is a war that pits an American republic against an outside power, the Rio treaty requires that all its members come to the assistance of the American republic. Others say that it is impossible to speak of colonialism when a people is not subjugated to another and, as we all know, there was no such*

1569 Woodward 1992
1570 Middlebrook 2003
1571 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.44
1572 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1573 Van de Bijl 2023

subjugation on the island. Others say there is no way in which the inter-American system – which protects regional order based on law and the peaceful settlement of disputes – can be interpreted as sanctioning the first use of armed force to settle a dispute.

With full respect for the views of others, the U.S. position is clear: Since the first use of force did not come from outside the hemisphere , this is not a case of extracontinental aggression against which we are all committed to rally. ...

We face a conflict that involves us all, but to which the Rio treaty does not well apply. It is a dispute over competing claims of sovereignty, each with profound historical and emotional sources. We know how deep is the Argentine commitment to recover islands Argentines believe were taken from them by illegal force. This is not some sudden passion but a longstanding national concern that reaches back 150 years and is heightened by the sense of frustration over what Argentina feels were nearly 20 years of fruitless negotiation.

We know, too, how deeply Britain, in peaceful possession of the disputed territory for 150 years, has been devoted to the proposition that the rights and views of the inhabitants should be considered in any future disposition of the islands. No one can say that Britain's attitude is simply a colonial reflex to retain possession of distant islands.

In the last 20 years no less than nine of the members of the Organization of American States received their independence in peace and goodwill from Great Britain.

For its part, the United States has not taken – and will not take – any position on the substance of the dispute. We are completely neutral on the question of who has sovereignty.

Indeed, 35 years ago, at the 1947 signing of the Final Act of the Rio Conference which created the Rio Treaty, the United States Delegation made this clear at the same time it set forth our position that the Treaty is without effect upon outstanding territorial disputes between American and European states. ... We must search for ways in which we can all join in helping to bring about peace, not ask the Rio Treaty mechanism to adjudicate a conflict for which it was never conceived." [1574]

Haig's speech is greeted in silence. Speeches from delegates that attack the USA, however, receive ovations.

"Costa Méndez set the tone with an intemperate onslaught against the US which had failed in its duty to join with its hemispheric neighbours against an external threat. He urged Argentina's true friends to unite in solidarity against the UK, which throughout the negotiations had acted with total intransigence. British actions were an insult to the Latin American continent.

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister accused the British of having a punitive obsession which was shared by the EC, ... He asserted that the locus standi of the UN in this dispute was subordinate to that of the OAS and the Rio Treaty. ...

The Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister maintained that in future the Rio Treaty signatories should meet in Latin America and not in Washington, which was "foreign territory."... The US was an accomplice in British aggression...

The Peruvian Foreign Minister maintained that Argentina had throughout been flexible...

Colombia introduced a mild hand-wringing Resolution. Trinidad and Tobago repeated its support for self-determination and condemned Argentina for using force to resolve a dispute.

1574 *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 pp.87-88. Also *OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc. 67/82* pp.28-35

Illueca (Panama) made his usual long-winded and abusive speech.

Costa Rica, Uruguay, Bolivia and Guatemala spoke without adding anything, although the last three joined the mob in condemning the US." [1575]

"The U.S. position was that because the unlawful resort to force did not come from outside the hemisphere, this was not a case of extra-continental aggression against which we were – and are – all committed to rally." [1576]

"The 27 May meeting of OAS foreign ministers opened with a statement by Costa Mendez in which he berated the United States for supporting 'the criminal colonialist, warlike adventure' of the United Kingdom. It was then reported that this was met with a standing ovation. Haig responded that since Argentina had been first to resort to armed aggression in the conflict, there were 'no grounds for taking collective action under the Rio Treaty'. This point was supported by the representatives from the governments of Brazil and Mexico who advised the meeting not to link support for Argentina with the Rio Treaty, and again reiterated, that in pursuit of a 'peaceful resolution' to the conflict, the United Nations was the best place for the matter to be debated." [1577]

Ambassador Henderson reports that Washington is still concerned that their relations with Latin America are suffering due to the USA's support of the UK.

"As they see it, we are now insisting on surrender of the Argentinian garrison and a return to British rule without any definite commitment to an attempt to achieve a long-term solution. In effect, we are basing ourselves on a return to the status quo ante."

Henderson goes on to suggest that the Islanders' interests could be safeguarded by; *"... some international group comprising say, two regional powers, plus the US and the UK, with the presence perhaps of the US and Brazilian forces and that, without prejudice to the future, in a given number of years this group will, in keeping with the wishes and interests of the Islanders, make proposals about the status of the Falkland Islands."* [1578]

In London, after reading Henderson's suggestions, Thatcher scrawls the word *"NO"* across the last paragraph.

In Buckinghamshire, a Parliamentary by-election for the Beaconsfield constituency returns the Conservative Party candidate, Tim Smith, with 61.8% of the vote. [1579]

"A new poll of 400 Britishers shows that if a national election were held now, the Conservatives would defeat Labor by a two-to-one margin. Eighty-four percent were satisfied with Prime Minister Thatcher's handling of the crisis, a substantial increase." [1580]

In the South Atlantic, *Argonaut's* unexploded bomb is finally removed and lowered into the sea; allowing repairs to begin.

"... by that night (27) Europic Ferry and Sir Geraint could leave and Sir Galahad was almost finished unloading. Unlike previous nights, no new ships were taken in for unloading. All the guns, vehicles and the

1575 *PREM19/632 Telegram No.1941 of 27 May*
1576 *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation* US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs August 5, 1982 (evidence of Assistant Secretary Enders)
1577 Bagnall 2021
1578 *PREM19/631 Telegram No.1921 of 27 May.*
1579 The Labour Party's candidate, Tony Blair, came in a poor third with just 10.4% of the vote.
1580 CIA Intelligence report dated May 29, 1982. See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21355-19820529-uk-argentina-british-military-gains

bulk of the immediate stores and ammunition were ashore, as were eleven Sea Kings, Four Wessex and one Chinook… Only warships and the damaged Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad remained in San Carlos Water… The battle of San Carlos was now definitely over." [1581]

At South Georgia, the liner/troop carrier *QEII* arrives. [1582]

"The QE2 had arrived in the Grytviken anchorage during the early evening of 27 May – seven hours after Canberra: cross-decking began almost immediately. … At the same time the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles were transferred to the Norland and the gallant ships' companies of HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope passed across from one liner to another for the sad journey home. The QE2 also embarked survivors from the equally gallant HMS Coventry brought out on board the RFA Stromness. The RFA then received 300 'new' men from the homeward-bound liner plus bulk ammunition." [1583]

"The Welsh Guards, Scots Guards, Gurkhas, Field Ambulance and 5 Brigade Headquarters would transfer to Canberra and Norland with their equipment as quickly as possible and head to San Carlos. Most logistics units would trail later on Stromness. These ships started arriving just before QE2 so that the cross-decking could commence without delay. It began on 27 May and continued throughout the night. The trawlers Northella, Junella, Farnella, Cordella and Pict ferried soldiers and 250 tons of supplies, carrying whatever they could between QE2 and other vessels. The cruise ship's captain had never attempted to unload at anchor before. All tried their best. Trawlers had difficulty, however, even staying alongside the massive superstructure of QE2 without knocking dents in her sides. Soldiers formed chain gangs down the luxury liner's corridors to pass boxes of supplies from forward storage decks through side doors to trawlers. The few helicopters that had deployed with the Brigade ferried freight as well between the top decks of the assembled ships." [1584]

In the Falkland Islands, at dusk, Argentine *Skyhawks* attack British positions at Ajax Bay, killing five men and wounding twenty-seven.

"Cooks were cleaning up after serving a meal to several hundred men from Commando Logistic Regiment and 45 Commando in the mess hall established in one section of the refrigeration plant. A few dozen feet away, in another section of the plant, surgeons in the small hospital area were in the middle of two operations. Suddenly, whistles sounded, a signal that enemy aircraft had been spotted in the area. … This would be the first time that Argentine pilots had penetrated air defences and attacked Brigade units on land. … Skyhawks succeeded in dropping twelve bombs into the congested BMA (Brigade Maintenance Area). Fortunately only four exploded. Some of those that did explode, though, stuck in the middle of the ammunition storage area, igniting stacks of 105mm artillery shells, mortar rounds and MILAN missiles. … Four bombs also hit the old refrigeration plant, which housed the Red and Green Life Machine and the mess hall. One passed all the way through the plant without exploding, but another detonated on impact in the mess hall portion of the building." [1585]

"In spite of the intense artillery fire, they dropped a salvo of their eight bombs over the refrigeration plant in Ajax Bay. They caused severe damage which triggered the explosion of a British ammunition depot. The root of Velasco's left wing was reached by 40-mm Bofors cannon ammunition fired from the Fearless and Intrepid vessels. The TRUCO aircraft escaped to the left, avoiding the missiles. After crossing the Sound heading west,

1581 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1582 At some point, a decision had been made that the loss of the *QE2* would be unacceptable. If only because of the name. Hence she was directed to South Georgia to disembark her passengers and supplies. Well away from prying eyes, and the danger of an airborne attack.

1583 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012

1584 Privratsky 2014

1585 *Ibid.*. Two 500lb unexploded bombs lodged near the surgical wards, where they remained for the duration of the war.

already overflying the Gran Malvina Island, wingman number 2 saw fire on number 1's damaged wing, very close to the oxygen cylinder, and alerted him immediately. The leader responded that his hydraulic pressure alarm had gone off, so he slowed down and climbed, and reported that he was ejecting … The time was about 1700." [1586]


At 2200 Falklands time, HMS *Arrow* moves into a position to bombard Argentine positions at Goose Green. 2 Para move forward.

"In a television interview Brigadier Thompson later described the order to attack Goose Green as coming from Northwood on 25 May, the day Coventry was sunk. He believed it a purely military decision, but it was political. Mrs Thatcher made her wishes known and Northwood gave the order."[1587]

May 28th, in the South Atlantic, HMS *Arrow* commences its bombardment of Argentine positions at Goose Green. At 0230 local time, British forces move towards the settlement.

"I watched the battle begin early on the morning of the 28th, before bullets stated hitting the house. I saw the mountains from Sussex to Blue Mountain illuminated in the darkness. I joined the others under the floor of the medical room. This was the safest place for all the civilians at the time. In the hall we had cut holes in the floor for the remaining civilians to take shelter in. Nan McCullum, as she was known, couldn't make it beneath the floor, so during the battle she stayed in her armchair. She was protected by two freezers full of frozen meats, which had been covered by a mattress and blankets to absorb wood splinters." [1588]

"As a dull dawn crept across the plain, the defenders watched the enemy advance… from the north." [1589]


Start lines
O.Ps on 27 May and fire support base on 28 May
Burntside Pool
1. A Coy attacks Burntside House
2. Coronation Point taken without opposition
3. A Coy's frontal assault on Darwin Hill repulsed; Lt Col 'H' Jones killed
4. Moving along beach D Coy takes Argentine positions at Boca House in flank
5. B Coy completes encirclement of Argentine positions
6. After Harrier strike D Coy captures airfield
7. C Coy moves up in reserve
Main defence lines
Darwin
S.A.S. O.P. before battle
D Coy captures airfield
The schoolhouse fight
Goose Green
B Coy cuts off settlement
N
Minefield

At 0430 a report is sent back from 2 Para to say that the assault is going as planned but, as dawn approaches, their momentum slows.

At South Georgia, finally loaded, *Canberra* and *Norland* set out for the Falklands.

1586 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 p.522. The pilot survived and was picked up by Argentine troops on June 1st, 1982.
1587 Elgood 2025 citing Mercer *et al*, 1987, p.53
1588 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.44
1589 Van der Bijl 2023. On the left of the Argentine defence line was an 8th Infantry Regiment platoon under the command of Lieutenant Aliaga. In the center, a Service Company Platoon under Sub-Lieutenant Peluffo. On the right, the 1st Rifle Platoon of the 25th Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Nestor Estévez. Hit twice during the battle, Estévez refused to seek medical attention, and died while still encouraging his platoon. Decorated posthumously.

"... all embarked, military and civilian, in Canberra and Norland knew that the enemy were aware of their movements and their load. In the same irresponsible manner over our departure from Ascension Island, our approach to landing and the move of 2 Para towards Darwin ... the BBC now broadcast that 5 Infantry Brigade was on the final leg of its journey in the Canberra and Norland to San Carlos. ... Due to government-sourced breaches of security we seldom achieved the most invaluable of military weapons, surprise." [1590]

On East Falkland, at about 0930, Lieut. Colonel Jones attempts to restore the initiative by leading a charge.

"... concerned about further delays, (Jones) concentrated on what he could control and focused on the obstacle ahead of him, the enemy position on Darwin Ridge leading towards the Hill... Jones decided to lead from the front... Armed with a sub-machine gun, he charged off towards the nearest enemy trench but was exposed to enemy fire from other trenches. Having been shot once he picked himself up and carried on firing but close to his target, he was hit again... He died before he could be evacuated." [1591]

"He died on the battlefield. The dramatic message was relayed back to headquarters: 'Sunray is down'. Five officers and men who charged forward with him were also killed." [1592]

"Several enemy attempts to breach the defence failed and then at midday, a small group of the enemy charged up a small gully of Darwin Hill on the Argentine right,... three were shot. As the remaining two ran west along the base of the ridge ... the fourth man fell and the fifth ran up the hill towards a trench and was also shot. The fifth man, Lieutenant-Colonel 'H' Jones was the 2 Para Commanding Officer." [1593]

A few moments later, a British 66mm anti-tank rocket scores a direct hit on the trench from where the fire that had killed Jones originated. At about 1100 local time, white flags are seen above the Argentine trenches on Darwin Hill.

"... after nearly six hours, the battle for Darwin Hill was over, but not without grievous loss: the Commanding Officer, the Adjutant, A Company Second-in-Command and nine junior non-commissioned officers and soldiers were killed and several wounded." [1594]

Argentine positions at Boca House surrender after a bombardment which leaves twelve dead. Fifteen Argentines are taken prisoner, including Sub-Lieutenant Aliaga. 2 Para continue towards Goose Green. Shortly after 1400, Argentine white flags are seen, but not honoured, leaving three British dead.

> *"I saw the white flag incident; I was in 11 Platoon. We were going up the hill, and the flag went up. The officer [Barry] called the sergeant [sic] and then got halfway up the hill. Bang! They let rip into them, Killed them. One guy [Corporal Paul Sullivan] was hit in the knee, and one of the bastards came forward and shot him in the head. He moved forward out of his position and shot him."* [1595]

"Lieutenant Barry thought he saw some white flags in the vicinity of the schoolhouse and received permission from Neame to arrange a cease-fire. ... Barry and two NCOs went forward. The offer of a ceasefire was refused. Barry and his party turned to go. At this moment a machine gun from another company fired at the

1590 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012

1591 Middlebrook 2003. Colonel Jones was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his actions.

1592 Briley 2022

1593 Van der Bijl 2023. A number of Argentine soldiers claim to have fired the shots that killed Colonel Jones, but there were no known Argentine survivors from the trench concerned. Van der Bijl (2023) notes that in Argentina, Corporal Osvaldo Faustino Olmos is generally regarded as the man who killed Jones, while Argentine historian Hugh Bicheno names Corporal José Luis Rios, who died in the trench. Another Argentine historian, Oscar Téves, concluded that the fatal shot was fired by conscript Oscar Ledesma, who was manning a MAG machine gun.

1594 Thompson 1992

1595 Private John Graham quoted in *The World's Elite Forces* Bruce Quarrie 1988

schoolhouse. The Argentines fired at Barry, killing him and his party. His platoon sergeant with the rest of the platoon overran the position, killing most of the enemy, although some of the occupants escaped, including the officer who had fired at Barry in the mistaken impression that the offer of ceasefire was a ruse." [1596]

"As the enemy advanced towards the airfield and Goose Green, several Argentines near the wind-sock waved white flags, but as Lieutenant Jim Barry and two of his NCOs walked towards them to take the surrender, they met Sub-Lieutenant Gómez Centurión advancing towards them - assuming that the British wanted to surrender. It soon became clear that neither side intended to surrender and so Centurión and Barry agreed a two minute break to return to their lines. However, it seems a distant Para machine gunner saw men in the open and opened fire and a short battle broke out which saw Lieutenant Barry killed and two Paras and an Argentine wounded in the confusion. British newspapers tried to exploit a tragic misunderstanding of the 'white flag incident'." [1597]

Two Argentine *Pucara* attempt to drop napalm on the British positions but miss. Hit by rifle fire, one *Pucara* crashes on its way back to Stanley.[1598] An *Aermacchi* is shot down with a *Blowpipe* missile.

At around 1530 local time, three *Harriers* arrive over the isthmus, having been delayed by poor weather conditions at sea. Two *Harriers* drop cluster munitions, silencing the Argentine guns at Goose Green airfield. The third uses its cannon to silence the anti-aircraft guns.

"The violent blast of the cluster bombs, forty-seven to a cluster, ripping like a giant Chinese firecracker across the peninsula, broke the will of the Argentine defenders and tipped the scales in 2 Para's favour. Civilians released from the Settlement the next day reported that the enemy soldiers had sobbed and screamed in terror." [1599]

At around 1700 local time, the Darwin Settlement is occupied by British troops.

"... directing fire onto the (Goose Green) settlement ceased to be an option when the inhabitants of Darwin, who had been liberated, told the paratroopers that 112 civilians were locked up in the Community Centre in Goose Green, where they had been since 1 May." [1600]

As the sun goes down, Argentine helicopters bring reinforcements to Goose Green. Artillery fire from British positions force these to disperse towards the settlement, which is now surrounded. [1601]

British troops are cold, exhausted and low on supplies, including clean water. Argentine forces at Goose Green receive an order from Stanley to counter-attack.

> *"I was in a raving fury at that order. Counter-attack! With what?... that order was impossible to carry out."* [1602]

In London, Brazil's Ambassador, Roberto Campos, calls on Francis Pym at the Foreign Office.

1596 Thompson 1992. Platoon Sgt. John Meredith was awarded a gallantry medal. Briley (2022) notes that Meredith subsequently sold his medals for £150,000 to fund his retirement.

1597 Van der Bijl 2023. Accounts differ. Van der Bijl (2023) notes that on his return to Argentina as a prisoner of war, Centurión claimed to have killed Lieutenant Barry.

1598 There is some evidence that the *Pucara* had been attempting to drop napalm on British troops. Located in August, 1986, the pilot, Lieutenant Miguel Giménez, was buried at the Argentine Military Cemetery at Fish Creek. See October 4, 1986.

1599 Thompson 1992

1600 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1601 Although, according to some reports, a number just got back on the helicopters and left.

1602 Lt.-Colonel Piaggi quoted in Middlebrook 2003

"Matters were now at a critical point. British insistence on an unconditional Argentine withdrawal would have a destabilising effect both on Argentina and the Region. If Argentina were faced with military humiliation, it might have no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union. … (he) wished to know whether the British position on Argentine withdrawal and on full restoration of British sovereignty was irreversible. He hoped not … He hoped that we might indicate a continued willingness to negotiate a solution which might involve a phased and mutual withdrawal and interim administration arrangements. I said … following our landing on the Islands, the circumstances were inevitably different. … We intended to repossess the Islands and to restore our administration. … Campos, who was in a waspish mood, went on to make some sharp criticism of our position on sovereignty … It was not a productive exchange." [1603]

Thatcher meets with Lords Buxton and Shackleton to discuss the economic future of the Falkland Islands. [1604] The Prime Minister asks Lord Shackleton to bring his 1976 report up to date. [1605]

Pope John Paul arrives in Britain for a six day visit.

In Lima, Peruvian Foreign Minister Javier Arias Stella, tells a press conference that his country is willing to consider providing Argentina with arms, including *Exocet* missiles. [1606]

"A failed and secret operation by the FAP, which involved two officers and the Peruvian Air Attaché in the United States, was the attempt to purchase Exocet missiles from France (it is unknown whether they were MM-38 or AM-39 models) for Argentina during the war." [1607]

In New York, Argentina answers Pérez de Cuéllar's urgent question of the 26th, providing their minimum terms for a ceasefire. These include a suspension of all operations by troops; monitoring by the UN; separate zones to be established on the Islands if necessary; no military reinforcement; the UN to provide food etc., to the troops and civilians; negotiations to take place on the withdrawal of both parties and an interim administration. [1608]

In the Falkland Islands, from the Goose Green settlement, farm Manager, Eric Goss, broadcasts to the British troops on a CB radio seeking contact with an officer.

"… there was a knock at my door. Six armed soldiers had been sent to bring me to their headquarters. On arrival at the house, I found eleven officers seated around the dining room table and one empty chair for me to sit on. Pedroza asked for my help in getting them in touch with the 'bad British' who were nearby. I pointed to Gopcevich to go aboard Monsunen and to call out on 2182 KHz, the international maritime distress frequency. This suggestion was met with reluctance. After a discussion, I was taken upstairs to put out a call on the 2m radio." [1609]

"Eric Goss and his wife had watched the battle from their upstairs window… As the battle crept towards Goose Green, they moved to the sitting room and then sheltered in the below ground cellars. Old Nan McCallum sat in an armchair in her house between two deep freezers full of frozen meat and covered with a mattress and blankets to protect her from plywood splinters. … As the fighting fizzled out, Pedrozo and Piaggi realised Task Force Mercedes was trapped… (Goss) spoke to a British officer and told him the Argentines wished to meet…" [1610]

1603 *PREM19/632 Telegram No.141 of 28 May*
1604 Livingstone 2018
1605 See 1976 & 1977
1606 *The Washington Post* May 29, 1982. Peru had possession of three ship launched *MM38 Exocets*.
1607 Rotta y Carmona 2022. FAP = Peruvian Air Force
1608 *PREM19/632 Telegram No.884 of 28 May.* See June 2, 1982 below.
1609 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.44
1610 Van der Bijl 2023

There is agreement that two Argentine POWs will deliver a message for Piaggi under a flag of truce. [1611]

"... the senior British officer in 2 Para, Major Chris Keeble, tried that evening to persuade the Argentine garrison to surrender, or at least allow a safe withdrawal of the civilians if the Argentine decided to continue fighting the next day.... They were surrounded and without hope of further support. A bombardment by ships and artillery would take place the next morning if they did not surrender." [1612]

"That night, with the possibility of an Argentine counterattack on Goose Green uppermost in everybody's minds and the chance that 45 Commando and 3 Para might be in contact at any moment if the Argentines reacted to their steady advance east, the evening logistical conference revealed grave shortcomings in the stock situation at the Brigade Maintenance Area: only eighty-three rounds for each 105mm light gun; a total of thirty Milan missiles for the whole Brigade; no one-man ration packs; two days supply of ten-man packs ... no spare clothing; three days worth of medical stocks." [1613]

Some 40 kilometers to the north, 45 Commando and 3 Para reach their objectives – Douglas and the Teal Inlet Settlement. Argentina's garrison has gone.

"The immediate reaction of the people in the settlement was delight and to offer as much help as possible. ... The enemy, who had vacated the settlement about two days before the Commando's arrival, were the same who had fled before 3 Para on D-Day. They had treated the settlers very crudely, vandalising houses and stealing valuables. The entire community had been locked in the schoolroom for four days." [1614]

May 29th, at Goose Green, just after midnight, an ultimatum is delivered to the Argentine defenders.

> *"To the Commander, Argentine armed forces, Darwin/Goose Green area.*
>
> *Military options: We have sent a prisoner of war under a white flag to convey the following military options: That you surrender your force to us by leaving the township, forming up in a military manner, removing your helmets and laying down your weapons. You will give prior notice of the intention by returning the POW under the white flag with him briefed as to formalities no later that 0830 local time. You refuse in the first case to surrender and take the inevitable consequences. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the POW without his white flag (though his neutrality will be respected) no later than 0830 hours local. In any event and in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Conventions and Laws of War you shall be held responsible for the fate of any civilians in Darwin or Goose Green and we in accordance with those laws do give you prior notice of our intention to bombard Darwin/Goose Green. Signed: C. Keeble, Commander British Forces, Darwin/Goose Green area"* [1615]

Shortly after dawn, the Argentine officer who had delivered the ultimatum returns with a message that a meeting of the two sides should take place at the airfield at 09.30 local time.

"I was taken back to the 2m every 90 minutes to confirm the first meeting would take place at the windsock at 7.30am on 29th May. The last confirmation was at 7am. During the night, my guard, Kishimotto fell asleep and I took a page off the Ham Radio pad and wrote a surrender note. At 7.15am, stopping at West End House, I passed the note to Pedroza, he read it and passed it to Lieutenant Colonel Italo Piaggi, who in turn gave it to Gopcevich. He interpreted it and read it out loud. He passed my note to Pedrozo who folded it and put it in his

1611 The British had become wary of white flags
1612 Middlebrook 2003
1613 Thompson 1992
1614 *Ibid.*
1615 Quoted in Briley 2022

tunic breast pocket. Gopcevich then punched me hard in the chest and told me to come no further as this matter was none of my business. I continued to watch the meeting unfold at a distance. It was then I noticed two British soldiers observe the meeting from the gorse hedge by the fence before they melted into the grass and disappeared. The Argentines returned to the settlement and began to lay down their arms." [1616]

Following talks, and after burning the regimental flag, at 1050, Lieut. Colonel Italo Piaggi and 1,100 Argentine troops surrender. [1617]

> *"The British Ministry of Defense announced ... that its forces had captured Goose Green and Darwin, suffering only light casualties. The Argentine Joint Chiefs of Staff denied the claim. Press reports indicate that other units, supported by artillery and light tanks, are moving eastward toward Stanley. ... The British ground offensive has begun in earnest. ... The seizure of Darwin and Goose Green removes the threat posed by Argentine forces there to the flank of the principle British thrust, provides an additional operating base for Harrier aircraft, and places British forces astride the main east-west route to Stanley."* [1618]



"... the Official Argentine Army Report states that the total number of soldiers present at Darwin Goose Green area on May 27th was 981. The commanding officer of the Task Force, Lt. Col. Piaggi, reported that on the same date, the number of his soldiers present in the area was 684, and, when considering the reinforcement sent in by helicopters, the final number of his forces reached 790. Cervo points out that the total Argentine army troops present in the area at the beginning of the fighting was 643 and that the final total count never exceeded 881. In addition, Air force personnel numbered 202. The official number of Argentine fatalities was 47, with 98 wounded." [1619]

"When they eventually marched out from their shelters, the Argentines discovered to their amazement that only a few hundred paratroopers surrounded them. The weary men of 2Para were no less surprised when they counted a thousand Argentine prisoners marching past. It was a stunning victory for the British. The paratroopers also took possession of the spoils of war in and around the Goose Green settlement, including four 105mm howitzers, two 35mm air defence guns, six 20mm air defense guns, six 120mm mortars and two Pucara aircraft." [1620]

"Hours after Goose Green fell, the Argentine air commander in Port Stanley praised the British airmen, sailors, squaddies, marines and special forces who bled for their victory. Britain maintained "absolute supremacy at sea, with all the operational and logistical consequences which this implies". ... At Goose Green "the enemy demonstrated great mobility through [the use of] helicopters, over-whelming fire power and anti-air [fire power] through the use of portable missiles, acting in exact coordination with supporting naval fire, employing it as back-up and relief for troops engaged in the front line". ... Argentine forces "offered strenuous resistance" but were badly trained and led ... "This message is top secret". Northwood received the

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1616 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.45
1617 Thompson (1992) put British casualties at 20 dead and 40 wounded. Argentine casualties were believed to be 55 killed with 90 wounded. Sources differ.
1618 CIA Assessment. See - https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21355-19820529-uk-argentina-british-military-gains
1619 Corbacho 2004
1620 Privratsky 2014

commander's missive, headlined 'Commander Falklands Group Laments the Inferiority of the Argentine Forces', at about the same time that authorities in Buenos Aires did." [1621]

"The tractor and McConnel arm were out and up and running within an hour of the Argentine surrender. We needed them to dig a mass grave for the 37 bodies which were around the settlement." [1622]

"The Argentine authorities were severely shaken by the complete loss of the strong garrison and the air base at Goose Green in less than twenty-four hours of actual fighting. The news was not released on the mainland for some time,..." [1623]

At Goose Green, interned Falkland Islanders are released and given medical attention. None of the 112 civilians are found to have been harmed by their experience.

> *"At one end of Goose Green settlement a Union Jack now flies high above the school. At the other end, the flag of the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment. After a whole day's bitter fighting and a morning's delicate surrender negotiations, the cheers of liberation came in the early afternoon. Women handed round cups of tea in Royal wedding mugs. Children carried round tins of sweets and biscuits to young Paras ... For nearly a month, 114 people had been shut up by the Argentinians in community hall. Their houses had been raided with furniture smashed and excrement on the floor. ... Now the 1200 or so prisoners are being made to clean up the mess..."* [1624]

Local Falkland Islands Company agent, Robert Hardcastle, reports to the company.

> *"Very thankful to be liberated. ... Some houses destroyed. All employees and visitors safe. ... Regret to advise goons occupied and looted all houses, stores, farm materials, Rovers, tractors and equipment. Settlement area a shambles. Much indiscriminate sheep killing for food by goons in helicopters ..."*

British commanders are now faced with the problem of the aftermath of Goose Green.

"... if 2 Para's success was a boost to British morale and a catalyst for future planning, it also proved to be a bane for logisticians in 3 Commando Brigade. The stunning capture of a thousand Argentines provided good publicity. At the time of capture, though, these enemy prisoners of war represented nearly twenty per cent of the entire British Land Force. The impact on Commando Logistic Regiment and future logistical planning became staggering. The Regiment knew before landing that it would have responsibility for guarding prisoners. ... The problem presented by this mass surrender, however, was not just one of guarding and controlling prisoners in a congested BMA. As he put it later, Commando Logistic Regiment simply 'did not have the tentage, wire, pickets, cookers and canteens' to establish and run a prisoner of war camp. Now, transportation, always at a premium whether on sea or land, had to be diverted to transferring prisoners from Goose Green to Ajax. The Argentines were in need of food due to lack of adequate provisioning at Goose Green. Several hundred of them required treatment of wounds, and British blood supplies already were critically low. Dozens more had to be buried, and the Regiment still had not managed to locate the body bags it shipped south for its own casualties, let alone for enemy dead. The Regiment would eventually bury the dead Argentines in a mass grave near Darwin." [1625]

1621 Ferris 2020. Not named, the Argentine air commander at Port Stanley was Brigadier Luis Guillermo Castelano.
1622 Eric Goss in Clack & Pollard 2022 p.45
1623 Van der Bijl 2023. On his return to Argentina, Lt.-Colonel Piaggi was forced to resign his commission and later faced several trials questioning his competence. Finally, in 1992, Piaggi had his military rank and pay restored.
1624 From Robert Fox, BBC, embedded with 2 Para.
1625 Privratsky 2014

To the north-east of the Falklands, a British fuel tanker, *British Wye*, is attacked by an Argentine *C-130 Hercules*. Of eight bombs dropped, only one hits the vessel. It fails to explode.

In Stanley, Argentine conscripts are suffering from malnutrition.

> *"The Argentine troops are very apprehensive, in some cases very frightened, here in Stanley. One broke down and had to be carried away by his mates. Another wandered up the road in tears, dragging his rifle. There are hundreds of them about the streets, clustered in pathetic, depressed groups, their clothes and boots sodden with rain and trench water. Very little spirit seems left in them. They are now realising that the push is about to hit them – and hit them hard… The food situation among troops in Stanley is becoming increasingly desperate. Jeremy says that yesterday when he was tipping out the rubbish at the dump the soldiers were waiting for his arrival with sticks for bits of food."* [1626]

From Paris, President Mitterrand informs Mrs. Thatcher that he is under pressure to complete the order of *Exocet* missiles to Peru.

> *"Peru has made it known to other Latin American countries that France is declining to execute the contract. Consequently, France's contracts with other Latin American countries are in danger."*

In New York, with both sides now aware of the other's '*minimum*' for a ceasefire, Argentina's representative contacts the UN Secretary-General to claim that the British base line amount to terms, *"for surrender."*

In Washington, a new Organisation of American States (OAS) resolution openly sides with Buenos Aires.

> *"The Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs, Resolves:*
>
> *1. To condemn most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and its decision, which affects the security of the entire American hemisphere, of arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 12 miles from the American coasts as a zone of hostilities, which is aggravated by the circumstance that when these actions were taken all possibilities of negotiation seeking a peaceful settlement of the conflict had not been exhausted.*
>
> *2. To reiterate its firm demand upon the United Kingdom that it cease immediately its acts of war against the Argentine Republic and order the immediate withdrawal of all its armed forces detailed there and the return of its task force to its usual stations.*
>
> 3. *To deplore the fact that the attitude of the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate the negotiations for a peaceful settlement that were conducted by Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations."* [1627]

Ambassador William Middendorf, on behalf of the US, abstains.

> *"We believe the Resolution before us to be one-sided. It charges some; it ignores the actions of others. It ignores what the legal effects of first use of force should be. Further, there is no recognition that there must be compliance by both parties with all elements of UN Security Council Resolution 502 …"*[1628]

1626 Diary entry in Smith 1984. p.189

1627 *OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc 80/82 rev.2*

1628 Quoted in *Peace and Change* Denis R. Gordon 1987. See also *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.90

An added declaration by the OAS assembly calls for assistance to be given to Argentina to "*overcome the harmful effects of the British blockade and international sanction*." [1629]

"After 17 hours of emotional debate that ended early this morning, foreign ministers from Latin America today condemned Britain's attack on the Falkland Islands and urged the United States to halt its aid to the British. The action came in a 17 to 0 vote with 4 abstentions at the Organization of American States building here. The United States abstained, along with Chile, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, calling the resolution one-sided. The action appeared to represent a significant setback to United States relations with Latin America. Sources at the O.A.S. said they had seldom seen such emotion and frustration emerge over an issue. The resolution seemed to further confirm the view of many Reagan Administration officials that the Falklands conflict has created a major shift in attitudes and policies throughout South America that will inevitably harm United States interests. This gloomy analysis is said to be shared by many of the Administration's leading experts on Latin America." [1630]

"The Argentine Military Junta again requested the application of the TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) in May, in rejection of the aid that the United States was providing to Great Britain. In the meetings of American representatives, the Reagan government was directly accused of violating the pact. Argentina once again obtained seventeen favorable votes, and the abstention of the same four countries (as April 27th). Beyond these resolutions, Argentina did not manage to get the TIAR to provide concrete support for its position, after which this military pact lost all legitimacy." [1631]

After the OAS meeting, Britain's Ambassador Henderson tells Secretary Haig that London is considering some form of independence for the Falkland Islanders.

Haig responds with his own thoughts regarding a ceasefire.

"Haig ... gave me a piece of paper containing four points ... in connection with the American ideas – (1) restoration of local administration does not include return of a Governor; (2) avoidance of publicly espousing independence or semi-independence, as the British goal; (3) agreement on withdrawal would have to say something about non-reintroduction of forces; contact group to stay on indefinitely." [1632]

PM Thatcher, on receiving Haig's suggestions, writes *"NO"* against (2), (3) and (4).

From South Georgia, the civilian liner *QE2* heads back towards home.

"... amidst renewed reports that Argentina was attempting to strike civilian vessels, QE2 abruptly headed north at dusk on 29 May for the United Kingdom. On board were survivors of Ardent, Antelope, and Coventry. The troop ship had been so difficult to unload that, when she sailed, 70 per cent of 5 Brigade's 81mm mortar and 105mm gun ammunition remained buried in lower decks." [1633]

May 30th, in the Falklands, 3 Para move forward towards Estancia House. A party of 2 Para arrive at Swan Inlet House to be informed by the local manager that there are no Argentine troops at either Fitzroy or Bluff Cove. 45 Commando are ordered to leave Douglas and advance to Teal Inlet.

Major General John Jeremy Moore arrives in the Falkland Islands to take overall charge of land forces; relieving Brigadier Julian Thompson as ground commander.

1629 *OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.20 Doc 77/82 rev.2*
1630 *New York Times* May 30, 1982
1631 *La Guerra de Malvinas, La Doctrina Monroe y La Crisis del TIAR* Leandro Morgenfeld in *La doctrina Monroe contra America Latina y el Caribe 1823 - 2023* Carlos Oliva Campos (ed) 2023.
1632 *PREM19/632 Telegram No.1963 of 29 May*
1633 Privratsky 2014

"His presence was particularly welcome for it heralded the arrival of the Army Brigade. The new command would see the problems of terrain, weather and air strikes first hand. There would be a better chance of those back in England now understanding our problems and accepting how successful the gaining of the initial foothold had been. However ... "He was in a terrible mood as I welcomed him at the waters edge to the Falkland Islands. Stormed past, followed by a rather puzzled-looking staff. ..."." [1634]

"As commander, land forces, Falkland Islands, Moore was the figurehead officer in charge at that final stage of the campaign ... Moore played a relatively small part in the Falklands operation. From the task force's departure on April 5, it was a naval responsibility, under Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward; once the 3,500 Royal Marines and paratroopers of 3 Commando Brigade landed on May 21, effective control passed to Brigadier Julian Thompson, whose job it was to recapture Stanley. It was only with the arrival of a second brigadier, Tony Wilson, and 5 Infantry Brigade, that an officer of Moore's seniority was needed to adjudicate on possible disputes between two military men of equal rank." [1635]

"When he arrived in the San Carlos area on 30 May, Major General Moore was intent on bringing the war smartly to an end. All British land forces now were under his command and control. When the Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas arrived in the next few days, numbers on land would increase to around 10,000. It had been nine days since the successful amphibious landing. Losses had been significant on land as well as at sea since then. Although the stunning victory at Goose Green had bolstered morale in the Task Force and back in London, much remained to be done. Moore hoped to bring the war to an end in the next week. Much depended, however, on how quickly he could get remaining units and supplies in position for an attack on Argentine forces concentrated around Stanley. By this time, units were spread around East Falkland. Two units, 45 Commando and 3 Para, were completing their movements across East Falkland carrying heavy packs. On Mount Kent, 42 Commando was digging in under harsh weather. Exhausted from fighting down the isthmus, 2 Para remained around the settlement at Goose Green, ... In reserve and still at San Carlos was 40 Commando." [1636]

In London, Thatcher responds to the French President's message of the previous day; *"If it became known, as it certainly would, that France was now releasing weapons to Peru that would be passed on to Argentina for use against us, France's ally, this would have a devastating effect on the relationship between our two countries. Indeed it would have a devastating effect on the alliance (NATO) as a whole."*

From the Foreign Office, Pym diplomatically advises Ambassador Henderson in Washington DC; *"Haig's ideas are being examined very carefully, but they require a good deal of further consideration by Ministers. We foresee that it will probably not, repeat not, be possible to transmit a full response to him through you before Tuesday 1 June.."*

Pym also informs Parsons in New York, that the Argentine terms for a ceasefire are unacceptable; and that Britain's position is as previously stated on May 27th.


> *"You should hold out no hope of our altering it in the face of the continued Argentine intransigence ... We naturally recognise that, in the circumstances, the Secretary-General may feel obliged to report failure to the Security Council..."*

1634 Southby-Tailyour 1990
1635 *Major General Sir Jeremy Moore Obituary* in *The Guardian* September 18 2007
1636 Privratsky 2014

To the north-east of East Falkland, during the early afternoon two *Super Éntendards*, escorted by four *A4C Skyhawks*, approach the carrier group. An *Exocet* missile is fired and both aircraft immediately turn away. [1637]

> *"Argentina said tonight that its warplanes had attacked and put out of commission a British aircraft carrier, hitting it with bombs and an Exocet missile. The military command said in a communique that the aircraft carrier was attacked today by Argentine Super Etendard and Skyhawk fighters 90 miles east of the Falkland Islands. The communique said columns of smoke were rising from the crippled carrier. The British task force has two carriers, the Hermes and the Invincible. The communique did not say which of the two had been hit, but a spokesman for the military command said pilots suspected that it was the Invincible. In London, the British Ministry of Defense tonight denied that the Invincible had been hit. … The (Argentine) command said the attack was "without precedent" and put the carrier "out of combat."..."* [1638]

The Super Éntendard approach, made without the benefit of up-to-date reconnaissance, was not far enough to the east and, instead of striking at the less protected rear of the task force where the aircraft-carriers were, came in amongst the outer Type 42 destroyer screen which was approximately thirty miles to the west of the carriers. The presence of the Super Éntendard and the launch of the Exocet were detected... the Exocet did not hit a ship and eventually ran out of fuel and fell into the sea."[1639]



"They detected several echoes ahead of them in the target area, and, .., the missile was fired at what was believed to be Invincible 15 miles ahead. They then turned away to find their tanker. The target identified was not Invincible but Avenger.... The Avenger's chaff distracted the missile, which passed close to the ship but did no harm. Then came in the four A4s. One was caught by a Sea Dart... while another was hit by small arms fire from Avenger or debris from the explosion that had taken out the first A4. The other two dropped their bombs but missed and turned away to safety." [1640]

1637 Subsequently both pilots claimed to have attacked, and damaged, the aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible*. However, the carrier was some 30 miles away to the east when the attack took place. Neither *Avenger* (the actual target), nor *Invincible,* were hit. Witness evidence from the 170 crew members of HMS *Avenger* and *Invincible*'s 1,100 crew have, todate, proven insufficient to counter this myth in Argentina; which persists. In his book *Wings of the Malvinas: The Argentine Air Force over the Falklands* Santiago Rivas recorded the testimony of the two surviving pilots – 1st Lt. Gerardo Isaac and 1st Lt. Ernesto Ureta. Only Isaac had been certain that *Invincible* was his target on firing his missile. Ureta was persuaded of the identity of the target on his return to Argentina. Both surviving pilots subsequently received awards – the Cruz de la Nación Argentina al Heroico Valor en Combate. Britain's official Attack Report can be found here – https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/05/may-30-1982-attack-report.pdf

1638 *New York Times* May 31, 1982.

1639 Middlebrook 2003

1640 Freedman 2005 vol.2. At the end of the war, *Invincible* was inspected by a Chilean officer, Andres Ortega;reported in the Spanish Newspaper *El Pais on* July 12, 1982 (*El portaeronaves británico 'Invencible',en perfecto estado, permanece vigilando las Malvinas*). See - https://elpais.com/diario/1982/07/12/internacional/395272804_850215.html

"Argentine pilots claimed they had attacked Invincible on 30 May with an Exocet missile and bombs, setting the carrier ablaze, but this was untrue. Admiral Woodward kept the carriers out of harm's way, prompting jokes that they were nearer South Africa than Argentina." [1641]

HMS *Ambuscade* and HMS *Glamorgan* bombard targets near Stanley. *Harriers* attack Argentine positions to the east of Mount Kent. One *Harrier*, having received damage from small arms fire, crashes into the sea. The pilot is rescued. 45 Commando reach Teal Inlet. 3 Para discover Estancia House devoid of enemy troops, and secure the position. An Argentine *Puma* helicopter crashes to the north of Mount Kent, killing its seven passengers. The crew survive. The Argentine administration extends the curfew. No civilian is allowed out of their house between 4pm and 8.30am. An evacuation of houses to the south of Davis Street is ordered.

> *"Last night's bombardment must have really made the Argentine's eyes water, especially up in the trenches and dug-outs at the back of the town. It was rather scary at times down here; it must have been bloody terrifying up there… There is the possibility of a total house curfew as the British troops continue their advance towards Stanley, so spent much of today storing water in the house…. The supply was cut off again at 4 this afternoon… On the Argentine news they admit to having lost contact with their troops at Goose Green. They also claim to have bombed HMS Invincible – Britain says this is untrue."* [1642]

Argentine special forces discover that Mount Kent, with its commanding view of Port Stanley, is occupied by Britain's Special Air Service (SAS). During a fire-fight, two Argentines are killed; five are wounded and one captured. Three SAS men are injured. Elements of 42 Commando land on Mount Kent in support of the SAS defenders forcing Argentine forces to withdraw.

"They could see Stanley laid out before them about eighteen kilometres away, the harbour and town looking exactly like the air photographs, taken years before, that they had studied for so long on the voyage south. The end really was in sight, but... Commando Tactical Headquarters, one rifle company, one SAS Squadron, six 81mm mortars and three light guns with very little ammunition were sitting on a key piece of ground near, nobody knew exactly how near, six Argentine infantry regiments, supported by thirty-eight 105mm guns and probably some 155mm guns. The nearest British troops were 3 Para at least half a day's march away. … the 200 or so Commandos and SAS men were on their own." [1643]

In Buenos Aires, a report is submitted to the military leadership;*"In the period from May 1 to May 29, 1982, forty (40) combat aircraft have been destroyed, which means 27% of the available supply of the FAA. Thirty-five (35) officers killed in combat."* [1644]

Spain formally joins NATO as its sixteenth member.

May 31st, *Sea Harriers* attack Stanley airfield. 2 Para settle in at Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. [1645]

1641 Briley 2022.Worthy of note that, on the day, *Invincible* had a crew of 1,050. Also on board, were two Argentine POWs in need of medical treatment. In all the years since, not a single witness has come forward to say that the ship was attacked. Not one, has written a book.

1642 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.192.

1643 Thompson 1992

1644 *Operations Report 214/82* quoted in *The tense conversation between Reagan and Thatcher in the middle of the Falklands war in which they spoke of "left Peronists"* Juan Bautista Yofre in *Infobae* May 31, 2020

1645 Having moved forward with unexpected speed, there was now the logistical problem of moving up enough reinforcements and equipment to hold the position. A decision was made to reinforce by sea, but this would take some days. *cf.* 5/6 June.

In Argentina, newspapers report a successful attack on HMS *Invincible*.

> *"The "Invincible" Was Seriously Damaged.*
>
> *In a daring operation, Navy and Air Force aircraft yesterday carried out an attack on the British fleet and caused very serious damage to an aircraft carrier – the "Invincible" that left it out of combat. Two Exocet missiles, fired by the Super Etendart, and high-powered bombs dropped by A4C fighters hit targets on the ship that began to burn."*


Clarín

EL "INVINCIBLE" FUE SERIAMENTE AVERIADO

En un operativo de audaces características, aviones de la Armada y de la Fuerza Aérea concretaron ayer un ataque sobre la flota británica y provocaron gravísimos daños en un portaaviones —el "invincible"— que lo dejaron fuera de combate. Dos misiles Exocet, disparados por los Super Etendart, y bombas de alto poder lanzadas por cazas A4C hicieron blanco en la nave que comenzó a incendiarse. Por otra parte, se produjo un intenso bombardeo británico sobre Puerto Argentino a cargo de fragatas y cuatro Harrier, dos de los cuales fueron abatidos.

"On Monday, May 31, the evening newspaper La Razón had a full page headline "The English aircraft carrier was out of combat. Evaluations are being carried out to find out if it is the Invincible, Brigadier Lami Dozo said today". El popular was not far behind: "The Invincible out of combat"." [1646]

From Paris, President Mitterrand informs Peru that its *Exocet* order cannot be met for; *"political reasons."*

In Argentina, an order signed by Vice-Admiral Lombardo alerts local forces on the coasts of Patagonia to the possibility that the British may attack the continent. [1647]

"The losses in aeronautics caused a state of tension among the troops stationed at the bases of the South Air Force. This is the only way to understand the visit that Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo made to Comodoro Rivadavia on May 31. To make matters worse, CEOPECON Agreement Act No. 12, of the same day, said that "it was agreed to alert the Maritime Littoral Defense System to the possibility that the English fleet would attack the continent seeking to affect its own air power." On that occasion, Lami Dozo told the accompanying journalism that the air power was ready to respond to the UK attacks." [1648]

In Buenos Aires, President Leopoldo Galtieri meets with the Soviet Ambassador Sergei Striganov. There is an agreement that Argentina will accept economic and military aid from the Soviet Union. [1649]

"The weight of the evidence suggests that Moscow made offers but the Argentines were unresponsive and the war in any case proceeded too fast for any aid to become topical." [1650]

On East Falkland, Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre troops attack Argentine special forces at Top Malo House, some nine kilometers south of Teal Inlet.

The British force takes the position after a short but fierce firefight, in which five Argentines are killed and seven are wounded; five more are taken prisoner.[1651] Three British Paratroopers are injured. [1652]

1646 Yofre 2011

1647 *Malvinas: la visita de Edward Denmark, entre la admiración y la vergüenza* in *Tribuna* January 25, 2020. After the conflict, war pensions were restricted to those members of the Argentine forces that had actually served in the archipelago. This caused a good deal of resentment among those troops on the mainland who felt that they had also taken part in the war by defending their country. *cf.* 1984

1648 Juan Bautista Yofre in *Infobae* May 31, 2020

1649 Mastny 1983

1650 *Ibid.*

1651 Thompson 1992

1652 Contrary to Argentine reports, there were no British deaths resulting from this action. See Middlebrook 2003

"Unknown to the Cadre the assault had been watched by two other Argentine Ops who, having seen the treatment meted out to their comrades and imagining that it was their turn next, decided to call it a day. One OP stationed on the summit of Mount Simon walked into Teal Inlet where they were picked up by 45 Commando. The other walked from The Baby towards Lower Malo House and surrendered to 3 Para." [1653]

At San Carlos, *Elk* and *Sir Lancelot* are unloaded while POWs are embarked onto *Sir Percival*.

"Out at sea... 5 Infantry Brigade arrived ... spread, with their equipment, across a variety of ships: Canberra, Norland, Nordic Ferry and Atlantic causeway, all supported by the tanker Blue Rover." [1654]

In New York, at the United Nations building, Argentina's representatives circulates the Organisation of American States (OAS) resolution (No.29), claiming it to be a *"document of the Security Council."* Parsons recommends to the Foreign Office, that he should respond by pointing out that the OAS resolution fails to refer to Security Council resolutions *502* and *505*. Also that the Security Council has; *"the Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."* Separately, Parsons provides Britain's response to Pérez de Cuéllar's question.

> *"You asked what terms for a ceasefire would be acceptable to us. ... Our answer to your question is that a cease-fire must be inseparably linked to the commencement of the withdrawal of Argentine troops and to the completion of the withdrawal within a fixed period. ... While we should be willing to consider in the longer term the possibility of alternative international security arrangements for the protection of the Islanders, there is no question of our agreeing to the withdrawal of British forces in parallel to Argentine withdrawal."* [1655]

The Secretary-General summons Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, before ringing the British Mission with the result. Parsons reports.

> *"Pérez de Cuéllar telephoned me after seeing Ros to ask if I would receive De Soto in my mission: Pérez de Cuéllar had some questions .. De Soto turned up about two hours later. It emerged that a 5 point plan for the implementation of SCR 502 and 505 had been put to the Argentines who, after long deliberation amongst themselves, had agreed to forward it to Buenos Aires. However, Ros had not brought any fresh instructions to deliver to the Secretary-General: he had called only to hear our final response... Pérez de Cuéllar's 5 point plan is - (1) at time 'T' a ceasefire would come into force and be monitored by UN observers; (2) at time 'T' plus 24 hours, Argentine withdrawal would begin in implementation of SCR 502 (ie total Argentine withdrawal), (3) at time 'T' plus 24 hours, token British withdrawal would begin, (4) the withdrawals would be completed within 'X' days, (5) negotiations would begin under the auspices of the Secretary-General within the framework of SCR 505. De Soto summed up Pérez de Cuéllar's views as follows. Points (2) and (4) would give us total Argentine withdrawal, whereas point (3) would amount to the restoration of British Administration. ... He hoped this would enable us to consider "the longer term" more as "the near future"..."*

In a separate telegram, Sir Anthony Parsons opines.

> *"I believe that this is a genuine effort by Pérez de Cuéllar to try to find a last-minute solution ... I do not believe that he is playing some kind of double game. However, as I see it, his proposals are unacceptable. First, if UN observers were in situ under a mandatory Resolution, and the Argentines*

1653 Thompson 1992
1654 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012
1655 *PREM19/633 Telegram No.485 of 31 May*

found pretexts not to withdraw, it would be very difficult for us to resume military action. Secondly, his plan involves some British withdrawal. Thirdly, it could resuscitate the whole idea of UN interim administration, target dates and UN supervision of the negotiations for a final solution. Nevertheless, it enables us to buy a little more time … I recommend therefore that I should be instructed to give him a reasoned response. His proposals pose greater difficulties for the Argentines, since they involve total Argentine withdrawal ... This is another reason why it will be in our interests to talk to him …"

In Washington DC, following a meeting with US Permanent Representative to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick, President Reagan telephones Margaret Thatcher to suggest that the British call a halt to hostilities.

"Look, could I be impertinent and take the liberty of transmitting some of my thoughts about the Falklands situation right now? Because, well, your impressive military advance could perhaps modify the diplomatic options, as we see them, that we would have between today and next Friday. By the way, I would like to congratulate you on what you and your young people are doing there. They have taken great risks and have shown the world that unprovoked aggression does not end well.

I know that Al Haig has conveyed to you some of our ideas on how we could capitalize on your success with a diplomatic initiative, and I support the concept that… given the actions of Argentina in all this matter, a new initiative might not be successful, but even if they rejected it, I think that the effort to show that we are willing to reach an agreement consistent with our principles could end the efforts of some leftists in South America who are actively trying to exploit the crisis.

Well, thinking about this plan ... Well, this is what you had in mind, but we believe that the only possibility of success would be before the capture of Port Stanley.

We wanted Latin [American] support, and we spoke with the President of Brazil, Figueiredo, when he was here; He wants to help, but, knowing the Argentines, he believes that the best possibility of a peaceful solution would be before a total Argentine humiliation. ... I think you would be in a very favorable position."

Irritated, Thatcher interrupts:

"*I didn't lose some of my best ships and some of my finest lives, to leave quietly under a ceasefire without the Argentines withdrawing... I'm not handing over the island now … I can't lose the lives and blood of our soldiers to hand the islands over to a contact group. It's not possible… This is democracy and our island, and the very worst thing for democracy would be if we failed now …"* [1656]

"President Reagan said that the USA considered it imperative that the UK should show that it was prepared to talk before the Argentineans were forced to withdraw. Willingness to talk now could prevent a Peronist take-over in Argentina in the future. …" [1657]

"He tried to avoid an English attack on Puerto Argentino and prevent a humiliating situation for Argentina."[1658]

"Upping the ante, on May 31 Thatcher demanded even more support from Reagan under the guise of stopping the conflict as soon as possible and thus saving lives at risk. In reality, it seems that the "iron lady" wanted to destroy the Argentine economy in pursuit of a quick victory. "I wonder if I can ask you to consider," Thatcher

1656 It is said that Reagan held the phone up so that his aides could here the tirade. The President of the United States; Leader of the Free World, could not get a word in edgeways.

1657 *Thatcher was ready for Falkland Islands deal, National Archives papers show* Richard Norton-Taylor & Owen Bowcott in *The Guardian* December 28, 2012

1658 Juan Bautista Yofre in *Infobae* May 31, 2020

asks: "... go further and impose a total blockade of Argentine imports in the United States? I believe that this would be, by far, the single most effective measure you could take to bring this crisis to a solution by peaceful means and I feel that we must make every effort to achieve that ... it would also coincide with the action that our European allies and the Commonwealth have taken over... I know this will affect their economic interests... but the same is true for many European allies, especially Italy and Germany. They have been ready to take these radical measures despite their political and legal problems because they see the real danger it poses to the safety of all of us if the Argentine aggression is not reversed."..." [1659]

After speaking to the President, Thatcher calls the British Ambassador in Washington.

"After the call, she immediately rang Henderson on an open line to complain. She had been 'dismayed' by Reagan's attitude and wished the President to know how 'upset' she was at being presented with 'another peace initiative', one that was 'pure Haigism': "We were prepared to negotiate before but not now. We have lost a lot of blood and it's the best blood. Do they not realise that it is an issue of principle? We cannot surrender principles for expediency."... Almost immediately after this conversation the Ambassador was contacted by Haig. He was full of admiration for the Prime Minister but concerned that relations were entering a difficult phase – "we can't accept intransigence."..." [1660]

From the Cayman Islands, £500,000, much of it raised by public collections, is sent to the UK; *"at a time when their Mother Country is in need of help."*

On East Falkland, at dusk, an Argentine *C-130 Hercules* transport place lands at Stanley airfield. On board is a platform designed to fire *MM38 Exocet* missiles, together with two *MM38*s. [1661]

"... a complete system had to be designed. .., consisting of an artifact to simulate the electrical signal that the ship's computer sends to the missile in its original mounting on board, .., a cart to transport the missiles, a target detection system and a generator to provide electrical energy. This equipment had to be built quickly, using only the elements that could usually be to be found in a naval workshop, ... This homemade system was developed by a naval officer and his small group of technicians, who in two weeks assembled it ... removing a couple of missile containers from a destroyer, placing them on a trailer, testing it manually in the Naval Base of Puerto Belgrano, "cheating" the missile by electronic means to behave as if you were on board a ship. Finally, after fifteen days of continuous work, the entire launch process could be simulated,... tested over a dozen times to make sure it worked correctly. Simultaneously, in the Naval Arsenal of Puerto Belgrano, (was) built a platform to mount the the missiles on the launch pad, and a old Siemens electric generator, with technology from the 1930s, ... With the construction work finished, the launcher of Exocet was now to be airlifted to the Falklands. Two Hercules planes remained available for loading the cart, the ramp, along with a couple of containers with their missiles, the Siemens electric generator and the simulated boxes with the ITB system, with a total weight in the order of eight tons.... The first Hercules landed, at dusk on the 31st of May, so that the ITB was finally able to reach the islands, after three weeks from its original conception." [1662]

Late evening, British troops establish themselves on Mount Challenger, overlooking the Stanley/Bluff Cove road. Argentina's Air Force commences night bombing raids.

1659 *Guerra Fría e intervención estadounidense en Malvinas (1982)* Ana Laura Bochicchio 2021 in *Quinto Sol: Revista de Historia* vol.25 no.1

1660 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1661 The *MM38* was a surface to surface missile designed for use on ships.

1662 *Inventiva bajo presión: El lanzador costero de Exocet en la Guerra de Malvinas* Alejandro Amendolara 2012. ITB was the name given the device by its builders - Instalación de Tiro Berreta (Berreta Shooting Facility).

"Their first attack in this new phase, by two Canberras against British troop positions in the San Carlos area, took place on the night of 31 May. This night raid took the British by surprise, but only minor damage was caused, with one man slightly injured." [1663]

From Buenos Aires, a group of women from the Anglo-Argentine community write to Queen Elizabeth II, appealing for pressure to be brought upon the British Government; *"... in the hope that Her Majesty's influence will rectify the erroneous course taken by Mrs. Thatcher and her Government regarding the Malvinas Question. ... Furthermore, by breaking a British "tradition of honour and behaviour," the women continued, the actions of the previous weeks made the "British and their descendants resident in Argentina shameful of the acts and deeds of the actual [sic] British Government." ..."* [1664]

In the Falklands, during the night, Mount Kent is reinforced. 3 Para secure Estancia House. [1665]

Much needed supplies reach both 3 Para and 45 Commando.

"The push to get supplies to 3 Para and 45 Commando had started on 31 May, when Intrepid made an emergency run around the north coast of East Falkland and launched two of her LCUs with 250 tons of critical supplies for Teal Inlet." [1666]

HM Submarine *Onyx* arrives; *"... now giving us the ability to land the SBS with more chance of success than before."* [1667]

In Washington DC, late evening, Argentine Ambassador Takacs, speaks to Tom Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, regarding a new peace proposal; Responding to Security Council Resolution No. 502 and to the United Nations Charter, both parties accept the good offices of the Secretary General for an agreement on resolving the conflict over the islands in the South Atlantic and agree to the following: (1) Beginning at H Hour on D Day, the parties undertake to refrain from the use of firepower or other hostile actions. (2) Immediate installation of an interim authority in the person of an Administrator, designated by the United Nations Secretary General, for the government of the islands during the negotiations. The Administrator will be assisted by an equal number of representatives designated by each party, as required by the Administrator. The latter will exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of this agreement; the parties agree to provide him with the necessary means for the normal daily life of the inhabitants. (3) Immediately following the installation of the United Nations Administration in the islands, both parties agree to withdraw their forces an equal distance under the conditions established by the Administrator designated by the United Nations Secretary General. (4) Both parties agree not to reintroduce any armed forces in the demilitarized zone in accordance with paragraph 3. (5) Four countries will ensure that the forces are withdrawn and are not reintroduced; these countries will be the United States, Peru, and two other countries, one to be named by each of the two parties. (6) Beginning on the date of signature of this agreement, the parties agree that the economic measures they have taken against the other party on their own initiative or through third countries will cease to have effect. (7) Both parties will initiate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General to reach, on an urgent basis,a peaceful settlement of the dispute in which the definitive status of the islands will be agreed upon. For these negotiations the Secretary General will rely on the assistance of the representatives of the four countries referred to in paragraph 5.

1663 Middlebrook 2003
1664 Mercau 2016
1665 Thompson 1992
1666 Privratsky 2014
1667 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012

"*Takacs, reflecting Lami Dozo, continues to have unrealistic views of the military situation. He believes the carrier was in fact seriously damaged, that Argentine troops on the islands can hold out for 3 or 4 weeks, and that "15 or 20" British ships more will be sunk. He is talking about continuing the war after the British win in the Falklands. Takacs had learned (through a Senate staff source) that the President had called Prime Minister Thatcher, and that the call "had not gone well".*"[1668]

June 1st, British intelligence reports that Libya is supplying missiles to Argentina in military and civilian *Boeing 707*'s; transiting via Cape Verde/Las Palmas and Brazil. [1669]

"Argentine buyers have also been combing the world for Exocets, almost all the sources said. One diplomat close to the Argentine military and one arms salesman said they had obtained one or more Exocets, but it was unclear how many. The diplomat said the Libyan Government had arranged the purchase -- Libya does not have the missiles in stock -- but others said the private black market or Peru appeared more likely suppliers."[1670]

"Libya had emerged as a major supplier of arms to Argentina, with an air bridge between Tripoli and Recife, Brazil, using B707-320C aircraft of the Argentine Air Force and Aerolinas Argentinas, which allowed direct flights carrying substantial loads. Up to ten flights were made... Clearance was given to transit Moroccan airspace, much to British irritation." [1671]

In the Falkland Islands, at the San Carlos anchorage, *Atlantic Causeway* unloads twenty *Wessex* helicopters and eight *Sea Kings* onto a new airstrip constructed by Royal Engineers. The Gurkhas come ashore from *Norland*, together with their heavy equipment from *Baltic Ferry*. Also three Army Air Corp *Scout* helicopters and a battery of Royal artillery light guns; *"... the Gurkha Commanding Officer was ordered to march immediately to Goose Green and relieve 2 Para, ..."*[1672]

Some 50 miles north of Pebble Island, an Argentine Lockheed *C-130H* Hercules reconnaissance aircraft is shot down by two *Sea Harriers* with the loss of all seven crew.

"During Mass this afternoon firing broke out, accompanied by lots of cheering from the troops. Anya, who had been to Mass this morning, met us immediately afterwards to say that a Harrier had been shot down; she had watched the pilot eject and come down by parachute towards Eliza Cove. Shortly afterwards a Chinook took off to bring in the pilot, so we rushed down to the football field to watch it return. Quite a crowd had gathered, including an Argentine TV team, who were very excited at the prospect of filming the British aviator, as they put it. Their disappointment and embarrassment was extreme when an Argentine fighter pilot appeared at the back hatch of the Chinook in a not too happy frame of mind. It seems that once again they had shot down one of their own aircraft. Some little time beforehand the Harriers had brought down a C-130 Hercules just off Mangeary Point as it was coming to land at the airport; possibly the fighter shot down had been an escort." [1673]

1668 *Memorandum for Mr. William P. Clarke, White House June 1, 1982* See - https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/2023-05/40-748-12026383-R26-015-2022.pdf

1669 It is believed that Libya provided 100 *9K32 Strela-2* missiles, anti-tank mines, machine guns, mortars and other projectiles

1670 *The New York Times* June 6 1982

1671 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1672 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012

1673 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.201

At San Carlos, 5 Brigade commences its disembarkation, with *Norland* arriving first.

> *"All the residents of Davis Street have been told to move down into the town, They were given short notice to relocate and to take all their valuables with them; there had been some objections all to no avail. The street had to be cleared according to the rules of war – to protect civilians from over-shoots or short-fall shots."* [1674]

"The main units and stocks of 5 Brigade arrived on the first two days of June aboard Canberra, Norland, Baltic Ferry, and Nordic Ferry. For those who had witnessed the devastation Argentine pilots had wrought in the anchorage in recent days, the return of the large troop ship dubbed the 'White Whale' must have been discomforting, even though overcast skies made air attacks unlikely. To some, disembarkation by the Scots Guards and Welsh Guards from Canberra appeared all too leisurely, given experiences on D-Day. The Gurkhas, however, seemed to exit Norland with far more determination; and once ashore, they set off almost immediately to Goose Green with the mission of relieving 2 Para, which had remained there since capturing the settlement." [1675]

In London, during a television interview with the BBC, the Prime Minister is asked whether she sees a future role for Argentina on the Falkland islands.

> *"I cannot, myself, see a role in anything relating to sovereignty, for the Argentines on the Falkland Islands. You saw what happened in Goose Green and Darwin, how our people have been treated. They'd never wanted to go to Argentine before, they'll be even less likely now."*

"There was now no intention to use the promise of wider political negotiations with Argentina to get a ceasefire. The Government returned to its original objective of restoring British administration to the Islands, and this would continue until such time as their security and economic future could be guaranteed." [1676]

In Washington, Ambassador Henderson speaks to US National Security Advisor, Judge William P. Clark at the White House;*"Clark said that he believed the President did understand the firmness of our position. Neither he nor Haig were wishing to undermine this. ... "We are in it with you," Judge Clark said. This was very much the President's conviction. But this did not prevent him from believing that considerable damage had already been done to the USA's relations with its Latin American neighbours, that the US should not neglect any chance of preventing further bloodshed and the humiliation of Argentina that could give a hostage to the future, and that in the long-term there had to be a settlement ..."*

Henderson adds; *"Haig has spoken to me in the light of the Prime Minister's talk with the President and my talk with Judge Clark. He says that there is no good in pursuing his ideas. It is a pity, but he understands."*

In Montevideo, Uruguay, Britain's Ambassador Hutchinson is invited to meet with the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs; in company with the Argentine Ambassador. To see; *"what could be done to achieve a cease-fire."*

From Washington, Haig sends a further message to Henderson.

"He did not expect a Resolution to come forward for another day or two. The Argentinians were still putting forward wholly unrealistic requirements for a cease-fire, asking for mutual withdrawal. But he hoped that we could again manoeuvre, as we had so successfully last week, to avoid a situation in which we and the

1674 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1675 Privratsky 2014
1676 Freedman 2005 vol.2

Americans were isolated in the UN. ... Haig thought we should be in a position to win militarily in the near future. ..."

From London, Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, advises Parsons in New York.

> *"Pérez de Cuéllar's five-point plan is certainly unacceptable as it stands. But I agree that without raising false hopes or misrepresenting our position you should give him a reasoned response... You should tell the Secretary-General that while other aspects of his plan give us difficulty we approve the emphasis on total Argentine withdrawal within a fixed period of time. We look forward to learning of the Argentine response."* [1677]

In Argentina, the newspaper *Clarin*'s headline announces *Combat near Puerto Argentino*.

"After a long repertoire of military communications, war events and fierce battles with (yet) nameless heroes, the Argentines learned that the British outposts were twenty kilometres from Puerto Argentino..." [1678]

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Alacrity* bombards targets at Two Sisters, Moody Brook and Mount Longdon. Fire is directed from a naval observation post on Mount Kent. 45 Commando, with no helicopters available due to the landing of 5 Brigade, continues its long walk towards Mount Kent. A *Sea Harrier* is hit by a Roland missile fired by Argentine anti-aircraft defences near Stanley. The pilot ejects and is rescued.

"For most of the conflict the (Argentine) bulletins were pure fantasy. If one added up the number of Sea Harriers they claimed to have shot down they exceeded by several times the total possessed by the RAF." [1679]

At Stanley, Argentine Governor Menéndez issues an order to his forces. [1680]

> *"The hour of the final battle has arrived.,*
>
> *All our efforts, the hours of waiting, the cold, the tiredness, the vigilance, have come to an end.*
>
> *The adversary is getting ready to attack Stanley with the audacious and odious intention of conquering the capital of the ISLAS MALVINAS.*
>
> *Every man must fully understand what his duty is. The enemy will be destroyed by the decisive action of each one at his combat post. If each man with his rifle, his mortar, his machine-gun, or artillery piece fights with the valour and heroism which has already characterised us, Victory is certain.*
>
> *The gaze of all Argentina is on us; our parents, wives, fiancées and children, all our families have total confidence in us. In the supreme hour we have the duty not to defraud them.*
>
> *We have contracted a sacred responsibility before our comrades taken in action to convert their personal sacrifice into a page of glory for ARGENTINA, and we cannot allow their heroism to be in vain.*
>
> *Not only must we beat them, we must do it in such a way that their defeat is so crushing that they will never again have the impertinent idea of invading our land ...*
>
> *TO ARMS! TO BATTLE!"*

1677 *PREM19/633 Telegram 488 of 1 June 1982*
1678 Yofre 2011
1679 *I went as a Reporter but ended up as a Prisoner of War* I. Mather in *The Observer* April 1, 2007
1680 *Argentine Gazette* quoted in Smith 1984 p.252

At Goose Green, Argentine ammunition being moved by a volunteer prisoner work party, under the supervision of an Argentine officer, explodes. Three Argentine POWs are killed, with another mortally wounded. [1681]

At Stanley, an attempt is made to use the platform based *MM38 Exocet* missile launcher.

"On the first attempt, although the container lid doors were opened, propellant failed to ignite due to reasons that could not be determined. Quickly, they prepared to fire the second missile, but it was launched with the wrong course caused by rushing to fire again before the enemy ship moved away. The Exocet left with an erratic course lighting up the waters it overflew, revealing the existence of the missile on the islands." [1682]

HMS *Avenger* bombards Argentine positions on Pebble Island, while *Active* and *Ambuscade* pound targets around Stanley.

In New York, Parsons transmits Pym's points to the Secretary-General, who is; *"... disheartened by them."* Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Eduardo Ros, tells Pérez de Cuéllar that Argentina is willing to accept his proposals. With conditions:

> *"(1) ... the completion of the total British withdrawal, whatever its rhythm, would be within Y days.*
>
> *(2) It is clearly understood that in no case would British forces remain alone on the Islands. The Blue Helmets should be on the Islands before the completion of withdrawal of Argentine forces. The withdrawal of Argentine forces from the areas occupied by them should correspond with a gradual takeover of control of those areas by Blue Helmets.*
>
> *(3) The British forces shall abstain from widening their areas of occupation at the date of ceasefire."* [1683]

Parsons informs London; "*... what this amounted to was that a date would have to be agreed for the completion of total British withdrawal and that British forces would not be able to establish control over the whole of the Islands... Pérez de Cuéllarr recognises that his current efforts have come to an end."*

From New York, Argentina's Ambassador Listre telegrams Buenos Aires.

> *1. They (the British) do not accept the ceasefire implemented by the United Nations. They also do not accept the presence of United Nations observers. The ceasefire must be agreed upon by military commanders in the area of operations. 2. Regarding the withdrawal of Argentine troops, they appreciate its mention in the Secretary General's proposals. 3. In relation to a British symbolic withdrawal (they) do not accept such a symbolic withdrawal although they could consider a limited unilateral withdrawal, of their own will and at an opportunity that they deem appropriate. 4. Regarding substantive negotiation, the United Kingdom indicated that they could only take place within the framework of Resolution 502. 5. The United Kingdom intends to restore British administration, indicating that it would not be necessarily within the scope of a return to the status quo ante pointing out that ... a military governor could be appointed..."* [1684]

1681 One of the injured POWs who could not be reached due to the flames, was shot. A mercy killing, initially misinterpreted by the Argentine officer. The incident was fully investigated and a report prepared in accordance with Art.121 of the third Geneva Convention.

1682 Amendolara 2012. Target unknown. This author believes that Britain was thereafter aware of the presence of MM38s on the Islands and started to search for them. I have found no information that confirms this. *cf.* June 5, 1982 below.

1683 *Blue Helmets* are UN sponsored troops

1684 Quoted in Yofre 2011

"Mrs. Thatcher had the undoubted ability not only to seize the opportunities offered her by the Argentines' imprudence, but also to construct the premises and the context which permitted her to exploit such opportunities to the full. Without her courage in taking determined decisions, and without her tenacity in following up on them, the Conservative leader would not have been able to turn her adversaries' weaknesses to her own advantage. Without her capacity to unite her resolve with diplomatic pliability, the Prime Minister could not have guaranteed the support of the US, nor could she have so thoroughly exploited the Argentine diplomatic suicide." [1685]

In New York, the new President of the Security Council, Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil, calls a meeting for the 2nd; to allow for a report from the Secretary-General on the Falklands question.

From Washington, Britain's Ambassador Henderson assesses the assistance provided by the United States to the United Kingdom.

> *"I do not need to go into the details about the value of the intelligence cooperation which has been given, … So far as communications facilities are concerned, the Americans have made especially available satellite communication channels at considerable cost to their own operations, communications sets for our special forces on the Islands, secure speech facilities with the fleet and satellite weather information. So far as equipment is concerned, we have over the last month procured at least $120 million of US material made available at very short notice and frequently from stocks normally earmarked for US operational requirements.*
>
> *This equipment has included the latest air-to-air Side-winder missiles urgently required for use by the Harriers, the Vulcan phalanx anti-missile gun system for HMS Illustrious, 4700 tons of airstrip matting for the Port Stanley airport once it has been recaptured, conversion of the SS Stena Inspector for use as a repair ship in the South Atlantic, Shrike missiles for use by the Vulcans, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for use by the Sea King Helicopters, Temporary accommodation on a large scale for Ascension Island for our forces, Stinger ground-to-air missiles (already used successfully against Argentine aircraft), as well as the usual array of weapons and ammunition…"* [1686]

Peru offers Buenos Aires the use of its Air Force - for the evacuation of Argentine wounded.

In the Falklands, Lieut. Colonel David Chandler arrives to take over command of 2 Para.

"… (after) the death of H Jones who was killed at Goose Green. Maj Chris Keeble took over 2 Para, led them to victory and accepted the surrender of the Argentineans at Goose Green. One might well have expected him to be given acting rank and continue in command but it was decided that 2 Para should have a new CO and we were told to lay on one of our special long range Hercs to deliver him on 1 June. We did this by flying down to arrive after dark, using the aircraft's weather radar to help position the aircraft at low level so that he could parachute into the sea to be picked up and moved forward to his battalion. It was a complicated and dangerous mission, right into the heart of the combat zone, but you would never guess it from the laconic way in which the literature on the war recounts the incident. Most accounts usually just note that 'Lt Col David Chandler arrived to take over command of 2 Para from Chris Keeble'." [1687]

Further supplies get through to British forces at the front line.

1685 Bruni 2018
1686 *PREM19/633 Telegram No.1977 of 1 June 1982*
1687 *RAF Lynham and the Air Bridge* Clive Evans in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal 30* 2003

"The first snowfall of winter had started, making it difficult, yet even more important, to get sufficient supplies forward. Fortunately, also on 31 May, helicopters had managed to get through bad weather to deliver some supplies as well. The first large delivery took place on the evening of 1 June, when the LSL Sir Percivale completed her first of several trips between Ajax Bay and Teal Inlet. Sir Percivale's Captain Tony Pitt would later receive the Distinguished Service Cross for navigating his ship that night in the dark through eleven miles of the narrow, hazardous inlet to get supplies forward to marines and paratroopers. He had no way of knowing whether the narrow inlet was mined or if the enemy was on shore ready to obstruct his passage, even though the Amphibious Task Force and special forces had tried their best to clear the area." [1688]

June 2nd, during the night, Argentina's designated hospital ship, *Bahia Buen Paraiso*, arrives at Stanley.

> *"Slept fairly well despite a naval bombardment and an artillery barrage somewhere to the south-west…. There was a great deal of activity during the night around the hospital ship; seemed to be unloading, which started late evening and continued till about 4.30 this morning. Lots of boat movements between ship and the jetty. Lorries on streets. Unable to see much because of black-outs and curfew. … Lots of new troops digging in at the east end of town. It looks very much as if they arrived yesterday on the hospital ship."* [1689]
>
> *"The Argentine Red Cross hospital ship Bahia Buen Paraiso had been in the harbour yesterday and offloaded a lot of stuff in the hours of darkness. There are some new troops in evidence in the town, did they come in the 'hospital' ship and what exactly did a 'hospital' ship carry that warranted off-loading in the dark?"* [1690]

"… the ARA Bahia Paraiso was used on two trips (June 1 and 10, 1982) to transport supplies and equipment (but not ammunition) for the inhabitants and the troops of the Islands." [1691]

In a *blue-on-blue* incident in the early hours of the Falklands' day, an SBS Sergeant is killed by an SAS patrol. *Sir Lancelot* gets much needed supplies into Teal Inlet, while, at San Carlos, *Canberra* disembarks the Welsh and Scots Guards.

"It took twenty-four hours to offload the Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas. Once off their ships, these battalions reorganized around anchorage areas. Due to limited communications during their passage south from the United Kingdom, they knew little more than the general situation on the ground. The two Guards battalions had not received guidance about how they would be employed beyond the beachhead. … At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Chaundler, the newly designated commander of 2 Para, arrived in the San Carlos area, even less aware of the situation at hand than the three battalions offloading from ships." [1692]

Off East Falkland, HMS *Arrow* bombards Fox Bay. 2 Para reach Bluff Cove and Teal Inlet to discover that the Argentine forces have gone. The Argentine's have also vacated the Fitzroy settlement. 2 Para request permission to move forward to Fitzroy. The request is approved despite the move putting 2 Para ahead of immediate support. The only remaining *Chinook* helicopter is commandeered to make the move.

1688 Privratsky 2014
1689 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.203. These reports suggest that the ship was breaching the Geneva Conventions by acting as a troop carrier.
1690 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021
1691 Yofre 2011. All evidence to the contrary.
1692 Privratsky 2014

"2 Para return under command of 5 Bde, seize Fitzroy and Bluff Cove but with no established lines of communication or supply." [1693]

"We now had a weak, unsupported battalion with no guns strung out in penny packets for thirty miles across the southern flank. It possessed no defence against any Argentine counterattack by land or air, or even by sea had the enemy been prepared to brave the consequences. ... It was clear that the only way to extricate 2 Para and tighten up the south coast was through some form of naval expedition involving the landing of men forward..." [1694]

At Montevideo, Britain's hospital ship, *Hecla,* arrives with 24 Argentine prisoners and 18 British casualties.

From Bogota, Colombia's President Turbay appeals to Prime Minister Thatcher in London; *"... consider the possibility of reaching an honourable peace agreement with Argentina, thus avoiding the unnecessary holocaust of many innocent lives."*

In New York, at an informal Security Council meeting, the Secretary-General reports that he has been unable to negotiate mutually acceptable terms for a ceasefire.

> *"It is my considered judgement that the positions of the two parties do not offer the possibility of developing at this time terms for a cease-fire which would be mutually acceptable. In accordance with the mandate given to me by resolution 505 (1982), I shall, nevertheless, maintain close contact with the parties in the event that an opportunity can be found in which the exercise of my good offices can contribute to bringing this tragic crisis to an end."* [1695]

Panama calls for a formal meeting, and the Security Council reconvenes. Spain and Panama immediately co-sponsor a draft-resolution for the Council's consideration; calling for an unconditional ceasefire.

> *"Ros spoke at length. The negotiations with the Secretary-General had shown that the UK did not intend at any time to heed the Council's appeals. Its only objective was to continue its aggression, with the intention of installing in the islands a military system as part of its plan to dominate the South Atlantic. The wishes of the Islanders were simply a mask. ... Argentina, on the other hand, had replied promptly and positively to the Secretary-General's efforts under SCR 505. ... The intransigence of the United Kingdom was evident. ..."*

After Brazil calls for an immediate cease-fire, Anthony Parsons, addresses the Council.

> *"I pay tribute once again to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has made during the past few days to implement Resolution 502 and 505. ... I have said before, but it cannot be repeated too often, that the current breach of the peace was caused by Argentina. It was Argentina which closed the diplomatic channels on 1 April. It was Argentina which remained silent in the face of the Security Council's appeal not to use force ... It was Argentina ... which invaded the Falkland Islands... It was, and is, Argentina which has failed to comply with Resolution 502 which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops. ... It is the United Kingdom which was the victim of the Argentine act of aggression.... Everything we have done since has been in exercise of our inherent right to self-defence. ...*

1693 Southby-Tailyour 1990
1694 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012
1695 *UN Doc S/15151*

The plain fact is, Mr. President, that until the Government of Argentina changes its position it is clear that the conditions for a cease-fire do not exist. Against this background the call by the distinguished representatives of Spain and Panama for an unconditional cease-fire is not acceptable to my delegation. A cease-fire which is not inseparably linked to an immediate Argentine withdrawal would not be consistent with Resolution 502... When we talk about security arrangements for the future, we are talking about security arrangements to shield the Islanders against any threat of renewed aggression – that is all." [1696]

Spain presses the Security Council for an immediate vote, but the meeting is adjourned until the 3rd; in order that delegates can obtain instructions from their respective Governments. Parsons advises London.

"Spain and Panama will press hard tomorrow morning for an immediate vote on their draft Resolution. They can count on six affirmative votes (China, USSR, Poland, Spain, Ireland, Panama). I think we can count on five negative votes or abstentions (France, UK, US, Guyana, Japan). Spain/Panama therefore have to get three out of the following four in order to get the necessary nine votes to turn our negative vote into a veto: Jordan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire... I recommend that the most urgent lobbying should now be carried out …"

In the Falkland Islands, leaflets are dropped on Stanley.

"The Harriers have been dropping leaflets as well as other things, urging the Argies to surrender, offering free passage home and warning that they are surrounded by British troops." [1697]

At Fitzroy, 2 Para establishes a defence perimeter.

"Seizing Fitzroy was a bold undertaking to be sure, very much akin to the Paras' success at Goose Green, but this time 2 Para had put itself close to enemy-held territory, less than 30km from Argentine forces at Stanley and closer still to those who were on mountain tops. They were over 50km from their sustainment base on the beachhead at Ajax. Now they were huddling into Fitzroy as night closed in, with only the supplies they had carried forward on their backs. The paratroopers lacked protection from supporting artillery and air defence. They had advanced far beyond the ability of 5 Brigade or the FMA to sustain them. Making matters even worse, they had outrun their radio communication capabilities and could talk to neither Wilson's headquarters nor to any units on the beachhead. The unit had pushed itself to the very end of a weak tether and without any way of receiving supplies or reinforcement quickly. … Transportation over land was not possible. The only alternative route to bolster 2 Para now was from the San Carlos area to Fitzroy by sea. That route extended from the anchorage in San Carlos Water all the way around Lafonia and up the east coast toward Fitzroy, a distance of 157 nautical miles, more than twice the distance from the anchorage to Teal Inlet. It would take a slow LSL sixteen hours to complete such a trip, making it impossible to complete the passage in the fourteen hours of darkness prevailing in the Falklands at the time. … Making matters worse, the waters off Fitzroy were visible from Mount Harriet and Mount Challenger, where Argentine observation posts were located." [1698]

1696 *PREM19/633 Telegram No.916 of 2 June 1982*
1697 *Nevilles' Diary* in Bennet 2021
1698 Privratsky 2014



June 3rd, in London, the Foreign Office notifies the Prime Minister's office that the French appear to be linking the issue of the supply of *Exocets* to Argentina, to the failure by the UK to hand over Alfredo Astiz, wanted on suspicion of murdering two French nuns. [1699]

In the South Atlantic, HMS *Plymouth* bombards Argentine positions at Port Howard. Two *Harriers* are lost following attacks on other Argentine military installations, although the pilots are recovered safely. On East Falkland Island, elements of 3 Para establish a patrol base 2km west of Mount Longdon.

"3 Para had put in a probing attack on Mount Longdon in the afternoon of 3 June but had run into a well-planned artillery fire and was ordered back." [1700]

In Stanley, life continues for the Islanders.

> *"There were quite a number of Argentine burials at the cemetery today; Jeremy saw them as he passed by on his dumper. They must have been victims of yesterday's action… Now only the officer's graves get marked with a cross. Other ranks are put two or three to a grave. There may be some sort of mass grave as well for rapid burials. All graves are very shallow; just a couple of scoops with a digger and*

1699 Astiz had been detained on South Georgia and transported, initially, to Ascension Island. While the French were demanding that he be handed over, the legal advice given to the Foreign Office was that to do so would be a breach of the Geneva Conventions. There were also concerns for regarding Flight-Lieutenant Jeffrey Glover, detained in Argentina.

1700 Thompson 1992

that's all…. Lorries were coming down the road with the dead and wounded… It seems to be mainly conscripts left in town now. As we watched, half a dozen of them came from the dockyard carrying armfuls of crosses, heading towards the cemetery. This is hardly the way to inspire an army;... Gen Menéndez has told his troops to fight to the last man." [1701]

In Buenos Aires, Canada's Ambassador is asked to leave the country following alleged pro-British remarks. Argentina recalls its own Ambassador from France. In New Zealand, a business man and his wife contribute $NZ 1,000 for a supply of *Dunbar Whisky* to be sent to the troops in the Falklands, for; *"immediate consumption."* [1702]

The US embassy in Argentina, sends a message for the information of Secretary Haig in Washington DC.

"I share with some of my colleagues here the impression that the British may be hoping that victory in the Falklands will produce the downfall of the junta and a new government willing to put an end to this conflict. My colleagues and I doubt that it will work out that way. More likely is a refusal by this or a successor military government to accept a ceasefire in any formal sense. The notion that a civilian caretaker regime might emerge and do so strikes me as even more improbable. There may be civilians around prepared to take on the onus of surrender, but I don't know any. Thus, as ex-president Lanusse said the other day, the war will go on. What that will mean in practice is not entirely clear. My best guess is that there will be a de facto end to hostilities while the Argentines lick their wounds, proclaim their defiance and contemplate their revenge. Such an unsettled situation would make the British position on the islands uncomfortable to say the least, would threaten continuing military incidents and would create endless instability in our relations with Latin America." [1703]

In the Falklands, RFA *Stromness* arrives with elements of No.63 squadron delivered by the QEII to South Georgia.

Following an operation over the Falklands archipelago (Black Buck 6), a *Vulcan* bomber (XM597) heads north to rendezvous with a *Victor* for refuelling.

"The Victor turned up on cue, assisted by a Nimrod for the RV, and Neil's attempt to connect with the basket on the first prod was rather abject. It was clear to us all that he was really fatigued but that was unsurprising. … his final attempt resulted in the probe penetrating the basket, damaging its spokes and sending splinters of aluminium down the engine intakes, damaging the inlet guide vanes of numbers 2 and 3 engines, and leaving the tip of the probe embedded in the basket!" [1704]



Unable to refuel, and without sufficient fuel to reach Ascension, the *Vulcan* crew divert to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.[1705]

"At Galeão we were greeted by forty to fifty armed guards along with their base commander and were held under open arrest in the Officers Mess for a period of seven days. … The remaining Shrike missile was confiscated by the Brazilian Air Force…" [1706]

1701 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.207 & 208
1702 *PREM19/633 Telegram 185 of 3 June 1982*
1703 *AMEmbassy Buenos Aires to SECState WashDC June 3, 1982*
1704 *Falklands War 1982: Black Buck Six – Rio de Janeiro Diversion* David Castle 2022
1705 At the time of the accident, the aircraft was carrying two *Shrike* missiles. One was successfully ejected, but the other remained stubbornly attached. All code books, charts and logs were ditched, before the crew turned for Brazil.
1706 Castle 2022. See June 10, 1982, below.

"For the Brazilian military, this was a 'menacing violation of our air, maritime and land space.' More so, the government was quite unhappy about the incident because it forced them to position themselves publicly, something they had carefully tried to avoid..." [1707]

Secretary Haig sends an instruction to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, directing the US Permanent Representative at the UN to work closely with Anthony Parsons; to see if the proposed Security Council resolution can be made to work. If this is not possible, Kirkpatrick is instructed to join the UK in a veto.

"Takacs spoke by telephone with Enders and told him "that if the veto of the United States was used (against the proposed resolution), the essence of which is a ceasefire for 72 hours, our government would consider this an act of extreme gravity that would immediately jeopardise the continuity of our diplomatic relations". Enders confirmed ... that the United States position was a negative vote (veto). The Argentine Ambassador, faced with such a response, asked for an abstention... Enders replied that he would contact Haig, who was with Reagan in Paris." [1708]

France's representative is also instructed by his Government to stay in close contact with Parsons. Japan confirms that its representative will abstain.

In New York, Argentine Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, attends a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. He makes a speech in which he compares Argentina with Algeria, India, Cuba and Vietnam, all of which had also needed to fight for their independence. In a similar vein, he also refers to the South African peoples fight against apartheid. His speech is greeted with laughter by some African representatives, who recall that Argentina has never previously supported their efforts against the Governments of South Africa.

> *"Costa Mendez spoke to a half-filled hall at a meeting of the non-aligned movement, members of which consider themselves independent of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Many of the members are leftist governments hesitant to support the right-wing Argentine military junta in its dispute with Britain. This is the struggle all Latin American people for the defense of a continental territory,' he said. 'It is the struggle of all who confront colonial aggression.' He criticized the United States for its support of Britain in the Falkland Islands war, adding Argentina has faced aggression from the two countries since 'almost prehistoric times.'..."* [1709]

"Costa Méndez's reference to Britain having expelled original inhabitants of Falklands does not seem to have misled most delegates." [1710]

At the UN, deliberations continue over the Spanish/Panamanian draft Security Council resolution.

> *"Spain and Panama failed to line up nine votes for the draft Resolution ... The Americans, and to a lesser extent the French, made frenzied efforts to avoid a vote today, lest they had to veto with us. (Spain) finally agreed ... to postpone a vote until 2000z tomorrow (4 June). ..*
>
> *It was clear at the start of play today that we had six negative votes or abstentions (France, Guyana, Japan, Jordan, UK, US). ... Guyana pressed hard, with some support from Jordan, for major changes to the draft in order to make the cease-fire conditional upon the commencement of Argentine withdrawal. Panama was not prepared to accept these amendments. ...*

1707 Krepp 2017 p.359
1708 Yofre 2011
1709 *Argentina asks non-aligned movement for support* in *UPI* June 3, 1982. Costa Méndez also asserted that HMS *Invincible* had "*disappeared*."
1710 *PREM19/633 Telegram 170 of 4 June 1982*

This led Panama to propose a new operative paragraph which would have asked the parties to implement immediately SCR's 502 and 505 in all their parts. This was acceptable to the Africans and Panama undertook to sell it to Spain."

A revised draft reads.

"The Security Council: Reaffirming its Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all the parts thereof,

(1) Requests the parties to the dispute to cease-fire immediately in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and to initiate, simultaneously with the cease-fire, the implementation of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) in their entirety;

(2) Authorizes the Secretary-General to use such means as he may deem necessary to verify compliance with this resolution;,

Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council within 72 hours and to keep the Council informed concerning the implementation of this resolution." [1711]

Panama's suggested amendment is debated. Parsons asks for time to seek instructions, but says that he would expect further, and substantial, amendments to be suggested by London.

"De Pinies (Spain) said that there was no question of the Argentines and the Panamanians accepting the kind of amendments I was talking about. He saw no alternative to voting straight away. This led to frenzied efforts by the Americans to persuade the Argentines to discourage de Pinies from pressing for a vote (I dread to think what promises were made). At the same time it became clear that both Zaire and Togo, in spite of their positions in the morning, were inclined to abstain on the revised draft. So de Pinies still had not got his nine votes and American and French efforts to postpone the vote met with success..." [1712]

Voting is deferred until the 4th. Parsons reports.

"I believe that our best tactic is firmly to put forward all the amendments we need to make the latest draft acceptable to us, ... Spain, Panama and the Argentine friends will explode, and may insist on an immediate vote on a text designed to leave us in maximum isolation. If they succeed, we will have to face it, something we always anticipated, in the not unsatisfactory knowledge that we have now held out for over 60 days." [1713]

Arriving in Paris for a conference, US Secretary of State Haig issues a press statement; *"With respect to the Falklands, of course, both leaders (Reagan & Mitterand) are concerned that bloodshed terminate at the earliest possible date and that the conflict be resolved within the framework of U.N. Resolution 502 which, from the outset, has enjoyed the support of both governments and which has been the fundamental premise upon which the United States has conducted its policies toward this very difficult situation in the South Atlantic."* [1714]

In the Falklands, British troops prepare for the move towards Port Stanley.

"There was much to do. The most important task was to patrol aggressively to find out exactly where the enemy were located in preparation for the forthcoming battle for Stanley. Hand-in-hand with this was the need to build up sufficient stocks of ammunition, particularly gun ammunition. ... Ammunition was now

1711 *UN Doc. S/15156/Rev.2*
1712 *PREM19/633 Telegram 924 of 3 June 1982*
1713 *PREM19/633 Telegram 927 of 3 June 1982*
1714 *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.15. Haig was accompanying President Reagan on a ten-day tour of Europe. They both met with Margaret Thatcher at the US Embassy where talks lasted over an hour.

coming into Teal (Inlet) by sea, but its had to be lifted forward from there by helicopter to the gun lines. … This caused a worry that the Argentine Air Force might put in an attack on the LSLs which lay unloading in the still waters of Teal Inlet; the low surrounding hills provided no cover at all." [1715]

"Between May 29th and June 3rd, the High Command established the western side of the defensive perimeter along the mounts that surrounded Puerto Argentino. These ran from north to south, and they comprised Wireless Ridge, Longdon, Dos Hermanas (Two Sisters), Harriet, Tumbledown, William, and Sapper Hill. This new perimeter was 48 kilometers long, and the Argentine forces could guard only 37 per cent of it. This meant that there was enough space left uncovered that the enemy could take advantage of the gaps and infiltrate the Argentine positions." [1716]

BBC *World News* reports that *"Teal Inlet is HQ of Force attacking Stanley."*

"Quite where they got this information will probably never be known. It was certainly not leaking from correspondents with the Commando Brigade who would have put themselves at risk as much as anybody had they committed breaches of security. … If announcements like this did not bring the enemy air force surely nothing would." [1717]

June 4th, in Paris, France, prior to a G8 summit meeting, Margaret Thatcher meets Ronald Reagan at the US Embassy. She tells the President that Britain is willing to accept a ceasefire, provided it is irrevocably linked to Argentine withdrawal within 14 days.

In London, a *memorandum* is submitted for the consideration of Britain's OD Committee. An annex notes; *"Any transfer of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (or the Dependencies) would be seen by the Argentines as strengthening their claim to parts of the British Antarctic Territory."* [1718]

From Peru, a squadron of 10 *Mirage 5P* fighter aircraft depart La Joya airbase bound for Argentina.

"… to ensure they arrived on time, the crews flew them on a secret flight. One May morning, the squadron took off from the La Joya base (Arequipa), flew in absolute silence at 33,000 feet over Bolivian territory, and a few hours later landed at the Tandil base, south of Buenos Aires. There were tense moments on that flight when, near the border between Bolivia and Chile, they were detected by Chilean radars and Chilean interceptors approached, but fortunately, the Chilean aircraft remained over Chilean territory and did not attack them." [1719]

"Many years later, it became known that despite General Boluarte's well-known reluctance to send Soviet aircraft materiel from the FAP military park, he quietly granted an exception: authorizing the shipment of a batch of SAM-7 Strela short-range anti-aircraft missiles, including a specialist air defense instructor trained in the USSR: FAP Lieutenant Alberto Ramírez Guillén, who had provided training during the war to his Argentine counterparts at the Comodoro Rivadavia air base. Ramírez traveled on the Hercules godmother that accompanied the mission to transport the Peruvian Mirages to Argentina on the journey from La Joya, in Arequipa." [1720]

1715 Thompson 1992

1716 Corbacho 2004

1717 *Ibid*. Four days later, the Argentine Air Force bombed Teal Inlet.

1718 *British Policy in the Antarctic: Minerals June 4, 1982 CAB 148/206* quoted in Livingstone 2018

1719 *Los aviones que Perú envió a la guerra de las Malvinas* Pedro Fernandez Barbadillo in 25 Libertad Digital October 5, 2011. On arrival the aircraft were found not to be in a condition where they could be used immediately, and were never deployed. There is also some evidence that Peru sent its navy southward to deter Chile from taking advantage of the deteriorating situation for Argentina in the Falklands. I cannot find any specific dates for this.

1720 Rotta y Carmona 2022

In the Falklands, Argentina's Air Force mount raids against British patrols near Mount Kent; failing, however, to inflict damage or casualties.

> *"Many troops use the church during the day; some come to pray for a few minutes, some just sit and shake. One sat in front of us shaking and trembling in a combination of exhaustion, fear and cold. Another cried uncontrollably. Most are very young. Their damp clothing smells of wet earth and camp fires."* [1721]

From New York, Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Eduardo Ros, contacts Thomas Enders at the US State Department, telling him that if the USA vetoes the UN Security Council resolution, then Argentina will break off diplomatic relations. Enders agrees to inform Haig in Paris. [1722]

In the reconvened UN Security Council meeting, Anthony Parsons addresses the Security Council.

> *"The situation facing the Council this afternoon is straight forward. If Argentina had not invaded the Falkland Islands at the beginning of April there would be no crisis and we would not be meeting today. If Argentina had obeyed the mandatory demand in SCR 502 immediately to withdraw all its forces from the Falkland Islands, the crisis would have passed and we would not be meeting today. But Argentina did invade the Islands, and defied the mandatory demand of the Council to withdraw.... there is no direct and inseparable link between the ceasefire and immediate Argentine withdrawal with a fixed time limit. The wording of the draft, without any shadow of a doubt, enables Argentina to reopen the endless process of negotiation, thus leaving Argentine armed forces in illegal occupation of parts of the Islands. This is totally unacceptable to my Government."* [1723]

However, Parsons states that he will not be proposing any amendments to the draft-resolution.

"... in that case, there was no alternative to voting... There followed a delay of about two hours while both sides counted heads, and Mrs. Kirkpatrick made several efforts to persuade Haig in Versailles to switch ... to abstention. With abstentions assured from Guyana, Japan, Jordan and Togo, and probably from Zaire, it looked as though De Pinies would not be able to get his nine votes. But, at the last minute, my Japanese colleague, to his obvious chagrin, received instructions from Versailles to switch from an abstention to a vote in favour. He took with him Zaire, and nearly Jordan as well."

As Panama's draft resolution is put to a vote, the UK vetoes the resolution. As does the USA; just moments before new instructions arrive from US Secretary Haig.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, explains her vote to the Security Council.

> *"My government has worked hard for mediation and settlement of this dispute. We have been rent by the clash of values, loyalties and friends. That clash continued down through the registration of the vote on this issue. I am told that it is impossible for a government to change a vote once it is cast, but I have been requested by my government to record the fact that were it possible to change our vote we should like to change it from a veto – a "no", that is – to an abstention."* [1724]

"I spoke with Walt Stoessel and Tom Enders at 3:00 p.m. To inform them that Japan and Ireland would vote "yes" and that France was abstaining. I said that I wanted written instructions, and then spoke with Stoessel

1721 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.209
1722 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990
1723 *PREM19/633 Telegram 935 of 4 June 1982*
1724 *UN Doc. S/PV.2373*

again to inquire if they were very sure that I was instructed to vote no. I reiterated what a disaster I thought a "no" vote would be, how unnecessary it was, how the U.K. frequently did not vote with US in the SC. Again, I said that to avoid any possible confusion, I wanted written instructions. I asked if they had spoken with Sec. Haig about the draft. They said yes. Again I repeated that I thought it would be an extremely controversial vote. I said that I thought they should discuss this again with Sec. Haig. At 4:00 I once again called Stoessel and Enders to say that I had received no written instructions. They said that my instructions were clear – I was to follow the British – but they could understand that I wanted written instructions. … At 5:00 I called to report everything we knew about the line up: Japan, Ireland, Spain, USSR, Poland, Panama, Zaire would vote yes, and the U.K. would veto. I then said that the SC meeting was about to begin. They said that Sec. Haig was still out at the dinner and they had not yet heard from him. Later at 6:00 they said that they had spoken to Sec. Haig, explained the situation to him, but that he (Haig) wanted to reflect. I explained that the vote was rapidly approaching. … At 6:30 I heard that the Secretary wanted to reflect further. I replied that time had run out, the SC meeting had been called for 4:00 and we had been delaying for 2 and a half hours by that point. At 6:35 the vote occurred, and we voted no…" [1725]

"The message to abstain came minutes after the SC vote. Since SC votes cannot be changed, Amb. Kirkpatrick was instructed to announce that we wished to record the change in any case. Amb. Kirkpatrick followed these instructions and added change of intention to the explanation of vote. Since then Kirkpatrick has explained the confusion was a result of short time and long distance." [1726]

Other members of the UN Security Council, speak in explanation of their votes.; *"France, which abstained, considered it understandable that one of the parties to the conflict felt it essential to obtain certain safeguards against continued non-compliance with the 3 April resolution; consensus should have been reached regarding its effective implementation. Similarly, Guyana abstained, saying that, while Argentine non-compliance with the 3 April resolution was both the cause and consequence of the current level of armed hostilities in the South Atlantic, the text failed to make an explicit link between a ceasefire and withdrawal of Argentine forces within a clearly defined time-frame. Japan supported the resolution with the understanding that Argentina would withdraw its forces within a reasonable period of time. Panama said the British veto had deprived the Security Council of a new chance to demonstrate its effectiveness, and had put that body back into a state of absolute impotence. Spain said the non-adoption of what it considered to be a highly balanced text represented a failure for peace. Ireland and Uganda felt the text clearly linked full implementation of the previous resolutions with the call for a cease-fire. Zaire supported the text as it called for the implementation of the previous Council resolutions. China also voted in favour, saying the Council should call for an unconditional cease-fire, resumption of negotiations and, at the same time, extend the Secretary-General's mandate…"*

Jorge Hugo Herra Vegas, spokesman for the Argentine delegation, addresses the Council.

> *"This (veto) demonstrates that the true intention of Great Britain, supported by the United States, is the re-establishment of a colonial regime in America. The war that the United Kingdom imposes on Argentina is an unequal an unjust war between a developing Latin American country and a great power, (a) member of NATO, supported by almost all of its allies."* [1727]

After the Security Council meeting ends, Parsons reports to London; *"The Resolution secured nine votes only because of a last minute switch by Japan. After the vote, Mrs. Kirkpatrick astonishingly stated that she had*

1725 *Kirkpatrick to Clark, Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/05/1982*
1726 *Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/05/1982*
1727 Quoted in Yofre 2011

been asked by her Government to say that if it were possible to change a vote once cast, the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an abstention."

Parsons concludes; *"It was a very close run thing. Had it not been for the last minute Japanese switch (for which my Japanese colleague was bitterly ashamed) the Resolution would have failed for lack of votes. I confess that, with the amendments, I expected it to do better. If anyone had told me on 9 April, when we notified to the Security Council the establishment of the EZ (exclusion zone), that we would last out until 4 June without having to veto a cease-fire Resolution and that the eventual Resolution would only scrape 9 votes, I would not have believed it. I think we owe this not unsatisfactory result to a number of factors. First, basic sympathy for our position amongst NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) members ... Argentine unpopularity, de Pinies' bullying methods: and powerful lobbying both here and in capitals. Another unexpected bonus was Mrs Kirkpatrick's truly grotesque intervention when she last received instructions from Haig to abstain having cast a negative vote. ... Her performance has already excited much more media attention than our veto. The important thing now is that we firmly kill any suggestion that we are isolated in the UN. ... The fact is that we are not. The Latins got a poor result for what looked like a reasonable Resolution to many people, and I have already received numerous expressions of sympathy and support from third world delegations from Africa and Asia. It is difficult to see what the UN will now do. There has been very little talk about an emergency special session of the General Assembly and there would definitely not have been nine votes for such a proposition had it been tabled tonight... We owe a great deal to David Karran, the charge d'affairs of Guyana, who has been a tower of strength and helpfulness throughout."* [1728]

"... despite my efforts last evening to dispense with the question of the U.N. resolution; that the difference in assessment between veto and abstention should in no way be interpreted as any lessening of U.S. Support for the principle involved, which Great Britain is upholding, nor has it changed in any way the levels of support and dedication to support that the United States announced earlier with respect to the conflict. We may have differences in the context of assessments of the particular U.N. resolution , as, indeed, we would expect to do from time to time. After all, the United States makes its decisions based on its own national interests." [1729]

"Most embarrassed was President Reagan, who, when questioned by reporters the next day while standing beside an evidently unimpressed Prime Minister, clearly had no idea what had been going on." [1730]

In the Falklands, British patrols move into position.

"*3 Para remain in area of NW Mount Longdon. 45 CDO are moving from Teal Inlet to the area of Smoko Mountain. 2 Para are at Bluff Cove with 1/7 Gurkha Rifles moving forward from Goose Green to join. 2 Scots Guards and 1 Welsh Guards are moving to Bluff Cove area by the night of 5/6 June. It is intended that two CDO attacks will be made on Two Sisters Mountain within next 48 hours. ... Incidents: A 42 CDO patrol struck a minefield during the night of 2/3 June; one own forces wounded. ... an Argentine patrol of 5 was engaged and 3 enemy killed.*" [1731]

In Argentina, a news agency, *Noticias Argentinas* and a newspaper, *La Jornada*, are closed down on orders from the junta; *"The closure of the agency was not due to a specific event, but to an accumulation of annoying despatches."* [1732]

1728 *PREM19/633 Telegram 935 of 4 June 1982*

1729 Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, speaking at the Versailles Summit on June 6, 1982 quoted in *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.7

1730 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990

1731 Situation Report handed to PM Thatcher the following morning, at the G8 meeting in Versailles.

1732 Yofre 2011. The reason given to the agency was that they gave news which was used by the British; the weather forecast being given as an example.

"The dictatorship was aware of the influence of the media and understood that if it identified with Falklands War as a historical reparation and a continuation of the struggles for independence, it would have a cohesive effect ... The construction of a feat as a founding myth of a new nation would relegate antagonisms in favour of national unity and guarantee popular support ..." [1733]

June 5th, in the Falklands, just after midnight, local time, HMSs *Invincible* and *Brilliant* rendezvous at Beauchene Island to the south of the archipelago. [1734]

In the UK, Lt.-Colonel Alfredo Astiz, a prisoner-of-war, arrives and is held under armed guard at Roussillon Barracks in Chichester. He is interviewed by senior Detective officers from Sussex Constabulary who puts to Astiz questions supplied by the French authorities. Astiz refuses to answer any question relating to the missing French nuns. [1735]

At Versailles, in France, President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher attend the eighth Economic Summit of the Industrialised Nations (G8) together with the leaders of France, Canada, West Germany, Italy and Japan.

In Brazil, Argentina asks the government to intern the British *Vulcan* bomber under the terms of the *Rio* Treaty, Brazil politely declines. In the capital, Brasilia, Britain's Ambassador presents a *bout de papier* condemning the decision to retain the *Vulcan* bomber; threatening *"serious consequences"* for friendly relations. [1736]

"... it became very clear in the second half of the note, that it was not the incident in itself that had angered the British government, but the nature of Brazilian support for Argentina... They were aware, the British government cautioned, of the Brazilian material support for the Argentines.... Ambassador Harding admonished that if the Brazilian government was truly serious about neutrality, then it could not detain British aircraft, without also interdicting Argentine flights. He had 'clear evidence', Harding warned, that every day two flights from Libya, one by Aerolineas Argentinas and another by a military aircraft, stopped over in Recife, in north-eastern Brazil, on its way to Argentina." [1737]

From the Falklands, HMS *Hydra* arrives in Montevideo with 51 British casualties. Argentina demands that Uruguay intern Britain's casualties under the Geneva Conventions. Uruguay refuses. Elsewhere ARA *Bahia Paraiso* accepts Argentine wounded from SS *Uganda*, while HMS *Intrepid* embarks Scots Guards for a journey to Fitzroy. Royal Marines move towards Mount Challenger.

In New York, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) deplores the military operations being carried out by the UK, with US support, and reaffirms; *"solidarity with Argentina in its efforts to end an outdated colonial presence."*[1738]

"The Latin Americans had taken the whole place over in a big way on the Falklands, with Castro acting as impresario for Costa Méndez. He (Doha) frankly admitted that Britain's friends had been swept away by the torrent of Latin American rhetoric, pressure and theatricality. All under the TV cameras. He had attended many NAM meetings over the years but had never heard anything like the violence of Costa Méndez's rhetoric.

1733 *Recuperar Malvinas: Las disputas por los significados de la guerra y su tardía inclusión en el campo de los derechos humanos* Alejo Ramos Padilla 2025

1734 Noted in the log of *Brilliant*. No reasons given, but there has been some suggestion that the fleet withdrew to a safe distance to rob the Argentine's of any more potential targets.

1735 After seeking legal advice, the British Government informed Paris that it was unable to assist as to do so would be a breach of the Geneva Convention. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to exert pressure by suggesting that if they were denied access to Astiz, their cooperation on *Exocet* sales to Argentina could not be guaranteed. This resulted in Astiz being moved to the UK, where questions supplied by France and Sweden were put to him.

1736 *PREM19/634 Telegram 250 of 5 June 1982*

1737 Krepp 2017 p.359. Brazil's government did not acknowledge the protest.

1738 An attitude not actually reflected in the NAM's votes at the UN.

Pretty well every Latin American under the sun had spoken on similar lines. Almost all the vitriol had been directed against Britain, with the United States as a footnote … Costa Méndez had received a long standing ovation with Castro capering in the public gallery …" [1739]

From New York, pleas from Pérez de Cuéllar are sent to both Margaret Thatcher and Leopoldo Galtieri. [1740]

> *"The armed conflict in the region of the Falkland islands threatens to enter into a new and extremely dangerous phase that is likely to result in heavy loss of life on both sides. This would gravely prejudice, for the foreseeable future, any prospect for a settlement of the underlying dispute... I feel it is my duty in this situation, in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, to appeal directly to Your Excellency and to President Galtieri, in the hope that a way can still be found to bring the fighting to a halt and to initiate negotiations towards a settlement of the crisis."*

The Secretary-General attaches a seven point plan. US Representative Kirkpatrick notes; *"Basically this proposal spells out the modes for implementing Resolution 502 which was the British resolution and one which they have repeatedly described as the only basis for peace. The proposal addresses the U.K. objection that the 'Spanish' resolution provided no specific time frame for withdrawal of Argentine troops. It provides for removing all Argentine troops in 15 days and only makes a reference to British plans for "reducing" its forces. That is, it leaves the U.K. in control of the Islands, but it also provides for future negotiations. This gives the British everything they have said they wanted, but provides a fig leaf for Argentine pride (the fig leaf being, basically, the right to surrender and withdraw under U.N. auspices instead of British). … If the President can help Mrs. Thatcher decide to accept this, lives and the U.S. interests would be saved."* [1741]

Parsons comments; *"I believe that this is another genuine last minute attempt by Pérez de Cuéllar to try to bring about Argentine withdrawal without further bloodshed. Obviously it has come too late …"*

"Ambassador Ros said that the proposal "is extremely poor and could be due to an imminent attack by the British"." [1742]

In the Falkland Islands, Royal Marines Capt. Rob Bell, a Spanish speaker, establishes contact via the civilian medical network with Captain Melbourne Hussey, of the Argentine Navy. There is an agreement that the network will be monitored at specific times in order that information can be passed, should it prove necessary. [1743]

An Argentine C-130 *Hercules* lands at Stanley airfield carrying two *MM38 Exocet* missiles. [1744]

"The ITB was ready again, but the movements of the British ships had been restricted by the threat of the Exocet, which avoided the area that was presumed to be within the range of the missile." [1745]

A little before midnight, HMSs *Cardiff* and *Yarmouth* bombard Mount Harriet and Two Sisters. [1746] Elsewhere:

"Intrepid and her escorts, Penelope and Avenger, left San Carlos under cover of darkness on the evening of 5 June with Scots Guards aboard and proceeded around Lafonia toward Elephant Island, where it would release its LCUs to transport the guardsmen forward to Bluff Cove. Planners estimated it would take four

1739 *PREM19/634 Telegram 958 of 7 June 1982.* Conversation between Anthony Parsons and Amin Doha, (Bangladesh).
1740 *PREM19/634 Telegram 945 of 6 June 1982*
1741 *Kirkpatrick to Reagan June 6 1982 Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982*
1742 Yofre 2011
1743 There is some, unconfirmed, evidence that an unnamed British Commandeer had a conversation, via this link, with General Menendez on June 8, 1982. Menendez apparently signed off saying he would call again on June 9.
1744 Amendolara 2012
1745 *Ibid. cf.* May 31 & June 1, above
1746 In excess of 600 shells were fired at the Argentine defences.

hours for LCUs to make the movement in open water from Elephant Island to Bluff Cove. It would be a tough passage for the Scots Guards in the open LCUs. ... After releasing her LCUs with the Scots Guards, Intrepid then would return to San Carlos to embark the Welsh Guards and again move around Lafonia under cover of darkness and rendezvous with LCUs returning from Bluff Cove, which would take the Welshmen to Fitzroy. The LCUs then would be in position at Fitzroy to shuttle supplies from the LSL Sir Tristram when she arrived that night with units and supplies to start forming the forward support base." [1747]

June 6th, at 0230 local time, LCUs depart *Intrepid* for the journey to Bluff Cove; arriving at 0800.

"The arrival of the Scots Guards came as quite a surprise to 2 Para, which by then had pressed forward to the Bluff Cove area. Like crews on British warships in the area, the parachute battalion had not received notice that the Scots Guards were arriving to relieve them. They wasted no time in vacating Bluff Cove for the guardsmen, though, to their great credit, the Scots Guards quickly recovered from the rigors of their passage, took over 2 Para positions and started patrolling." [1748]

As HMS *Cardiff* bombards Argentine positions, it mistakenly targets a British *Gazelle* helicopter of 656 Squadron carrying 5 Brigade's Signals Officer and another passenger. The helicopter is hit by a *Sea Dart* missile killing both pilots and passengers. [1749]

An Argentine patrol is ambushed near the Murrell River by a 3 Para squad, resulting in the deaths of five Argentine soldiers. The British patrol takes fire from Mount Tumbledown, but withdraws without casualties.

Unloading/loading at San Carlos are *Blue Rover*, *Elk*, *Nordic Ferry*, *Sir Geraint*, *Sir Tristram*, and *Sir Galahad*. *Sir Lancelot* is moored and acting as a temporary home for the SAS while repairs continue. Due to sail for Fitzroy, loading of the LSL *Sir Tristram* takes longer than expected due to bad weather limiting helicopter flights. [1750]

"Lack of sufficient helicopters "precluded the option of airlifting the bulk of 5th Infantry Brigade"62 as was originally planned, at least in a short period of time. And operational planners had been warned that unless the war was over by 2 1 June, air support would have to be reduced by 50%at that time in order to permit essential maintenance to be performed. As a result, decisions were made to continue giving priority of helicopters to support the buildup of 3 Commando in forward areas and to move 5 Brigade and its stores by sea from San Carlos to Fitzroy." [1751]



MV *Norland* (right) sails towards Montevideo with 1400 Argentine prisoners. [1752]

RFA *Engadine* approaches the Falklands with four Wessex helicopters and fuel.

1747 Privratsky 2014. LCU = Landing Craft Utility

1748 Privratsky 2014

1749 For reasons never stated, Britain's Ministry of Defence covered up the details until 1988 when, under pressure from the mother of one of the deceased, Lance-Corporal Simon Cockton, a new inquest was held and the truth emerged. Seemingly, the Royal Navy had been told that nothing '*friendly*' would be flying at that time. The MOD has never apologized. *Cardiff* also targeted the LCUs from *Intrepid*, unaware of the movement of the Scots Guards. Fortunately, observers on *Cardiff* recognised that the LCUs were British.

1750 LSL = Landing Ship Logistic

1751 Privatsky 1986

1752 MV *Norland* was a P&O roll on/roll off ferry from Yorkshire, requisitioned for use as a troop carrier.

In New York, Parsons receives instructions to inform the Secretary-General that his proposals are unacceptable.

> *"I saw the Secretary-General at 2300z this evening, ie one hour before his deadline. He had not by then heard from the Argentines... I said that you (Pym) and the Prime Minister had studied the Secretary-General's message very carefully... But for the immediate future you had a single objective, namely to bring about Argentine withdrawal by one way or another and as quickly as possible. The military situation on the ground was now too complex to make it practicable for a third party to intervene.*
>
> *You could not at this stage accept an integrated package involving many other aspects of the crisis. Nor at this stage could you commit yourselves to any proposition about the reduction of UK forces or about long term security arrangements under the UN's or anyone else's auspices. These were matters that would have to be worked out after we had repossessed the Islands. I went on to say that we had become disillusioned by the course of negotiations during the last two months. ...*
>
> *Most recently our complete lack of confidence in the Argentines had been compounded by the Non-Aligned communique which had just been drafted in Havana. This had been an Argentine text. It showed absolutely no disposition on Argentina's part to compromise. ...*
>
> *Against this background you were not prepared to take another chance which would involve the risk of re-involving ourselves in interminable negotiations. ... It was clear that none of this came as any surprise to the Secretary-General. ... De Soto has since told me that the Argentine response was negative, he would not reveal the details ..."* [1753]

In Paris, at the end of the Economic Summit at Versailles, President Reagan makes a statement in which he refers to the war in the South Atlantic; *"The tragedy in the Falkland Islands has been a serious concern to us all. Throughout the crisis, we have all been impressed by the British resolve, and, in various ways, we have demonstrated our support for the United Kingdom. The United States continues to believe that we must end the fighting in the South Atlantic and achieve a political settlement."* [1754]

US Secretary of State Haig, adds; *"We remain confident after the discussions - the extensive discussions between the President and Mrs. Thatcher here, the discussions I've had with Foreign Minister Pym - that we share a common view with Britain ; that the crisis in the South Atlantic should be resolved with a minimum loss of life. And I would like to note tonight that the option of a honorable withdrawal for Argentine forces remains still available."* [1755]

Argentina's Ambassador to France, Gerardo Jorge Schamis, writes in his personal diary; *"I am tired of being told that the (French) Government are divided regarding the Malvinas; in my ear they tell me that they hated the British; in the UN, in the EEC, to Reagan, they publicly express their support for Great Britain"* [1756]

In the Falkland Islands, at San Carlos, with *Intrepid* experiencing engine trouble, the task of moving the Welsh Guards to Fitzroy falls to the LPD *Fearless* (Capt. Larkin). [1757]

"The next phase of the shuttle plan called for Fearless, carrying two of its own LCUs preloaded with guardsman's supplies, to link up with the four LCUs from Intrepid that were in the forward area already. Two

1753 *PREM19/634 Telegram 949 of 6 June 1982.* The mood among US officials was described as "glum".
1754 *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.5
1755 *Ibid*. pp.8-9
1756 Quoted in Yofre 2011
1757 LPD = Landing Platform Dock

of Intrepid's LCUs and the two from Fearless would carry the Welsh Guards to Fitzroy. … Larkin, therefore, set sail from San Carlos on the evening of 6 June with Welsh Guards aboard and two LCUs, expecting to link up with the four LCUs from Intrepid, this time at Elephant Island not Lively Island" [1758]

In the Middle East, Israel invades Lebanon.

"Israel's anger over British condemnations of its actions in Lebanon made it less receptive to London's protests over the arms sales to Buenos Aires. … A further source of irritation for Israel was that Britain drew comparisons between the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and that of the Falkland Islanders." [1759]

June 7th, during the night, two SAS patrols set up observation posts on Beagle Ridge, overlooking Stanley airfield and Argentine positions on Wireless Ridge. [1760] Argentine positions near Stanley are bombarded, while Gurkha patrols mop up pockets of resistance behind British lines. A night-time bombardment by *Active* and *Ambuscade* targets Argentine positions near Fitzroy.

Fearless arrives at Elephant Island, as planned.

"When LCUs failed to show early the next morning, and after using its onboard helicopter to search for them, the captain of Fearless signalled Clapp, … and then released his two LCUs with as many of the Welsh Guards as possible. The mission for guiding these LCUs beyond the release point fell to Major Tony Todd, a Royal Corps of Transport officer with considerable amphibious and maritime experience, who was erroneously told to take the contingent of Welsh Guards to Bluff Cove instead of Fitzroy, their intended destination. Todd expertly guided the two LCUs safely to Bluff Cove. They arrived with half of the Welsh Guards at 0800 hrs as Fearless was well on her way back to San Carlos with the other half of the battalion." [1761]

A *Harrier* attacks an Argentine position near Stanley.

> *"… a Harrier had made a mad dash down the valley towards the racecourse and had taken out a gun site as Felton's Stream. I hope everyone had some washing on their lines as it passed in case it was taking photos."* [1762]

An Argentine radio station, *Radio Libertad*, starts broadcasting propaganda to British troops in the Falklands.

"Using Tokyo Rose as its inspiration, Radio Liberty was created by the intelligence service of the Argentine Army. Its purpose was to demoralize British troops by playing Beatles songs and other British classics. The leading broadcaster was Silvia Fernandez Barrio, or 'Argentine Annie', as she was nicknamed by the British troops. "She was really fluent in those days, but she talked with a strong American accent. So we had to hire an Irish translator to help her sound more Victorian" recalled the radio producer." [1763]

1758 Privratsky 2014. This author asserts that, unknown to the planners, one of 2 Paras officers had requisitioned, at gun point, three of the four LCUs that had moved the Scots Guards. So that 2 Para could return to Fitzroy. Southby-Tailyour (1990), who was the landing craft officer at Bluff Cove, mentions that a 2 Para officer, who was known to him, had requested transport across the inlet of Bluff Cove Creek. A request Southby-Tailyour agreed to. However, after he had left, a second 2 Para officer (not named) demanded that his men be taken directly back to Fitzroy. Brown (2021) identifies the officer only as a 'Parachute Regiment Major.' The appearance of a pistol appears to be confirmed in a book by General Frost – *2 Para at War.*

1759 Bermant 2017

1760 There they remained, undetected, until hostilities ceased.

1761 Privratsky 2014.

1762 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

1763 *Five Obscure and Curious Events from the Malvinas/Falklands War* Federico Sujarchuk (undated)

"In Argentina the vast majority thought they were going to win. "We can only wait for the defeat of the British in the next 48 hours", the Governor of the Province of Chubut, Rear-Admiral Niceto Echauri Ayerra, declared to the press without flinching." [1764]

Back at San Carlos, the remaining Welsh Guards aboard *Fearless* are embarked onto *Sir Galahad*.

At Port Stanley, General Menéndez addresses his officers.

> *"Not only must we defeat them, but we must do so in such a way that their defeat is so overwhelming that they will never again have the daring to invade our land."* [1765]

In Ireland, in a letter to Taoiseach Charles Haughey, the Irish Exporters Association inform their Government that the policy of opposition to EU trade sanctions against Argentina had caused a severe trade backlash in the UK. [1766]

Following Zaire's support for the vetoed UN Security Council resolution, London decides not to finance military equipment for the Zairean contingent in Chad, among other punitive actions.

After a meeting with the Italian Prime Minister in Rome, President Reagan and Secretary Haig fly to the UK.

In the Falklands, Major-General Jeremy Moore addresses Brigadier-General Mario Menendez over the radio; "*For God's sake let's stop the slaughter."* [1767]

An Argentine *Learjet* is hit by a *Sea Dart* missile fired from HMS *Exeter*; crashing onto Pebble Island with the loss of all five onboard. [1768]

Late evening, *Sir Galahad* sails for Fitzroy, carrying 352 men of the Welsh Guards plus their kit; 16 Field Ambulance (men plus kit and stores); G Company SAS (30 men) and four *Rapier* units. [1769]

Major Yeoman, Royal Corps of Transport, briefed Sir Galahad's master, Captain Phil Roberts, on the assignment, saying that the plan was to sail from San Carlos on 7 May (after embarking the troops) and arrive at Bluff Cove at 03.00 on 8 May to offload the Welsh Guards and their kit. At 05.00 the ship would sail for Fitzroy arriving there at 06.30 to offload 16 Field Ambulance and their kit and stores. ... Loading in San Carlos was completed at 21.45. There was considerable confusion over whether her destination was to be Fitzroy or Bluff Cove, but finally the former was confirmed and Sir Galahad sailed at 22.00" [1770]

"... previously unsealed documents show Royal Navy command sent Sir Tristram a signal ... explaining that Sir Galahad was on its way. Evidence shows the signal was documented in the Sir Tristram's signal file, which suggests two of their crew saw it. The file says no-one acted on the signal that Sir Galahad was coming,..."[1771]

1764 Yofre 2011

1765 Quoted in Yofre 2011

1766 Sales of Guinness beer had plummeted.

1767 Reported in *The Sun* newspaper, June 8, 1982.

1768 See Middlebrook 2003. One of the passengers was Vice-Commodore Rodolfo de la Colina.

1769 Brown (2021) states that on embarkation, 16 Field Ambulance was found to consist of 90, not 30, men, while the Rapier Battery crew added another 90 men. Still damaged from the May 24 attack, the Welsh Guards had to be accommodated in the tank deck. Set to carry nearly 600 men, authorisation was sought, and given, by Commodore Clapp.

1770 Brown 2021.

1771 *Falklands War: partly released documents on Welsh Guard losses trigger more controversy* in *MercoPress* May 18, 2024

In Stanley, Argentine officers are unable to maintain discipline.

> *"… in excess of twenty-five homes have been broken into by Argentine troops, mainly during the hours of darkness. The sight for the owners next day must be sickening – excreta plastered about, remains of a fire often in the middle of the sitting-room carpet, and general dishevelled mess."*[1772]



June 8th, just before dawn, *Sir Galahad* arrives at Port Pleasant in Fitzroy Sound; dropping anchor near *Sir Tristram,* which is still being unloaded of stores and ammunition. Only one LCU is available.

"Those at Fitzroy, like Southby-Tailyour, who had experienced the fury of Argentine air attacks at San Carlos now were horrified at what they saw and hurried to Galahad with the only remaining LCU, itself partially filled with ammunition from Tristram, to encourage passengers to get ashore quickly and walk to Bluff Cove. By then, however, it was discovered that the ramp of the lone LCU could not be lowered sufficiently to marry up with the stern door of Galahad, thereby preventing soldiers from boarding the landing craft with their heavy weapons directly from the stern door. Instead, the Welsh Guards faced the prospect of climbing down the side of the LSL on rope ladders to board the landing craft. This frustrated even more the Welsh Guards, who were still perplexed as to why they were not at Bluff Cove. Arguments ensued between Welsh Guards leaders aboard Galahad and Southby-Tailyour intent on getting men off as quickly as possible. Four hours after arrival of Galahad, most of those who had sailed aboard the LSL were still below decks in a canteen watching a movie. A Sea King helicopter had succeeded in lifting a Rapier to shore, but it was still undergoing calibration tests. Harrier combat air patrols, which Division Headquarters had scheduled for that same morning, went off station at the arranged time since they had received no word to stay longer. The movement to Fitzroy had become one surprise after another, surpassed only by horribly poor communication." [1773]

"The port anchor was let go at 07.15 on 8 June and the ship anchored some seven cables south-east of Fitzroy settlement and three cables east of Sir Tristram. Her arrival was unexpected for the troops offloading shipments onto the beach, partly because of a failure to receive the first signal from COMAW and the fact that they were not copied into the later signal from COMAW. So there was no co-ordinated plan for unloading both Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram…" [1774]

1772 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.215

1773 Privratsky 2014. Southby-Tailyour (1990) states that he had a conversation with two Welsh Guards Majors on *Sir Galahad*, and advised them and their men to make their way to the beach in the half-laden LCU and mexeflote (a powered raft), from where they could start the trek to Bluff Cove. Southby-Tailyour (also a Major) asserts that, despite him ordering the officers to disembark their 350 Welsh Guards, the officers refused, preferring to remain aboard *Sir Galahad* and await delivery to Bluff Cove that night by ship. Disembarkation was, in any case, then thwarted by the lack of either the LCU or mexiflote; both of which had been pulled away by an army Lieut.-Colonel to unload his Field Ambulance and its attendant vehicles. Information released in May, 2024 revealed that the subsequent inquiry did not believe that Welsh Guards Major Sayle had received an order to disembark, from a 'superior officer'.

1774 Brown 2021. A cable length is about 600 feet.

At San Carlos a *GR3 Harrier* crashes onto the airstrip while attempting take-off; *"The knock-on effect was substantial, for 800 Squadron Harriers based on Hermes now had nowhere local to refuel."* [1775]



From the mainland 500 miles away, Argentine aircraft are dispatched towards the archipelago. [1776]

"... with accurate intelligence about the landing craft at Fitzroy, four Mirage 3s and eight A4Bs were sent from Rio Gallegos, and six Daggers from Rio Grande... Argentine tactics were to use the Mirage 3s as a diversion, hoping to draw off any Harriers, while the Daggers and the A4Bs would fly low, hoping to stay undetected."[1777]

Argentina's aircraft are not seen by the radar detection systems established on Tierra del Fuego.

"That day, after several months of continuous operation, our long range radar had to be switched off for long-overdue maintenance. The Argentinean forces were then able to achieve a complete surprise attack." [1778]

At Fitzroy, two *Rapier* missile air defence systems are operational. Two others remain inactive. [1779]

A little after 1300 local time (1710z), Argentine aircraft fly in from the east.

> *"The landing ships were unloading men and materials when a formation of Skyhawks came in low from the direction of the sea. Both ships were hit and sustained damage. From just over a ridge I watched a column of grey smoke slowly turn to black as fire aboard Sir Galahad spread swiftly. The sea around the ship blossomed in orange dots as men jumped over the side into life rafts... From the flames came a steady rattle of exploding ammunition."* [1780]

"A red alert went. We hit the deck and I saw this great orange and red steak. Trouble was, I watched, and didn't protect my face. Three lads next to me were in flames." [1781]

"..., shortly after noon, five Skyhawks found the LSLs sitting in open waters in the anchorage of Port Pleasant off Fitzroy without the protection of a single warship, since a bar prevented warships from getting closer." [1782]

"As the first aircraft approached Sir Galahad's beam, it began to bank to port and released four 500lb bombs... Because the aircraft was banking when it released its bombs, they tended to diverge. Two landed in the water between the ships, off Sir Tristram's starboard bow. Two passed over the forecastle of Sir Tristram and hit the water off her port bow. One of these ricocheted off the water and exploded on the land of Pleasant Point. The three bombs that landed in the water failed to explode. The second aircraft followed about 200 metres behind the leader, and the third was about 100 metres behind it. ... They approached the starboard beam of Sir Galahad in level flight at about 100ft altitude and released their bombs simultaneously,... Two of the bombs

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1775 Southby-Tailyour 1990

1776 The assumption has always been that the ships were seen by an Argentine observation position on a peak above Port Pleasant known as Wickham Heights. A more likely alternative is that an increase in the signal traffic at Fitzroy alerted the Argentines.

1777 Freedman 2005 vol.2

1778 Chilean General Fernando Matthei in *The Matthei to Mrs Thatcher Memorandum* March 25, 1999.

1779 The specific *Rapier* unit assigned to cover the Fitzroy anchorage was out of action awaiting a spare part.

1780 Brain Hanrahan despatch in Briley 2022

1781 Simon Weston, who sustained 46% burns, quoted in *The Guardian* October 11, 1982. Out of 30 members of Weston's platoon only 8 survived with only one uninjured.

1782 Privratsky 2014

penetrated the starboard quarter of Sir Tristram, one passing through the tank deck partly detonating in No. 25 port ballast tank... the other passed through No. 25 starboard ballast tank into the sea without exploding. Another bomb exploded beneath the transom, ... whilst the fourth fell into the water. " [1783]

With two dead, 100 tons of ammunition and some 400 gallons of kerosene still on board, plus an unexploded bomb, RFA *Sir Tristram* is abandoned.[1784]

"The third aircraft released a clutch of four bombs little more than 100 metres from the starboard beam of Sir Galahad. Three of these entered the aft accommodation areas ... One transited the ship and made an exit on the port side ... big fires and black smoke developed immediately. Sir Galahad had been hit by three 500lb high explosive bombs on the starboard aft side, and was struck by a short burst of 30mm cannon fire in the area of the engineers office and possibly the troops' cafeteria. No bombs exploded, but there were two fireballs/fire-fronts. One was probably from a bomb that entered at upper poop deck level, passing downwards through the galley extension into the port engine room, smashing a 500-gallon header tank of diesel fuel that sprayed finely and ignited... The other fire-front was probably from a bomb, or possibly two, entering down No 2 ramp hatch and deflagrating... This created a fireball in the stern trunk... It flashed forward into the tank deck ..." [1785]

With thirty-two Welsh Guards dead, together with five of *Sir Galahad's* crew and eleven other army personnel, the order is given to abandon ship. One hundred and fifteen are injured; seventy-five of them walking wounded.[1786]

"On 8 June 1982, GCHQ produced much material about the Argentine attack on British landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram offloading infantry at Bluff Cove, near Port Stanley, which was processed far faster than was usual for Ultra, yet still too late to save fifty-one British lives. Errors by Siginters and about Sigint shaped this failure. Siginters on TF317, inexperienced against the danger, took time to pick up indications of attack. A flash message from Rio Grande naval base in Tierra de Fuego to Port Stanley preceded many attacks, which even unread still enabled warning of their time, though not place. Such information could have enabled concentrations of Sea Harriers to loiter over targets, but still perhaps not (enough to) have saved even one ship." [1787]

Off Chaco Point, Argentine *Dagger* aircraft engage HMS *Plymouth*.

"Four Skyhawks of the 5th Fighter Group found a lone British landing craft in the Choiseul Sound. The first two Skyhawks attacked, and a bomb and some cannon fire all but destroyed the small craft killing six of the men on board. But a pair of Sea Harriers saw the attack and swiftly disposed of three of the four Skyhawks..." [1788]

"Argentine pilots coming out of attack runs at Fitzroy noticed an LCU in open water, about half way to Goose Green, heading toward Fitzroy. It was the LCU that Southby-Tailyour had sent to Goose Green earlier in the

1783 Brown 2021

1784 Yu Sik Chee and Yeung Shui Kam were both from Hong Kong. Detail in Brown 2021. *Sir Tristram* was repairable, raising questions about whether she should have been abandoned at such an early stage. At the end of the war, HMS Sir *Tristram* was towed to Port Stanley and used for accommodation. In 1983, she returned to the UK and was rebuilt.

1785 Brown 2021. On June 21, 1982, HMS *Sir Galahad* was towed out to sea and sunk. Now an official war grave. In 2023 there were calls for still embargoed files relating to the attack on *Galahad* to be released. The Board of Inquiry Report for both ships (redacted) can be found here - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/board-of-inquiry-report-into-the-loss-of-rfa-sir-tristram-and-rfa-sir-galahad-june-8-1982.pdf

1786 All survivors were conveyed back to San Carlos Water. A Hong Kong Chinese crewman, Chiu Yiu Nam, was awarded a George Medal in 1983 for his bravery in saving Welsh Guardsmen trapped inside the ship. An extremely modest man, he initially refused any recognition. Helicopter crews received praise for their bravery. One of the pilots was HRH Prince Andrew.

1787 Ferris 2020

1788 Middlebrook 2003

morning with instructions to return that night under cover of darkness. Contrary to his instructions, the lone LCU was now in open water in broad daylight. Argentine fighters attacked again, killing six men and badly damaging the LCU and its cargo. Aboard were the six Land Rovers that comprised 5 Brigade's headquarters, filled with its command and control equipment." [1789]

In London, US President Ronald Reagan addresses Parliament.

> *"On distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren't fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause – for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and the people must participate in the decisions of government – the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodletting of World War II."*

In Paris, *Le Monde* declares that President Mitterrand does not endorse the British claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, and that while France agrees that international law must be upheld, Britain should negotiate with Argentina for a new status for the archipelago that would be fair for both sides.

In New York, at the United Nations, Argentina's representative hands a note to Nepal's Ambassador demanding that Gurkha troops be withdrawn from the Falkland Islands. Katmandu responds that the Gurkhas are British troops. [1790]

At Fitzroy, rescue efforts continue.



"Soldiers from 16 Field Ambulance aboard Galahad disregarded their own safety and worked frantically to save lives as explosions wracked the LSL. The lone Sea King helicopter at Fitzroy made repeated trips into dense smoke to remove wounded soldiers and rush them ashore for treatment by the small advance party of 16 Field Ambulance. Other helicopters from throughout East Falkland soon responded and established a steady shuttle throughout the afternoon and night covering the 50km between Fitzroy and the field hospital at Ajax Bay. … Some medical personnel from Ajax grabbed supplies and flew back to Fitzroy … to help; others followed. So many casualties soon started arriving at the Red and Green Life Machine, though, that Jolly called Fearless and asked the headquarters to identify vessels that could take casualties. Eventually, Jolly's hospital had over a hundred casualties lying in and around the tiny refrigeration plant at Ajax. Landing craft took two dozen casualties each to Fearless, Intrepid, and Atlantic Causeway in the anchorage, as helicopters continued the shuttle from Fitzroy. Other helicopters took some casualties straight to (SS) Uganda. Medics and doctors at both locations worked tirelessly and, despite such a heavy influx of casualties, continued to maintain their miraculous record. Every British casualty who arrived alive at the small Ajax hospital remained alive. Regrettably, many others never had time to get off the burning LSLs." [1791]

1789 Privratsky 2014.
1790 UPI archives June 8, 1982
1791 Privratsky 2014.

Far to the north of the conflict zone, 600 nautical miles from Argentina and some 500 from the Falkland Islands, a crude oil tanker, *Hercules*, owned by a Liberian corporation and unconnected with the conflict, is attacked and bombed by Argentine aircraft.[1792] The vessel is hit by a single bomb which lodges in the ship but does not explode. A hospital ship, HMS *Hydra*, sails from Montevideo to assist.

> *"A 100,000-ton supertanker, bound from St. Croix in the Virgin Islands to Alaska, reported that it was bombed and hit by aircraft rocket fire 480 miles northeast of the Falkland Islands yesterday. British military sources in London said the planes that attacked the ship were apparently Argentine C-130 transports converted for use as bombers. As of late yesterday, the Argentine Government had made no comment on the attack. No injuries were reported by the tanker, the Liberian-registered Hercules."* [1793]

Damaged, *Hercules* makes for Rio de Janeiro. [1794]

In the Falkland Islands, Argentine *Skyhawks* return to Fitzroy in the evening.

"When the Skyhawks returned to their base and reported the success, it was decided to send out two more formations of four Skyhawks to continue the attacks in an attempt to add to the damage already caused to the British . ... Four aircraft of the 4th Fighter Group made the first attack, roaring in over the British units deployed around Fitzroy. But this area was (now) well defended, and the units there greeted the Skyhawks with a hail of fire from every type of infantry weapon and from Rapier missile launchers. This attack caused no casualties to the British troops. The four Argentine aircraft were all damaged." [1795]

A third wave of Argentine A-4Cs aircraft attack ground targets, albeit without noticeable damage.

"The lack of communication between 5 Brigade and Division Headquarters had created massive misunderstandings and dangerous assumptions. A combination of oversights, mistakes and coincidences followed, creating a window of opportunity for Argentine pilots that day. When it was all over, British ground forces had sustained their biggest setback of the war. In many ways, the British had been lucky in days past. Dozens of Argentine pilots had scored hits on vessels since the amphibious landings. When the Task Force was most vulnerable in waters off San Carlos, though, as it worked frantically in the hours following the landings to get supplies ashore, Argentine pilots had left logistics vessels alone. Even when pilots struck Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad in those early days, their bombs failed to detonate. All that changed at Fitzroy. The British luck had run out. Forty-nine men lost their lives as a result of the air attacks and a hundred and fifteen were wounded, forty-five of them very seriously. Most were from the Welsh Guards and 16 Field Ambulance. Countless tons of supplies also had been destroyed. ... If there was any glimmer of light amidst the darkness that day, it came from the increased focus by Argentines on the southern approach to Stanley. They were more convinced than ever that the main thrust by the British would originate from the south." [1796]

1792 On June 3, 1982, in an attempt to safeguard neutral American-interest shipping, a list of vessels traversing the Atlantic had been sent to both Argentina and the UK. *Hercules* was on that list. Whether a warning was given, or not, is disputed.

1793 *Tanker Attacked in South Atlantic* in *The New York Times* June 9, 1982.

1794 The ship arrived safely in Brazil but was found to be extensively damaged with an undetonated 1,000Ib bomb in one of its tanks. Following a determination that the bomb could not safely be removed, *Hercules* was taken 250 miles off the Brazilian coast and scuttled (July 20, 1982). With a total loss in excess of $11 million, the owners took a case for compensation to the US after failing to find an Argentine law firm that would represent them; *Amerada Hess Shipping Corp v. Argentine Republic, 830 F. 2d 421. 423 (2d Cir.1987)*. Decided on appeal 1989. See - https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/488/428/

1795 Middlebrook 2003

1796 Privratsky 2014. Total British losses for the day across the whole theatre amounted to 56 servicemen killed, and 150 wounded. Marking for he greatest loss of life among British forces on a single day since World War II, and accounting for 20% of British fatalities during the Falklands War.

June 9th, during the night, HMS *Yarmouth* pounds Argentine positions around Stanley; pulling away before dawn. Royal Marines patrol near Mount Harriet and Two Sisters; *"The dried Arctic rations being provided contained over 5,000 calories but required water and cooking fuel to reconstitute them. Units generally ran short of both; and as a result, men were starting to suffer from diarrhoea and dehydration. Consequently, many relished finding captured enemy rations, because they came with fuel tablets called hexamine for cooking and sometimes with a small bottle of whisky and cigarettes."* [1797]

Spain's daily newspaper, *Ya,* quotes a statement by President Galtieri.

> "*Argentina will not accept a return to the status of 1 April in the Malvinas.. but is willing to withdraw her forces at the same pace as the British, leaving a UN Administrator to govern the Islands."*

In the UK, during an interview for NBC, Margaret Thatcher is asked about the chances of a political settlement

> *"We've been trying for a political negotiated settlement for 8 weeks. For 8 weeks the Argentines could have withdrawn at any time. They haven't withdrawn. It is now beyond a negotiated settlement."*

In Buenos Aires, newspapers headline a, *"serious British setback at Fitzroy Settlement,"* and talk of, *"British losses in landing attempt." La Nacion* and *Clarin* claim that a frigate has been sunk and three other Royal Navy vessels, *"destroyed,"* and that President Galtieri is saying that Argentina; *"is prepared to continue the war for as many months and years as necessary."*

"... the (British) Government agreed to a request from the Task Force commanders to hold back the full details of the casualties to encourage the mistaken belief in Buenos Aires that the blow had set back the British far more than was in fact the case. The Argentines believed that future British operations had been hampered because of the loss of some heavy vehicles, supporting arms and provisions as well as many men." [1798]

In Paris, French President Mitterrand says that although he felt solidarity with Britain; *"This war must not turn into a war of revenge. There are limits to this conflict which I fully intend to make known at the right time, ..."*

Arriving at Stanley, the Argentine Hospital ship, *Bahia Paraiso*, unloads two *MM38 Exocet* missiles.

"Two Exocets shipped in on a vessel marked as a hospital ship were detected by Islander Fred Clark, an aircraft engineer who had worked in France on Exocet production. In a dangerous pre-dawn recce in freezing weather to a banned military zone during curfew, he saw two Exocet missiles in Stanley jetty shed. He was challenged by a sentry whose thick winter gloves prevented him from firing his rifle. Fred Clark placated the guard with a cigarette and made his escape. Those missiles were never used." [1799]



1797 Privratsky 2014.

1798 Freedman 2005 vol.2. A meeting between Media Editors and the MOD (PUS) on June 9, 1982 raised some frustrations regarding the lack of details regarding casualty figures from the Bluff Cove attacks. Excuses were offered, but no serious information given at that stage. A statement issued by the MOD shortly after the meeting ended, suggested that casualty figures were likely to be higher than first thought, but again no exact numbers were provided to the Press.

1799 Briley 2022. At the end of the war there appear to have been three *MM38 Exocet* missiles that had not been used, and which were seized by the Royal Navy.

From London, Foreign Secretary Pym sends instructions to UK Embassies and missions around the world.

> *"Please deliver as soon as possible the following message from me – Quote – I am very concerned to ensure that, once Argentine forces have been obliged to leave the Falklands, all military action by Argentina against us in the South Atlantic must stop. We want the next period to be one of rehabilitation and reconstruction and not one of continuing bitterness and hostility. I hope that this would also be the Argentine mood, and presumably they will be concerned for the return of their prisoners of war.... We do not want a situation where we have regained the Falkland Islands but Argentina refuses to give up the fighting against us. There may be a need to maintain economic measures until Argentina agrees to cease all hostilities in the South Atlantic."*

June 10th, in the Falklands, during the night, HMS *Yarmouth* shells Argentine positions to the west of Stanley. At first light, a Special Air Services (SAS) observation post near Port Howard, is spotted by Argentine troops and fired upon. Captain G.J. Hamilton is killed and his radio operator taken prisoner. [1800]

Four Argentine *Pucaras* from Stanley airfield, bomb 3 Para positions on Mount Kent.

In Argentina, it is the Day of the Affirmation of Argentine Rights in the Malvinas; *"... in Buenos Aires it was celebrated with scenes of great patriotic feeling and enourmous enthusiasm."* [1801]

In London, Defence Secretary John Nott makes a statement in Parliament.

> *"Since I reported to the House on 26 May British forces have moved forward to positions surrounding Port Stanley and are in firm control of high ground on an arc surrounding the town. ... We are in constant contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross to see whether we can find some means whereby islanders who may be in a difficult situation in the town can, with Red Cross assistance, be brought out. The Red Cross is working with us on this. So far we had not had a satisfactory response from the Argentines. Our concern for the islanders is very great,.."* [1802]

Pope John Paul II flies for Argentina.

> *"The Pope is coming to Argentina in a hastily arranged trip to balance his tour of Britain, which ended eight days ago. Vatican officials have insisted that the Pope's visit will be pastoral and that he will not be playing an intermediary role between the two countries, which are fighting in the Falkland Islands. "The Holy Father will come with words of peace, faith, hope," Msgr. Ubaldo Calabresi, the Papal Nuncio here, said in an interview. ...*
>
> *Vatican officials, however, say they fear that Argentina's ruling military junta might seek to portray the Pope's 32-hour visit as support for their side in the conflict over the Falklands. Underlining those fears, Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez said today that while no negotiations were in the offing, the Pope's trip "could mean a great encouragement toward an end to the aggression and the establishment of a peace that recognizes our rights."..."* [1803]

1800 Hamilton's four man team had been deployed behind enemy lines on June 5, 1982, establishing an observation point on a ridge known as Many Branch Point. On this day, only Hamilton and a radio operator (Cpl. Roy Fonseka) were at the post. In the exchange, Hamilton was killed and Fonseka taken prisoner. Hamilton was posthumously awarded the Military Cross on evidence provided by the Argentine commander of Port Howard – Col. Juan Ramon Mabragana.

1801 Yofre 2011

1802 *HC Deb 10 June 1982 vol.25 cc399-405*. See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/jun/10/falkland-islands#S6CV0025P0_19820610_HOC_235

1803 *The New York Times* June 11, 1982

In Brazil, the crew of Britain's detained *Vulcan* bomber are told that they may leave provided that they give an undertaking that the aircraft will take no further part in *"warlike operations."* However, the missile removed from the aircraft is to remain in Brazil for the time being. [1804]

"... the real reason we were released, according to the Brazilian colonel who was assigned as our mentor and escort, was that the day after our eventual release on the 11th July (sic) 1982, Pope John Paul ll was travelling to visit Buenos Aires. On his way to Argentina, arrangements were rapidly being made for him to fly into Rio Galeão Airport where he was expected to say Mass to an invited congregation of nearly a hundred thousand followers. The altar for Mass was to be located on the hard standing next to where our Vulcan bomber was parked. The base commander requested that we taxied 597 to the other side of the airfield so that it would be out of sight. We politely declined but suggested that if he filled our tanks to full with AVTUR we would get out of his hair and fly back to Ascension forthwith. Our request was granted, probably to save embarrassing the Pope or the President – or both." [1805]

In the Falkland islands, representatives of the Red Cross (ICRC) finally arrive from Montevideo on SS *Uganda*; *"... we came very late (to the war)... We had been impeded in our efforts to come to the Islands. At the end we could come on the 10th of June thanks to the British Army."* [1806]

In New York, at the United Nations, Secretary-General, de Cuéllar makes it known that he is thinking of asking the Pope to intervene with President Galtieri, in an attempt to persuade the Argentines to accept his proposals. Sir Anthony Parsons attempts to dissuade him.

In Argentina, Lt.-Colonel Alfredo Astiz is repatriated. [1807]

Seemingly oblivious to events around them, Argentina's postal services in Stanley issue a new stamp. Celebrating the 153rd anniversary of Luis Vernet's *Civil and Military Command* of 1829. [1808]


REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
CREACION DE LA COMANDANCIA POLITICA Y MILITAR DE LAS ISLAS MALVINAS 10 DE JUNIO DE 1829
5000 PESOS
PRIMER COMANDANTE POLITICO Y MILITAR DE LAS ISLAS MALVINAS
DON LUIS VERNET 1829
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Puerto Soledad (1829)
12 JUNIO 1982
BUENOS AIRES

1804 The retained missile was eventually returned to the UK – after being dismantled and closely examined.
1805 *Falklands War 1982: Black Buck Six – Rio de Janeiro Diversion* David Castle 2022
1806 *Falklands: Red Cross clear on Argentine families' wishes of identifying remains at Darwin cemetery* in *Mercopress* July 1, 2016.
1807 After seeking legal advice, the British Government concluded that to hand Astiz over to either France or Sweden would be a breach of the Geneva Convention. In Buenos Aires, among a number of papers regarding interviews with returning POWs, is a letter dated June, 23, 1982 and signed by Astiz. In it he refers to questioning at Ascension Island on May 23, 1982 (Padilla 2025). See above. In 2011, Astiz was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity by the Argentine government.
1808 See Vol.2

June 11th, during the night, four LCUs convey 260 tons of ammunition from San Carlos to Fitzroy. [1809] MV *Monsunen* ferries a company of the 1/7 Gurkha Rifles from Goose Green to Fitzroy.

"Her owners, the duplicitous Falkland Islands Company, behaved very strangely throughout and certainly seemed to plot how they could screw every last penny out of the Royal Navy for her use. The skipper was to claim that his ship had broken her back and the propeller shaft was bent but these claims were easily proved false after I sent Fearless's engineer officer to check the story." [1810]

HMS *Active* shells Argentine positions in the mountains to the west of Stanley. MSA's *Cordella* and *Pict* reconnoiter Berkeley Sound; reporting that no mines have been found.

> *"A very noisy night with bombardments from all quarters…"* [1811]

Harriers bomb Argentine positions at Stanley airfield, Two Sisters, Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon, Mount Tumbledown and Moody Brook Barracks. A *Wessex* helicopter attacks the military command post believed to be situated in Stanley Town Hall.

> *"… from the front porch saw huge bits of the police station roof flying about through the air with flashes, flames and lots of smoke. There was intense small-arms fire outside, the three spectacular eruptions as the Harriers bombed the Pucaras at the airport, which burned furiously and exploded… Uncle James was seen walking to work through the middle of it all."* [1812]

"… the most unusual action of the day was a British attempt to kill Brigadier-General Menéndez. The British believed that Menéndez held a regular morning conference in the Town Hall/Post Office building on Stanley's waterfront, and a Wessex helicopter, hovering over the high ground three miles to the north, fired two AS-12 wire-guided missiles at the building. One missile failed; the second flew on, just missing the intended target and striking the Police Station on the other side of the road." [1813]

In London, PM Thatcher speaks to the House of Commons, with regard to the British dead.

> *"It is a traditional and well understood practice, and one which provides equal treatment for all, that Service men who are killed in action on land abroad are buried in the first instance quickly and with all possible reverence close to where they fall. Once hostilities are over they are transferred to a permanent cemetery near to the scene of action.*
>
> *It has been the custom to offer the next of kin the opportunity to visit the site at public expense. Those who die at sea are buried at sea. The Government believe this practice should apply to those who die in the Falklands, but we recognise that this is an extremely sensitive question and we would not wish to make a final decision until all relevant factors, including the views of next of kin, have been taken into account…"* [1814]

In Washington DC, Argentine Ambassador Takacs speaks to US Admiral Hayward; *"… the British were misrepresenting the military situation in the Malvinas and were predicting a quick military victory. This misrepresentation had removed the pressure for continued negotiations. He wanted Admiral Hayward to have*

1809 Southby-Tailyour 1990
1810 Commodore Clapp quoted in Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012
1811 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.223
1812 *Ibid.*
1813 Middlebrook 2003. Menéndez was actually some 600 yards away, in the main Argentine Command Post. A warning sent to local postal workers had not gotten through. In the event, there were no casualties.
1814 *HC Deb 11 June 1982 vol.25 cc168-9W*

an appreciation for the true military situation in the Malvinas and hoped that the United States would do all in its power to help force a diplomatic resolution. ...” [1815]

From New York, a member of UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar's staff (De Soto) flies to Buenos Aires to rendezvous with Pope John Paul II. In order to give him a full briefing of the Secretary-General's proposals of June 5th.

Parsons reports.

> *“This is tiresome. It is naive to suggest that De Soto will not be in contact with Ros in Buenos Aires and if his mission becomes public it will arouse expectations...”*

In Peru, Foreign Minister Dr. Arias, tells the British Ambassador that Argentina's Foreign Minister Costa Méndez had telephoned him to say that the Argentines will withdraw if, *“some suitable formula could be found.”*

From Buenos Aires, US Ambassador Schlaudeman sends a message for the information of Secretary Haig.

“It has been clear at least since the British victory at Darwin and Goose Green that there could be no negotiations between the two sides for some time to come after the Argentines are ejected from the island, but HMG' s decision to foreclose any possibility of negotiations puts us in a very difficult position. It would be one thing for the United States to participate in a peacekeeping force on the basis of an understanding that the prospect of an eventual negotiated settlement is open and that we will be actively engaged in the effort to bring it about. It would be something else entirely for us to participate in a permanent garrison and/ or a "security system" directed against Argentina and her allies - as seen in Latin America. ... As we have reported, many Argentines are absolutely convinced that we want a military base on the Falklands and that that explains our posture in the South Atlantic crisis. This is a theory that should not be difficult to sell generally in Latin America if we turn up on the islands as part of Mrs. Thatcher's garrison. It should also be noted that no foreseeable Argentine government is going to do less than continue to press the claim to the Malvinas, using whatever methods are at hand. The outlook would then be for a prolonged war of nerves at the very least, with ourselves and the British on one side and the Argentines and at least some of the rest of Latin America on the other.” [1816]

Pope John Paul II arrives in Buenos Aires to be met by crowds shouting; *“Holy Father, bless our just war.”* Radio broadcasts relay the news to the Argentine troops in the Falklands.

> *“A curious atmosphere in the town, the troops are very withdrawn and quiet. Lots of military things have disappeared off the scene. John Street, which yesterday was like something out of the Western Front, was almost back to its former self. All the defences around the schools had gone. Very few of the troops have any weapons visible. The International Red Cross people are walking around the town with some senior Argentine officers. I do hope that they are not being taken in by this flagrant charade, put on for their benefit by the Argentines. They do not appear to have been allowed to make contact with many locals.”* [1817]

As dusk falls in the Falklands, British troops move towards Argentine positions on Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon.

1815 *Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982*
1816 *AMEmbassy Buenos Aires to SECState WashDC June 11, 1982*
1817 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.225

"The strength of the Argentine units was between 8,500 and 9,000 men, of whom maybe 5,000 could be classed as fighting troops… There were six infantry units – five army regiments and a marine infantry battalion – to face the seven infantry units which the British would be able to bring up for the battle." [1818]

"… the battle for Puerto Argentino began on the night of June 11th . The British plan encompassed two phases, the first phase being the conquest of the first line of mounts. The entire 3rd Commando Brigade under Brigadier Thompson would take part in this attack. The Third Parachute Battalion would attack Mount Longdon, the 45th Commando Battalion would confront Mount Two Sisters, and the 42 Commando Battalion would move against Goat Ridge and Mount Harriet. During the operation, the frigates HMS Avenger, HMS Glamoran and HMS Yarmouth would provide the supporting naval bombardment. … the British attacked simultaneously all along the western front. The attackers outnumbered the Argentine defenders by two to one."[1819]

"Twenty-two Islanders, led by Trudi McPhee wearing white gloves so people following could see her hand signals in the dark, drove their Land Rovers without lights loaded with ammunition through a minefield up to the front line to help 3 Para attack Mount Longdon." [1820]

To the south of Stanley, *Avenger*, *Glamorgan* and *Yarmouth* take up their designated positions. By 2130, Falklands' local time, all the British units are engaging Argentine troops and positions across the heights. [1821]



June 12th – in the Falkland Islands, shortly after midnight, the Royal Navy pounds Argentine positions. HMS *Arrow* positions itself in Berkeley Sound.

Onshore, an Argentine team wait with a *MM38 Exocet* loaded onto their make-shift launcher.

"On the night of June 11-12, three British ships were deployed for naval bombardment operations in support of ground attacks against the hills surrounding Puerto Argentino. … They (then) had to get back to the carrier group before the dawn, to avoid being caught in daylight by Argentine planes. Meanwhile, on land, the Argentine ITB team spent the nights in the midst of a tense wait for their prey. Somehow, the British ships

1818 Middlebrook 2003
1819 Corbacho 2004
1820 Elgood 2025
1821 In the image, Stanley town can just be made out to the east of Mount Tumbledown.

were beginning to cover an erratic path and generally came within range of the RASIT radar, but not the ITB. This monotonous and frustrating wait generated a situation that, in the midst of the drama and tension that was lived, added a touch of humor. One of the team members suggested performing an Indian-style rain dance around the missile launcher. With nothing to lose, the initiative was authorized, thinking that, at least they would warm up with physical exertion. Thus, under oath never to tell what they were going to do, the men began to dance around the pitcher, shouting Uka-Uka imitating the Indians, hoping that some British ship would remain within range of the Exocet." [1822]

At around 0230 local time, following a fierce fight on Two Sisters, the Argentine defenders begin to withdraw.

Mount Harriet is the next target; *"We were involved with a one night attack on Mount Harriet, when the Welsh Guards were coming up as a back-up. This involved marching for several hours on a very dark night, through a minefield. Sporadic shellfire slowed our progress tremendously. Eventually we made the base of Mount Harriet, which was coming under incredible fire from a frigate off shore. The whole mountain seemed to erupt in flame. It seemed impossible that anybody could survive an attack like that. This went on for well over an hour, shell after shell whistling over our heads and hitting the mountain. Eventually this was lifted and the Marines went in. To our amazement, there seemed to be an incredible amount of fighting going on. There was a lot of tracer fire. The whole night was being lit up by flares, which cast a dead, unrealistic, pall over the whole scene"* [1823]

A shell fired from HMS *Avenger* goes off course; landing in Stanley.

"The results were impressive, marred by a stray round landing in Stanley, killing two civilians and wounding some others. A third died three nights later ..." [1824]

On Mount Longdon in the early hours: *"... (4 & 5) platoon were in an area vulnerable to a well-sited Argentine position, from which they faced machine gun and sniper fire. A burst of fire killed one man of 4 Platoon and wounded six more, including the Platoon Commander. At this point Sergeant Ian McKay, taking control of 4 Platoon, determined to take out the Argentine position. He led four men, all of whom were killed or wounded, but he succeeded in knocking out the trenches supporting the machine-gun 'sangar'. Before he could attack this last position he was killed."* [1825]

"Terry (Peck) and Islander Vernon Steen joined 3 Para's fighting patrols and their successful attack on 12 June was one of the hardest-fought battles of the war." [1826]

Two Sisters ridge is secured by British forces at 0430 local time and before dawn, Mount Harriet is finally secured with two British fatalities and thirteen wounded. Argentine losses are ten dead and 53 wounded. More than 300 Argentines have been captured. A halt is called to the naval bombardment.

"By 0530Z (0130 local) Arrow had completed its task, and Glamorgan and Yarmouth stopped just over half an hour later. Avenger remained on the gunline." [1827]

1822 Amendolara 2012

1823 John Witheroe, British War Correspondent, quoted in *Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War* Andre Deutsch 1989 p.271

1824 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Susan Whitley and Doreen Bonner were killed instantly. Mary Godwin died a few days later. Caused by a defect in a tracking radar system.

1825 Freedman 2005 vol.2. Awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/citation-sgt-ian-mckay-1982.pdf

1826 Elgood 2025. 3 Para awarded Peck their coveted red beret.

1827 Freedman 2005 vol.2.

As HMS *Glamorgan* moves away, the ship is targeted by Argentina's shore-based *MM38 Exocet* missile platform; *"Several difficulties were encountered in placing the launcher on a suitable flat surface. The launching ramp was fixed, therefore it couldn't aim, so it was only through the radar that they could detect an imprudent frigate passing in front of it. ... That early morning, a group of men, ... were watching the radar display. 'Come on, just two degrees more. Move. Just a little more, please!' And it happened. The ship crossed the line, and the radar operator shouted – 'Now!'."* [1828]

"..., the RASIT radar, operated by a non-commissioned officer from the Artillery Group 3 (GA 3) of the Argentine Army, with the support of a naval officer, detected a ship entering the firing zone, at its far end. Immediately, the firing procedure began, launching a missile towards contact. On this occasion, the target was the British destroyer HMS Glamorgan when she was moving away from the coast, after completing her naval fire support mission against Argentine land positions." [1829]

Glamorgan's crew see the missile coming and attempt a high speed turn to present her stern to the incoming *Exocet*. The missile strikes the ship's port side near the stern hanger, skids onto the deck and explodes creating a hole in the hanger deck and causing a fire in the galley area below. The ship's *Wessex* helicopter also explodes, creating a fire within the rear hanger. Despite being damaged, and on fire, *Glamorgan* is still seaworthy and moves out of range. [1830]

"While cutting a corner (of which she had been warned) to save time she was hit by a shore launched Exocet suffering 13 dead and severe, but containable, damage." [1831]

Around 0630 local time, reports confirm that Mount Longdon has been secured. Elements of 3 Para move on towards Wireless Ridge. [1832]



"All units ... are firm on high features Mt. Longdon, Two Sisters and Mt. Harriet." [1833]

Around 0800 (1200z), British troops dig in on Mount Longdon, while artillery pounds Argentine positions on Mount Tumbledown. Overnight fighting has cost the Argentines 69 dead, 220 wounded and 404 captured. British losses are 37 killed and 105 wounded.

"... the loss of Two Sisters, which overlooked Stanley, appalled Brigadier-General Menéndez and he signalled the Joint Operations Centre in Buenos Aires demanding immediate air and naval bombardment and insisted the National Reserve must be deployed." [1834]

As the sun rises, the civilians in Stanley learn of the stray shell.

1828 Argentine account quoted in Middlebrook 2003

1829 Amendolara 2012

1830 The first warship to survive an *Exocet* strike, albeit at a cost of 13 dead and 15 injured. One of the wounded died of his injuries on August 19, 1982. The 13 dead were buried at sea, the same evening of the attack.

1831 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 2012

1832 At a cost of 17 dead and 40 wounded. 3 Paras Post Operation Report can be found here - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/3-paras-post-operations-report-battle-for-mount-longdon-june-11-1982.pdf

1833 *PREM19/635 Situation Report for Prime Minister as at 1200A Sun 13 Jun 82*.

1834 Van der Bijl 2023



"A most awful day. James came in early this morning to tell us the terrible news that Sue Whitley and Doreen Bonner were killed during the night when shrapnel from a shell went through John and Veronica Fowler's house, in which they were staying. Old Mrs Mary Goodwin, well into her eighties, has also been very badly injured. So has Steve Whitley (Sue's husband)… it is impossible to think straight and form a proper picture." [1835]

On HMS *Glamorgan*, all fires are extinguished by 11.00am local time.

In Buenos Aires, the junta announces that British forces have attacked the hospital ship *Bahia Paraiso* – a claim immediately denied by representatives of the Red Cross; who are on board the vessel.

In London, *The Times* newspaper publishes an interview with Argentina's General Galtieri: [1836]

Fallaci: *"... the islands are practically back in the hands of the British..."*

Galtieri: "No, madam journalist. The Malvinas are not back in the hands of the British. The British have still to capture them, and the result of the battle which is going to take place at Puerto Argentino is not so sure as you expect. I am much more optimistic than you. However, even if Puerto Argentino should fall as you say, I should not ask myself "was it worth while," even less would I think I had made a mistake. … Listen to me, madam journalist, not even the fall of Puerto Argentino would be the end of this conflict and our defeat... In fact I am not alone in believing that what we did on the second of April was right. The whole Argentine people believe it. Madam journalist, for 149 years the Argentines have denounced the aggression by the British .., and for 17 years they have tried to settle the problem through diplomatic channels, through the United Nations...."

Fallaci: *"But why do you say colonization? ...Whom did the British colonize in this case – the penguins?"*

Galtieri: *"They are all British because the British never permitted the Argentines to buy a piece of land there, to start a business, some kind of commerce or presence. ... The British ... kept these islands as a personal farm, and did not let any Argentine settle down."*

Fallaci: *".. you are a colonizer too, Mr. President.."*

Galtieri: *"... let's not go back that far in the past. Let's look at things as they are since the British stole the Malvinas from us. Let's observe where these islands are situated, how the under-water terrain extends itself in that area and connects with the islands. One can easily see the natural correlation existing between them and the terra firma. Not only historically, but geographically, the Malvinas belong to us..."*

Fallaci: *"But apart from that underwater terrain, what is it that appeals to you so much in those ugly islands? ..."*

Galtieri: *"You should ask Mrs. Thatcher, who is dealing death to us and to her people because of these islands, and because of these islands has lost half her fleet. Go ask her."*

1835 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.228
1836 Interview by Oriana Fallaci, an Italian journalist

Fallaci: *"Now I am asking you."*



Galtieri: *"Madam journalist, its the sentiment... the sentiment of the Argentine nation since 1833."*

Fallaci: *"... should I say illusions? To begin with the illusion that Great Britain would not react.."*

Galtieri: *"No, I'll tell you that though an English reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a probability. Personally I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable. In any case, I never expected such a disproportionate answer. Nobody did. ... It seems senseless to me."*

Fallaci: *"Haig claims that the fault is yours because he did not know with whom to deal ... Even on the 502 Resolution, the one that asked the Argentines to withdraw, he claims you and your generals had different views…"*

Galtieri: *"... the 502 Resolution contained a series of consequences that we could not accept because Argentina had not shed on drop of English blood to take back the Malvinas and the British were attacking us ..."*

Fallaci: *"... you said that the complete fall of the islands would not mean the end of the war..."*

Galtieri: *"... Argentina does not give up her rights on the Malvinas, on South Georgia, and on the South Sandwich Islands. It means that Argentine will never accept a return to where she was on the first of April. It means that we shall not have peace until we have obtained what we want."*

Fallaci: *"What is wrong with accepting, for example, the United Nations flag on those islands?"*

Galtieri: *"... the United Nations flag is alright until the negotiations take place. But not after. Not in the future. The future must see the Argentine flag on the Malvinas. And it will."* [1837]

At Port Stanley, local residents give thanks for their survival.

"Went to Mass at 2.30. The church is a pathetic mess, with pools of mud and water on the floor; smelling dank with the sweat and fear of the troops… Harriers have been bombing continuously throughout the day, mainly on the Argentine artillery positions at the back of Davis Street and Callaghan Road. Kathy and Robert Watson's windows were all blown in just after 10 this morning… The icy roads today have caused some spectacular disasters… One lorry towing a mobile soup kitchen went through Terry Binnie's back fence, ending up in his garden, resulting in a fearful mess of fence battens, fresh vegetables and hot soup..." [1838]

1837 *Galtieri: No regrets, No Going Back* by Oriana Fallaci June, 1982
1838 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.231



June 13th, off East Falkland Island, a little after midnight, HMSs *Arrow* and *Active* bombard targets at Moody Brook and Sapper Hill.[1839]

> *"It is impossible to adequately to describe the noise, which is now almost constant. The air is filled with the stinging smell of cordite... Our house, and I suppose everyone else's, shakes and shudders continuously."* [1840]

"The British were working furiously, bringing up ammunition and supplies for the attack they hoped to resume in the coming night. They received a nasty shock when eleven Skyhawks swept in from the mainland and nearly caught them by surprise. Some bombs narrowly missed a British headquarters near Mount Kent where a briefing of senior officers was taking place; several helicopters here were damaged, but there were no casualties." [1841]

The New York Times reports.

> *"... the independent news agency Noticias Argentinas quoted a military source this afternoon as having said that the British had "succeeded in some penetration of the first Argentine line of defense" about 10 miles west of the capital, which is the key Argentine stronghold on the islands called the Malvinas by Argentina. (In London, Defense Secretary John Nott said that British troops had advanced more than five miles before dawn in what he described as "a brilliant surprise night attack" that had caught the Argentine defenders asleep) ... Heavy ground and air fighting was reported in the area of Mount Kent and Mount Two Sisters, west of the capital. The Argentine command reported that British ground troops attacked at dawn after what it said was a night of "indiscriminate bombardment" of the capital, known here as Puerto Argentino, by British warships. The command announced this afternoon that*

1839 There is some evidence that the ITB land based *Exocet* platform fired a *MM38* missile towards HMS *Penelope* at around 0130 local time. The ship recognised that it was under attack and responded with *Seacat* missiles, one of which appears to have hit the target. Unconfirmed.

1840 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.232

1841 Middlebrook 2003

Argentine bombers "attacked and burned" one of the British frigates involved in the bombardment, leaving it "out of combat and abandoned by its crew."..” [1842]

At 0800 local time, Scots Guards move to an assembly area near Mount Harriet; *“On arrival the Battalion dug in. Enemy harassing fire, mainly from mortars was landing all over the Harriet-Two Sisters area and occasionally rounds landed within the Battalion position. Whilst only one casualty ... was caused by their fire, most members of the Battalion experienced a near miss at one time during the afternoon.”*

Gurkha Rifles move forward at midday.

In Argentina, the Gallup Institute conduct a poll. Asked who will win the war in the Falkland Islands, 79% of respondents opt for Argentina. Only 4% indicate that the UK will win. [1843]

One of three Argentine aircraft attacking British ships near Stanley, is shot down.

“About 11.30 this morning poor old Wilfred Newman’s house up on Davis Street received a direct hit and burned to the ground very quickly in a great mass of smoke and flames. The British are obviously trying to hit the Argentine 155mm that is between the houses up there.” [1844]

In the late afternoon, British artillery pounds Argentine defences. [1845]

“The marines at Tumbledown were among the more effective Argentine troops and were well prepared for an assault. The defenders were on full alert. At 1600 hours, as the sun began to set and snow began to fall, the attack began.” [1846]

2100 local time (0100z) 2 Scots Guards cross their start line.

“The objective for the Scots Guards was Mount Tumbledown, which for the most part was defended by the Argentine 5th Marine Battalion, made up from regulars and conscript troops, along with some elements of the 4th and 12th Infantry Regiments. In preparation for the attack, which was first going to be a daylight assault from the south on 12 June but was then sensibly moved to an attack from the west on the night of 13 June, the men were moved from Fitzroy by helicopter on the morning of 13 June. They dug in on the south side of Goat Ridge, located around a mile to the west of Tumbledown.” [1847]

2130 local time, a diversionary attack is launched to the south of Mount Tumbledown.

“Fences, streams, all were thoroughly checked before crossing and all likely 'come on' areas avoided. Now and then, the quietness of the night was abruptly shattered by Naval gunfire and our own Artillery, being directed on Tumbledown.

After 3 or 4 kms, OC Recce Pl took over the lead. We had about 300m before coming to the target... Straight ahead we could just make out the bunkers and we could see the supporting 30mm tracer, stitched lazily towards the northern bunker. We crouched now as we moved, the Scorpions giving us

1842 *Argentines Report British Breached Stanley Defences* Richard Meislin in *The New York Times* June 13, 1982 p.1. No British ships were hit on this day.

1843 Yofre 2011

1844 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.234

1845 Twelve British *105mm howitzers* fired in excess of 6,000 rounds onto Argentine positions before nightfall.

1846 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990. Argentine defenders on Mount Tumbledown numbered nearly a thousand men including 700 experienced Marines and Commandos supported by four 105mm recoilless rifles. Positioned in Moody Valley were another 23 105mm howitzers.

1847 Clack & Pollard 2022 p.18

cover. We had just moved down an embankment when we came under fire from 20m. We dashed forward returning fire, diving for cover...

The GPMG section deployed on the right and put down really effective fire, as now I could see some Argies running away, (towards Stanley). ... Then there was an almighty bang, a Scorpion had hit a mine. We eventually reached our cover, only after some aid from the GPMG. ...

Five minutes went by and all firing had stopped. A quick head count, two dead... and six wounded. ... after 1½ long hours or so, we reached our RV with the Scorpions. What a relief." [1848]



2 Scots Guards take advantage of the situation.

> *"Whilst enemy fire and illuminant had concentrated on the Deception Plan Grids, G Coy had taken their objective. Left Flank moved through G Coy's position and contact was made soon after. For several hours the company struggled through well prepared positions whilst friendly gun fire tried to assist."* [1849]

"Within a few minutes, Argentine snipers using night sights had killed three Guardsmen and wounded two more. The usual British formula of replying with 66 and 84 mm rocket fire seemed to have little impact on the enemy positions among the rocks. The Scots Guards could hear some of the Argentineans shouting and even singing as they fought. These were the best troops General Menéndez put into the field, the 5th Marines...As night wore on and the fierce firefight continued, they showed no sign of crumbling, and their main positions held firm." [1850]

2140 local time (0140z), after bombardment by *Ambuscade*, *Yarmouth*, *Active* and *Avenger*, 2 Para move onto Wireless Ridge. [1851]

"D Company reached its first objective by 0140z (2140 local), finding a few enemy dead. Most had withdrawn. A and B Companies began their advance, with the Argentine troops seen to be running away in front of them...

1848 From 9 Para RE War Diary. At least three others were wounded by mines.
1849 War Diary of 2 Scots Guards
1850 Hastings & Jenkins 1983 pp.301-303
1851 Defended by some 500 men of Argentina's 7th Regiment with a company of the 3rd Regiment and a platoon of Paratroopers in support.

The assault, when it started, still faced considerable resistance (including heavy machine gun, recoilless rifle, artillery and mortar fire) causing casualties. The enemy was withdrawing but fighting at the same time…" [1852]

> *"The ridge itself is a long spine broken in the middle, with each section 800 metres in length. The first feature was taken unopposed. A delay then followed as artillery required readjustment. During this time the second feature was effectively suppressed by the CVR(T)s, Machine Guns Platoon, Milan detachments and Naval gunfire. …*
>
> *When the assault started considerable resistance was at first encountered and casualties received as the enemy fought a fighting withdrawal from their bunkers. Suddenly, as the company closed with the enemy they broke and ran, harassed off the ridge by machine gun fire from the Blues and Royals and Machine Guns Platoon and pursued by D Coy. Immediately reorganisation began and D Coy came under heavy artillery fire, as well as effective small arms fire from the Tumbledown and Mount William features, which had not yet been captured by 5 Inf Bde.*
>
> *The enemy could be heard in the darkness regrouping east of the company further along the ridge and also to the south in the area of Moody Brook."* [1853]

In Stanley:

> *"Sleep was impossible: shells screaming and tearing overhead, the bursts rocking the house every few seconds; deafening noise from the Argentine guns – loud twanging cracks only yards away; crashes and crumps from the British shells landing. … By looking through the black-outs we could see the sky alight with explosions, flares and tracer. The final stage in the battle for Stanley seemed imminent."* [1854]
>
> *"What a noise. 'They' have moved a gun down into town, not to far along the road from us either. 'They are firing to the west and the shells crackle as they pass over our chimneys…. A rattling good noisy night. Peter King's message on 'Calling the Falklands' as usual: 'heads down, hearts high.' They are, don't worry."* [1855]

From Stanley airfield, an Argentine C-130 takes off.

"On June 13, 1982, an Argentine Air Force (FAA) C-130H took off at night from the Puerto Argentino airstrip in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and headed for the Argentine mainland. The C-130's crew left 55 comrades dead and 63 FAA aircraft destroyed or captured, all lost in 44 days of aerial combat between the FAA and the British task force." [1856]

In Washington DC, Secretary Haig is interviewed on ABC's *This week with David Brinkley*.

> *Q. There are reports from London that Prime Minister Thatcher, once the Falklands have been retaken from Argentina - assuming that happens - wants to fortify them and perhaps give eventual independence to those islands . I thought our position was that there should be negotiations, including Argentina, to try to determine the ultimate future. Is that our position?*

1852 Freedman 2005 vol.2. After initial successes, 2 Para was pinned down by heavy fire from a height known as Apple Pie. An artillery bombardment was called in to decimate the ridge.

1853 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982

1854 Diary entry in Smith 1984 p.237

1855 *Neville's Diary* in Bennett 2021

1856 *La Fuerza Aérea Argentina en la Guerra de Malvinas* William G. Beaman 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022

A. I think our position goes back to U.N. Resolution 502, and that resolution calls for the withdrawal of Argentine forces, the cessation of hostilities, and a diplomatic or political solution to the problem.

Q. Including Argentina? Will it have a voice?

A. Clearly, in controversies where two nations are involved , it can't be a unilateral thing. On the other hand -

Q. Yes. But when one is defeated, they very seldom have the chance to decide who rolls the next dice .

A. There's no question about that. That makes it somewhat of a different ballgame than it was before the violence began." [1857]

June 14th, in the Falklands, 2 Scots Guards continue up Mount Tumbledown.

"As each position was cleared and prisoners held the numbers of advancing troops was reduced. By the time the summit of the mountain was reached there were only seven men, and of these three, including the Platoon Commander, were immediately cut down by a burst of machine gun fire. At 0800Z (0400 local) Kiszely found himself holding Tumbledown Mountain with three other men." [1858]

"The Guards reached the last of the enemy positions on Tumbledown only after a further struggle inch by inch up the rocks, using phosphorous grenades and automatic weapons to force the enemy from his bunkers ... The battalion had ... captured one of the most strongly defended Argentine positions of the war." [1859]

"The members of the 5th Marines had undergone night combat training, and because of their training in Tierra del Fuego, its members had adapted to the rigorous climatic conditions that they also encountered in the Falkland/Malvinas." [1860]

"... the battle raged among the rocks with bullet, bayonet, and grenade all doing their bloody work. Anti-tank weapons were also used against the Argentine positions – including a number of disposable M72 LAW 66mm rocket launchers and a single, cumbersome Carl Gustav 84mm recoilless rifle ... The Argentines, using their cover to limit casualties, and even shouting abuse at their attackers, kept Left Flank Company pinned down among the rocks in freezing conditions for over three hours." [1861]

At 0430 local time, the 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move through the Scots Guards pushing on to Mount William. Two Argentine *Canberras* carry out a high-level bombing raid over Mount Kent; failing to hit anything.

"The British destroyers Cardiff and Exeter, on station to the south, plotted the flights by radar and launched several Sea Dart missiles. One of the Canberras was hit by Exeter at a near extreme altitude of about 40,000 feet... The pilot of the Canberra, captain Roberto Pastrán, managed to eject and was eventually retrieved by British forces... but his navigator ... was trapped in the aircraft and presumably died when it crashed into the sea." [1862]

0500 (0900z) 2 Scots Guards stop.

1857 *Department of State Bulletin* July 1982 vol.82 no.2064 p.57
1858 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982. The Scots Guards suffered 8 men dead and 35 wounded. Argentina – 16 dead and 45 wounded.
1859 Hastings & Jenkins 1983 pp.301-303
1860 Corbacho 2006
1861 Clack & Pollard 2022 p.20
1862 Middlebrook 2003

"The Battalion went firm having taken all of its objectives. The struggle to backload casualties, which had continued throughout the night was accelerated. Left Flank had suffered 7 dead and 19 wounded (only 4 of the assaulting team remained unhurt) and Right Flank suffered six wounded. Two platoon commanders were shot and wounded, one very seriously." [1863]

Around first light, 2 Para reach the top of Wireless Ridge. [1864]

"With daybreak a rather strange and unexpected counter attack of about platoon strength developed from the area of Moody Brook, which was repulsed by small arms, mortar and artillery fire. With the failure of the counter attack the enemy resistance collapsed and shortly after they could be seen withdrawing in large numbers from Moody Brook, Mount William, Tumbledown and Sapper Hill. … Throughout the battle for Wireless Ridge the Battalion had suffered 3 dead and 11 wounded. Lack of time precluded the counting of Argentine casualties, but of an original Argentine strength of about 500, up to 100 may have been killed and apart from the 17 prisoners, the remainder fled" [1865]

"… we saw from the study window the amazing sight of hundreds of Argentine troops streaming like ants along Wireless Ridge, down through Fairy Grove towards the Camber. They were running before the British shells which were landing just behind them – almost keeping pace with them, throwing up great mounds of earth and rock… several houses seem to be on fire at the west end of town… from the BBC we heard that the International Red Cross had got a response from the Argentine Government that there was to be a designated 'Safe Area' for the civilian population… The Argentines could have least have let us know… the designated safe building was the cathedral, but we saw the back door of the West Store open, so stopped the Mini (van) and heaved ourselves inside… There were 126 of us in there… "[1866]

" This was to be the last battle of the war and would see the combined arms of infantry, artillery, and armour working very effectively together. At dawn, after nearly ten hours of fighting, with Tumbledown at last in possession of the Guards, the 1/7 Gurkhas, after advancing along the northern flank of the mountain, crossed its eastern end and moved south towards their own objective, Mount William. Coming off the mountain in daylight they were caught in the open and hit by heavy artillery fire, which wounded several men. They reached their objective but not before the Argentines stationed there had retreated back to towards Stanley, briefly taking up position on Sapper Hill before falling back on the town." [1867]

In Argentina, the *La Nacion* newspaper reports: *"our forces fight bravely to contain the invader. … the British use infrared sights in the fight that allows them to vizualize Argentine soldiers during night and fog. Such sophisticated elements, together with the use of panoramic visors with an infrared system, constitute a technical advantage that is opposed by boldness with which the Argentine defenders fight in the vicinity of Puerto Argentino."* [1868]

"At 9.15 am, … Rear Admiral Otero sent the following communication to the commander-in-chief of the navy: "I am going to destroy cryptographic files and equipment". At the same time, the following cable was received

1863 War Diary of 2 Scots Guards
1864 British casualties amounted to 3 dead and 11 wounded. Argentine casualties were estimated at about 100 as most had fled. Only 17 prisoners were taken for the same reason.
1865 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982.
1866 Diary entry in Smith 1984 pp.238-240
1867 Clack & Pollard 2022 p.22
1868 Quoted in Yofre 2011

at the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Malvinas Islands: "Main western positions at Tumbledown-Williams and Wireless Ridge in enemy hands. Hand to hand fighting. Numerous casualties ... Precarious position will not be able to be sustained beyond today".” [1869]

At 1000 in Buenos Aires, *Communiqué No.158* is issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: *“The Argentine forces heroically contained the enemy in the battles of Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge.”* [1870]

From Stanley, Governor Menéndez makes a telephone call to Buenos Aires; answered by General Iglesias. [1871]

> *“This is over. We no longer have any means left. There was hard fighting until the last few hours. The artillery group has been pulverized. General Jofré has managed to recompose a precarious position. I don't know if he will be able to hold on and defend it further to the night. The remaining alternatives are the following: 1. Accept Resoution 502 and withdraw our flags. 2. Accept the slaughter. 3. Accept the possibility of a rout with exhausted troops and running out of ammunition. I'm with Jofré. He informs me that our hospital has been affected. They have no regard for anything ... If you need time you should consider that we don't have much aroubnd here. They tell me that the English are 4 or 5 blocks from here.”* [1872]

As General Iglesias is reporting the conversation to the junta, a second call comes from Menéndez. This is taken by Galtieri. Menéndez says that he cannot continue. Galtieri responds:

> *“You live the situation, ... something that I cannot from the Plaza de Mayo ... certain sectors of the position have been pierced by the English attack. There must be Army regroupings and Marine Infantry ... in the rear of the English... They (the British) are also in a critical situation, as much as we are. ... attack the flanks of the enemy penetration... Use all the means that you have ... and counter attack. Use all the means at your disposal and continue the fight with all possible intensity,...”*

To this, Menéndez says:

> *“My general, I really must tell you that then I have not been able to give you a feeling of what we have experienced throughout the night and in the morning, and for two days now, my general, bah! Three days. Actually, my general, at this time, given what artillery is left here, the possibilities of air support and the physical performance of the (troops), my general, the BIM 5 has counter-attacked several times during the night, three and four times, and been repelled. The 25th Infantry regiment was already moved forward and one company practically disappeared ...*
>
> *The elements of the 6th Infantry that were taken out to go forward also disappeared. My general, there is practically no ammunition ... my general, the troops cannot give more, they are fighting with all their might in the trenches, I have seen it. ... my general, we cannot demand more from these troops after what they have fought... We have not been able to maintain the heights, we do not have space, we do not have means, we do not have support, and I believe, my general that we have to access the great responsibility towards the soldiers who are going to die fighting a combat without possibilities, for a period of a few more hours and that will cost many lives.”* [1873]

Galtieri terminates the conversation, telling Menéndez that he'll consider what he has heard and call him back later in the day.

1869 Yofre 2011
1870 *Malvinas: Identidad de Heroes* Daniel Santa Cruz 2022
1871 Van der Bijl 2023 suggests that this call took place at around 0800. Yofre 2011 places it specifically at 1055.
1872 Quoted in Yofre 2011
1873 All quoted in Yofre 2011. Garbled. Not an easy translation.

"I had to repeat to him what our situation was, but he didn't want to understand. Tactically, it was an unsustainable war. I ended the call. I thought, "This is the end." I knew my troops couldn't give any more." [1874]

Mount William is reported secure at 1300, by the Gurkha Rifles; *"Believed to be held strongly by a Battalion of enemy which, by all accounts, faced with the panache and reputation of the Gurkhas appeared to have turned tail and fled ... So no heads were cut off with kukris or anything messy like that... The mere presence of the Gurkhas actually helped to quicken the final stages and save casualties...."*

With Argentine troops withdrawing in obvious disarray, the British forces' bombardments and air strikes cease. Elements of 2 Para enter Moody Brook, and the outskirts of Stanley, before stopping at the racecourse. Argentine troops are seen to throw down their weapons and surrender.

> *"HQ 3 Cdo Bde were asked permission for the Battalion to advance down into Moody Brook and along the Port Stanley Road. This was not granted until the Bde Comd came forward to see the situation for himself. The order to advance was given at about 1300 hours. ... 30 minutes later the leading elements of 2 Para were the first British Troops to enter Port Stanley since the Argentine occupation 11 weeks before."* [1875]

"With the two British brigades literally at the gates of Stanley, Argentine command and control disappeared as the Inner Defence Zone collapsed and thousands of troops poured into Stanley, some in units, others as individuals ... Private Miguel Savage and others from C Company, 7th Regiment were among the first to reach the relative safety of Port Stanley only to be greeted with disdain by immaculately dressed staff officers." [1876]

In Buenos Aires, after consulting with General Osvaldo Garcia, President Galtieri prepares a transmission for General Menéndez in the Falklands.

> *"1. that no document should be signed; 2. that there be no talk of surrender or capitulation except in terms of evacuation and withdrawal of troops, including those from Howard and Fox Bay; 3. that he had to ensure that each man returned with his uniform and individual weapons; and 4. that the eventual commitment had to be in terms of a commitment of honour."* [1877]

In the Falkland Islands, after a final skirmish with an Argentine position to the west of Sapper Hill, around midday, a message is circulated.

> *"Check firing. Check firing. There are white flags in Stanley."* [1878]

"After Brigadier-General Jofre had already refused an offer of mainland Skyhawks to napalm Wireless Ridge, Navy Captain Barry Melbourne Hussey, from Menéndez's governmental staff in Stanley, agreed to contact the British. When Major-General Moore agreed a cease-fire and the decision was relayed to Galtieri by Major-General Garcia, Menéndez was ordered to commit himself to discussing the evacuation of Argentine troops from the Falklands." [1879]

1874 Unpublished interview with Mario Menéndez quoted in *The Telegraph* June 13, 2012

1875 2 Para Post Ops Report for 13/14 June, 1982

1876 Van der Bijl 2023

1877 Yofre 2011

1878 Unnamed British artillery officer quoted in Middlebrook 2003, who gives that time as between 1pm and 1.30pm. White flags were reported, but these may have been raised by small groups of Argentine troops outside the town, or some of the civilians within it. No white flag were seen flying over Stanley that could be considered as proclaiming the surrender of the military authorities there.

1879 Van der Bijl 2023

Following contact with Argentine Captain Hussey, made via the medical network established on June 5th, SAS Commander Michael Rose, Royal Marines Capt. Rob Bell and a signaller, fly to Stanley's sports pitch for a meeting with Governor Menéndez at 1500 local time.

> *"I told Menéndez we did not want a bloodbath in Stanley, fighting building to building, and he would not want to be known as the 'Butcher of Stanley.'..."* [1880]

Menéndez contacts Buenos Aires and is provided with a list of conditions dictated by President Galtieri. These include no use of the word 'surrender'; no public or private ceremony and no signature in front of journalists. [1881]

In London, at 2212 local time, Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, addresses the House of Commons.

> *"Mr. Speaker. May I give the House the latest information about the battle of the Falklands? After successful attacks last night, General Moore decided to press forward. The Argentines retreated. Our forces reached the outskirts of Port Stanley. Large numbers of Argentine soldiers threw down their weapons. They are reported to be flying white flags over Port Stanley. Our troops have been ordered not to fire except in self-defence. Talks are now in progress between General Menendez and our Deputy Commander, Brigadier Waters, about the surrender of the Argentine forces on East and West Falkland. I shall report further to the House tomorrow."* [1882]

At Stanley, at 2100 local time, after six hours of negotiations, Menéndez agrees to surrender all his forces.

"It then became apparent that the disconnected Argentine chains of command meant that Menéndez would be unable to surrender the Navy and Air Force. Menéndez then contacted Galtieri to obtain assurances on the control of these other forces... The administrative details were then finalised. It was agreed that the formal surrender would be 'low key' with no press present." [1883]

Separately, Menéndez and Moore agree on the arrangements be followed.

"Major-General Moore and General Menéndez had agreed that Argentine units could retain their colours, while commanders and officers could still have command of their troops and could keep their sidearms to protect themselves from the anger of their men; that Argentine troops should withdraw to the airport area and assemble there; that mixed (British and Argentine) commissions would be formed to solve the problems that would arise ..." [1884]

At 2355 local time, General Menéndez contacts General Garcia with details of the surrender, which he reads out. Menéndez tells Garcia that there is another document, a 'gentleman's agreement' that he wrote down with General Moore; dealing with the practical aspects of the surrender. Garcia informs Galtieri.

> *"I am really disappointed. I am disappointed with the agreement signed by General Menéndez where he speaks of practically unconditional surrender. I am disappointed as President of the Nation and Commander in Chief of the Army, of the agreement signed by General Menéndez as Commander of the Joint Forces in the Malvinas Islands. It is not what we had discussed today at noon with you (Garcia), with General Menéndez, in the terms that a ceasefire and evacuation or withdrawal of Argentine forces*


1880 Michael Rose quoted in *The Telegraph* June 13, 2012
1881 Yofre 2011
1882 *HC Deb 14 June 1982 vol.25 cc700-2*
1883 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1884 Van der Bijl 2023

from the Malvinas Islands should be agreed upon. …[1885] *General Garcia, I had spoken with you and we had agreed on some points today at noon. I spoke about the issues that should be considered by General Menéndez in the agreements to be made with General Moore. I think it is quite unconditional. I think it is a surrender …"* [1886]

Just before midnight, formal surrender is made in a private, un-photographed, ceremony. Attended by Argentine Governor Menéndez, Capt. Hussey and Vice-Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve for Argentina; Major General Jeremy Moore, Capt. Bell, Lieut. Col. Geoff Field, Col. Brian Pennicott, Col. Reid and Col. Tom Seccombe for the UK. [1887]

At the moment of signing Menéndez objects to the word "*unconditionally*".

"When I read it and saw the term 'unconditionally', I reacted badly. I got very tense and told him 'General Moore, this is not what we agreed, here it says about unconditional surrender when it is not. … He asked me what the difference was. I told him that the difference was that I agreed to a surrender with conditions and there it said unconditional, so I would not sign that document … He was thoughtful for a moment, I do not remember if he consulted on his radio or not, and then he said, 'Okay, we cross it out'." [1888]



Headquarters, Land Forces
Falkland Islands

INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER

I, the undersigned, Commander of all the Argentine land, sea and air forces in the Falkland Islands ~~unconditionally~~ surrender to Major General J. J. MOORE CB OBE MC* as representative of Her Brittanic Majesty's Government.

Under the terms of this surrender all Argentinian personnel in the Falkland Islands are to muster at assembly points which will be nominated by General Moore and hand over their arms, ammunition, and all other weapons and warlike equipment as directed by General Moore or appropriate British officers acting on his behalf.

Following the surrender all personnel of the Argentinian Forces will be treated with honour in accordance with the conditions set out in the Geneva Convention of 1949. They will obey any directions concerning movement and in connection with accommodation.

This surrender is to be effective from 2359 hours ZULU on 14 June (2059 hours local) and includes those Argentine Forces presently deployed in and around Port Stanley, those others on East Falkland, ~~[illegible]~~ West Falkland and all the outlying islands.

..... Commander Argentine Forces

..... J. J. MOORE
Major General

..... Witness

..... 2359 hours 14 June 1982

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2359 hours 14 June 1982

1885 Garcia interjected to suggest that, at least, it was a conditional surrender and not unconditional.
1886 Galtieri quoted in Yofre 2011
1887 Already June 15th in London. As a result the surrender was 'backdated' three hours.
1888 General Mario Benjamin Menéndez quoted in Van de Bijl 2023 citing *Malvinas, Testemonio de su Gobernador* Carlos M. Túrolo 1983

In a telex message to the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Major-General Moore reports.

> *"In Port Stanley at 9pm Falkland Island time tonight, 14th June 1982, Major General Menéndez surrendered to me all the Argentine Armed Forces in East and West Falkland, together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather in their arms and equipment, and to mark and make safe their ammunition.*

"The Falkland Islands are once more under the Government desired by their inhabitants. God Save the Queen."

> *"General Menendez has surrendered forces on the Falkland Islands, both East and West, 11,000 of them, a lot to be sorted out. The Argentines have fought very bravely. I am not surprised at the outcome because of the superb quality of the men I have been commanding whose training is excellent, whose determination, drive and energy in very, very difficult conditions in the mountains, hard weather, hard country and a determined enemy, have made it a jolly hard slog. … It has been a damn close-run thing. Some of my guns this morning with 400 rounds a gun were down to twenty."* [1889]

"In the Malvinas, inexperienced youths faced a superior adversary under extremely bad environmental conditions (aggravated by the ineffectiveness of their bosses), and "offered" their lives. It is the regime that in good faith cheated the Argentines and killed them, not the British. The war was explained as a political decision of the military, nullifying collective responsibilities …" [1890]



"On the continent, the news of the defeat was made known through a brief communiqué, number 164, by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially communicated that "... the Commander of the Task Forces of Britain, General Moore and the Military Governor of the Malvinas Islands, General de Brigada Mario Benjamín Menéndez... (have) agreed (on) the conditions for a ceasefire."..." [1891]

"On June 14, General Benjamín Menéndez, governor of Malvinas appointed by the Argentine Military Junta, surrendered to the British offensives. Thus began the peace negotiation process. Argentina's clear defeat meant the continuity of the previous status quo." [1892]

1889 Major-General Moore interviewed by Brian Hanrahan immediately after taking the surrender. In Briley 2022. This has tended to give the impression that British forces were on the verge of running out of ammunition. Not so. Supply lines from the rear to the front had been the main problem from the day of the San Carlos landings. However, ammunition there was. It was just taking its own sweet time getting to where it was needed. See Privratsky 2014

1890 *Testigos de la derrota Malvinas: los soldados y la guerra durante la transición democrática argentina, 1982-1987* Federico Guillermo Lorenz 2006 Many of Argentina's forces were regular troops. The number of 'conscripts' is over-played.

1891 Carbone 2008. A clampdown on news outlets was promptly put into place.

1892 Bochicchio 2021

"Oh good, the men will be pleased" [1893]

In New York, Anthony Parsons informs Pérez de Cuéllar.

> *"I saw the Secretary-General … we have told the press that the meeting took place at my initiative: and I wished to inform the Secretary-General of the statement which the Prime Minister had made shortly beforehand in the House of Commons.... We have said nothing to encourage the speculation about a future role for the United Nations…"*

At Stanley, the victors survey the spoils.

"It would have been a surreal scene had anyone been there to observe the Brits disembark their helicopters in battle uniforms that evening and walk across the sports field on which they had landed. Some Argentine soldiers were milling around, still armed, as others continued to straggle on to the streets from the surrounding hills. And although they surely anticipated they would find damage, it must have been particularly surreal and unnerving for the newly arrived Brits to see the carnage, filth and disorder then characterizing the capital. Walking from the landing area across the muddy sports field that evening, Baxter could see dozens of shipping containers on side streets, their doors open and their insides stuffed with things like sides of beef and bacon, bottles of olive oil, cases of wine, clothing and other items clearly different from the supplies Argentine conscript soldiers in the field had been receiving. But some containers also were filled with crates of ration packs that had never made it to the front lines. Now Argentine soldiers were looting these containers, taking whatever they wanted. Vehicles packed streets that were ankle-deep in mud. Weapons, ammunition, dead men, occasional body parts and debris littered the town. Even more startling, perhaps, was the complete degradation of sanitation. Argentine leaders had not enforced basic sanitary measures in units during their occupation; forces had built no field latrines in the two and a half months since the invasion. Soldiers therefore had been defecating wherever and whenever they pleased – on the streets, in the town hall, in the hospital, the post office, on jetties, in virtually all public places as well as in houses where they were staying. Artillery, cannon fire and bombs, coupled with Argentine sabotage, had crippled local services, including plumbing. Permeating the air was the stench of garbage, carcasses rotting in freezers without power at the town's slaughterhouse, dead bodies and human excrement. … Stanley had become a horrible place." [1894]

"The victory in the South Atlantic was the triumph of Margaret Thatcher. If the Argentine invasion was the fruit of a lack of leadership in managing the Falklands issue, the positive resolution of the crisis owed much to Thatcher's ability to react rapidly to the initial shock, to achieve and maintain firm control of the political handling of the crisis, to clearly identify objectives, and to pursue them with a persistence that never lost contact with diplomatic prudence. The episode, which could have caused her political death, ended up giving her unassailable force, for many years." [1895]

In the USA, military planners commence their assessments of the British victory.

"… we have begun to study the issues and implications of the battle in the Falklands. … There appears to be consensus on the following preliminary lessons: Flexible and skilled forces capable of multiple tasks can be decisive. Although the British had inadequate or no contingency plans for such an effort, they did extremely well in developing ad hoc plans, devising appropriate operations and tactics,_ and carrying out their objectives. They were able to load depot stocks aboard 58 civilian ships by the end of May using requisition, charter, and conversion where necessary. Furthermore, the first elements of the Task Force sailed in five days, two days less than the British thought necessary for a contingency in Europe. The usefulness of naval forces

1893 Unnamed commander at Pebble Island on learning of the surrender, quoted by Van de Bijl 2023
1894 Privratsky 2014
1895 Bruni 2018

has been reconfirmed in dealing with contingencies like the Falkland's conflict. British actions demonstrated the need to be able to project naval power to remote geographic areas and to engage in amphibious operations, for which British operational concepts and tactics proved very successful, especially in the assault and ground actions. The importance of gaining and maintaining air superiority in maritime/amphibious operations was also reconfirmed. The British used small carriers capable of deploying limited numbers of Sea Harrier aircraft, but lacking any bases close enough to the action to be usable, the small carriers provided only a small volume of air offense and defense. In fact it was the lack of long-range air defense warning systems, and air attack systems, that made this such a close run thing. One of the first lessons seems to be the inestimable value of large carriers; with their air defense provided by ships,of the carrier groups, in such situations. If the British had not been lucky in several instances when Argentine MK-82 bombs struck six ships and did not explode, the outcome would have been much worse. We do not currently know the reasons for these Argentine failures, but we are looking into the following possibilities: ● fuzes may have been defective ● Argentine pilots may have delivered the bombs at too low an altitude. .... Britain modified quickly a large number of commercial ships for use as mine-sweepers, troop carriers, aircraft transporters, hospital ships and other purposes. ... Mobile and man-portable surface-to-air U.K. missiles systems, such- as Rapier and Blowpipe, were quite effective. These systems are currently credited with downing a large number of Argentine aircraft. ... The value of good training was demonstrated. The value of good leadership was even more conclusively demonstrated. The outnumbered British forces outperformed and defeated conscript Argentine ground forces in defensive positions. The British believe this high level of performance was due to the rigorous and active training their troops undergo, and the excellent leadership qualities of their officers and NCOs. ... The British set and conveyed clear objectives that were understood and implemented by the British military leadership. This allowed necessary authorities to be delegated, unequivocal rules of engagement to be established, and on-scene field commanders to proceed as they believed required. In the final analysis, the battle for the Falklands appears to have been a closer call then many would believe. The British won primarily because their forces, inferior in numbers at first, were superior in training, leadership and equipment. But luck also played a significant role.[1896]

"... the taking of Puerto Argentino was the result of the clear superiority in means and technology of the English forces; that these means, many of which were totally new and unknown to the global arms market, turned the Malvinas area of operations into a field of experimentation and testing; (with) the logistics facilitated by the United States." [1897]


The process of mopping up begins, albeit with Argentina refusing to acknowledge that hostilities had ceased. [1898]

1896 *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library: Oliver North Files 1982-1986: Falkland Islands (Malvinas) [2 of 2]: RAC Box 103. Memorandum for the President – Military lessons from the Falklands July 19, 1982*

1897 *Argentine Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement No.166* quoted in Yofre 2011

1898 Official casualty figures for the British side show 255 military personnel dead with 777 non-fatal casualties, and three civilians. Argentina claims 649 dead and 1,188 injured. This is disputed. According to Argentina's Defence Ministry the number is 651. See *Malvinas, los muertos que (no) tenemos* Alejandra Diaz Biglia 2015. Van der Bijl (2023) claims that 17 more are not listed, including 14 Argentine Air Force ground crew, and two coastguards. Also "*several*" Merchant Seamen. Padilla (2025) notes Argentine casualties as 649 consisting of 634 killed in action, 13 in accidents and 2 due to illness. He adds that 391 belonged to the Navy, 194 to the Army, 55 to the Air Force, 7 to the Gendarmerie and 2 to the Prefecture. Argentina did not formally acknowledge an end to hostilities unto 1989. 74 days for the UK. 7 years for Argentina.

June 15th, the Falkland Islanders wake up to freedom.



THE PENGUIN NEWS

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS NEWS MAGAZINE

VICTORY

The date : MONDAY, 14th JUNE 1982

The place : NOT "Puerto Rivero", "Puerto de las Islas Malvinas" OR "Puerto Argentino" BUT PORT STANLEY, FALKLAND ISLANDS

The event : Surrender of all Argentine forces in the Islands

FREEDOM AND A FUTURE

The following message reached Prime Minister Thatcher in the early hours of Tuesday, 15th June 1982 -

" H.Q. Land Forces Falkland Islands, Port Stanley.

In Port Stanley at 9 o'clock pm Falkland Islands time tonight 14th June 1982, Major General Menendez surrendered to me all the Argentine Armed Forces in East and West Falkland, together with their impediments.

Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather their arms and equipment, and to make safe their munitions.

The Falkland Islands are once again under the government desired by their inhabitants. God save the Queen."

(Signed) J. J. Moore.

> *"At 9.30 this morning we were allowed to come home… through the streets filled with abandoned vehicles, the gutters choked with ammunition – it's everywhere, millions of rounds which we crunch underfoot… British helicopters started arriving this morning early. We went down to the football field to watch them. … Fires are being left alone as dozens of booby traps are being discovered in sheds, houses, gardens…. filthy and ravaged, the town seems quite beautiful … The British Army is in Stanley. It's so difficult to grasp the fact that they are really here and that it is all over at last."* [1899]

> *"Valerie came home for a meal, quite worn out from the day's activities of clearing up the mess in the hospital and other such duties, The Argies had left the old end fairly tidy. They had stacked the mattresses very kindly out of the way, and then put hand grenades between each layer (What kind of person sets booby traps in a hospital?)."* [1900]

"The vast majority of the British nation applauded the victory. Heroes had been made, the aggressor put back in his box, and the name of the Falklands branded into the memories of all that were born before 1975. … Two thousand people suddenly had the rights and effective political power that had been denied their predecessors for one hundred and fifty years." [1901]

From Stanley, a press statement is released.



> *"Hundreds of Argentine prisoners on the Falkland islands could die from malnutrition, hypothermia and disease unless Argentina declares an immediate end to all hostilities. Fifteen thousand Argentine troops who surrendered to British forces yesterday pose a problem of disaster relief proportions … This is a problem of the Argentines own making. It was foolish to put 15,000 troops out on a line where they could not be resupplied. They are already suffering from malnutrition, exposure (in some cases hypothermia), trench foot, scabies and diarrhoea, brought on by lack of food and pure water, proper clothing, shelter and sanitation..."*

1899 Diary entry Smith 1984 pp.245-246 & p.248
1900 Neville's Diary in Bennett 2021
1901 *A Little Piece of England – My Adventures as Chief Executive of the Falkland Islands* Andrew Gurr 2011



From the UK, a message is sent, via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires, for the Argentine government.

> *"Following the ceasefire in the Falkland Islands, there are a large number of Argentine personnel who will wish to return as soon as possible to their homes and families in Argentina. The British Government is prepared to start the process of repatriation as soon as possible, provided that they receive confirmation from the Argentine Government that there is now a total cessation of hostilities between the two countries and that Argentina is ready to accept the return of Argentine prisoners of war and others from the Falkland islands and dependencies direct to Argentine ports on British or other ships or aircraft. ..."* [1902]

In London, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher addresses the House of Commons. [1903]

> *"... in Port Stanley, 74 days after the Falkland Islands were invaded, General Moore accepted from General Menéndez the surrender of all the Argentine forces ... General Menéndez has surrendered some 11,000 men in Port Stanley and some 2,000 in West Falkland. In addition, we had already captured and were holding elsewhere on the islands 1,800 prisoners, making in all some 15,000 prisoners of war now in our hands....*
>
> *We have today sent to the Argentine Government, through the Swiss Government, a message seeking confirmation that Argentina, like Britain, considers all hostilities between us in the South Atlantic – and not only on the Islands themselves – to be at an end. It is important that this should be established with clarity and without delay."*

Thatcher also confirms that Governor Rex Hunt will return to the Falklands as soon as is practicable.

"In the South Atlantic it was Argentina that was beaten. But back in Whitehall the Foreign Office lost the Falklands War." [1904]

In the Falklands, Islanders start to return to their homes and farms.

"Claude and Judy Molkenbnhr remained in their house on the north side of the Murrel River during the war, but decided when the fighting came close to Stanley, and stray bombs were sometimes falling not far from their farm, that they should leave. Johnsons Harbour was their refuge from the 21st May until the fall of Stanley. In this twenty-four day period the Argentines came, and they left their customary calling card.. Claude and Gavin Short returned by helicopter to the Murrel they found destruction and filth that almost defies description. In one room there were up to forty bullet holes, and if the furniture had not been taken, it was so badly damaged that it could not be used. Rooms were smeared in excrement, and any items of value

1902 *PREM19/635 Telegram 119 of 15 June 1982.*
1903 See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/jun/15/falkland-islands
1904 *The Spanish Ambassador's Suitcase* Parris & Bryson 2012

were either stolen or pointlessly destroyed. A Hoover worth £94 "had a hole just punched in it" and the Land-Rover in the shed also suffered. ... Claude's wife Judy, and daughter Lisa, lost most of their clothes, and he was left with the few clothes that he had managed to take to Johnsons Harbour. The livestock had been almost wiped out. 9 pigs were lost and one old sow was discovered in the pantry. She was let out, but starvation had weakened her and she died the following day. 104 chickens disappeared and it was later discovered that over 15 cows had been blown up by land mines. ... Large areas of his farm land are out of bounds due to the indiscriminate planting of mines." [1905]

"The people of Stanley lacked basic services. There was no running water. Residents were relying on the little water remaining in tanks at their homes; the town's water purification facility had been badly damaged by shellfire during the final assault. The sewage pipe to the sea had been severed. Two of the three generators in the town's power station were not working. In many places, power lines cut by shellfire were draped around buildings. Roads remained largely impassable because of mud and abandoned equipment. ... And beyond the capital, miles away in settlements, the inhabitants faced similar challenges. Argentines had taken whatever they wanted from them too." [1906]

As the population start to return, there is an immediate need to consider safe routes in and out of the town.

"Capt. Brian Lloyd of the Royal Engineers says he discovered a grenade booby trap wedged under the floorboards of the Stanley school building. "Any kid jumping up and down could have set it off," he said, adding that the Argentines probably thought soldiers would be garrisoned there if the British retook Stanley. Captain Lloyd said other booby traps had been found among sacks of wool in the Stanley warehouse, in peat used by the islanders to heat their homes, on fence posts at the Stanley racecourse and in trenches, ammunition dumps and open fields. Three British soldiers have been maimed in mine explosions, as has one of the 35 Argentine soldiers and engineers British officials say have volunteered to help in the clearing operations. ... British forces have set up a 24-hour phone line for islanders to call in and report mines, booby traps and unexploded bombs and have made appeals on the local radio to keep children away from unsafe areas." [1907]

"It quickly became clear that the Argentinian Marines and army engineers had both been laying mines and some areas had overlapped. On 15 June 59 Commando Squadron's Recce Troop, ... teamed up with fourteen selected key Argentinian engineer prisoners-of-war. Splitting up into small groups they went out to see what they could actually find 'on the ground'. ... By the end of the day a gruesome picture emerged. The Argentinians did not know how many mines they had really laid, or where, and could not even vouch for those for which records did exist." [1908]

Britain's dead also have to be gathered in.

"Planning for the unpleasant task of exhuming those killed in action and buried in the field actually commenced before the surrender on 14 June. Coffins and embalming materials had been shipped south aboard MV Strathewe with a Graves Registration party from the Royal Pioneer Corps, the first such team the British had formed since the Second World War. They estimated their task would take six weeks; they completed it in two. In most instances exhumation was by hand, except at San Carlos where they were able to use a mechanical digger. Fourteen of the dead were reburied in the War Graves Commission Cemetery at San Carlos with full service honours, including 2 Para's Commander, Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones. The other sixty-four

1905 *Penguin News* August 23, 1982 pp.3&4
1906 Privratsky 2014
1907 *The New York Times* July 9, 1982
1908 *Falklands Aftermath: Picking up the Pieces* E. Fursdon 1988. Within a few days, two British members of the team had been injured. So a decision was taken to identify and fence off problem areas. De-mining would have to wait.

bodies were repatriated. It was the first time in British military history that repatriation of the dead had taken place from foreign lands. The next of kin of the deceased were all given a choice: to have their loved ones buried in the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on the Falkland Islands, or to have their remains repatriated to the United Kingdom." [1909]

As do Argentina's deceased. [1910]

"More than three weeks after the conclusion of the Falklands conflict, the hilltop battlefields around this island capital are still littered with Argentine corpses. British military officials say that as Argentine defenders fell back from the high ground before their surrender on June 14 they scattered thousands of mines in unmarked fields. Until these are cleared, the British say, British soldiers cannot remove the bodies." [1911]

"Of the 650 Argentine dead, 246 remained on the islands. Many of them were buried in mass graves, war graves, in a local cemetery, or were simply scattered on the frozen ground of the islands covered with stones, covered with blankets, or directly on the ground, in the same place where they fell." [1912]

From the UK, messages are sent to Governments world-wide requesting them to apply pressure to Argentina; *"The US Ambassador has been instructed to speak immediately to the Argentinians; the US Ambassador in Brasilia has been instructed to encourage the Brazilians also to advise the Argentinians to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities. It is not clear, however, whether the Junta is in any state to take decisions."*

In New York, faced with a similar instruction, Parsons raises doubts.

> *"I do not wish to seem inhumane, but I am reluctant to involve the Secretary-General in this exercise. We would in effect be asking him to persuade the Argentines to accept a cessation of hostilities including the lifting of economic measures/exclusion zones so that their prisoners could be returned immediately. I believe that the Secretary-General and his staff would see this as a golden opportunity to get the UN into the act again...*
>
> *If we ourselves invoke the Secretary-General's help and, having consulted the Argentines, he comes back with proposals for UN involvement ostensibly on humanitarian grounds, we could find ourselves in a difficult position. ...*
>
> *We should stick to the ICRC as the correct agency for dealing with such situations."* [1913]

In Buenos Aires, with no announcements, rumours spread quickly. Crowds fill the Plaza de Mayo.

"Faced with the military surrender on the islands, the first reaction was silence and half-words. They did not even have the courage to admit that the troops had surrendered. .... Nothing, just nothing. .... At 6.40pm the Federal Police advanced to disperse the public who were shouting "the Military Junta is a national shame" and "surrender is treason". Finally, the crowd was violently repressed and the surroundings of Plaza de Mayo were the scenes of pitched battles between protesters and police." [1914]

1909 Privratsky 2014. At San Carlos, now known as the Blue Beach Cemetery, 14 British dead remain interred to this day. Another who died in early 1984, is also buried there. Elsewhere, two more lie at Goose Green and Port Howard. All are maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. See November 16, 1982, below.

1910 A dramatically more complicated process, as the Argentines had maintained few records and bodies remained unburied, often where they had fallen. Anecdotal evidence from Islanders spoke of bodies being taken out to the Tussac Islands outside Port Stanley during the early stages of the war. No official confirmation. See December 16, 1982, below.

1911 *The New York Times* July 9, 1982

1912 *Malvinas: Identidad de Heroes* Daniel Santa Cruz 2022

1913 *PREM19/635 Telegram 1001 of 15 June 1982*

1914 Yofre 2011

"People had been deceived by the communication of the events in the Malvinas, which hurtled from "We are Winning" to the sudden 'un-agreed cease fire' – used because the media could not use the word 'surrender' in the news." [1915]

At 10pm, President Leopoldo Galtieri announces on Argentine national television that the fighting has ended.

> *"The battle in Puerto Argentino has ended... Our soldiers made supreme efforts in fighting for the dignity of the Nation. Those who fell will always be alive in the hearts and great history of the Argentinians. ... They fought against incomprehension, contempt and arrogance with more courage than arms. They faced up to the overwhelming superiority of a power supported by the military technology of the United States of America, which was surprisingly the enemy of Argentina and its people. They fought to remove from our soil the last vestige of colonialism. They fought for the very essence of our national and American identity, they fought for the same causes which prevailed over the glorious birth of our Fatherland. Our Nation has fought for its spiritual and material integrity, convinced that ever tolerated insults break the spirit of peoples and of men....*
>
> *Puerto Argentino will not be the last step in the National endeavour which we began in 1833 and which we continued on 2nd April. ...*
>
> *What we are claiming belongs to us, will always be within our reach and sooner or later we will obtain it...*
>
> *There will be no definitive peace if we return to the colonial status."*

"Our children were sent into a fight they did not choose, decided by a government they did not elect, for which they were not prepared. There were 40,000 professionals in Argentina trained by vocation and study for a war. It is not easy to understand why 10,000 boys between the ages of 18 and 20 who lacked the necessary training were sent ..." [1916]

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry considers the future.

"On June 15, 1982, ... the Western Europe Department of the San Martin Palace (Foreign Ministry) sent a three-page memorandum to the Director of Politics in which it estimated that "the continuity of war actions will jeopardise (and) severely impact our country's chances in subsequent diplomatic negotiation. It will also nullify the possibility of isolating the United Kingdom in any attempt to avoid a serious timetable for negotiations regarding the sovereignty of the Islands and, in addition, will give (the UK) the possibility of continuing to invoke its status as an attacked country to ensure the support of Europe and the United States and with it not only the maintenance of sanctions against our country but the continuity or increase in the logistical assistance it receives from them"." [1917]

Argentina's Ministry of Education issues advice to teachers, on how to handle questions. Possible answers include; *"Heroism is superior to victory; The occupation of April 2 was an act of recovery and not a provocation or aggression; We did not seek war but an affirmation of law and justice; Strength is harder in the face of adversity; Sacrifice and pain are never sterile; ... the emancipation of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata was a reality made of heroism and courage; ... heroes are not the only victors of battles."* [1918]

1915 Alejandro Amendolara in Van der Bijl 2023

1916 *El otro frente de la guerra. Los padres de las Malvinas* Dalmiro Bustos 1982

1917 Yofre 2011

1918 *Lobos con piel de ovejas malvineras* Frederico Lorenz 2012 citing *Ministerio de Educación, Pensar Malvinas. Una selección de fuentes documentales, testimoniales, ficcionales y fotográficas para trabajar en el aula,* Buenos Aires 2009 p.127

Near the US Embassy, a small home-made bomb goes off.

In a further announcement, Argentina's official news agency *Telam* asserts that there is an agreement for the withdrawal of its troops, requiring that - (1) the courage of Argentine troops to be recognised, (2) a joint Argentine-British Commission be set up for a transfer of the Island's Administration, (3) Argentine troops remain under the command of their officers, (4) British and Argentine troops jointly clearing minefields, (5) Argentine troops retain their flag, (6) the surrender ceremony be held in private, and (7) Argentine troops to withdraw in Argentine ships/aircraft. [1919]

> *"Argentine Foreign Office official Bunge called Ambassador Kirkpatrick this afternoon to detail the terms Britain has proposed to Argentina. According to Bunge, they include: No formal ceremony (in the mind of the Argentines, this means no actual surrender); "withdrawal of the flag"; Argentine units to withdraw with their weapons, except for those made prisoner; Definitive end to hostilities, including a specific commitment against overflight by Argentine Air Force units. Bunge says these terms are "totally acceptable" to Argentina. Junta is now discussing how they could be made public as Argentine initiative. Idea in Buenos Aires would be to present these terms as implementation of Resolution 502. Argentines continue to hope that British can be persuaded to engage in "negotiations". Comment: If this report is accurate, the British have been very sensitive. Bunge attributed this to US influence."* [1920]

In Mexico, Ambassador Tickell is asked by the Deputy Foreign Minister about future talks over the Falklands.

> *"I said that it was too early to think about negotiations with the Argentines. They had caused the loss of many lives, wasted vast resources and done enormous damage. We were more inclined to send them a bill than to join them in a cosy chat about the future."*

In New York, at the UN, US Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick tells the Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, that the two sides have reached an agreement that Argentine withdrawal will take place in implementation of Security Council resolution 502.[1921] Also that all Argentine troops will withdraw with their weapons and equipment except POW's taken before the final assault and, on this basis, Argentine aircraft will not carry out further attacks.

Summoned by the Secretary-General, British Ambassador Anthony Parsons denies the existence of such an agreement. Parsons informs London.

> *"It is characteristic of Mrs Kirkpatrick that she should choose to act as a relay between Argentina and the Secretary-General. … I have no doubt that she is in touch with the Argentines, probably General Miret – it may represent the conditions that Argentina will try to put forward …"* [1922]

June 16th, Britain, via the Red Cross, proposes that one of its STUFT cruise liners be used to repatriate POW's. Argentina's response is that it has no objections to the *Canberra* or the *Norland* repatriating troops, but only through Montevideo. No British ship can enter an Argentine port.

1919 Some of these had arisen during the surrender negotiations. Argentine troops did remain under the control of their own officers – who retained their (empty) pistols due to a fear that they were in danger of being lynched – and the surrender was held *in camera*. But a demand that Argentine troops should be repatriated in their own ships had been rejected, and there was no mention of a 'Commission.' Menéndez retained his flag, although the gift presented to him by Galtieri to celebrate April's occupation, an equestrian statue of José de San Martín, now resides in an SAS mess-room.

1920 *Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Miscellaneous Files, March 1981–February 1983, Lot 83D210, Falklands [Folder 1]. Confidential. Drafted by Enders on June 15.* Not accurate.

1921 SCR 502 of April 3, 1982 had called for the withdrawal of Argentine troops.

1922 *PREM19/635 Telegram 1004 of 15 June 1982.*

Buenos Aires – via the Swiss Embassy – issues a demand.

> *"Argentine prisoners (must)* ***not be considered as prisoners of war*** *because this would suggest capitulation and instead would like the evacuation of their troops to be considered as "withdrawal" linked with Security Council Resolution 502."* [1923]

In London, congratulatory messages are received from around the world. [1924] From Washington DC, America's Vice-President Bush, and US Senator Percy, telephone Margaret Thatcher to offer their congratulations. In London, the US Ambassador expresses his; *"profound admiration."*

Secretary Haig notes; *"It appears that fighting on the Falklands has ended. However, Argentina will not renounce its claim to the Islands. Unless Argentina and the United Kingdom agree on a permanent solution, a future resumption of fighting cannot be ruled out. Prime Minister Thatcher seems set on self-determination for the Falklands which would preclude serious negotiations with Argentina over sovereignty, at least in the short term. She is prepared to maintain sufficient forces in the area to thwart another invasion."* [1925]

> *"I must say that I hold a great grudge against them (the USA) because the Americans know very well that as commander-in-chief of the Army, that is, before being president, I always tried to approach them and their administration... It was very disappointing when (Haig) sided with the English... The worst part is that Reagan and his senior staff did the same thing. To tell the truth, (all) Argentines share my view that this is a betrayal."* [1926]

In the Falkland Islands, British troops are offered what little accommodation is available.

"Those in Stanley now eagerly opened their homes, took in as many of the British as they could, and looked after them. Local hospitality of this kind would continue for many months, until more permanent accommodation for the military became available. Ada Watts, for example, turned her entire house over to the British forces and returned several times a week to cook meals for those staying there." [1927]

June 17th, from London, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym sends a message to the Swiss Embassy in Argentina.[1928]

> *"We are deeply concerned that the condition of Argentine POWs on the Falkland Islands, and our efforts to repatriate them as soon as possible have been misunderstood (or in some cases misrepresented). …We have asked the Argentines to agree that we should repatriate these troops to Argentine ports and for this purpose need a guarantee of safe conduct for our ships. … The Argentines in response have said merely that the prisoners should be repatriated to Montevideo. … If the prisoners are repatriated to an Argentine port.. the return journey ... will take 46 hours. For a journey as short as that we could load the Canberra with 5000 prisoners of war. ... to Montevideo the travel time would be considerably longer. Moreover, we cannot dock the Canberra alongside at Montevideo … the Argentine insistence upon Montevideo displays an incomprehensible lack of interest on their part in the well-being of their own people."*

1923 *PREM19/635 Telegram 168 of 16 June 1982.* My emphasis. Had those soldiers not been treated as Prisoners of War, they would have lost all their protections under the Geneva Conventions. This demand was ignored.

1924 Many, apparently, whispered or muttered quietly on the understanding that they should not be made public.

1925 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820315–0692*

1926 General Galtieri quoted in '*Argentina seguirá combatiendo'* in *El Nacional* Caracas 16 de junio de 1982 in Carbone 2008

1927 Privratsky 2014

1928 With the British Embassy closed, the Swiss continued to act on the UK's behalf.

Advice is sent out to Britain's Ambassadors world-wide.

> *"There remains widespread international confusion about the basic issues ... Ministers should take every opportunity to set the record straight.*
>
> *(1) what we are demanding from Argentina now is a ceasefire and an end to hostilities: ie we want peace. We are not demanding a 'Peace Settlement', nor that they should explicitly renounce their sovereignty claims over the Falklands, nor that they should give up any long-term understandings.*
>
> *(2) We are not using the POWs as hostages or as a bargaining counter to achieve this ceasefire... the Geneva Convention does not envisage a return of POWs until a cessation of hostilities has been agreed. Premature return risks prisoners being recycled for war.*
>
> *(3) Despite this, we are prepared as a humanitarian act, to return the vast bulk of the Argentine POWs even in advance of a ceasefire providing only that we have a guarantee of safe passage. Reports from Port Stanley have shown that the Argentine prisoners were in very bad condition when captured and that local resources are quite inadequate to provide shelter and nourishment in the prevailing blizzard conditions.*
>
> *(4) Our evacuation plans are being dangerously frustrated by the Argentine refusal even to give safe-conduct for the ships on which we would propose to return their prisoners. We are prepared to send these to any port in Argentina or a neighbouring country where they may be safely delivered. But the closer the port to the Falklands the faster we can undertake the operation and therefore the more chance we have of avoiding even more severe hardship and even fatalities among the POWs.*
>
> *(5) The Argentine Junta's intransigence demonstrates their lack of regard for the safety and well-being of their own troops: they appear to be using POWs as an expendable factor in their own efforts to avoid political embarrassment."*

In the UK, Major-General David Thorne is designated as Military Commissioner/Commander British Forces; to take over from Major-General Moore. [1929]

"Of primary importance to British commanders at this time, of course, was the welfare of their men, who had been sacrificing so much for the past month in the islands and also for the previous two months to get there. Thousands of troops remained in field locations, many in the open with only personal gear. Most had not enjoyed a hot meal in days. Many had not showered in weeks or even changed their underwear recently. ... Early decisions to hold many units in field locations outside Stanley certainly lessened congestion in the town as well as easing command and control issues. Shortly after the surrender, the Division relocated soldiers from 5 Brigade by helicopter from their last field locations at Sapper Hill, Tumbledown and Mount William directly back to Fitzroy and Goose Green, where they vastly outnumbered the tiny populations of those settlements. Most of Brigadier Wilson's men would never walk the streets of Stanley." [1930]

In Stanley, with insufficient shelters or tents to house Argentine POWs, 5000 are embarked onto SS *Canberra*. Another 1000 on MV *Norland*. En-route to the port in a disorderly line, some Argentine POWs break free and riot; settling fire to the Globe Stores. [1931] Order is quickly restored and the fire put out, albeit with considerable damage to the building.

1929 Thorne arrived in July, 1982 along with the 1st Queen's Own Highlanders.
1930 Privratsky 2014
1931 The Globe Stores had been used by the Argentine occupiers as a clothing warehouse.

"Before boarding, prisoners were to jettison everything except the uniforms they were wearing, a spoon and washing kit and would be frisked by the Royal Marines Police and be questioned by a small interrogation team collecting tactical information before being ferried to the ship from the jetty. ... At the order 'Next!', each prisoner doubled forward and stood in front of the screeners who asked, 'Name?, Rank?, Occupation?, which was followed by a short interrogation to determine repatriation or remaining at Her Majesty's pleasure. Some officers who had exchanged identities and uniforms with other ranks were mostly betrayed. ... Disorder engineered by several officers nearly saw the screening in danger of being overrun until an RAF SNCO examining an automatic pistol accidentally pulled the trigger, followed by silence and then said, 'Sorry about that, chaps!'. A 40 Commando troop then arrived complete with fixed bayonets." [1932]

In Brasilia, newspaper *O Globo* claims that British policy is now to offer the *"Kelpers"* self-determination and independence. Approvingly, the newspaper says that this is in line with the traditional British policy of decolonisation. It also notes that Britain has fought an *"ethical"* war. An editorial in the *Estado de Sao Paulo* states that Britain, by defending a principle without which international life would become impossible, had done the international community an exemplary favour.

From South Georgia, HMS *Endurance* sails with the frigate *Yarmouth*, a tanker, *Olmeda* and tug *Salvageman*. Capt. Barker establishes contact with the Argentine station on Southern Thule to tell the personnel there that they will be taken off. [1933]

The response is defiant.

> *"You are navigating in Argentine waters. The base is carrying out scientific work."* [1934]

In New York, at the United Nations, Argentina notifies the UN Security Council.

> *"... (with) regard to the scientific station 'Corbeta Uruguay', which the Argentine Republic set up in March 1977 on Morell Island (Southern Thule), in the South Sandwich group. Previous work on this station had begun at the end of 1976....*
>
> *It should also be noted that, before the construction of the scientific station, no permanent installation like 'Corbeta Urugay' had been built on the South Sandwich Islands and that consequently there was no permanent settlement on the islands up to that point."*

Ambassador Parsons' comments; *"The letter is remarkable for not asserting Argentine sovereignty."*

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's senior military officers meet to discuss the future.

"In recent days, Galtieri has been described by press reports and sources as increasingly desperate and emotional. In meeting with Army leaders, he proposed a "total war" with Britain and refused to accept responsibility for Argentina's military defeat. Reports said Galtieri had also attempted to disassociate himself from the decision by Argentine forces to surrender to Britain and had threatened to Army leaders that he would disavow the surrender agreement signed by his commander in the Falklands, Gen. Mario Benjamin Menendez." [1935]

1932 Van der Bijl 2023

1933 One of the South Sandwich Islands, claimed by the UK. An Argentine presence on Southern Thule had been a bone of contention since 1955.

1934 Barker 1997. There is some evidence that a message had been sent earlier in the day from Buenos Aires to Argentine commander, Lt. Enrique Martinez, with an instruction that the base continue to operate, and that he exercise sovereignty.

1935 *The Washington Post* June 18, 1982

From the US Embassy, America's Ambassador Schlaudeman messages the US Secretary of State.

> *"Tonight is a night of meetings in the GOA: the junta first, later Costa Mendez with the joint staff in the Foreign Ministry and Galtieri with the army generals. The media have announced the imminent arrival of General Menendez, military governor and commander on the islands, but that is as yet unconfirmed.*
>
> *Two things are clear: - the junta is going to have to take the responsibility for surrender on the islands. At this point we do not know how Menendez's trip to Buenos Aires came about, but, however, the junta is now stuck with the humiliation, not the commander in the field. That is a development of considerable potential political importance. The three chiefs must be nervous about Menendez at this point. He is the senior active-service representative of a military family with almost 48 years of history in plotting coups.*
>
> *... Lami Dozo, Galtieri and Anaya, if we go by what they say, want to continue the fight. But the air force would have to bear the burden and Lami Dozo and the pilots may not be that enthusiastic. They cannot be forced; they have all the high cards coming out of this war and what they decide will be critical ...*
>
> *We should not assume as a matter of course that a prolonged air-guerrilla war is ahead in the South Atlantic. That is what Galtieri has promised, but I still think that a de facto cease fire before very long is a possibility. ...*
>
> *Whatever we can do at this point to refrain from any public remarks indicating satisfaction in Argentina's defeat and to reaffirm our commitment to the other two elements of UN Resolution 502 – ceasefire and negotiations – would be helpful. How the USG comes across in this moment of the greatest humiliation in Argentina's history will be important to our relations for a long to come."* [1936]

"... General Galtieri has offered his resignation as Army Commander in Chief and will be replaced tomorrow as Army CINC by First Corps commander General Cristino Nicolaides. There is no official word yet on Galtieri's future as President, but the private news service DYN has reported that Galtieri will also submit his resignation as President. ... Dissatisfaction with Galtieri was widespread following the week's events. According to Argentine press, Galtieri's rejection of a total cessation of hostilities with the UK met stiff opposition within the army with all but two of fourteen senior generals favoring a definite termination of hostilities. Galtieri's decision to "convoke the people" for his June 15 speech also drew substantial criticism. The text of the surrender document released by London received front page coverage June 17 in most Argentine dailies." [1937]

In London, PM Thatcher answers a question in the House of Commons.

> "*We have not yet been able to procure a complete ceasefire in the South Atlantic. We seek such a ceasefire for the reasons that I explained last time I answered questions. It is important for us in the future. The figures for the number of prisoners that I gave to the House the other day were given to us by the commandant of the Argentine forces, whom we assumed knew the numbers. I am not sure that that assumption was correct. As far as we are aware, the latest estimate is 10,660, but the final figure is not yet confirmed. The only solution is to do an actual count to make certain of the numbers.*

1936 *AMEmbassy Buenos Aires to SECState WashDC June 17, 1982*

1937 *Situation Report Prepared by the Department of State Falklands Working Group June 17, 1982 5pm* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Vol. XIII Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984.* Dated the day before the official resignation, it would appear that US intelligence was well informed.

I agree with what the hon. Member said about the Argentine indifference to the state of its prisoners. We are trying hard to return the younger conscripts as soon as possible. The "Canberra" will be loaded by this evening with about 5,000 young Argentine prisoners of war. So far Argentina has not agreed a safe conduct to allow those prisoners to be repatriated to any Argentine Port. Argentina is attempting to insist that they go to Montevideo, which is a lot further away and would take longer." [1938]

June 18th, in the early hours, General Galtieri resigns.

"I am addressing the honorable Military Junta to inform you that, after having arranged my retirement as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I hereby renounce the position of President of the Nation with which I was once honored." [1939]

"Somewhere, in the midst of it all, you learned a tough lesson by yourself. A lesson that not many get the chance to learn in a lifetime: that every government, no matter what it is, is always truly representative. General Galtieri was nothing but a mirror to almost every man in Argentine. Given time the young people of today will be the Galtieris of tomorrow. Galtieri was not produced in a vacuum. He was the logical, genuine, inevitable product of the "Argentine factory". Among other things, Argentina has a rigid educational system, made to reject anyone who doesn't conform. Within the national school system there are no alternatives whatsoever. The result of it is rigid minds. Brainwashed minds. And more Galtieris. The only thing that could save the country is a courageous few who will dare break the vicious circle without anarchy or fanatical extremes. If that doesn't happen, Argentina will continue to be a lonely and inhospitable place for many of it's children." [1940]

The *New York Times* reports:

"General Galtieri had backed the position that Argentina should try to continue the war unless Britain agreed first to negotiations on sovereignty in the Falklands. He was reported to have offered his resignation as Commander in Chief just before dawn today at the end of a night long meeting of army generals. Most of those present were said to have favored a resumption of diplomatic efforts to win control of the islands. Presumably General Nicolaides was chosen to succeed General Galtieri at the same meeting."

The *Washington Post* reports:

"... "I am leaving because the Army did not give me the political support to continue as commander and president of the nation," Galtieri said tonight as he left the presidential palace. ... The position of Navy Commander-in-Chief Jorge Anaya, the chief proponent of Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands along with Galtieri, remained uncertain. Anaya, who met last night with leading admirals, issued a statement tonight that made no mention of a possible resignation. The third member of the ruling junta, Air Force Commander Basilio Lami Dozo, was expected to remain in his position at least temporarily."

Spain's *ABC Sevilla* newspaper reports:

"In those piled-up weapons, fortunately surrendered before the great battle, but not before harsh suffering, lies the generosity of young soldiers who did not deserve the fate that awaits them. If they

1938 *Hansard: Commons Chamber:Oral Answers to Questions: Prime Minister: Engagements June 17, 1982.*
1939 Quoted in Yofre 2011. Lieutenant-General Cristino Nicolaides took over as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
1940 From a letter written by Anglo-Argentine Elizabeth Hosking, published in *Falklands News* October 11, 1982

are not repatriated immediately - which means the Military Junta giving official status to the surrender - hundreds of these prisoners will not be able to survive malnutrition, hypothermia, and other serious disorders in the Malvinas Islands. There is no shelter for them at twenty degrees below zero, and they will have to be transported to unknown destinations if Argentina continues to refuse to allow English ships to approach its ports.

Nevertheless, England has a sacred responsibility to its prisoners, whether or not the conditions it has imposed are met. To do otherwise would be a barbaric violation of the law of nations. And now England will explain to the world whether it is the great nation that created modern liberty or the mean-spirited people described by Dickens. We wait."

A statement is released from Buenos Aires.

"Argentina will not accept any British proposal for a ceasefire as long as there is no mention of the possibility of being able to reopen the discussion on sovereignty." [1941]

From the Falklands, HMS *Invincible* sails for the mid-Atlantic to effect repairs to a malfunctioning turbine; escorted by *Andromeda* and *Antrim*.

In New York, at the same time, Argentina's c*harge d'affairs* at the United Nations hands a letter to the President of the Security Council.

"On express instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to the attention of the Security Council with regard to the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands: After vetoing the draft resolution ordering the cease-fire, which was voted by the majority of the Council on 4 June 1982, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has continued its armed aggression against my country and has completed the military occupation of Puerto Argentino, the capital of the Malvinas, on 14 June.

The self-defence exercised by Argentina in order to safeguard its territorial integrity could not prevail against the military superiority of the aggressor. Consequently, the Commander of the Argentine forces defending the Malvinas had to surrender the personnel under his command in order to avoid greater loss of human life.

Throughout the developments which led to this situation the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ignored the demand for an immediate cease-fire contained in Security Council resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and also the exhortation of the Council contained in paragraph 3 of that resolution to the Governments concerned to seek a peaceful solution of the dispute by means of negotiations.

As is well known, the United Kingdom vetoed the draft resolution of 4 June, submitted by Panama and Spain, thus making clear its refusal to carry out the cease-fire and to accept resolution 505 (1982), although it had been adopted unanimously and, obviously, with its own affirmative vote. Argentina cannot and will not accept the situation of force which Great Britain has thus sought to impose.

Today, it is clearer than ever that the United Kingdom's aim is to ensure by any means the continuation of a situation of colonial domination in the South Atlantic, in open violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Argentine Republic is now addressing the Security Council again to make clear, as it has done on previous occasions, its full readiness to carry out resolutions 502

1941 *PREM19/636 Telegram 177 of 18 June 1982.*

(1982) and 505 (1982). My country hopes likewise that the Council will continue its efforts to secure the full compliance of the United Kingdom with these resolutions. The United Kingdom is maintaining its troops on the Islands, its fleet in the South Atlantic, the naval and air blockade against Argentina and also the economic aggression carried out with the participation of other industrialized countries. ...

*In view of the present circumstances, **there is a de facto cessation of hostilities which Argentina is now observing**. However, this cessation of hostilities will be precarious as long as the British policy of continuing the military occupation, the blockade and the economic aggression continues. The total cessation of hostilities will be achieved only when the United Kingdom agrees to lift the naval and air blockade and the economic sanctions referred to above and when it withdraws the military forces occupying the Islands and the naval task force and the nuclear submarines which it has deployed in the area.*

The Argentine Republic points out, once again, that only negotiations within the framework of the United Nations and in conformity with the pertinent resolutions — negotiations in which Argentina has always been ready to participate—can lead to a final settlement of the dispute, thus eliminating a situation of illegal colonial domination, which is sustained by force and which in itself constitutes a permanent threat to peace." [1942]

Argentina's representative also alleges that Britain is refusing to implement paragraphs 1 and 3 of *SCR 502* of April 3, 1982.[1943]

"Argentina comes back again today to the Security Council to establish clearly, as it has on previous occasions, its full readiness to implement Resolutions 502 and 505. My Country hopes at the same time that the Council will pursue its efforts to get the United Kingdom to implement those Resolutions in full. ...

The complete cessation of hostilities will only be achieved when the United Kingdom lifts its sea and air blockade and the economic sanctions already referred to and when it withdraws its military occupation forces on the Islands, the naval Task Force and the nuclear submarines which it has deployed in the waters of the region.

Argentina indicates once again that only a negotiation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and in accordance with the relevant Resolutions, for which Argentina has always been ready, can lead to a definitive solution of the dispute, removing the situation of illegal colonial domination, sustained by force and which in itself constitutes a permanent threat to peace." [1944]

Made aware that there are moves within the UN to demand negotiations, Britain's Permanent Representative, Anthony Parsons, calls on the Secretary-General to tell him that it is; *"... absolutely and totally out of the question that we should sit down to diplomatic negotiations with the Argentines through any third party in order to discuss the future of the Islands or anything else. ... It was no good talking of exchanging a full cessation of hostilities for an opening of diplomatic negotiations. If we could not get an unconditional cessation*

1942 *UN Document S/15234: Letter From the Argentine Chargé at the United Nations (Listre) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (De la Barre Nanteuil)* June 18, 1982. My emphasis.

1943 Art.1 demanded an immediate cease fire. Art.3 called upon the governments of Argentina and the UK to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN. *cf.* April 3, 1982. Argentina had ignored UN resolution 502 from April 3 to June 14, 1982.

1944 *PREM19/636 Telegram 1025 of 18 June 1982*.

of hostilities out of Argentina, we would have to live with that. ... What we now needed was a long cooling off period with no outside interference while we restored normal life to the Islands."

Parsons reports to London.

> *"I told Urquhart afterwards of the ... conversation. He said that he was glad I had spoken as I had. He had been present at all Pérez de Cuéllar's recent meetings. A number of visitors, including Reagan/Haig, Schmidt (rather offensively to us), and Trudeau had been wringing their hands about the need to heal the breach between the West and Latin America and about the need for the British to show flexibility etc. Pérez de Cuéllar had told each of them that, in his judgement, the Argentines had been in the wrong from the start, that they had been vastly mistaken not to accept our offer of 17 May "which involved major concessions which he knew we had been reluctant to make", that Argentina had wrecked his negotiations, thus leaving us no choice but to repossess the Islands by force."* [1945]

From Washington DC, President Reagan writes to Prime Minister Thatcher.

> *"Let me extend my congratulations on the success of British arms in the South Atlantic. Your victory was both a brilliant military feat and a defence of our shared principle that disputes are not to be resolved by aggression. The minimum loss of life and the generous terms of withdrawal were also in the finest British tradition. A just war requires a just peace. We look forward to consulting with you and to assisting in building such a peace. It must of course take into account the sacrifices of your men in battle. Its elements in my judgment must include enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic, mitigation of Argentine hostility and improvement in the relations of both our countries with Latin America."*

In the Falkland Islands, some 500 special category prisoners of war are transferred to Ajax Bay. [1946]

"In the afternoon, a padre held Mass. I sat next to to Lieutenant-Colonel Giménez who was very angry because he feared court martial for retreating and was worried that he would be accused of having left the front line. ... That evening we listened to the radio and heard Anaya bidding farewell to President Galtieri." [1947]

Sir Tristram, badly damaged at Fitzroy, is towed to Stanley to act as accommodation while being repaired. *Sir Bedivere* also arrives to meet accommodation needs. *Baltic Ferry* joins them as a floating workshop.

From Geneva in Switzerland, late in the day, the International Committee of the Red Cross announce that Argentina has now agreed to the repatriation of POWs through Puerto Madryn. [1948] Guarantees of safe conduct for SS *Canberra* and MV *Norland* are provided. Both ships sail almost immediately.

"With the departure of prisoners, one of the most difficult challenges in the restoration of order came to an end, removing the potential for insurrection and significantly reducing supply requirements." [1949]

No news of repatriations is circulated within Argentina.

"The Armed Forces themselves concealed the return of the soldiers..." [1950]

1945 *PREM19/636 Telegram 1024 of 18 June 1982.*
1946 The 'special category' prisoners, including General Mario Menéndez, would remain until early July.
1947 Frigate Captain Adolfo A. Gaffoglio quoted in Van der Bijl 2023.
1948 *PREM19/636 Telegram 341 of 18 June 1982.*
1949 Privratsky 2014
1950 Federico Lorenz quoted in *Malvinas between dictatorship and national Independence: Argentinian history in CFK's speeches* Paula Salerno 2019

From Washington DC, Britain's Ambassador Henderson telegrams the Foreign Office in London.

> *"Eagleburger has told me about a proposition which was put to Haig this morning by the Secretary-General in New York. This was that since paragraphs 1 and 2 of SCR 502 had now in practice been fulfilled, the way was open for HMG and the Argentines to negotiate a diplomatic solution under para 3. ... I said that there was no future in the Secretary-General trying to pursue this thought. Things had changed fundamentally since the Resolution was passed."*

June 19th, at Southern Thule, *Yarmouth, Olmeda, Endurance,* and *Salvageman* arrive. An observation team is inserted onto the island.

"M Company 42 Commando Royal Marines formed the bulk of the landing force." [1951]

In Buenos Aires, a meeting of the junta – Nicolaides, Anaya and Lami Dozo – agrees that Army General Bignone should step up into the position of President. [1952]

In New York, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* at the UN, Arnoldo Listre, presents a *Note* to the Security Council. [1953]

> *"After vetoing the draft Resolution ordering the cease-fire which was voted by the majority of the Council on 4 June 1982, the United Kingdom ... has continued its armed aggression against my country and has completed the military occupation of Puerto Argentino, the capital of the Malvinas, on 14 June. ...*
>
> *Throughout the developments which led to this situation the United Kingdom ... ignored the demand for an immediate cease-fire contained in Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and also the exhortation of the Council contained in paragraph 3 of that Resolution to the Governments concerned to seek a peaceful solution of the dispute by means of negotiations. ...*
>
> *Argentina cannot and will not accept the situation of force which Great Britain has thus sought to impose. Today, it is clearer than ever that the United Kingdom's aim is to ensure by any means the continuation of a situation of colonial domination in the South Atlantic, in open violation of the Charter of the United Nations."*

Sir Anthony Parsons reports.

> *"It looks as though Costa Méndez's propaganda machine is making the most of the Argentine note... Officials said that the note had been approved by the ruling three man Junta, including General Nicolaides. ... Foreign Ministry officials favoured a resumption of the Secretary-General's mission because he seemed fair and well-versed in the issues. .... Pérez de Cuéllar and I looked ... but thought it did not amount to a serious offer of an immediate cessation of hostilities..."*


At Puerto Madryn, Argentina, on the same day, SS *Canberra* arrives with over 4,000 POWs.

"I didn't shed a tear (in the) Falklands in the days of combat, but when I went down the steps of the British ship Canberra I started to cry because I saw the empty dock. The population had been prohibited from accessing the port. Then they put us in trucks and close the tents as if we were deported, so that the people on the road would not see us." [1954]

1951 *Supplement to the London Gazette* December 14, 1982
1952 Yofre 2011.
1953 *PREM19/637 Telegram 1032 of 19 June 1982*.
1954 Veteran Miguel Trinidad quoted in *Wounds after the War: "After returning from Malvinas the dictatorship tried to hide*



“June 19, 1982,was a historic day for the city of Puerto Madryn, located in the province of Chubut, in Patagonia, Argentina. On that winter day, almost all residents took to the streets to welcome 4,136 Argentine soldiers who fought in the Falklands War. For the authorities at the time, this transfer procedure was intended to go unnoticed. Therefore, after disembarking the British ship Canberra, all the veterans boarded large trucks, where they were to travel to a warehouse located in the center of the housing development, under a canvas roof, without attracting attention. But, simply put, the opposite happened: thousands of Puerto Madryn residents discovered that these vehicles were filled with heroes. Therefore, they took to the streets and gave them warm applause, which continued throughout the day. The soldiers then peeked out from under the tarp and began interacting with everyone they met. … In the first interactions that occurred on June 19, 1982, the residents of Puerto Madryn quickly noticed that the Argentine soldiers who disembarked from the Canberra were very hungry. That's why, without hesitation, they began giving them all the food they could get their hands on. Fruit, cookies, and bread predominated among them.”[1955]



“From there, the combatants were sent to Trelew and then to the Libertad Building, the Puerto Belgrano Naval base, and the General Lemanos and Sargento Cabral schools in Campo de Mayo. The creation of three Recovery Support Teams was also arranged. … these would adopt the "the necessary counter-intelligence measures, especially those related to prohibiting personnel from making statements and/or appearing in reports through the media".” [1956]

Bus windows are ordered to be shut. Cameras are confiscated. Once at the Recovery Centres, returning conscripts are given a booklet. [1957]

> *“You have been summoned by the homeland to defend its sovereignty and oppose colonialist intentions. This forced you to a total and selfless dedication. You fought and gave back everything the homeland offered you: the pride of being Argentine. Now the homeland requires another effort from you: from now on you must not provide information about your mobilization, place of presentation, weapon you had, acquired aptitude, and your combat experience. (Do) not be imprudent in your judgements and assessments. (Do) not be swayed by rumours or alarming news. Remember that we must all perpetuate the heroic way in which our soldiers gave their lives for national sovereignty.”*

us" George Wilson in *24 News Recorder* April 2, 2022


1955 *19 de junio de 1982: la historia del día que Puerto Madryn se quedó sin pan* in *Billiken* March 31, 2025

1956 Padilla 2025

1957 *Ibid* citing *Counter Intelligence Recommendation Booklet 761/82*

June 20th, on Morrell Island, Southern Thule, Argentine troops and meteorological staff surrender.

> *"We were just about ready to open fire and give the order for the recce troops to come down the mountain when someone popped out of the base waving a white flag."* [1958]


H.M.S. ENDURANCE
Yo por este medio rindo sin condiciones La
Base a Southern Thule South Sandwich Islands
y las cercanías en nombre del Gobierno Argentino
a los representantes de Her Britannic Majesty's
Royal Navy. este 20 dia de junio 1982.

Argentina's commander on Southern Thule signs a formal surrender on HMS *Yarmouth* (right).

In Europe, from Brussels, although opposed by the UK as being premature, economic sanctions imposed by the EC on Argentina are lifted; with the exception of the arms embargo.

"The British had no objections to informal talks taking place between individual members of the Community and Argentina, but would not accept a formal agreement with the Community on any subject until there was satisfaction that Argentine discrimination against the UK across the board had ceased. The EC Commission endorsed this line..." [1959]

On the eastern coast of Chubut Province, at Puerto Madryn, MV *Norland* arrives with 2000 POWs. Not wishing to repeat the welcome offered by local citizens the day before, the troops are loaded on to trucks inside the port and driven out by a route that avoids the town. [1960]

"A plot by other Argentine prisoners to hijack the merchant vessel Norland taking them to Argentina was thwarted when their coded messages between cabins were detected by a Spanish-speaking British soldier." [1961]

"The fighting over, thousands of prisoners were repatriated. The military authorities hid the returnees, isolating them from their fellow citizens in some cases, to improve their physical condition, but above all to avoid the diffusion of their stories. Even journalistic interviews were prohibited." [1962]

"... to hide the shameful actions of the Armed Forces, the testimonies of the combatants and the evidence of their skeletal bodies had to be prevented from becoming known to the public." [1963]

In Stanley, with no administration yet returned (awaiting the arrival of Rex Hunt), the Islanders have little say in what is happening around them. One type of military command, exchanged for another.

> *"... at times it was hard to believe that they (the Falklanders) had any connection with the war. They behaved, it sometimes appeared, like peasants caught in an eighteenth century European dynastic clash..."* [1964]

1958 Barker 1997
1959 Freedman 2005 vol.2
1960 *19 de junio de 1982: la historia del día que Puerto Madryn se quedó sin pan* in *Billiken* March 31, 2025.
1961 Briley 2022
1962 Lorenz 2006
1963 Padilla 2025
1964 *The Observer* June 20, 1982

June 21st, the *New York Times* reports the British operation at Southern Thule:

> *"Britain said today that it had reclaimed the last of its South Atlantic possessions from Argentina without a fight. It said troops based on the Falkland Islands swooped onto Thule, the southernmost of the remote South Sandwich Islands, and captured a team of Argentine scientists. Britain said the scientists were there illegally, but Buenos Aires, which confirmed the takeover, said an agreement had been reached years ago authorizing their presence.*
>
> *The Argentine high command charged on Saturday that British helicopters had machine-gunned "defenseless scientists" on Thule, which is situated 1,275 miles south-east of the Falklands off the coast of Antarctica. According to the Argentines, 10 scientists were presumed to be British captives.*
>
> *Foreign Office officials said that the Argentines were discovered on Thule in 1976 and that their presence had been protested at that time. … British military sources said as many as 70 Argentines, most of them naval personnel, had been on Thule."*

In New York, at the UN, Argentina's representative complains to the Security Council regarding Southern Thule.

> *"This action constitutes a clear violation of the cessation of hostilities existing under the terms of my note No. 172 of 18th June and also constitutes a new act of aggression committed by the United Kingdom, in violation of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982)."* [1965]

In Argentina, it is announced that General Reynaldo Benito Bignone is to be President; until March 29, 1984. [1966]

At Stanley, repairs to basic infrastructure continue apace.

"It did not take the British long to restore basic services on the island, although the challenges were many and repairs remained short-term solutions. Work started quickly to repair damage to the water supply system in Stanley. It took Royal Engineers about one week. Using their water purification units, they first established water points on an interim basis. Then, with the help of flexible dracone bladders belonging to the Falkland Island Government, they established direct supply from Fleet bulk water tankers to supply the town." [1967]

June 23rd, in New York, PM Thatcher visits the UN. Pérez de Cuéllar reminds her that he still has a mandate from the Security Council, but realises that there is little to be done at the present. Thatcher appraises de Cuéllar of the problems being addressed on the Islands, including unmarked plastic mines. She tells him that Britain has repatriated some 10,000 POWs, many in a poor condition, but would retain 600 – 700 technicians, pilots and senior officers pending a formal end to hostilities. As regards a lifting of exclusion zones, etc., the British Government had sent a message via the Swiss, but it was difficult to know who to deal with. [1968]



Ambassador Parsons reports that there is no sign of the Security Council *"resuscitating the subject,"* and informs the Foreign Office that Uganda's representative had made a comment asserting that; *"the British people would lynch anyone who talked of negotiating with Argentina for at least a year."*

At the UN, during a special session on disarmament, Margaret Thatcher addresses the General Assembly.

1965 *PREM19/637 Telegram 1035 of 23 June 1982.* Argentina had only recognised a *de facto* cessation.
1966 Thereby seeing out Galtieri's term. See Yofre 2011
1967 Privratsky 2014. Electricity would take another week.
1968 *PREM19/637 Telegram 1045 of 23 June 1982.*

"The fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types, … It is the disposition on the part of some states to impose change on others by resorting to force."

Meeting with President Reagan afterwards, PM Thatcher tells the President; *"… that the British would likely be in the Falklands for a very long time."*

"The British had been caught napping once, but they would not be caught a second time. She asserted that her government is sending back Rex Hunt very soon as civil commissioner. The two priorities in the Islands now are rehabilitation and reconstruction; at some point, it might be desirable to bring the Falklands into a self-governing status, similar perhaps to the formula the U.S. worked out on Guam. She added that she and her government will do everything they can to restore normal relations with Latin American countries – "we will have to be gentle". Mrs. Thatcher noted that with the exception of Argentina, all British ambassadors remain at their posts." [1969]

June 24th, in the UK, the daily Foreign Office *Situation Report*, issued by its Emergency Unit at 0700 every morning since April 2nd concludes.

"(1) There is nothing to report. (2) This is the last SITREP."

Off the Falklands archipelago, unrepairable, HMS *Sir Galahad* is scuttled in deep water.

On East Falkland, work continues with the collection of ordinance.

"… they placed booby-traps in some of their abandoned trenches; for instance a number of grenade 'traps', invitingly laid, were set for those in a hurry. These were often simple devices,… like grenades without a pin leant against another object, ready to explode when dislodged, or two grenades linked together for maximum effect. Lance-Corporal Budhaparsad Limbu of 1st/7th Gurkhas was killed by such an object in the early aftermath, while clearing the Argentinian trenches at Goose Green." [1970]

"In the weeks following the surrender, engineers received some assistance from thirty-five Argentine Army and Marine prisoners, who agreed to assist the clean-up effort in return for good meals, warm showers and separate accommodation. Some had records of the minefields. The British also established a kids' club for the children in Stanley. If children found something suspicious and reported it to engineers, they were dubbed 'deputy bomb disposaleers' and given a certificate and a pat on the head. In the end, 237 out of 280 children on the island enrolled in the programme. Gradually, other records of the minefields started showing up mysteriously in houses, probably hidden there by Argentine engineers who had been staying in homes before heading to the prisoner camp." [1971]

Repairs at Stanley airport allow for a landing.

"By the end of the war, the airfield at Stanley had become a sea of mud. Drainage ditches were not capable of holding run-off. It was every bit as big a mess as the town itself. The Argentines had performed only crude repairs to the runway. Of primary concern, other than damage from shellfire, was a large crater on one side. Although this crater did not stop C-130s from landing and taking off, it provided an undesirable hazard and required capping before British air cargo operations could begin. The airfield itself was far from first-rate. Built in the late 1970s, it offered a mere 4,000 feet of tarmac over bedrock, making it suitable only for C-130s

1969 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, United Kingdom (04/26/1982–09/29/1982)*
1970 Fursdon 1988
1971 Privratsky 2014

and smaller aircraft; any bigger planes would require either an extension of the existing runway or construction of a new one. Royal Engineers completed a clean up and temporary repair of the existing runway shortly after the departure of Argentine prisoners, including installation of air defence radar, air traffic control and an instrument landing system. The British renamed the airport RAF Stanley, perhaps a signal that the Royal Air Force would have a significant role from then on in the future protection of the Falklands. The first British C-130 Hercules touched down on the refurbished runway on 24 June with air movement personnel and equipment for cargo operations, just eleven days after the last Argentine C-130 had taken off." [1972]

Back in London, PM Thatcher addresses the House of Commons. [1973]

> *"I gave the Secretary-General an account of the present situation in the Falkland Islands. I emphasised our wish for a permanent cessation of hostilities, though I have to report that so far the Argentine's response has been negative. I also referred to the repatriation of well over 10,000 prisoners, but I explained that we could not return them all until we were satisfied that hostilities would not be reopened. The Falkland Islanders would be preoccupied for some time to come with the task of reconstruction, none the less, Britain would in due course seek to bring the islands to full self-government. Mr. Perez de Cuellar stated that he remained ready to act as a channel of communication between Britain and Argentina, if this would help...*
>
> *I was particularly glad to be in New York during the last week of Sir Anthony Parsons' term of service as our representative at the United Nations. His contribution and abilities have been widely and rightly praised."* [1974]

June 25th, from Wellington, the New Zealand government announces that it is not prepared to normalise its relations with Argentina until the UK is; *"satisfied that hostilities have ceased."* Canada lifts economic sanctions against Argentina, but maintains its arms ban.



At Port Stanley, ex-Governor Rex Masterman Hunt returns as Civil Commissioner; with instructions to carry out an urgent assessment of what is required to return to some normality – both immediately and in the longer term.[1975]

"On 25 June, senior British commanders welcomed Governor Rex Hunt back to the Falklands. He established and chaired a Joint Rehabilitation Committee to guide restoration work essential in the months ahead. Included on the Committee were Major General Moore and Commodore Clapp. Both had moved into Stanley with their staffs. The same day that the Governor returned, the first echelons of British units started leaving the Falklands for the long voyage back to the United Kingdom. The first ships to depart were Norland and Europic Ferry with the two parachute battalions." [1976]

1972 *Ibid.*
1973 *HC Deb 24 June 1982 vol.26 cc433-9*
1974 Sir Anthony Parsons was shortly thereafter appointed as Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister. I am unable to pin down an exact date. Something of a kick in the teeth for the Foreign Office.
1975 Hunt was also returned to the role of High Commissioner for the British Antarctic Territory
1976 Privratsky 2014

In Argentina, three British journalists, seized in Ushuaia and charged with spying on April 17th, are released.

> *"Simon Winchester of The Sunday Times and Ian Mather and Anthony Prime of The Observer boarded a flight for Madrid tonight under a special court permit issued on their pledge to return in two months to stand trial. They paid bail of $6,500 each, and, if convicted, face prison sentences of two to eight years."* [1977]

Further enquires are initiated via the Swiss Embassy regarding the repatriation of Flt. Lieut. Glover, captured on May 21st. Argentina is reminded that all their wounded have already been repatriated.

Via a press release, Argentina's postal authorities state that it will not handle mail carrying the address - *'Falklands'* or *'Port Stanley'*.

> *"RETURN TO SENDER – Postal communications have been interrupted in the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich due to the illegitimate occupation by Great Britain of these Islands, which form part of the Argentine Republic and belong to its sovereignty."*

June 26th, from the Falklands, *Canberra* sails for the UK carrying 3 Commando Brigade.

In Buenos Aires, at the Foreign Ministry, ex-Ambassador to the UK, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, notes; *"What do we do with Great Britain? Nothing. Argentina should not sign anything. ... If they do not want to return the prisoners, they don't, the international community itself is going to take care of putting pressure on them. Furthermore, Thatcher already has internal problems over the future cost of maintaining the Falklands. To this must be added the cost of the losses (seven ships sunk, eight seriously damaged), some 1.1 billion dollars. The English will have to rebuild the relationship with Latin America. In turn, the United States in order to mend the relationship with Argentina, must help us on this (Malvinas) issue, give us financial aid and make other political gestures. ... Sooner or later the Falklands will be ours. ... We must initiate broad action in international organisations."* [1978]

June 28th, at Montevideo, HMS *Hydra*, carrying 66 British casualties, anchors; the casualties are for onwards transmission to the UK aboard an RAF VC10. *Sir Percival* sails from the Falklands for the UK.

"That left logistics units from 5 Brigade, including 81 and 91 Ordnance Companies, 10 Field Workshop and a transport troop to build upon the progress already made and to provide the framework for a larger logistics organization. .. Other units ranging from postal and pay to NAAFI and veterinary services joined the 5 Brigade logistics units, all formally established into the Falkland Islands Logistic Battalion on 28 June." [1979]

In Argentina, Aquirre Lanari is appointed Foreign Minister, while General Cristino Nicolaides asks the Americans to intercede with the UK; in order to get the remaining POW's returned; *"... without a formal armistice..."* [1980]

In Washington DC, Acting Secretary of State Stoessel speaks to President Reagan.

> *"We have just learned from the British that they are about to propose to the Argentines, via the Swiss, that the prisoners be returned without precondition. The British have asked us to make no public disclosure of this until they have worked out the modalities and made their own announcement.*

1977 *The New York Times* June 30, 1982. No trial date was ever set by the Argentine government.
1978 Yofre 2011
1979 Privratsky 2014.
1980 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P890076–1206*

They also ask that we not lift sanctions until the prisoner problem is settled, which should take no more than a day or two; but they say they would understand if we lifted sanctions promptly thereafter." [1981]

From the UK, on the same day, 'Christian Salvesen Ltd.', responding to an inquiry, informs the Civil Commissioner that the contract with Constantino Davidoff to remove the scrap metal from South Georgia remains valid. [1982]

"After the removal of the Argentines from the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, the question arose of whether the contract was still in force ... Despite the breach of the terms of the contract, Davidoff's actions in themselves do not make the contract automatically invalid... in any event the contract will expire on 31 March 1983... Her Majesty's Government have no standing in relation to the contract itself and there is no action which the Government of the Falkland Islands could take directly to annul or otherwise cancel it. But the Falkland Islands Government do of course have the right to refuse Davidoff permission or any of his employees permission to land on South Georgia." [1983]

June 29th, at Port William, HMS *Uganda* anchors to provide hospital facilities for Islanders and troops. Supplies arrive from Ascension Island.

"Of critical importance following the arrival of the British in Stanley was the restoration of the airfield and jetties, the hubs for aerial and sea delivery of supplies. The air bridge from Ascension remained active. C-130 cargo planes air-dropped clothing, boots, sleeping bags and other supplies for the troops, as well as nearly a ton of mail daily for both the military and civilians. The British established a snatch procedure for outgoing mail while runway repair work was underway. The technique involved two twenty-foot vertical poles connected by a wire loop holding a bag with about ten pounds of mail. Pilots flew their C-130s near to the ground, snatched the mail from the loop with a hook attached to a hydraulic winch and then flew back to Ascension. About thirty of these snatches took place before the runway was finally fixed sufficiently that pilots could start landing their planes." [1984]

July 1st, in Buenos Aires, Major-General Reynaldo Bignone takes over officially as Argentina's new President.

"... without the support of the Navy and the Air Force ... the last president of the military regime. Except for the Minister of the Interior, Llamil Reston, all the Ministers were civilians." [1985]

"On July 1, 1982, Reinaldo Bignone, the last de facto president spoke, in his first public speech, about the period that he was in charge of leading and about the Malvinas war, that had concluded fifteen days prior to that. He proposed "an emotional tribute to our civilian and military compatriots, who with such courage, loyalty and self-sacrifice defended our sovereignty in the Malvinas Gesta. Our heart-felt tribute goes out to those who offered their lives, with a strong desire of a quick recovery for the wounded and a proud recognition to all". He also stated that "we will never renounce to those lands that are so close to the sentiment of generations of Argentines and for which now so many heroes surrendered their lives (...) The sheer patriotism we have expressed and felt will forever be a source of pride and a badge of unity, never the starting point for deception"." [1986]

1981 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Argentina (07/02/1982–07/15/1982)*
1982 See September, 1979, December, 1980 and December, 1981
1983 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations January 14, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street. *cf.* February, 1983
1984 Privratsky 2014
1985 Yofre 2011
1986 Lorenz 2020

In the US, *The New York Times* repeats a Soviet journal report alleging that HMS *Sheffield* was carrying nuclear arms when sunk; *"Literaturnaya Gazeta said the Sheffield went down too quickly for the weapons to be removed and that there was now a danger of widespread radioactive contamination once seawater eroded their protective coating."* [1987]

July 2nd, from London, the British government inform General Bignone's administration that the UK is willing to proceed with an exchange of the remaining prisoners on; *"... the assumption that active hostilities were over."*

In the Falklands, an Argentine POW, assisting in the marking out of the limits of a minefield on Stanley Common, is injured in an explosion.

"Cabo Primero Cattay was a volunteer in the task of marking off minefields, that he was not engaged on the locating and lifting of individual mines, ... It was thought that the mine was probably outside the known limits of the minefields and that Cabo Primero Cattay stepped on it accidentally when he followed the officer round what was believed to be the limits of the minefields." [1988]

HMS *Invincible* rejoins the Task Force after effecting repairs to a turbine.

> *"The Invincible carrier, pride of the British Navy, has been left alone, protected by other ships, in waters near the Falkland Islands. The other carrier ships, the Hermes, has separated from it, no doubt heading towards the United Kingdom.*
>
> *The Invincible has not been damaged, contrary to what the Argentine Junta intended; this special envoy was able to see it with his own eyes when he landed on his deck on Friday aboard a Sea King helicopter."* [1989]

July 5th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Aguirre Lanari, announces; *"There is in fact a ceasefire by Argentina in the South Atlantic, but that does not mean that we are giving up the defense of the 100-year-old rights."* [1990]

July 6th, in London, Privy Councillors select Lord Franks to head a commission of inquiry into the war.

> *"To review the way in which the responsibilities of Government in relation to the Falkland islands and their dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, taking account of all such factors in previous years as are relevant; and to report."*

"The chief accused at present in the dock is undoubtedly the foreign office, with the government intelligence machine seen as its accomplice. The charge is that over a period of 17 years it had signalled to Argentina Britain's desire to be rid of the Falklands, in contradiction to both the wishes of the Islanders and the British parliament. A subsidiary charge is that, when the Argentines finally tired of negotiating and decided to invade, the foreign office was taken completely by surprise." [1991]

1987 HMS *Sheffield* had been hit by an Exocet missile on May 4, 1982 and finally sank on May 10, 1982. The weapons concerned, nuclear depth charges, had been transferred to RFA *Fort Austin* on April 16, 1982.

1988 *Argentine Prisoners (Death and Injury) HC Debate April 11, 1983 vol 40 cc305-7W.*

1989 *El portaeronaves británico 'Invencible', en perfecto estado, permanece vigilando las Malvinas* Andres Ortega *El Pais* July 12, 1982. https://elpais.com/diario/1982/07/12/internacional/395272804_850215.html

1990 *Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry Files (1982), Box 16, Box 1: C–353 Argentina.*

1991 *The Economist* June 19, 1982

"The composition of the committee and the scope of its inquiry have become subjects of intense controversy in recent days, but Mrs. Thatcher appeared to have reached an agreement over the weekend with Mr. Foot that will assure at least initial bipartisan support for the work of the panel. Its report, due before the end of the year, could have a far-reaching impact on the future of Mrs. Thatcher's Government. Many Labor Members of Parliament, and even some M.P.'s from the Prime Minister's own Conservative Party, believe that she was negligent in taking no military action when signs of an imminent Argentine invasion mounted in late March. Others believe that the Argentine junta was encouraged to order an invasion when Britain announced the withdrawal of the ice patrol ship Endurance, its only ship in the area." [1992]

"Franks was a government insider, a safe pair of hands, the Committee representatives of establishment bodies that might incur censure for failures leading to the war." [1993]

In New York, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar receives a telephone call from Buenos Aires to say that they are releasing Flt. Lieut. Glover.

In London, a junior defence minister submits a written answer to Parliament confirming that British casualties total 255 dead and 777 wounded. Of these, 18 dead and 18 wounded were civilians. [1994]

July 7th, in Brussels, financial aid for the Falkland Islands is agreed by the European Community.

July 8th, in the US, a CIA report notes.

> *"President Bignone's government intends to maintain the de facto ceasefire with Britain, but it cannot, for domestic political reasons, accede to London's demand for a formal statement acknowledging a cessation of hostilities. ... The highest priority of the Argentine leaders is to protect their claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, and they are therefore unwilling to take any steps, such as a formal cessation of hostilities, that in their view would prejudice this claim.*
>
> *Army Commander General Nicolaides told a military audience on 3 July that recovery of the islands, using "the most appropriate measures possible", would continue to be the main objective of Argentine foreign policy. The Argentines apparently are confident that the British eventually will release the remaining Argentine prisoners of war, lift the maritime restrictions, and end economic sanctions without securing a formal declaration ending hostilities. This calculation probably is correct because the Thatcher government is searching for a way to end the impasse and to return the last 590 prisoners. According to press reports, London is considering a unilateral declaration on the cessation of hostilities, assuming that Argentina would not challenge such an initiative."* [1995]

In London, Foreign Secretary Pym writes to Tam Dalyell MP following an enquiry regarding British rights to the Falklands archipelago.

1992 *New York Times* July 7, 1982

1993 Elgood 2025. Lord Franks, a senior civil servant and former Ambassador to Washington DC, was selected as chair of a committee of six Privy Councillors – Lord Barber, a Conservative party peer and former Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Lever, a Labour Party peer and former Paymaster General; Sir Patrick Nairne, senior civil servant from the Admiralty and MOD; Merlyn Rees, a Labour party MP and former Home Secretary and Lord Watkinson, a Conservative party peer and former Transport Minister.

1994 The figures included a number of British soldiers injured whilst clearing Argentine land mines after the surrender, but did not include the three Falkland Islanders killed during the conflict.

1995 *Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: EXDIR and Executive Registry Files (1982), Box 16, Box 1: C–353 Argentina.*

"The strength of our case depends on a detailed legal examination of all relevant events and factors. Even leaving aside arguments in our favour based on events before 1833, we have been consistently advised that our title can be soundly based on our possession of the islands from 1833. Our case rests on the facts, on prescription and on the principle of self-determination.... Prescription as a mode of acquiring territory is generally recognised in international law." [1996]

From Montevideo, Flt-Lieut. Jeffrey Glover, the only British serviceman taken prisoner by the Argentines on the Falklands, is repatriated to the UK.

July 11th, in the UK, *Canberra* arrives back at Southampton (right).



July 12th, from Washington DC, US trade sanctions imposed on Argentina are lifted.

In the Falkland Islands, the last 590 Argentine POWs are embarked upon MV *St. Edmund* for repatriation to Argentina. Among them is General Mario Menéndez. [1997]

"The Argentine commander on the Falkland Islands and the remaining 592 Argentine war prisoners were returned by Britain today and released at a small port in southern Argentina under tight security. Their return aboard a British ferry ended the repatriation of about 10,000 Argentines captured by the British in the war that ended with the Argentine surrender on June 14. Britain had been holding the commander, Maj. Gen. Mario Benjamin Menendez, and the final contingent, most of them officers, to press Argentina to declare formally that the hostilities were over. Argentina never did, but Britain announced Monday, after an exchange of notes with Argentina, that both sides had agreed there was a de facto end to hostilities. General Menendez was also the Argentine governor on the islands, and his return aboard the ferry, the Saint Edmund, underlined the end of Argentina's brief rule over the archipelago,..." [1998]

July 13th, at Stanley airport, on the runway, a *Harrier* pilot accidentally fires a *Sidewinder* air-to-air missile causing casualties among a party of Welsh Guards clearing snow.

July 14th, orders are issued to the remaining British forces in the Falklands.

"On 14 July, Admiral Fieldhouse's CINCFLEET headquarters issued a logistics support plan for what was to be called the Falklands Island Garrison and included both remaining land forces and ships operating in the area. It detailed tasks to military services and formally reverted provisioning of the population to the civil government, except for rations, which the garrison would continue to provide until the end of September." [1999]

July 15th, in Argentina, *Gente* magazine reports:

> *"How could it happen that a chocolate bar with a letter inside, sent by a 7-year-old boy to our soldiers in the middle of the war, was sold days ago at a news stand in Comodoro Rivadavia."* [2000]

1996 Quoted in *One Man's Falklands* T. Dalyell 1982. Also *Self-determination in Disputed Colonial Territories* Jamie Trinidad 2018 p.140. Tam Dalyell was a Scottish Labour Party MP, and prominent anti-war campaigner.
1997 35 Argentine POWs volunteered to remain behind to assist with mine clearance; to be paid £10 per day.
1998 *Last Prisoners Returned to Argentina* Edward Schumacher in *New York Times* July 15, 1982
1999 Privratsky 2014
2000 A realization slowly spread that money and gifts meant for the soldiers, had been diverted.

July 16th, in Washington DC, George P. Shultz takes over as US Secretary of State. [2001]

"Every American secretary of state in recent history, at an early point, has had to think through the matter of the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States. ... When I took office, the Falklands fighting was over, but the war had made its mark on the Anglo-American alliance, now closer than at any time since World War II. Yet a great deal of resentment about the U.S. role in the war remained within some elements of the Reagan administration. Tom Enders, the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, in his early briefings to me, stressed the problems created for us in Latin America by our massive and visible support for the British. It would be hard to say, Enders argued, that the Falklands War had done serious damage to British interests, which were not large in Latin America; it was American interests that were damaged. My reaction to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's decision and the British action in the Falklands was one of admiration, despite my misgivings about the apparent impact on our relationships throughout Latin America. The British decision to go to war for these desolate, wind-scoured, scarcely populated rocky islets 8,000 miles from London was the first marker laid down by a democratic power in the post-Vietnam era to state unambiguously that a free world nation was willing to fight for a principle. The world paid attention to this – and not just the Third World either; it was noted by the Soviets too. Attitudes everywhere were significantly affected. The Argentine military was discredited overnight, and the pressure for democracy in that country strengthened."[2002]

In the Falkland Islands, an editorial in *Penguin News* calls for the establishment of a 200-mile conservation zone around the archipelago.

July 19th, US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger provides an initial assessment of the war for the President.

> *"Although the British had inadequate or no contingency plans for such an effort, they did extremely well in developing ad hoc plans, devising appropriate operations and tactics, and carrying out their objectives. They were able to load depot stocks aboard* ***58 civilian ships by the end of May*** *using requisition, charter, and conversion where necessary. Furthermore, the first elements of the Task Force sailed in five days, two days less than the British thought necessary for a contingency in Europe....*
>
> *In the final analysis, the battle for the Falklands appears to have been a closer call than many would believe. The British won primarily because their forces, inferior in numbers at first, were superior in training, leadership and equipment. But luck played a significant role. The failure of the Argentine bombs is but one example; others exist. The British prevailed and pushed to victory just in time as they were critically low on artillery rounds and other supplies (8 rounds per barrel of artillery and no helicopter fuel) when they retook Stanley."* [2003]

"... I do not think that the United States support was crucial. It was helpful, I hope, and effective, and most of all it was delivered in time and very much more quickly than had been thought possible. That was the principle contribution. I do not think that it was vital to the victory. I think it was important to the victory, but Britain's contribution – the actual fighting – was obviously the decisive thing." [2004]

2001 After 18 months as US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig resigned on June 25, 1982. Accepted July 5, 1982.

2002 *Cold War: The "Special Relationship"* (Shultz memoirs) at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

2003 *Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0003, Argentina (June–Sept) 1982*. My emphasis. Fifty-eight ships carrying supplies down to the Falklands, together with resupply missions via aircraft drops from Ascension Island. It is difficult to pin down, but the situation does not seem to have been as bad as portrayed; with the main difficulty being the transport of supplies from the rear to the front.

2004 Caspar Weinberger interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.180

July 20th, from Buenos Aires, the Argentine government complains to the President of the European Commission regarding a decision to grant emergency assistance to the Falkland Islands, arguing that; *"... the action constituted inadmissible interference and could be construed as disregard for Argentina's legitimate rights over the archipelago."* [2005]

July 21st, from London, the British government informs Argentina that it is lifting the 200-mile Exclusion Zone; to be replaced by a 150-mile Protection Zone.

HMS *Hermes* returns to Portsmouth (next page).



July 22nd, Britain's Exclusion Zone around the Islands is lifted. PM Thatcher informs the House of Commons.

> *"We have decided to lift the total exclusion zone of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland Islands, which was established on 30 April. Port Stanley harbour and Port Stanley airfield, together with the three mile territorial sea around the Falklands, nevertheless remain closed to commercial shipping and aircraft until further notice for reasons of safety. Our warning of 7 May that any Argentine warship or military aircraft found more than 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be regarded as hostile similarly no longer applies. But British forces continue to have authority to take all necessary measures to protect themselves against attack anywhere in the South Atlantic and to defend the Falkland Islands and the dependencies in accordance with the inherent right of self defence recognised in article 51 of the United Nations Charter.*
>
> *In particular and to minimise the risk of misunderstandings or inadvertent clashes we have asked the Argentine Government, via the Swiss Government, to ensure that their warships and military aircraft do not enter a zone 150 miles around the islands where they would pose a potential threat to our forces. Argentine civil aircraft and shipping have also been requested not to enter this zone unless by prior agreement with the British Government, and also to stay clear of other British dependencies in the South Atlantic."* [2006]

July 23rd, in New York, in a letter to the President of the UN General Assembly, Argentina asserts that the principle of *self-determination* does not apply to the "*occupying*" population of the Falkland Islands; *"... which had been established there through an act of force by the colonial Power and which consisted in many cases of transitory employees of the United Kingdom Government or of the British-based Falkland Islands Company."*

July 25th, in Britain, the *Sunday Times* newspaper publishes a story regarding alleged assistance given to Argentina by French experts during the war. [2007]

"London's Sunday Times quoted a French engineer at Argentina's Bahia Blanca air base as saying that he and his team fitted Exocet missiles to French-built planes during the Falkland war. The report suggests it was a

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2005 *UN Yearbook 1982*
2006 *HC Deb 22 July 1982 vol.28 c235W*
2007 See also December, 1982

secret and perhaps deliberate breach of France's military embargo on Argentina, enabling two British ships to be sunk. The French Government is furious. A flat public denial has been issued, ... Before making its statement, the French Government held an investigation "because it's true, strange things can happen in the arms trade,', an official said. Herve Colin, the Dassault engineer who headed the team sent to Argentina last November along with the first batch of Super-Etendard planes, was summoned to Paris." [2008]

July 26th, in Stanley, at a public meeting called by Councillor Terry Peck, Islanders vent their frustrations at the way they were kept in the dark in the days leading up to the April 2nd invasion. Some particular fury is aimed at the Overseas Services Aid Scheme (OSAS) whereby people from the UK are given lucrative employment in government posts, but who were the first to abandon the Islands after the Argentine troops arrived.

> *"The OSAS system came in for a public hammering unlike any it has ever received ... Surprisingly little time was spent discussing the future of the Falklands, but it was significant that not one person spoke up suggesting that the Islands should return to their old status as a colony in every sense of the word. ... It was very evident from the meeting that Falklanders ... want change, in our political status, but they want to move cautiously, examining every option open to them. ... If there was one theme that kept reappearing it was Islanders are no longer willing to be pushed around, ignored and exploited."*[2009]

July 27th, in the UK, regarding the allegations in the *Sunday Times*, a statement is issued.

> "*The French Government totally fulfilled the obligations imposed on it by its solidarity with its British ally."*

"The allegation that a team of technicians from the French company Dassault helped the Argentine navy fit Exocet missile launchers to Super Etendard aircraft during the early part of the Falklands conflict was taken most seriously by both the British and French authorities. For us the tragic loss of life and serious loss of equipment caused by Exocet missiles was a particularly distressing feature of the conflict. As far as the French Government was concerned, the allegation called into question the effectiveness of their embargo on military assistance and co-operation for Argentina during the hostilities. In these circumstances the Foreign and Commonwealth Office promptly asked the French Government for an explanation, and the French Minister of Defence immediately ordered an urgent investigation. The outcome of this investigation was announced in a joint statement by the French Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs on 27 July. The findings were that the Dassault technicians had properly carried out the French Government's specific instructions not to help the Argentines in the event of an armed conflict between Britain and Argentina. These instructions were issued before hostilities began and are standard French procedure when French technicians are working overseas during periods of tension. ... It is fair to say that the French statement does not contain a detailed point by point rebuttal of the 25 July article. But this is not unusual and the Sunday Times must know as much. What the statement does do is to say quite unequivocally that an investigation has shown the newspaper's allegations to be unfounded. We have no reason to question what was said by the two French Ministers: there is no evidence available to us to support a contrary view." [2010]

"In what would appear to be a clear breach of President Mitterrand's embargo, a French technical team - mainly working for a company 51% owned by the French government - stayed in Argentina throughout the

2008 *The New York Times* July 29, 1982
2009 *Penguin News* July 1982 pp.2&3
2010 *HC Deb 08 November 1982 vol 31 cc64-5W* . See https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1982/nov/08/falklands-campaign-french-technicians

war. In an interview carried out in 1982 by Sunday Times journalist Isabel Hilton, the team's leader, Herve Colin, admitted carrying out one particular test that proved invaluable to Argentinian forces. "The verification process involves determining if the missile launcher was functioning correctly or not. Three of the launchers failed. We located the source of the problem and that was it. The rest was simple". ... The French company he still works for, Dassault, told us that after 30 years that it was unable to confirm whether or not it had authorised the work his team carried out in Argentina at this time. But it is now clear that, thanks to tests they carried out, the Argentinians were able to fire Exocets at British forces from three previously faulty missile launchers. Francois Heisbourg, who at the time was international security adviser to the French Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu, insists that his government did not know that the technical team was there. But, he says, the fact that it evidently was is inexcusable. ... But not all in the French government were in the dark about the technical team's presence in Argentina during the conflict. Pierre Lethier, former chief of staff of the DGSE - the French equivalent of Britain's foreign intelligence agency MI6 and signal intelligence headquarters GCHQ - admits that his department did know about them. "This is what intelligence is for. You need sources. We had difficulties to penetrate the Argentinian army at that time during the Falklands conflict. So, the more helpers you have the better you are", he says. Lethier told me that the DGSE had an informer among the members of the technical team who was able to give them some information about what the Argentinian military was doing. But he is fiercely critical of the French team for the technical help it gave."It's bordering on an act of treason, or disobedience to an embargo", he says. "I mean, it's clear that if the head of state in France decrees an embargo, it's an embargo. Full stop". Britain's Defence Secretary at the time, Sir John Nott, told me that although he knew that a French technical team was in Argentina then, its work was not thought to be of any great importance. British efforts, he insists, were mainly focused on stopping the Argentinians getting hold of any more Exocets. Had he, I enquired, asked Paris to withdraw the team? That, he could not remember. Overall, he added, the French did give Britain substantial help during the conflict. But, does he, nonetheless, now feel a little let down by a nation that he had previously described as Britain's greatest ally? This was his response: "We asked Mitterrand not to give assistance to the Argentinians. If you're asking me: 'Are the French duplicitous people?' the answer is: 'Of course they are, and they always have been'." ..." [2011]

July 28th, in Stanley, for the first time since the occupation, the Falklands Legislative Council meet in formal session. Among the motions presented for consideration are proposals for increasing immigration to the Islands, and amendments to the colony's constitution.

"The semi-democratic government of the Falklands was suspended a few hours before the Argentine forces took over Port Stanley. Governor Hunt (as he then was) invoked the Emergency Powers Act of 1939 giving him absolute power in the Islands. This state of emergency must be legally renewed monthly. As it was not, the Falklands have returned to their old political system." [2012]

"There were a few surprises in store. The new commander of the Falklands garrison, Major General Thorne, took his seat at the right of Dick Baker at the table; a ninth member of Legco who had been appointed by direct order from London. Mr. Hunt stressed that the General has responsibilities for the defence and internal security of the Islands. The second surprise came when the CC (Civil Commissioner) informed Councillor Terry Peck that Legco is definitely <u>not</u> the government of the Falklands. Exco, with its mainly unelected membership, the CC himself and Britain govern the Falklands. ... it was surprising to hear a person in such high office admitting that the system of government is so undemocratic." [2013]

2011 *How France Helped Both Sides in the Falklands War* BBC Radio 4 March 5, 2012.

2012 *Penguin News* July 30, 1982 p.8

2013 *Penguin News* August 6, 1982 p.6. Original emphasis. The CC was Rex Hunt. LegCo = Legislative Council. ExCo = Executive Council

July 29th, in Washington DC, Britain's Foreign Secretary Francis Pym meets with US Secretary George P. Shultz before speaking to Vice-President Bush.

"Pym said that as a result of the war, the UK could not discuss the Falklands with Argentina for at least another year, and it would be even longer before the issue of sovereignty could be on the agenda. Pym also asked for the continuation of the US arms embargo. The Secretary encouraged Pym to move quickly to repair relations with Latin America, and he said that at some point the US may have to reopen its military sales pipeline to Argentina, but promised to consult closely with the UK before taking any action. ... Pym remarked that the UK no longer expected to secure a formal cessation of hostilities from the GOA, and that the UK will probably go ahead soon and lift its economic measures against Argentina." [2014]

August 1st, a story in Britain's *Sunday Times* newspaper suggests that the Islanders' attitude towards large numbers of British troops is unwelcoming.

> *"... their attitude towards the British is a mixture of continued deep mistrust, disappointment and a sullen acceptance of the military realities of the new occupying army amongst them..."* [2015]

"... the British press have done us a great disservice. For weeks now they (from the 'Times' down to the 'Sun') have been hawking the story that Islanders are ungrateful for their liberation. The 'Express' some weeks ago gave us all the shocking news that there was little elation after the surrender and that prices were raised for soldiers. The 'Sunday Times' informs us that the Islanders attitude is a "sullen acceptance of the troops". The reports are not true, and I have yet to see a paper that mentions in a major article that a considerable proportion of the troops in the Falklands are the welcome house guests of local families. ... "sullen and ungrateful" Islanders cause quite an emotional reaction. It follows that they sell newspapers." [2016]

August 3rd, at Stanley, John Brodrick, Director of the Falklands Public Works department, suggests the cost of war damage will be at least £35 million, not including any work on the airport; *"And that is a low estimate."* [2017]

August 5th, in Washington DC, the US Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs receives a written submission from Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders.

"The clash between Argentina and the United Kingdom erupted suddenly, then as quickly disappeared from the headlines. It left in its wake some haunting questions about how to prevent war in the hemisphere, about the future of inter-American cooperation, even about regional stability and progress. ... US neutrality on the question of sovereignty has been confirmed repeatedly... I reassert it again today, before this body. The United States takes no position on the merits of the competing claims to sovereignty, nor on the legal theories on which the parties rely." [2018]

In the Falklands, at Stanley airfield, nine thousand sheets of aluminium are laid; allowing RAF *Phantom* fighter aircraft to operate from the runway.

August 10th, in Washington DC, a *memo* from Alfonso Sapia-Bosch of the US National Security Council Staff, to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark), considers the relationship with Argentina.

2014 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820007–0183*
2015 *Sunday Times* August 1, 1982 quoted in Corbacho 2018
2016 Editorial in *Penguin News* August 13, 1982. p.9
2017 Quoted in Fursdon 1988
2018 *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation* US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs August 5, 1982 (evidence of Assistant Secretary Enders). Full document here - https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173018150879&view=1up&seq=3 The US position prior to 1945 was generally supportive of British sovereignty, with a succession of US Consuls appointed to the Falklands. See June 24, 1945.

"I have had a number of conversations with State and there has now been some movement to improve relations with Argentina. ... Tom Enders will meet with Argentine Foreign Minister Aguirre in Santo Domingo ... Enders will tell Aguirre the U.S. will accept a resolution at the UN calling for negotiations between the two parties so long as the language of the resolution is moderate." [2019]

August 11th, France's Foreign Ministry announces the end of its arms embargo against Argentina; *"... opening the way for the delivery of jet fighters armed with the type of missile that sank two British ships during the war over the Falkland Islands. Britain voiced its disappointment over the French move, the first by any of the member countries in the European Economic Community."* [2020]

August 13th, the UK responds to Argentina's letter to the UN GA of July 23rd, pointing out; "*... that historical evidence did not support Argentina's contention that a settled Argentine population had been forcibly displaced by the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century."*

"(Argentina's) assertion that the case of the Falkland Islands differs from the typical case of colonialism may be intended as an oblique acknowledgement of the fact that the Falkland Islanders have consistently, and democratically, expressed their clear wish to remain British. This fact, which lies at the very heart of the matter, must not be lost sight of and is of crucial importance for evaluating the situation in terms of the Charter of the United Nations. ... The claim to set aside the right of self-determination in the case of the Falkland Islands, ... is tendentious in the extreme and cannot be allowed to pass without challenge."

In the US, *The New York Times* reports on the war's aftermath in Buenos Aires.

"At least 1,000 people gathered in a downtown meeting hall to shout slogans condemning Argentina's surrender to Britain in the Falkland Islands and demand the continuation of the war to regain the archipelago. Local news agencies said that between 1,000 and 2,000 people attended the Thursday night rally.

One speaker, Gerardo Palacios Hardy, a journalist, told the crowd, "For us, the war has not ended and we do not want peace but demand victory". The rally was organized by a group called Militant Patriotism. The organization recently placed advertisements in Buenos Aires newspapers calling on the Government "to continue the war effort in the propitious moments, forms and opportunities until the enemy is completely expelled from the South Atlantic".."

On the same day, from the Falklands, *Penguin News* reports:

"... the British press have done us a great disservice.. For weeks now they (from the "Times" down to the "Sun") have been hawking the story that Islanders are ungrateful for their liberation. The "Express" some weeks ago gave us all the shocking news that there was little elation after the surrender and that prices were raised for the soldiers.

The "Sunday Times" informs us that the Islanders attitude is a "sullen acceptance of the troops". The reports are not true, and I have yet to see a paper that mentions in a major article that a considerable proportion of the troops in the Falklands are the welcome house guests of local families. ...

It follows that they sell papers."

2019 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Argentina (07/16/1982–08/15/1982)*

2020 *Paris, Breaking Ranks, Ends Argentina Arms Ban* in *The New York Times* August 11, 1982

August 16th, in the Dominican Republic, Argentina's Foreign Minister Lanari and US Assistant Secretary Enders meet. The encounter is reported by the local US Embassy to Washington.

> *"Aguirre made a pointed pitch for "positive gestures" by the USG, in light of the adverse impact on Argentine public opinion of U.S. support for Great Britain in the Falklands crisis. When Ambassador Enders referred to the broad range of issues in our relations, Aguirre insisted that the principal question was U.S. Policy on the Malvinas issue. He urged that greater accommodation on this matter be achieved in order to undercut the forces on the extreme left and right who were working against the process of democratization now going on in Argentina. ...*
>
> *When Aguirre referred to the proposed UNGA resolution on the Falkland Islands, Ambassador Enders identified the two principles of the U.S. position, namely that the resolution not prejudge the sovereignty issue and that it not impose an unrealistic time-table on negotiations. Within those limits, the United States Government would be interested in exploring whether a consensus existed.*
>
> *Aguirre described the substance of the resolution (the text of which was not available at the meeting) which he summarized as calling on the parties to renew negotiations on the Falklands dispute, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General who would report to the next session of the UNGA. Ambassador Enders, commenting that a detailed consideration of the text would be inappropriate at this point, noted that it appeared that the introductory paragraphs of the resolution contained language which might prejudge the sovereignty issue, and the operative part contained possibly prejudicial timing instructions."* [2021]

August 17th, in London, a representative of the US Embassy speaks to Julian Bullard of the Foreign Office regarding the prospect of a new UN General Assembly resolution calling for negotiations. Bullard is clear on Britain's view; *"They are just not going to happen."* [2022]

"Streator provided a summary of the meeting, noting that Bullard had stated "that the British intend to stonewall in New York". Bullard said that, at the political level in the U.K. Government, "there was no question of resuming negotiations with the Argentines for the foreseeable future. Thatcher is unalterably opposed, and there is no support within the Tory party, or indeed in the Opposition, for fresh talks". Streator responded: "Though I was without instructions, I believed that the British might be taking an unnecessarily stiff position, in view of the fact that there is such widespread international support for new talks". Bullard agreed that even the Europeans would be clamoring for talks..." [2023]

August 18th, US Assistant Secretary Enders sends a message to the UK's Foreign Office.

> *"I believe we understand one another's views on handling the Falklands UN resolution. We recognize you are not prepared now to enter into negotiations with Argentina. You should not be pressed to do so. For our part, we would not support a resolution which prejudged the question of sovereignty, nor one which attempted to impose an unrealistic timetable for future negotiations. Our public position remains unchanged ..."* [2024]

2021 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820426–0735*

2022 Quoted in *Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (08/01/1982–10/03/1982)* citing *Telegram 18181 of August 17, 1982*

2023 *Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (08/01/1982–10/03/1982)*

2024 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820430–0045*

August 19th, in New York, two members of the Falkland Islands' Legislative Council, John Cheek and Anthony Blake, arrive at the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization meeting to represent the Falkland Islands' people. Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. Abdulla of Trinidad and Tobago, welcomes them. [2025]

> *"I wish to welcome among us this Morning Mr. John E. Cheek and Mr. Anthony T. Blake, Councillors of the Legislative Council of the Territory. I invite Mr. Cheek to address the Committee."*

"Messrs Blake and Cheek were chosen by joint councils after the British Foreign Office suggested it would be a good idea if the various bodies of the UN could hear first hand about the desires and needs of the Falklanders."[2026]

Committee members, Venezuela, Cuba and Czechoslovakia immediately object, claiming that, as petitioners, the Islanders had first to be approved by the Sub-Committee on Petitions. Australia remind the Committee of UN resolution *1466 (XIV)* of 1959 which promoted the participation of representatives of the Territories in the work of the Committee. After listening to representations, Chairman Abdulah announces his decision. [2027]

> *"I am not going to ask members of the Secretariat to read General Assembly resolution 1466 (XIV), although I shall refer to it. I would point out that these two gentlemen are* ***not*** *here as petitioners; they are here as* ***representatives of the people of the Territory*** *which we are about to consider. Therefore, the question of referring any requests to the Sub-Committee on Petitions, Information and Assistance does not arise.*
>
> *That is the practice, has been the practice, and, I hope, will continue to be the practice in this Committee."* [2028]

Reservations from Cuba, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and the USSR are merely noted for the record, before the Chairman dispenses with any further objections.

Researcher's Comment: **Not** petitioners. With this 1982 decision the Chair of the Special Committee on Decolonization recognised the representatives of the **people** of the Falkland Islands. Despite Argentine denials, to be listed as a territory for the purposes of decolonization, there has to be a 'people'. [2029]

Islander, John Cheek addresses the Decolonization Committee.

> *"In April of this year we were invaded: out of the blue, by a heavily armed military force of some 10,000 men. We were told we were colonial remnants, that we had no right to determine our own future and that we must come to terms with the idea that all decisions about our living would be taken by Argentine military commanders. These ideas seemed to us then and seem to us now preposterous and offensive. The only colonialism of which we are aware is that which the Argentines sought to impose on us ..."* [2030]

Anthony Blake also speaks.

> *"The Argentines often told us they had come to protect our interests and rights,. but how do we relate that to the behaviour we saw in the time that they occupied the Falklands? Our democratically elected*

2025 *UN Document A/AC.109/PV.1223 p.18.* See https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/n8260960.pdf
2026 *Penguin News* August 1982 p.2
2027 *UN Document A/AC.109/PV.1223 pp.18-24.* For UN resolution 1466 (XIV) of 1959 see - https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/1466(XIV)
2028 My emphasis.
2029 See UN Resolution 567 (VI) of 1952.
2030 *A/AC.109/PV.1223 p.27*

representatives were totally ignored. Our right to free speech was subject to restrictions which if broken would have resulted in long-term prison sentences. ... Imposed upon us were restrictions of movement and communication which prevented us from going about our daily work... we now hear that the Argentines want to negotiate again, but only on the basis that they should have sovereignty over us. We know that whatever we think, whatever we say, they regard as irrelevant and that we are to them an unfortunate complication in their expansionist policies. Can anyone blame our people for asking us to come here and ask this Committee to uphold our right of self-determination, the right to choose..." [2031]

Councillor Cheek speaks again;

"We have sat down with these people, the Argentines, and talked before. I was here myself in February at negotiations with the Argentines as part of the British delegation. We talked in good faith with the Argentines, putting before them our wish to determine our own future and at the same time trying to understand what they had to say. The atmosphere was reasonable enough. The head of their delegation agreed to the joint communique saying the talks had been "cordial and constructive". And then within a month we faced an armed invasion. ... We hope' this Committee will put all its weight behind our desire to make our own decisions about the future. ... We in the Islands believe passionately in the United Nations ideal of the right to self-determination. We look to you all to support us in this belief." [2032]

The United Kingdom's Representative, Sir John Thompson, then addresses the Committee. [2033]

"My Governments co-operation with the Committee of 24 rests, as members well know, on our shared recognition of the principle of self-determination. In the process of decolonization which successive British Governments have pursued throughout the lifetime of the United Nations, we have held fast to that principle. ... My Government has on many occasions this year reiterated its conviction that the principle of self-determination cannot here be held "irrelevant" or "inapplicable". The Falkland Islanders are a people. ... there has never been any doubt on the part of the British Government about our sovereignty. I should like also to re-emphasize that Argentina has at no time exercised effective control over the Islands. ...

We must conclude that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory are far less important to the Government of Argentina than its own nationalist ambitions based not on valid claims but on old mythology. What sort of a world would this be if every nation with an historical grudge were to seek to reverse, by force of arms, events which have taken place 150 years before? Surely no international border would be sacrosanct. My Government does not rewrite history. We base ourselves on firm principle. ... It is inconceivable that we should now return to the negotiating table with Argentina,.." [2034]

In the UK, on the same day, a South Atlantic Fund is established and registered with the Charity Commission. [2035]

"The fund was established to disburse money through existing charities. Subsequently it was registered as a charitable trust and the trust deed reflects the policy of using the existing experience and machinery of Service

2031 *UN Document A/AC.109/PV.1223 pp.27-28*
2032 *UN Document A/AC.109/PV.1223 p.29*
2033 A noteworthy event as the UK had departed from the Committee in 1972. This may have been the only time between 1972 and today (2025) when a UK representative has addressed the Special Committee on Decolonization (C24).
2034 *UN Document A/AC.109/PV.1223 pp.31-36*
2035 Australia promptly donated AUS$ 250,000

charities to achieve the fund's principal aim of meeting needs. ... The trustees quickly transferred £1·5 million to Service charities so that they had funds available to relieve immediately any hardship that came to their notice. They have applied this money to assist people in many ways, such as moving house, meeting educational expenses, expenses of visiting the injured in hospital, and the provision of suitably modified cars. Additionally some 200 charities were contacted and invited to give immediate assistance whenever required and subsequently to seek reimbursement. The trustees anticipated that assessing the long term needs of the bereaved and injured comprehensively and compassionately could take some time as the Services would not wish to press individuals to come to terms with their situation and to decide how they wished to live their future lives. Interim grants totalling £1·9 million were therefore made through appropriate charities to the bereaved to meet their immediate needs pending completion of the longer term assessments, which are being conducted comprehensively, compassionately and as expeditiously as possible. The trustees are very conscious of the wish for speed and confidentiality in reaching settlements. Specialist charities such as BLESMA and St. Dunstans are being consulted. The trustees have also informed me that compassionate medical assessments have been conducted of those most seriously injured and interim grants totalling some £400,000 have been made to help them over the rehabilitation period, again through other charities. The trustees continue to fund interim awards on a personal and confidential basis and stress that they have so far funded only a small fraction of what will be disbursed over the next four months." [2036]

August 20th, in New York, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization concludes its consideration of the Falkland Islands Non-Self Governing Territory. [2037]

At Chatham docks, in the UK, on the same day, HMS *Endurance* finally returns from the South Atlantic.

"Captain Nick Barker was above all a man of courage ... He fought not one but three wars: against the Argentines; against what he called complacency, incompetence and misjudgement in high places in Britain; and against the planned scrapping of his own ship. ... Barker jeopardised his own outstanding career by challenging senior admirals, officials, ministers and even Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, herself." [2038]

"When Endurance finally docked at Chatham on 20 August 1982, (Capt. Nicholas Barker) was met at the gangplank by two MOD officials who told him: "Your future in the Navy depends more upon Friday's press conference than anything you have ever done". A very angry Barker was suitably discreet. In September, Mrs Thatcher invited Commanding Officers from the Falklands Campaign to dinner at No 10, but despite his prominent role Barker was not on the list. In October he received a CBE. Anything less would have caused comment. In his autobiography, Barker bitterly described the invasion as "the culmination of years of political bungling, diplomatic misunderstanding and disastrous intelligent assessment"." [2039]

August 23rd, in the Falklands, *Penguin News* reports:

> *"With barracks still a long way off, most troops are living with families in the camp and Stanley, in social halls and clubs, or on some of the sixteen large ships at present in Stanley Harbour and Port William. ... The frenetic activity of the military continues, but one detects a slowing down. Not quite as many helicopters buzz continually between ships and shore, and the harbour is not quite as full of cargo-laden barges as it was a few weeks ago. Life is gradually getting back to normal, ..."* [2040]

2036 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to the House of Commons November 30, 1982.
2037 See November, 1982, below.
2038 *Obituary: Captain Nick Barker* Harold Briley in *The Independent* April 8, 1997.
2039 Elgood 2025. Prior to Argentina's invasion, Capt. Nicholas John Barker had sent repeated warnings to the MOD about Argentina's intentions. He had been ignored at the time because MOD officials believed that he was attempting to prevent *Endurance* being taken out of service as part of Minister John Nott's cost-cutting.
2040 *Penguin News* August 23, 1982 p.9

August 25th, the Falklands air service acquires a helicopter.

"Thanks to the efforts of Government Air Service mechanic Vernon Steen, and helpful technicians aboard HMS Invincible, an abandoned and partially derelict ex-Argentine Bell Huey helicopter has been made serviceable."[2041]

August 27th, in London, the House of Lords debates Defence Estimates. [2042]

> *"A further sign of some progress up the learning curve is the decision to retain HMS "Endurance" in the South Atlantic. Her intended withdrawal was not only mistaken but may well be shown later to have been a trigger to the Argentine aggression."* [2043]
>
> *"I have also protested more than once in this Chamber about the declared intention to scrap "Endurance". Now, I am glad to note that she has been reprieved. That little ship, in my view, had an importance in the South Atlantic totally disproportionate to her size or to her maintenance costs. I am sure it will be found when history is written about that campaign, that the knowledge that the "Endurance" was leaving, led to the final conviction of the Argentines that Britain's role was to leave the Falklands and not actively to oppose any takeover of them. When I say "leave the Falklands" I mean leave them in the state in which they were."* [2044]
>
> *"..., I am quite certain that he (the Secretary of State for Defence) made his own contribution to the Falklands war actually breaking out,* ***because of his policy on HMS "Endurance"*** *and what he had to say about the surface fleet about a year ago. That may not have been a major contribution, but I am sure it contributed, that it was totally insensitive to make that kind of remark and, in effect, encouraged the Argentinians to feel that we really had lost interest in that part of the world."* [2045]

August 28th, in the South Atlantic, in a display of sea power, aircraft carriers *Invincible* and *Illustrious* meet.



"Mindful that the Argentine threat was still present, this great meeting of ships was brief, and air and submarine attack watches were not relaxed. The two carriers cruised at speed alongside each other, and crews of both ships paraded on deck in a mutual salute. At one stage a destroyer sped towards and between the two

2041 *Ibid*. August 30, 1982 p.1

2042 See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/1982-08-27/debates/09507dad-eb23-42ed-aff5-e3f55eb9a87c/TheDefenceEstimates1982

2043 Lord Hill-Norton (formerly Admiral of the Fleet, Peter John Hill-Norton), speaking during the debate.

2044 Lord Murton of Lindisfarne.

2045 Lord Mottistone. There has been a long held belief in the UK that the threatened withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* was seen by Buenos Aires as an indication of a defeatist attitude within the British Government. Suggesting that the Falkland Islands would be abandoned, should Argentina attack. This prevails today, despite there being no evidence from Argentine sources to indicate that the withdrawal of *Endurance* was considered a pertinent factor. The proposed withdrawal was widely publicised in Argentine newspapers, but in the years that followed, no junta member ever suggested that it weighed upon their decision making. *Endurance* was comparitively lightly armed and would have offered no great deterrent to the Argentine navy which was South America's largest at that time with an aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates, corvettes and three submarines. *Endurance*'s two 20-mm cannon were hardly a threat.

carriers, while other ships manoeuvred at speed on each side of the group. It was an exercise which could only take place on the high seas, and partly for this reason, partly for security, it was carried out over one hundred miles east of the Falklands. … The Illustrious arrived on station off the Falklands just two weeks after being commissioned. She is outwardly identical to her sister ship, but unlike the Invincible is equipped with an airborne early warning system and American Vulcan Phalanx rapid fire 20mm cannons, which are thought to be an effective defence against Exocet missiles." [2046]

In **September –** the UK Government eases financial sanctions against Argentina, while Lord Shackleton publishes his updated report. This notes the changes that have occurred between 1976 and 1982, and recommends a transfer of land ownership to the inhabitants. He also notes the advantages of a 200-mile limit around the Islands and suggests that greater economic emphasis be placed on offshore fishing.

"Lord Shackleton revived his report – which was now accepted as wise and practical, whereas it had been shelved only five years before." [2047]

"Shackleton's 1982 Economic Study noted that "International maritime law has developed in conjunction with the negotiations in the UN Law of the Sea Conference; for example, 200-mile limits have been widely adopted". Shackleton wrote "we recommend the establishment of a 200-mile fisheries limit around the Islands" and discussed the advantages of this." [2048]

September 3rd, Foreign Secretary Pym writes to Secretary Shultz in Washington.

> *"I have been thinking about the handling of the debate at the United Nations which will result from the Mexican initiative … As you know, we are more than willing to live at peace with Argentina and to normalize our economic and commercial links as soon as this is possible. But I do not suppose that you will be surprised to hear that we shall oppose any call on us to enter into negotiations about the future of the Falkland Islands with Argentina. As you know, we had embarked upon a new attempt to reach a negotiated settlement when Argentina chose to break off the negotiations and attack us. The physical and psychological effects of that attack will be with the Islands for a long time to come, as will the constant risks from the mines so indiscriminately scattered by the occupying Argentine forces.*
>
> *The personal and economic cost to this country has also been great and neither parliamentary nor public opinion would understand if we were to contemplate resuming negotiations in the circumstances that now exist. After a reasonable period of reconstruction we shall want to take soundings of Islander opinion about the future. I would be surprised if, after what has happened, they opted for any closer association with Argentina. Britain will certainly not be prepared to push them in this direction.*
>
> *Given our responsibilities towards the people of the territory under the UN Charter, and against the background of Argentine insistence that negotiations must lead to a transfer of sovereignty despite the Islanders' clear opposition, it would be irresponsible for us to allow others to think that negotiations between the UK and Argentina offer a realistic way ahead for the foreseeable future. I believe that our position will be widely understood in the many countries which have shown sympathy and understanding for us in the events of recent months. The draft resolution which Argentina and Mexico have been working on is wholly unacceptable. … I should like to feel sure that the United States will not consider giving its support to any such text."* [2049]

2046 *Penguin News* September 6, 1982
2047 Gurr 2011
2048 Elgood 2025
2049 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.787

September 13th, in Washington DC, in a *memo*, US Secretary of State Shultz notes.

> *"At the UN, we support inscribing the Falklands issue on the agenda but will only support a resolution on negotiations that does not prejudge Falklands sovereignty or impose an unrealistic timetable on the British. This is now a central political theme for Latin America. We have positioned ourselves to gain support in the hemisphere while attempting to make sure we are in very close touch with the British about their own interests.*
>
> *Francis Pym has asked that we not support any resolution on negotiations. The European Community countries are expected to turn down a similar request. Led by the French, Germans and Italians, the EC may offer to vote for a simple call for negotiations. This is our traditional position as well. We would find it impossible, from a political and international legal standpoint, to fail to support a resolution calling for peaceful settlement. The British will continue to press us. Their diplomats seem to understand the political necessity of our position in Latin America but Mrs. Thatcher may feel much stronger on this issue than her diplomats. ...*
>
> *We plan very soon to remove the embargo on our small pipeline of spare parts and reinstate munitions control sales, hopefully in step with action by key European states. The French have resumed deliveries of Mirage aircraft and Exocet missiles. The Germans have told the Argentines they soon will authorize shipments of naval craft but prefer official EC action first to lift the European embargo on military sales. The British remain strongly opposed but will not be too surprised."* [2050]

September 16th, Pym complains to Shultz regarding the renewed supply of military spares to Argentina. [2051]

In the South Atlantic, Royal navy divers reach the wreck of HMS *Coventry* to retrieve sensitive material from the Captain's safe – *Operation Blackleg*. [2052]



September 17th, HMS *Invincible* returns to Portsmouth. [2053]

In London, questioned about the strength of British title to the Falkland Islands, the FCO responds.

> *"... it would be misleading to attach any particular significance to what might appear to be shifts in the factors which at any particular time carried most weight in the Government's thinking. Our case is based on all the facts and circumstances* ***both before and after 1833****. ... With a subject as complicated as the history of the Falklands ... it is inevitable that there will be differing and, in some cases, conflicting views."* [2054]

2050 *Ibid* p.796. Twenty member states of the UN requested that the Falklands appear on the Assembly's agenda (*A/37/193*)
2051 No public announcement was made until the 28th.
2052 See January, 1983
2053 Argentine conspiracy theories abound, ranging from "*suspiciously newly repainted*" to the extreme "*HMS Illustrious renamed*". Junta claims that the ship had been sunk on May 30, 1982, linger on to this day (2025).
2054 *Foreign Office Minister Cranley Onslow to Peter Beck 1982* quoted in Beck 1983. My emphasis.

September 23rd, Argentina complains to the UN regarding "*harassment*" of its fishing vessels by UK aircraft.

September 24th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) states that it is prepared to hear from individuals and petitioners regarding the Falklands' question; *"... a decision to have the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) considered in plenary meeting was amended, by a recorded vote of 41 to 33, with 24 abstentions, to provide that bodies and individuals interested in the question would be heard in the Fourth Committee."* [2055] Seventeen Latin-American countries protest the decision.

September 28th, in New York, Foreign Secretary Pym meets Secretary Shultz.

"Pym rehearsed British objections to an UNGA resolution on the Falklands in familiar but forcefully animated terms. Pym asked for help in encouraging the Argentines to agree to a formal end to hostilities and said the UK could see no point in discussing a resolution for the immediate future. Now is not the time to talk with the Argentines about the long term, he argued. The Secretary told Pym that it is difficult for the U.S. to oppose a moderate resolution that does not prejudge the sovereignty issue or set an unrealistic deadline for negotiations. ..." [2056]

September 30th, in Australia, Falkland Islanders compete in the Commonwealth Games for the first time.

> "*A rifle-shooting team from the Falklands Islands has gone to Brisbane, Australia, for the Commonwealth Games, a multisport, Olympic-type competition among British Commonwealth countries that starts Thursday. But the two men who constitute the team say that they haven't had enough practice - because of the Falkland Islands war. Tony Petterson says his team is probably the worst-prepared squad ever to enter the Games. "The Argentine soldiers," said his teammate, Gerard Cheek, "confiscated our rifles, burned our targets and mined our shooting ranges'."* [2057]

October 2nd, in Washington DC, Argentina's Foreign Minister Aguirre Lanari meets with Secretary Shultz.

> *"Aguirre said that Argentina, as a government and a nation, was deeply preoccupied by the Malvinas war and its far reaching implications. The focus was now on the UN. It was more necessary than ever to ask the UN Secretary General to help the parties sit down together to negotiate the future status of the Malvinas. ... (The) U.S. posture on this issue was of particular importance, to Argentina and to many other countries. Argentina recognized that the U.S. did not want to prejudge the substantive question of ultimate sovereignty but he hoped the U.S. would be able to support the Malvinas/Falklands resolution which had emerged from consultation with many countries.*
>
> *Aguirre then gave the Secretary a revised text of the Argentine draft resolution ... he said, he believed the United States should be able to support the resolution, even with our concern that it not prejudge the question of sovereignty. ... Aguirre asked whether the Secretary had any reaction to the revised text.*
>
> *The Secretary said he preferred to review the language carefully prior to making specific comments. The Secretary then commented that he had learned that often in such resolutions preambular sections*

2055 *UN Yearbook 1982.* The Fourth Committee is comprised of all the members of the UN. Each of the 193 members is entitled to one seat on the committee (not obligatory). A plenary session of the General Assembly has all 193 members of the UN represented. Essentially, committees such as the Fourth do the detailed work, while a plenary session of the general Assembly makes the final decision.

2056 *Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Secretary Shultz Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz – Memcons September 1982*

2057 *The New York Times* September 28, 1982

were as important as operative ones. In this case, references to NAM[2058] *declarations seemed to have the effect of prejudging the outcome of the sovereignty issue.*

Aguirre recognized that possibility but pointed out that the United States could make a formal declaration at the time of its vote, noting its non-acceptance of sections of the preamble yet nonetheless voting for the resolution because the operative paragraphs were consistent with the U.S. position. In that way, he said, the U.S. vote would not be seen as prejudging the sovereignty issue.

The Secretary responded that in his experience reservations did not count for much. In the end, what mattered was how one voted. We would be happy to review the entire resolution and to provide the GOA with our views on its contents." [2059]

October 3rd, at Stanley, Foreign Office Minister Cranley Onslow, arrives to inspect rehabilitation work. At a public meeting, he suggests that not all of Lord Shackleton's recommendations may be implemented. Controversially, Minister Onslow appears opposed to any break-up of the Falkland Islands Company.

"As an alternative to the sometimes suggested nationalization of the FI Company (who own about 40% of the Falklands farming land he seemed to favour small holdings, a scheme that would probably be acceptable to the present land owners... He clearly felt, in accordance with the Tory policy, that the companies should only part with land of their own free will. It seems as though Lord Shackleton may again become a disheartened and frustrated man. A status for the Falklands to replace the present colonial system was not suggested. He said Falklanders should look for their own identity which is "democratic and rooted in society". A unique constitution similar to that of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Mann may be the result. This, in fact, was the essence of his message to the Islanders: they should contribute actively to the solution of their own problems ..." [2060]

October 6th, in Washington DC, Assistant US Secretary of State Thomas Enders informs Argentina's Ambassador Garcia del Solar that the US has *"serious problems"* with the text of the proposed UN resolution on the Falklands. [2061]

October 7th, Panama's Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests British plans for a victory parade in London on the 12th; claiming that it would *"wound the pride not only of the Argentine people but also offends the most sensitive fibres of the feelings of five hundred million Latin Americans."* [2062]

> *"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider that acts such as that planned only lead to the deepening of the wound caused by the warlike action taken by the United Kingdom in the face of the Argentine nation's just aspirations to sovereignty. The effects of these wounds continue to be reflected in the unanimous feeling of the Latin American nations, who cannot allow past actions to become the subject of mockery and disrespect to the deep feelings of historic nationalism which have united us."*

2058 Non-Aligned Movement. This is a forum of nations which are not specifically aligned with, or against, any of the major powers. Cuba's Fidel Castro was a prominent leader of the movement up until 1979, but declined to criticise Russia's Afghanistan adventure. Currently the largest grouping of nations outside the UN.

2059 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820510–0519*

2060 *Penguin News* October 11, 1982

2061 *Telegram 283693 to Buenos Aires and USUN, October 8; Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, United Kingdom Political Files, Lot 89D489, Falklands—Telegrams 1982*

2062 Quoted in *Britain and the Falklands: International Perspectives 1982-1990* J. Bagnall 2021 citing *FCO 99/985 f94*. Protests were also received from Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela.

October 12th, in London, a Victory Parade is held.[2063]



"As many as 300,000 people lined London streets today to cheer parading veterans of the Falkland war as Britain celebrated yet again its successful military campaign in the South Atlantic. While millions more watched on television, 1,250 uniformed representatives of the 28,000-member task force marched through the historic financial district with military bands playing and waves of warplanes whining overhead. ... Undeterred by drizzly weather, the large crowds waved small Union Jacks, cheered and sang "Rule, Britannia!" as the military men swept by, accompanied by tanks and other equipment." [2064]

October 18th, Argentina's government writes to the UN's Secretary-General asking that a document be circulated amongst UN members - '*Question of the Malvinas Islands and the United Nations General Assembly*'. It lays out Argentina's perception of the history of the question at the United Nations after 1960.

> *"... the General Assembly expressly recognized that there was a dispute concerning sovereignty over the territory and that there were only two parties to the dispute: the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom. The Assembly established further that finding a solution to the dispute was the only way to bring to an end the colonial- situation in the Malvinas and ruled out the applicability of the right of self-determination to this particular special case."* [2065]

In the Falklands, one *Phantom* fighter and two *Harriers* are alerted by early warning radar of the approach of an Argentine aircraft, towards the 150 mile defence perimeter; *The Argentine aircraft altered course back to Argentina before it entered the zone, and so the three RAF planes did not come into contact with it. It seems likely that the Argentine Air Force were probing defences..."* [2066]

In London, at the House of Commons, Peter Blaker MP, representing the Government, answers a question regarding disabling wounds sustained by British troops during the Falklands War.

> *"The great majority of those injured in the Falkland Islands have now returned to normal duties. Only 38 are still receiving hospital treatment. A further small number are currently on sick leave and most of these will return to their units in due course. It is too early to say how many people will be permanently disabled. No one has yet been discharged from employment in the Armed Forces or the Merchant Navy as a result of wounds received, and no one has*

Loss of arm	4
Loss of leg	16
Loss of foot	9
Loss of hand	1
Loss of toes	1
Eye injuries	13
Ear injuries	12
Burns	120
Head injuries	59
Fractures	58
Gunshot wounds	72
Other wounds (including shrapnel)	195
Trench Foot and other injuries attributable to cold	109
Shock	17
Smoke inhalation	13
Dislocations and Sprains	39
Minor and unknown	39
	777

2063 Sgt. Major Brian Summers and Private Douglas Hansen represented the Falkland Islands Defence Force.
2064 *London Hails Falkland Victory Anew S*teven Rattner in *The New York Times* October 13, 1982
2065 *UN Document A/37/553.* At no time has the UN General Assembly stated that the right of self-determination does not apply to the Falkland Islands or described the territory as a 'special case'. A phrase only ever used within the Decolonization Committee. For the full document, see https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/question-of-the-malvinas-islands-and-the-united-nations-general-assembly-october-18-1982-un-doc-a-37-553.pdf
2066 *The Penguin News* October 25, 1982

therefore become registered as disabled. These figures include both Service men and civilians. They reflect the up-to-date situation but may have to be adjusted in the light of future clinical developments in individual cases." [2067]

October 22nd, in the Falklands, Minister of Defence, John Nott, arrives to inspect the garrison.

"Argentina fanatics plotted to kidnap British defence secretary John Nott in the aftermath of the Falklands war, government papers suggest. Newly declassified archives have revealed concern in the corridors of power about a possible attempt to abduct the Cabinet minister in the months after the 1982 conflict. The three-day visit, the first Nott made to the territory since its liberation, was due to take place in October. That month, a diplomat at the British Embassy in Uruguay warned London that a trusted source in Buenos Aires with contacts in the military had told him "The Argentines might wish to mark in some way Mr Nott's visit to the islands". The source, he went on, even suggested "that an attempt to kidnap the minister and bring him to Buenos Aires may be made". The British government was taking seriously the possibility of a renewed attack against the Falklands by renegade elements of the Argentine military, and Margaret Thatcher, prime minister at the time, had ordered an urgent assessment of the islands' defences only a few weeks earlier. There was concern that an attack might be launched to coincide with a victory parade being held in London to celebrate the successful conclusion of the war. In response, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, the commander in chief of the fleet at the time, wrote to the prime minister assuring her that "our forces in the area are at the necessary state of readiness to meet any likely contingency". The diplomat in Uruguay sent a telegram to London warning: "There is a substantial group of nationalists, in particular in the navy and Air Force, who would like to have another crack at the islands". In the end, Nott's visit to the Falklands passed off without incident." [2068]

October 25th, Prime Minister Thatcher writes to President Reagan.

> *"We are now approaching a debate on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly with the vote expected on 4 November. This is, as you will appreciate, of considerable importance to us and I wanted to let you know personally how strongly we feel about it.*
>
> *The Argentine draft 2 is wholly unacceptable to the British Government and to the British people. It suggests that the maintenance of the present status of the Islands is a threat to world peace and must be ended whatever the people of the Islands may want: it recalls three earlier Argentine-inspired resolutions which were unacceptable to us and which the United States also declined to support: it refers to pronouncements of the Non-Aligned Movement which prejudged the dispute in Argentina's favour and dismissed the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Islands: and it calls upon us to resume negotiations.*
>
> *Negotiations were of course in progress earlier this year when Argentina launched her military assault on the Islands without provocation or warning. Argentina subsequently ignored the appeals and instructions of the Security Council. Her action was widely condemned as a breach of the most important provisions of the UN Charter.*
>
> *I am sure that you will understand how offensive it is to us that Argentina now comes before the General Assembly to seek a resumption of the negotiations which she herself broke off. The hypocrisy*

2067 *Hansard vol.29 October 18, 1982*. Two of the 13 with eye injuries had been blinded, one in both eyes and one in one eye only; 17 of the 120 with burns, had burns of more than 20 per cent.

2068 *Argentine nationalists 'plotted to kidnap British defence secretary after Falklands victory* in *The Telegraph* December 28, 2024

of this approach is shown up by the determination of the authorities in Buenos Aires to keep open the option of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover it is clear that Argentina still contemplates only one possible outcome to negotiations with Britain – the transfer of the Islands to Argentina in defiance of the wishes of the people. To support her in the coming debate would be to encourage her in this unprincipled ambition and thus to set back the cause of peace.

There can be no resolution of this issue until there is a fundamental change of heart on the part of Argentina. You will understand our insistence that the principles of the United Nations Charter, including those of self-determination and the non-use of force, are as applicable to this as to other international problems." [2069]

October 27th, reported in *The New York Times:*

"Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the House of Commons today that the Falkland war against Argentina cost Britain about $1.19 billion. Answering a Commons question, Mrs. Thatcher said, "the cost to the defense budget up to the end of September was an estimated 700 million", or $1.19 billion. She said that $17 million had been allocated for rehabilitation work in the islands in the South Atlantic." [2070]

October 28th, in New York, the sponsors of the proposed Falklands UN resolution meet with US Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

"They explained and emphasized their conviction that the U.S. vote would have a large effect in healing or exacerbating U.S. relations with Latin America. Amb. Kirkpatrick assured them she understood their views but noted that the U.S. position was not yet decided; and said she had found the British to be strongly opposed to any resolution that proposes negotiations. The Ambassador stated that, while she would be very happy to raise the Latin concerns with the British, she was not optimistic that we would have any influence." [2071]

"... representatives of the Governments of Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Brazil met with Kirkpatrick, on behalf of the UN resolution's 20 Latin American sponsors, to request (A) a U.S. vote in favor of the Falklands resolution, (B) U.S. good offices to persuade the British to forego amendments and keep the parliamentary situation in the UNGA Plenary as simple as possible." [2072]

In London, on the same day, three members of the UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC) – John Barlow, Bill Christie and Robert Elgood – address the Franks Committee at the Old Admiralty building in Whitehall.

"The Franks Committee did not have copies of the Argentine newspapers where the invasion was openly discussed three months before the war so I loaned them mine. My impression was that the main interest of the Committee was whether we intended to publish our evidence. We had discussed this beforehand and agreed that it would be published in the future, but that Thatcher's government was being very supportive of the Islanders which publication might halt. Our evidence did not reflect well on Britain and should not be published while the public were exultant over the war's success." [2073]

2069 *Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, [Falklands 11/01/1982–11/14/1982]*

2070 Freedman (*Britain and the Falklands War (Making Contemporary Britain)* 1988) estimates the cost of *Operation Corporate* to have been £1.5 billion. Replacing lost equipment then adds some £1, 278 million, which includes the replacement of four Type 22 frigates, replacement aircraft and lost equipment.

2071 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820562–0058*

2072 *Ibid.*

2073 Elgood 2025. UKFIC papers are currently stored at the Museum in Stanley, embargoed until 2040.

October 29th, Britain's responds to Argentina's letter of the 18th. [2074]

> *"The annex to the letter … claims in three places that the General Assembly has "ruled out the applicability of the right of self-determination to this particular special case". The decisions in question are the Committee of 24's conclusions and recommendations of 13 November 1964 and the General Assembly's resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973.*
>
> *However, it will be seen from the texts themselves (reproduced in annex II to the Argentine document) that none of them contains anything to support the Argentine allegation. In fact, all three decisions draw their inspiration from resolution 1514 (XV), which declares in its operative paragraph 2 that: "All peoples have the right to self-determination". …"*

In the Falklands, on the same day a cross-party group of British MPs, arrive.

"At the Press conference the ten men were unanimous in the opinion that the British commitment to the Islands would not be allowed to decline, and sovereignty of the Islands would never be bargained away." [2075]

October 30th, in New York, further amendments to the proposed UN resolution are handed to the US Mission. America's Department of State indicates its approval and authorises Kirkpatrick to tell the resolution's sponsors that the USA will support it.

October 31st, the *Buenos Aires Herald* reports that Nobel Peace Prize winner (1980) Perez Esquivel hopes to visit the Falklands to search for survivors of the ARA *General Belgrano* that he believes are detained there. [2076]

November 1st, Washington instructs its Embassy in London to deliver an unsigned message from President Reagan to the British Prime Minister.

> *"Dear Margaret: I have given careful consideration to the issues raised by your letter of October 25. I understand the importance to you of the United Nations resolution on the Falklands, and appreciate your concerns. When we were first approached by the Argentine representatives on their proposed resolution, we made very clear our objection to much of its content. They were the same objections which your letter identifies. We emphasized that the United States could not accept any resolution which prejudged the questions of sovereignty or the outcome of any negotiation. We further stressed that we could not support any resolution with unrealistic deadlines on negotiations or other processes of peaceful settlement. Argentina, however, now proposes to delete references to the Non-Aligned Movement's communiques which specifically prejudge the question of sovereignty, to reaffirm expressly principles of the UN Charter concerning non-use of force in international relations, and to make other changes which make the resolution more moderate. While the revised version suggests negotiations at an earlier rather than later date, we do not consider this to be a strict deadline.*
>
> *We conclude that the resolution in its revised form does not legally prejudice the position of either party in the dispute.*
>
> *The United Kingdom is justifiably concerned that there was no reference to the recent hostilities or to self-determination in the resolution. The most recent revisions to the draft expressly refer to the cessation of hostilities and the intention of the parties not to renew them, coupled with reaffirmation of*

2074 *UN Document A/37/582*
2075 *Penguin News* November 8, 1982
2076 ARA *Belgrano* had been sunk on May 2, 1982, south of the Falkland Islands. All survivors had been rescued by Argentine ships. The British played no part in the rescue, and consequently, held no prisoners.

the principles of non- use of force and peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States assumes that any negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina would necessarily take into account the views of the Falkland Islanders. The reference to Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly underscores the principle of self-determination, and the revised draft now expressly refers to the necessity of taking the interests of the Islanders into account. Our support for your position during the hostilities was based on our strong belief that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

We continue to hold that belief and support your position that any solution to the problem must be accomplished in the context of all relevant elements of the UN Charter. We do not believe, however, that the resolution, as currently written, prejudices that position and consider that it is moderately positive in reaffirming the fundamental obligations of the Charter concerning the non-use of force. For these reasons we believe it reasonable now to vote for the substantially modified resolution.

We understand your reluctance to enter into negotiations when loss of life remains fresh in everyone's mind. We can appreciate your desire for a cooling off period and more concrete evidence from Argentina that it will not resort again to further use of force. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that the options of negotiations or other means of peaceful settlement not be foreclosed, particularly in light of the fact that the Government of Argentina now suggesting negotiations is a different one from the one which launched the aggression. Margaret, I know how you have anguished over this conflict from the beginning. Your courage and leadership throughout have been a source of deep personal inspiration to me. I count it as a privilege to have been able to support you and Britain at this critical moment. You may be absolutely confident that I would do it all again the same way." [2077]

November 2nd, Thatcher responds to the US President.

"I received your message about the Falklands just as I was going into a meeting of my Cabinet this morning. I discussed it with my colleagues and I must tell you at once that we are utterly dismayed by its contents. If the United States votes for a resolution on the lines of the Argentine draft, you will encourage the Argentines in their ambition to secure the transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands to themselves, against the wishes of the inhabitants.

Their sole purpose in putting forward this draft is to further that ambition. The resolution misrepresents the situation completely. It mocks the concept of self-determination by saying that the "interests" of the Falkland Islanders will be "taken duly into account". It retains references to previous resolutions which prejudge the issue. It calls for early negotiations but you and all our friends know why negotiations are not bellicose statements by representatives of the Argentine regime.

You rightly refer to the staunch support which you gave us during the conflict in the South Atlantic. I remain deeply grateful. May I say that we have also supported you at the UN and elsewhere in matters of prime concern to the United States. The vote on this Argentine resolution is a matter of prime concern to Britain.

That is why I must make an urgent and personal appeal to you to think again. A vote by the United States for the resolution would be received here with incomprehension. Worse, it would be seen as an affront to the government and the people of Britain and to me personally. I cannot believe that you

2077 *Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (10/04/1982 – 11/01/1982)*. In many ways, Reagan was a brave man – sending that to Thatcher.

would consider delivering such a blow to the right of self-determination which means so much to the democracies of the free world. I had greatly hoped that you would vote against this hypocritical text. But if you cannot, I must ask you, with all we have done together in mind, at least to abstain." [2078]

President Reagan sends a further message to Thatcher.

"I have just received your message and would like to respond immediately, given the importance of the issue to both of us. I fully understand that negotiations are not acceptable to you, having just paid so much in blood and treasure to repulse the Argentine invasion. We have no intention to press you – or to see you be pressed – into negotiations before you are ready. Equally, we have no intention to take a position on the substance of the matter that is in any way prejudicial to your position on the questions of sovereignty and self-determination. Indeed Resolution 1514 contains stronger references to self-determination than it does to the principle the Argentines proclaim, "territorial integrity."

Margaret, my country has always supported you and always will in defeating any effort to solve the Falklands dispute by force. You know that we have always been neutral on the question of sovereignty. And we have always favored peaceful solution of the issue by negotiation. I am well aware that it was the Argentines that interrupted negotiations by attacking the Islands. But I do not think that in itself is reason not to support a solution by negotiations sometime in the future. It is hard for the United States to have any other position. Reading your message, I believe more weight ought to be given to the text of the resolution as it now stands. The Brazilian amendments have made it much less objectionable. It was on the basis of this new text that my colleagues informed Argentina and other sponsors that we would support it. In particular, the references to de facto cessation of hostilities and the intention of the partners not to renew them takes us a good ways towards the formal renunciation of hostilities we both have been working for, although I would agree with you that they are not equivalent.

At the time of the vote, our representative will put clearly on record our views that force must not be used again to solve the dispute, that the underlying question of sovereignty is not and cannot be prejudiced by the resolution, and that the aspirations of the Islanders must be taken into account. I am truly sorry that we disagree on this matter and for my part will do everything in my power to make sure this resolution is not abused. You may be confident that the United States will continue to abide by the jointly shared principles which guided both our countries through the Falklands crisis to its successful conclusion." [2079]

At the UN, the Fourth Committee, in receipt of the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization, considers questions relative to the Falkland Islands. Panamanian Ambassador Ozores Typaldos speaks. [2080]

"... said that he wished to make a statement on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. ...

3. With reference to the Assembly's decision to permit petitioners currently resident in the Malvinas Islands to be heard by the Fourth Committee, the 20 Latin American States wished to place on record that the original population of the Islands were Argentines who had been expelled when the Islands

2078 *Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, United Kingdom: Prime Minister Thatcher Cables(1)*
2079 *Reagan Library, Dennis C. Blair Files, United Kingdom 1982 (11/02/1982). Secret; Flash. Sent in telegram WH07645 from the White House to the Cabinet Office via Cabinet Office channels.*
2080 For the full session, see https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/n8257231.pdf

had been occupied, illegally and by force, in 1833; since that year, Argentines had not been permitted to become permanent residents of the Territory.[2081]

4. In those circumstances those who currently inhabited the Malvinas Islands did not have the legitimate relationship with the Territory necessary to have the right to self-determination. The Latin American countries… considered that the current residents of the Territory, including the petitioners, did not meet the standards laid down by the United Nations to be entitled to that right.

Such was indeed basically the position of the General Assembly, which, in its three resolutions on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), had stipulated that the only way in which the Territory could be decolonized was by solving the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom and that the Governments of those two States were the only parties to that dispute." [2082]

Falklands Councillors Cheek and Blake are called before the Committee. MLA Cheek speaks first. [2083]

"All that the Islanders asked was to be able to continue to live their lives as they chose. They had always believed that they had the right to determine their own future just like any other people in the world."

MLA Blake follows.

"The effects of the Argentine invasion were still with the islanders and it would be some time before the Territory could recover from the material damage, quite apart from the emotional strain on the inhabitants. … The Argentines had always said that they respected the interests of the islanders. Everything they had done during their occupation of the Islands showed that they either had no concern for the interests of the islanders or else that they had rather a strange interpretation of island interests." [2084]

MLA Cheek concludes.

"… he appealed to the delegations of Latin America, which might feel that, as a matter of solidarity, they should support the Argentine claim – one which would make his country an Argentine colony. The Falkland Islands, however, were no more part of Argentina than were Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay or Bolivia." [2085]

Petitioners speaking for Argentina include an Islander, Alexander (Alexandro) Jacob Betts. [2086]

"He expressed the hope that his personal observations might serve to demonstrate that the case, as previously presented to the United Nations, was not supported by all the islanders. … Argentina had come to the Islands as a liberator to free the islanders from British colonialism but, in so doing, it had made an error of judgement in failing to understand that the intransigent islanders were not prepared to compromise their colonial status. …

2081 The first population were French Acadians (1764-1767). Buenos Aires was trespassing in the 1820s and had been warned twice – 1829 and 1833. All relevant chapters here - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/

2082 *UN Document A/C.4/37/SR.12 p.2.* No UN GA resolution has said any such thing.

2083 *UN Document A/C.4/37/SR.12 p.4.*

2084 *UN Document A/C.4/37/SR.12 p.5*

2085 *UN Document A/C.4/37/SR.12 p.7.* The two MLA's were then subjected to a question and answer session.

2086 Betts had fled to Argentina after the war; abandoning his pregnant wife and children. Subsequently granted an Argentine military pension, Betts was suspected of having spied for Buenos Aires prior to the 1982 invasion after forming a relationship with a member of the LADE air staff. Granted Argentine citizenship, Betts would continue to appear regularly as a petitioner for Argentina up until his death in March 2020. He never returned to the Islands. *cf.* 2014

The United Kingdom should pledge to negotiate and to make Argentina's arguments available to the islanders, including the list of guarantees that Argentina had presented in every round of negotiations. To his knowledge, that list had never been made public in the Islands, nor had the islanders been properly informed of Argentina's request, early in 1981, that they should produce their own list of guarantees. … He believed that if the United Nations was to maintain its credibility, it must urge the parties to the dispute to return to the negotiating table." [2087]

"The Argentine Government, surprised to be met in the UN several weeks ago by a small delegation of Islanders who were there to plead their case for self-determination, made a similar move last month, when four Islanders (two of whom had defected to Argentina during the latter days of the war) addressed the General Assembly supporting Argentina. Alex Betts and Reynold Reid left the Falklands aboard an Argentine hospital ship only days before the surrender, and took refuge in Argentina. Mr. Reid was not born in the Islands, and is believed to be Chilean of British descent. He had, however, lived in the Islands for many years... Mr Betts, who is an Islander, told the Assembly "now the Islanders must accept change and adapt". Two locally born women who several years ago married Argentine citizens and went to live in that country, had also been brought to the UN to add human aspect to the Argentine argument." [2088]

"... when President Cristina Kirchner released the Rattenbach Report in 2012 she remarked that little needed to remain classified, other than the names of an Argentine intelligence officer and an Islander who collaborated."[2089]

At the same time that the Fourth Committee is listening to petitioners, the UN's General Assembly is also sitting in plenary session to consider the same subject. [2090]

Argentina's Foreign Minister, Aguirre Lanari, addresses the General Assembly:

"After 17 years of fruitless bilateral negotiations undertaken pursuant to General Assembly resolutions, through which my country proved its flexibility and good will, expressly recognized by the United Nations, we must return today to request again the attention of the Assembly,.. we Argentines and our Latin American brothers feel particularly offended by the fact that there should still exist a colonial enclave in our very continent especially since the Assembly has labelled colonialism in all its manifestations as a crime against mankind and has laid down the legal obligation for all Members of the international community to cooperate in bringing it to an end. That is also why those 20 Latin American countries, founding Members of the United Nations, requested at the appropriate time the inclusion of the item on the question of the Malvinas Islands in the agenda, and today submit draft resolution A/37/L.3/Rev.l to the General Assembly.

This draft resolution is based on the premise that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace, and its purpose is that the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom should resume negotiations with a view to finding, as soon as possible, a peaceful settlement to this dispute over sovereignty. …

2087 *UN Document A/C.4/37/SR.12 pp.18-19*
2088 *Penguin News* November 8, 1982
2089 Elgood 2025.
2090 *UN Document A/37/PV.51.* Full November 2nd session document here – https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/nov-2-1982-ga-plenary-nl860473.pdf The General Assembly's consideration went on until November 4th. The documents – *A/37/PV.52, A/37/PV.53, A/37/PV.54* & *A/37/PV.55* – are available online at the UN.

What can never be accepted, unless we admit to absolute failure which would lead us to the depths of frustration, is the perpetuation of age old plundering in the name of universally supported principles through rejection of negotiations which would guarantee legitimate interests. There would be no losers in such negotiations, for the only winners would be harmony, justice and peace."

The UK's representative, Sir John Thomson, responds to say *inter alia*:

"I was most struck by the fact that in the long and detailed speech of the Foreign Minister of Argentina there was no reference to the invasion of the Falkland Islands in April; there were only references to British aggression…

And then we come to the Falkland Islanders. It was significant that the Foreign Minister of Argentina took such pains in his statement to repeat so frequently that there were only two parties to the dispute: the United Kingdom and Argentina. Is that really true? It does seem that in one of these changes at this late stage, Argentina has been prevailed upon to acknowledge the existence of the Falklanders. But is there anything in the revision about their wishes or anything about the right to self-determination? Not one word.

I repeat what I have a\ready said: for the United Kingdom, it is not acceptable that our clear obligations towards the Falkland Islanders under Article 73 of the Charter should be smudged and blurred into an offhand phrase about taking "due account" of their interests. What a far cry from a clear affirmation of the principle of self-determination enshrined in the Charter and in the practice of the United Nations. …

In short, my delegation's objection to this revised draft resolution is, above all, that it fails to acknowledge that at the heart of this dispute, which, unfortunately, exists between the United Kingdom and Argentina, there are people. Indeed, the most important parties in this dispute are the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands."

"In the draft, the General Assembly would take into account the de facto cessation of hostilities and the express intention of the parties not to renew them, reaffirm the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), request the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the Falkland Islands, and request the Secretary-General, inter alia, to continue to use his good offices to that end. … The representative of the United Kingdom objected to the draft in part because it insufficiently recognised the rights of the people of the Falklands. He said that in accepting its obligations under Article 73, which the United Kingdom had done since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 66(I) of 14 December 1946 … his Government had recognised the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories were paramount … A number of delegations supporting the argument of the representative of Argentina explained why in their view the principle of territorial integrity superseded that of self-determination in the present case … During the vote on the draft resolution, however, numerous delegations also expressed reservations about the draft on the grounds that it contained insufficient reference to the rights or interests of the population of the territory." [2091]

"The national representatives at the United Nations had an entirely false idea of the "original population"; many must have imagined there had been a long-established population of Argentinians in the islands. The

2091 *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs: Supplemen*t 6 vol.5 Arts 73-91 of the Charter 1 Jan 1979-31 Dec 1984

delegations at the UN remained unaware that in January 1833 not a single person had been in the islands for even as much as 5 years,.." [2092]

November 4th, from London, Thatcher responds to Reagan's letter of the 2nd.

> *"I delayed replying to your message of 2 November about the Falklands until my Cabinet meeting this morning. My colleagues and I have now discussed it and I want you to know our unanimous view. The British people would see your vote for this resolution as an American decision to support Argentina against Britain, to support a dictatorship against the home of democracy.*
>
> *The issue of self-determination is at the heart of Western democracy. Nothing could be more fundamental. The Falkland Islanders want to stay British. The object of these Argentine manoeuvres at the UN is simply to start a process which will deny them that choice. Negotiations? Argentina simply wants to achieve by negotiation what it failed to achieve by military aggression which cost so many young lives. ... if America votes in the way you propose, my task will be immeasurably harder.*
>
> *I know very well how difficult a change would be for you now, with all the publicity that has been given to your intentions. But the free world would understand and applaud a decision to abstain. I do urge you to look at this again urgently and personally. So much depends on it."* [2093]

At the United Nations, the US Deputy Representative addresses the General Assembly.

> *"... in calling on the parties to negotiate, let us not forget, Mr. President, that these islands are and have been for generations the home of a small, but resolute, population of island people. The United States assumes that negotiations under taken by the United Kingdom and Argentina must necessarily take into account the aspirations of the Falkland Islanders."* [2094]

With the debate concluded, the General Assembly adopts *Resolution 37/9* by 90 votes to 12 against, with 52 abstentions. [2095]

> *"Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),*
>
> *Aware that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,*
>
> *Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,*
>
> *Recalling also Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,*
>
> *Taking into account the existence of a de facto cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention of the parties not to renew them.*
>
> *Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII),*

2092 Pascoe 2020 p.322
2093 *Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982*
2094 *U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press* Release USUN–112(82).
2095 Sponsored by 20 Latin American nations.

Reaffirming also the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,

1. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands.

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take the necessary measures to that end...'' [2096]

"(a) The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by a significant majority, at the plenary meeting on·· 4 November 1982, resolution 37/9 fully confirming its previous resolutions 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976, and its four consensuses of 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971, on the question of the Malvinas Islands. Thus, the General Assembly recognized once again the existence of a dispute concerning sovereignty over the territory of the Islands and the fact that there are only two parties to that dispute, the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom. The General Assembly also reiterated that only the settlement of that dispute would put an end to the colonial situation in those territories and again rejected the application of the right of self-determination in this special individual case."[2097]

"The price of victory was high: Argentina paid more than 200 million dollars ... and in some cases it paid in kind (wheat)." [2098]

"... a draft resolution (A/37/L.3/Rev.1) was presented and voted on; it was passed by the General Assembly ..., and duly became UN Resolution 37/9, which merely "Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)". In other words, Resolution 2065 was merely repeated, as if the Falklands War had not happened." [2099]

"The central starting point of the radical government was United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/37/9 adopted on 4 November 1982. Indeed, among other points, the resolution maintains that the Malvinas War did not alter the validity or nature of the dispute over the sovereignty of the islands between Argentina and the United Kingdom and that it is still pending negotiation and settlement. In other words, the United Kingdom's military victory over Argentina gave it no rights over the Malvinas." [2100]

"It is important at this stage to note that most Arab states were members of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement). ... in November 1982, the UN General Assembly voted on a draft for another resolution. This time the draft was presented by Argentina and called for a resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful resolution to the ongoing dispute over sovereignty. The resolution, however, had no binding force, and Britain had no interest in discussing the future of the Falklands with anyone other than the Islanders. Again, the Argentinians lobbied hard for the NAM votes. Though the passing of this draft into resolution was of little de facto consequence to the British, they still lobbied hard in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent it from being

2096 Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 refer to monitoring by the Secretary-General, and the question being raised again in 1983.

2097 *UN Doc A/38/563 Letter dated 3 November 1983 (sic) from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.* Original emphasis.

2098 Yofre 2011

2099 Pascoe 2020 p.324

2100 *La Cuestión Malvinas: una hoja de ruta. Herramientas para la política exterior argentina* Agustín Romero 2020

passed. In the Gulf countries, the British focused their lobby on the principle of self-determination. The same principle of self-determination that applied to the Falklands also applied to the Palestinians. Palestinian self-determination was precisely what the Arab states had been working for, for several decades. Suddenly the Falkland Islanders and the Palestinians had common interests, demonstrating yet another surprising interconnection. This became very apparent when the overwhelming majority of NAM members voted in favour of the Argentinian resolution but all Gulf countries either abstained or voted against the Argentinian resolution." [2101]

A number of UN members place their reasoning on record.

"In explanation of vote, absence in the text of an explicit reference to the principle of self-determination or respect for the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands was cited by many, among them Antigua and Barbuda, Fiji, the Gambia and Solomon Islands, which voted against; Jamaica, Lesotho, Norway, Sweden and Zaire, which abstained; and Liberia, which voted in favour. New Zealand voted negatively, and the Netherlands abstained, saying that the Islanders were entitled to have a say in their own future. ... Belgium, abstaining, said the text should have referred not only to the interests but also to the aspirations of the Islanders. Botswana, Ghana, Israel and the United States, supporting the text, and Sweden, abstaining, said the negotiations should take into account the Islanders' rights and aspirations. Australia, abstaining, said the text referred to the rights of the inhabitants in a highly qualified way... Saint Lucia, abstaining, was not convinced that the argument against self-determination was valid in respect of the time-frame in question. ... Mexico, on the other hand, asserted that the text did not expressly affirm the background information in support of the legitimacy of Argentina's claim over the Islands. ... Luxembourg called the right to self-determination a corollary of the principle of decolonization, and Australia asserted that it was Argentina, not Britain, that was attempting to impose an alien rule." [2102]

The US representative makes a long speech giving his country's reasons for supporting the resolution. [2103]

> *"The United States would not have voted for any resolution which prejudged the question of sovereignty or the outcome of negotiations. We have never taken a position on the question of sovereignty and we do not do so now. We conclude, however, that the resolution before us does not legally prejudice the position of either Argentina or the United Kingdom and, in fact, opens the way towards negotiations in good faith and without any pre-ordained result. ... In supporting this resolution, the United States affirms that this dispute, like all others, should be settled by discussion and never by force and that the fate of peoples should never be settled without due account being taken of their views, values, interests, and rights."*

The USA also issues a separate press release.

> *"The United States assumes that negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina must necessarily take into account the aspirations of the Falkland Islanders."* [2104]

At the same time, President Reagan sends a personal message to Prime Minister Thatcher.

> *"Reading your message ... I realize that our understanding of these events is indeed quite different. I can assure you, Margaret, that the United States did not make a decision to support Argentina against*

2101 *Drawing a Line from the Falklands to the Persian Gulf* Johanne Marie Skov in *Epoch* June 1, 2022. Argentina was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (founded 1961) between 1973 and 1991.
2102 *UN Yearbook 1982*
2103 *UN Document A/37/PV.55 p.959*
2104 US Press Release *USUN 112 – (82) Nov 4 1982*

Britain, or to support dictatorship against democracy. Neither did we abandon the principle of self-determination. We reaffirmed our support for a negotiated settlement to a long-standing conflict. We have supported the principle of negotiation throughout this long, difficult dispute. It is the principle to which Britain herself has adhered for so many years with regard to this and other disputes. Certainly, we will never alter our view that a people must ultimately determine their own future and certainly we mean this with regard to the people on the Falklands. Finally, you and I have supported each other in the past because of our shared faith in the Anglo-American relationship and our shared commitment to the same fundamental principles and values. I feel sure neither you nor I will abandon those principles and values nor the effort to help our peoples understand their application in this complex, difficult world. I assure you we stand as firmly with you on the principles of non-use of force, of negotiation and self-determination as ever." [2105]

"My first encounter with Prime Minister Thatcher's ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Wright , was stormy. I had persuaded President Reagan that we should vote in favor of a balanced UN resolution on the Falklands. Although our consultations had let her know what was coming and our negotiations produced a resolution she could live with, Margaret Thatcher was furious. We voted with Argentina and the rest of the Western Hemisphere for a resolution that she opposed. Her ambassador, on instructions, read me off like a sergeant would a recruit in a Marine Corps boot camp. I felt Mrs Thatcher was wrong to oppose us for taking a reasonable position on a critical issue in our neighborhood. And Wright was wrong to lay it on so thick. I worried that President Reagan would be alarmed at Margaret Thatcher's reaction, but I found that he, too, was getting a little fed up with her imperious attitude on this matter." [2106]

November 5th, in London, speaking in Parliament, the Foreign Secretary says that; *" .. we cannot accept a call for negotiations on sovereignty after an unprovoked attempt to force the issue by invasion."*

November 11th, in the Falkland Islands, a corporal of the 69 Gurkha Engineer Squadron, Krishnakumar Rai is killed in an explosion near the Darwin Road, while disarming unexploded Argentine ordinance.

November 12th, in Plymouth, England, a Falklands War Victory Parade is held.

November 15th, in New York, the United Nations adopts resolution 37/10 approving, by consensus, the *Manila Declaration* on the peaceful settlement of disputes; the result of work by the 'Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization'. The declaration calls upon every State to settle its international disputes exclusively by peaceful means. [2107]

"2. Every State shall settle its international disputes exclusively by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. ...

Declares that nothing in the present Declaration could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other form of alien domination;..."

2105 *Reagan Library, William P. Clark Files, Falklands War (UN/Kirkpatrick/Haig) 06/06/1982–11/04/1982*
2106 *Cold War: The "Special Relationship"* (Shultz memoirs) at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation
2107 See - https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/37/10 Also - https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/37

"Although an obligation to negotiate may be highly desirable, it appears that at present there is no general obligation imposed on states, applicable in all situations of dispute or disagreement, to enter into negotiations as a matter of customary or conventional international law." [2108]

November 16th, from Port Stanley, HMS *Sir Bedivere* sails for the UK carrying 64 of Britain's dead. [2109]

November 18th, in Washington DC, US Secretary of State, George Shultz, addressing the annual assembly of the Organisation of American States, calls upon the UK and Argentina to negotiate over the Falkland Islands.

The OAS final resolution then also calls for talks.

> *"Resolves: 1. To express its support of Resolution 37/9 of November 4, 1982, of the Thirty seventh General Assembly of the United Nations, in which the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom are requested to resume negotiations aimed at seeking a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute as soon as possible, and the Secretary-General is requested to use his good offices to assist the parties in carrying out the aforementioned resolution. 2. To exhort the parties to the dispute to carry out that resolution. ..."* [2110]

The Washington Post reports:

> *"On the Falklands, the United States has decided over Britain's opposition to support Argentina's demand for negotiations. That is a conciliatory gesture apparently meant to overcome the anti-American sentiment that welled up throughout Latin America when the United States backed Britain during the war in the South Atlantic last spring."* [2111]

November 20th, France delivers *Super Éntendard* fighter aircraft and *Exocet* missiles to Argentina. [2112]

"Mrs Thatcher was reported to be furious that France had resumed its arms supply to Argentina, which has not yet formally acknowledged that the conflict is over. Although the Argentine Government has agreed that there is a de facto cessation of hostilities, there has been no guarantee that the new Exocets with their sophisticated launching aircraft will not be used against British naval ships." [2113]

November 24th, in Argentina, a secret assessment of the war is provided to Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Nicolaides by Maj. Gen Calvi.

> *"The fundamental mistake of invading the islands is attributed to faulty intelligence and reasoning. The Argentine army, the report concluded, is structured and trained to fight a neighboring South American adversary and thus, had no chance against the UK. The estimate that the UK would not fight was a very serious miscalculation. As a result, senior officers sent to the islands were chosen for their administrative and technical capabilities and knowledge of English rather than for their ability to command combat troops."* [2114]

2108 Rogoff 1994 p.153

2109 52 soldiers, 11 Royal Marines and a laundryman from Hong Kong.

2110 *OAS General Assembly, Twelfth Regular Session, Washington, D.C., November 15–21, 1982: Proceedings (Washington: OAS General Secretariat, 1982), vol. I (OEA/Ser.P/XII.0.2), p. 27*

2111 *The Washington Post* November 18, 1982

2112 *Argentina (French Arms Sales) HC Deb 22 November 1982 vol 32 cc583-6.* Between 1982 and 1984 another nine aircraft, with a missile for each, were delivered. Completing an order that predated the Falklands War.

2113 *Penguin News* November 21, 1982

2114 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P820172–0851*

A UK journal, *The Economist,* reports:

> *"Many of the FCO's core policies are treated with disrespect if not open hostility by the present prime minister and her Parliamentary supporters .. She signalled her personal lack of faith by appointing a special advisor on foreign affairs, Sir Anthony Parsons, to he private office ... she was deeply sceptical of a department which in her view was less than true to Britain's interests..."* [2115]

November 29th, in the Falklands, a nuclear powered submarine, HMS *Courageous*, arrives off San Carlos. [2116]

In London, at the House of Lords, a *British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Bill* returns for a second reading. [2117]

> "*I should like to congratulate my noble friend Lady Vickers on her continuing advocacy of the cause of the Falkland Islanders. My noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter was, I think, the first to raise the matter in this House when he tabled a Question on the matter in July. The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, then brought in a Bill on similar lines to the one we are debating today, though there was insufficient time left to consider it in what remained of the last Session. Today's debate, therefore, provides our first opportunity to debate the matter thoroughly. We do so on the basis of my noble friend's Bill, which seeks to ensure that all the Falkland Islanders become British citizens.*
>
> *As things stand, about three-quarters of all Falkland Islanders will become British citizens when the British Nationality Act 1981 comes into force on 1st January next year. That will be the case whether my noble friend's Bill becomes law or not. But the remainder, about 400 people in all, may not do so because their ties are mainly with the Falkland Islands, while their connections with the United Kingdom are more distant. Those 400 would therefore hold the important parallel citizenship which is called British Dependent Territories citizenship. ...*
>
> *My noble friend's Bill would make an exception for the Falkland Islanders. "* [2118]

December 2nd, in Argentina, a secret decree (*15/82*) appoints a Commission to investigate and assess the performance of the armed services during the war; including an assessment of potential criminal conduct with regard to duty, discipline and honour. The Commission to be chaired by General Benjamin Rattenbach.[2119]

"Lieutenant General Benjamín Rattenbach appointed as head of that commission and it was made up of Major General Tomás Armando Sánchez de Bustamante, Admiral Alberto Pedro Vago, Admiral Jorge Alberto Boffi, Brigadier General Carlos Alberto Rey and Brigadiet Major Francisco Cabrera." [2120]

"The Calvi Commission's purpose was to evaluate the conduct of the soldiers who had participated in the war. The intention was to produce a descriptive document, devoid of assessments and ratings, in which an objective analysis of the events would be made." [2121]

2115 Quoted in Elgood 2025

2116 In full view of the Press, a message was clearly being sent.

2117 See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1982/nov/29/british-nationality-falkland-islands

2118 Lord Elton. Debates regarding Baronnes Vickers's Bill would go on until March, 1983. The Bill received Royal Assent on March 28, 1983, with the Act backdated to January 1, 1983 creating an exception to the British Nationality Act 1981; coming into effect on that same date.

2119 Formally known as - *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades Políticas y Estratégico-Militares en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Political and Strategic-Military Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict).* The final report was submitted to the government on September 13, 1983. Partially leaked in 1983 and partially released in 1988. Finally declassified in 2012, even then incomplete. See 1983 & March, 2012.

2120 Yofre 2011

2121 Padilla 2025

December 8th, in London, in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym outlines Lord Shackleton's updated report.

> *"The Government agree with the broad conclusions of Lord Shackleton's report and are ready to support action by the Falkland Islands Government in the following major areas covered by his recommendations: A Falkland Islands Development Agency should be established. This would be provided with funds to buy land on the open market, and to divide it into smaller holdings. It would also have powers to make loans and grants towards the cost of a number of small-scale development projects. The Islands' agricultural research centre, the Grasslands Trials Unit should be expanded; There should be a feasibility study on an improved harbour complex, including a new deep-water jetty; The Stanley-Darwin road should be completed and the existing network of tracks should be improved; A pilot scheme for salmon-ranching and a survey of shellfish resources should be established; hotel and guest house facilities upgraded; and cottage industry skills developed.*
>
> *Although they were not specifically covered in Lord Shackleton's report, we believe that urgent action should also be taken to improve the water supply and sewerage system in Port Stanley, and to study the requirements for future electricity generation and distribution, and the telephone system in the islands. The following proposals made by Lord Shackleton in our view require further study: Exploratory offshore fishing and the establishment of a 200-mile fisheries limit: the implications of such a limit, not least its policing, and the degree of commercial interest in fishing need to be carefully assessed. Expansion of tourism: this will depend to a large extent on the establishment of commercial air links. ... Lord Shackleton proposed expenditure of between £30 million and £35 million. My tentative estimate is that the programme that I have outlined would cost about £31 million over six years. The Government also propose to make available a further £5 million for civilian rehabilitation, in addition to the £10 million announced in July. The islands' economy will inevitably be affected by the presence of a sizeable military garrison there, and by the outcome of the Government's present studies into the feasibility and cost of establishing a better airfield on the islands. ... We have restored the freedom of the Falkland Islanders and shall continue to do what is necessary to guarantee their future security."* [2122]

December 11th, in France, HMS *Hermes* visits Brest.

"In Brest, British sailors from HMS Hermes, on a goodwill visit, were involved in fighting with locals while discussing the role of the Exocet in the Falklands War." [2123]

December 14th, in London, the British Government publishes a 'White Paper' on the Falklands Campaign: The Lessons. This is immediately announced in the House of Commons.

> *"Part I of the White Paper consists of a brief description of the operation to repossess the Falkland Islands; part II analyses the principal lessons to be learnt from the campaign itself; and part III describes the steps which we are taking to make good losses of equipment, to provide for the future defence of the Falkland Islands, and finally the additional measures now proposed to increase the mobility and flexibility of our Armed Forces for future operations in the NATO area and elsewhere."* [2124]

2122 *HC Deb 08 December 1982 vol.33 cc851-60*

2123 *Portrait of the Week* in *The Spectator* December, 1982. See July, 1982

2124 Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, to the House of Commons December 14, 1982. See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1982-12-14/debates/102977e7-afff-45ff-b8a5-575281a2d599/FalklandIslands(WhitePaper)#129

At the same time, the White Paper is presented to the House of Lords. [2125]

> *"The White Paper describes a number of other new purchases of equipments, weapons and stocks—including a list of the new weapon systems such as Harpoon and laser-guided munitions purchased during the conflict, which remain as a general addition to our force levels. On the subject of war stocks, we saw again during the campaign the key importance of staying power and of the need to allow for delays in re-supply. We plan to increase substantially, by at least £10 million, the number and range of items in the stockpile specifically earmarked for the support of operations outside the NATO area."* [2126]

"A big boost for the navy came after the conflict, with the reversal of many of the cuts announced in the 1981 Defence Review. Invincible's sale to Australia was cancelled, and all three carriers of her class would be retained. The assault ships Fearless and Intrepid and the ice patrol ship Endurance would be retained and a replacement for Sir Galahad would be built. The cut to the number of escorts would be moderated, so that 55 ships would be in front-line service instead of the planned 50. Four new Type 22 frigates would be ordered to replace the four escorts lost in the conflict. All of the aircraft lost would be replaced, and a further seven more Sea Harriers and six more Sea King helicopters would be ordered. In addition, ... the defence budget would increase by 3 per cent per annum in real terms for the next three years." [2127]

December 16th, in London, US Secretary George Shultz visits Downing Street for a meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

"Mrs. Thatcher ... made it clear that the Falklands are still a serious issue in British politics. She said that the UK was not prepared to enter into negotiations with Argentina at this time, nor to discuss the question of sovereignty. She argued that the Islands were too small to become independent, that the inhabitants are British, and that UK control offered strategic advantages for NATO. (Shultz) restated our position – the Falklands issue should be settled by negotiation rather than by force of arms." [2128]

"On Thursday afternoon, December 16, 1982 ... I landed in London, the last stop on my European swing. When I arrived at Number 10 Downing Street the next day for my first meeting as secretary of state with Margaret Thatcher, I was apprehensive that I would run into an argument about the Falklands. Again, she met me at the door. We sat and talked in a living room where a fire burned brightly. The Falklands were on her mind, and she spoke of their strategic significance. What if the Panama Canal were to be closed, requiring shipping to go "around the Horn", as in clipper-ship days? The location of the Falklands in the shipping lanes of the South Atlantic would then be vital. I thought that was far-fetched, but there was no point arguing about it. I agreed with our decision to support her, but I felt it was time to repair the damage done to our interests in South America. I stated my views firmly; she listened, but not sympathetically. ... The special relationship between America and Britain was going to be stronger than ever, I felt, because it was flanked by the Reagan-Thatcher personal relationship, which was as close as any imaginable between two major leaders." [2129]

2125 See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/1982-12-14/debates/c0a79bcd-309b-4f89-97f0-073e95b5e0ce/TheFalklandsCampaignTheLessons(Cmnd8758)
2126 Viscount Trenchard, Minister of State for Defence Procurement
2127 *Abandon Ship: the real story of the sinkings in the Falklands War* Paul Brown 2021
2128 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820010–0095*
2129 *Cold War: The "Special Relationship"* (Shultz memoirs) at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

Britain's government commission a firm of undertakers to search out and consolidate all of the Argentine war graves at a single site outside Port Stanley. Where an identity is unknown, the grave is to be marked simply - *"Soldado Argentino Solo Conocido Por Dios* (An Argentine Soldier Only Known by God)*"* [2130]

"On December 16, 1982, the Military Junta outlined the actions for the bodies of those who fell in the Malvinas Islands and ordered that, once the opinions of the relatives were known, a request would be made to the International Red Cross for the compliance with the international requirements regarding the treatment of the dead..." [2131]

"In December 1982, the British authorities entrusted Captain Geoffrey Cardozo with the difficult task of collecting, exhuming, identifying and burying the bodies of the Argentine soldiers scattered across the islands."[2132]

Argentina's Air Force Commander Hughes, a member of the governing Junta, gives, on behalf of his Corps; *"its solemn promise to recover our southern archipelago."* Major Doughlin of Argentina's Fifth Army Corps, claims that they are; *"... getting ready for another war, profiting by the situations already experienced."* [2133]

December 21st, in London, the debate commenced on December 14, regarding the White Paper – The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons – resumes in the House of Commons. [2134]

> *"In the Falklands, deterrence failed, partly because of the lack of in-place forces. ... I believe that the measures announced in the White Paper are right for the defence of the Falklands in the future. However, they also significantly improve those elements in our defences that I have described today. The lessons of the Falklands conflict are described in the White Paper at some length. I shall not repeat them here today. In the last resort, we have learnt the lesson that matters more than any other. It is that, if deterrence fails, the loss of life and expenditure of money are out of all proportion to the insurance needed to prevent that. We have learnt, too, that at the point of decision in battle men count more than machines."* [2135]

December 22nd, in the House of Commons, a Written Answer notes; *"A total of £498,200 has been paid out to the injured from the South Atlantic fund as 258 separate interim payments, including to those who were injured and have subsequently left the Service. Payments have ranged from £300 to £20,000, and currently average £1,946. The payments are calculated according to the degree of seriousness of each injury. ... As at 16 December 1982 over £2·3 million has been disbursed in direct interim payments from the South Atlantic Fund either to the next of kin of those who died or to the injured. The total assets of the fund remaining amount to about £10 million."*

On the same day, intelligence reports note an increase in activity at the Argentine airbase at Rio Gallegos.

"The JIC met this afternoon and concluded that there was no significant increase in the threat of direct action against our forces. Nevertheless t British Forces has requested an additional Phantom aircraft to replace one which is currently unserviceable due to an accident on landing, and also that the Harrier force of 6 aircraft

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2130 123 of the 237 graves were subsequently marked thus. See February, 1983, below. Also 2017
2131 Padilla 2025
2132 Cruz 2022
2133 *The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984.* para.30
2134 See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1982-12-21/debates/90afde7b-521a-4032-ab34-92b3d6b3377c/FalklandsCampaign?highlight="special forces"
2135 Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott.

should not be reduced over the next few weeks. In the circumstances we have decided it is prudent to meet these requests." [2136]

At Southern Thule, in the last act of the year, the *Corbeta Uruguay* base on Morell Island is visited by HMS *Hecate*. When it is discovered that the Union Jack has been removed and an Argentine flag raised in its place, the base is completely destroyed.

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For the full research

https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/

https://independent.academia.edu/RogerLorton

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